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Letter from the Editor

Our second spring brings around already the fourth issue of the European Perspectives, the journal, which we hope has already managed to attract attention both from readers as well as from authors. We are glad to witness that with each new number there are more paper proposals arriving on the editor's desk. A significant part of them offer fresh ideas and approaches what backs up the main goal for which the journal was established – to contribute to the contemplation endeavors about the European perspective of the Western Balkans and to offer the academic niché for authors from the region.

Without too much of enthusiasm we could be pleased with the way we managed to set up so far. However, the interaction and synergy between the journal, authors and readers would have to be maintained in order to keep the steering trend of the journal rolling on. Hence we expect continous interaction and methodologically arranged contributions from authors. At the same time we feel safe with flexible and smooth cooperation with our silent side – the peer reviewer's community. Our thanks has to be extended to them.

The current issue, following the established outlook, brings at the beginning a fresh, attractive and well polished guest view from Jamie Shea, a prominent senior diplomat, skilled writer and an academician about latest conceptualization evolution within the North Atlantic Alliance. The New NATO Strategic Concept, reflected also through the expectation of the Western Balkans, is elaborated here in an innovative and in-depth view. At the other side, our routine author exercises on messages and vibrations of Lovćen, a mountain as well as a symbol, found in the Montenegrin heights of the Balkans.

The Sarajevo 2014 section focuses with a rarely seen approach on selected linguistic aspects of the region concerned. The contribution is a kind of an experiment, showing that although it may sometimes look like everything

has been told about the Western Balkans, there are angles and points of view still to be discovered, tested and exposed to the public eye. We might say this contribution arrives not from a typical, though original and challenging area of thought. Further such contributions from other fields would be appreciated.

In the main section two papers focus on economic issues and the other two discuss the EU related aspects, while additional one is historically oriented. Including the five of them a body of already twenty articles altogether has been formed, which provide a solid background to dwell on the current and future development of the region. We hope that many scholars would find it useful to study and face this material with a critical eye.

It would be difficult, of course, to measure to what extent exactly a scientific elaboration could influence policy issues and efforts in the theatre. The same goes also for a possible link between the here presented theorizing and policy reality in the region discussed. In any case the events on the ground offer much to debate and share about. Therefore, we would wish to receive more contributions, focused on topics, which so far have not been taken into account. This would upgrade the accuracy of the journal, add to its attractiveness and stimulate further explorations. But also the policy making process and its agenda within the EU itself offer much to a critical academic attention, which we try to harbour on the pages of our journal.

Having in mind various aspects, connected to our mission, let me wish you a nice intellectual walk-through the content. We are looking forward very much both to a possible feedback and to new contributions.

The Castle of Jable, April 2011 M. J.

guest view

NATO's new Strategic Concept: moving from Theory to Practice

Jamie Shea

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NATO's new Strategic Concept: moving from Theory to Practice

Jamie Shea[1]

Many strategic concepts and security doctrines do not live up to expectations. The reasons for this are multiple. They sometimes simply describe what an organisation is doing rather than stating what it should do if it is to fulfil its core mission. Or these concepts set out grandiose ambitions that are not backed up by sufficient resources and political will to implement those ambitions. It also happens that intense political debates and bureaucratic rivalries, leading up to the approval of a new concept, inevitably impose painful compromises and ambiguities on the final product. The result is incoherence and the avoidance of necessary choices that make the new concept difficult to implement. In this way and despite much hard work, the concept fails to provide the clear sense of direction that was its initial "raison d'être". Another frequent failing is when concepts set out a clear intellectual vision and set of priorities but then say little or nothing about the organizational reforms that are essential to implement such a vision. When such a mismatch occurs, either the structures take years to catch up with the new level of ambition; or the vision itself is gradually watered down by the resistance of the old structures. All this to say that devising a new Strategic Concept is a necessary stage in the modernization of any organization given the accelerating pace of change in the world today; but it is also one of the most difficult. As Alexis de Tocqueville once noted: the most perilous moment in the life of any regime is when it tries to reform itself.

So has NATO managed to avoid these pitfalls and perils in its own recent exercise of formulating and approving a new Strategic Concept? Does form fit purpose in this document? Are the policies outlined in the Strategic

[1] Dr Jamie Shea is Deputy Assistant Secretary General, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

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Concept not only the right response to today's security challenges but also ones that NATO will be realistically able to implement? If we are to answer these questions, four key issues need to be convincingly resolved by the Atlantic Alliance.

The first concerns NATO's spectrum of security challenges. During the past 20 years, NATO has essentially defined itself through its operations. They have become not only what the Alliance does, but what it is. They have been the driving force for NATO's transformation. None of the Alliance's new post Cold War policies – from expeditionary forces, the comprehensive approach to civilian-military cooperation or the ever closer involvement of Partners, would have received so much emphasis if they had not been linked to out of area military deployments. Yet the overwhelming focus on operations has come at a price. It has diverted NATO's political attention away from other emerging challenges, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyber vulnerabilities or threats to energy supplies and critical infrastructures or vital supply lines. If these issues become increasingly important for NATO's member states, and feature prominently in their national security strategies – as has been the case of late – but NATO has no major role in addressing them, there is a danger of a disconnect between NATO-Brussels and national capitals. Less political attention and fewer resources will then be invested in the NATO organization and diplomats and bureaucrats rather than political leaders will take over the direction of NATO policy. For this reason, it was important that the new Strategic Concept broaden NATO's agenda of responsibilities. Operations can by their very nature play only a limited role in addressing these transnational security challenges. Tanks cannot stop a cyber attack, nuclear deterrence does not work against terrorists, and an operation such as ISAF in Afghanistan can weaken but not eliminate Al Qaeda as that terrorist network has already relocated to Pakistan, the Arab peninsula or the Horn of Africa.

A second issue concerns operations themselves. In the 1990s, during the interventions in the former Yugoslavia, the application of military power worked quickly and effectively. Conflicts were ended and reconstruction could begin. NATO's problem was to get to the point of being willing to use that military power rather than the use of that power itself. Afghanistan shows by contrast, that the age of "war without tears" (at least for the Allies) is over. Far larger numbers of NATO forces have been deployed in Afghanistan at much greater human and financial costs but for what the

public perceives as less of a result. Why? Is it a radically different situation or the way NATO has been using its assets? If military power is achieving less, will NATO be used less in the future? How can NATO's traditional unique asset – its transatlantic military capabilities – be reoptimised so that they can once again be useful and useable but also decisive in bringing security to conflict–torn countries? Drawing the right lessons from Afghanistan was a central concern of Madeleine Albright and her group of experts as they began their preparatory work on the Strategic Concept.

A third issue touches on connectivity. The nature of modern security challenges is that they are multifaceted, civilian as much as military, transnational and often combining a mix of destabilizing factors (such as terrorism and the drugs trade or organized crime). International responses have to be equally networked and multidimensional to be effective. Consequently organizations like NATO are only as good as their ability to leverage the contributions of others. The 1990s were probably the last time when the Alliance could achieve its security objectives with its own membership or when partners were desirable rather than essential. These days organizations that are not globally wired to attract and absorb the capacities they themselves lack are of limited value. A key element of the new Strategic Concept exercise was therefore to test the quality of NATO's connectivity. Are the Alliance's relations with other key international organizations functioning smoothly? Does NATO have the right partners? Is it getting the best out of its existing partnership arrangements? Is the NATO structure properly configured to interact successfully with others and can it effectively bridge traditional disconnects between military and civilian operators, between governments and NGOs or between Western and other cultures? It was important for the Strategic Concept not only to identify NATO's weaknesses in connecting but also to identify ways of overcoming them.

A fourth and final question mark hung over NATO's political scope as a forum for transatlantic security cooperation. A few years ago the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, shocked many NATO loyalists when he declared at the annual Munich Security Conference that NATO was no longer the forum for the transatlantic security dialogue, although he did not say whether this had gravitated to the EU or to bilateral relations between the US and its European Allies. It was not clear if the remark was meant as a simple observation or an incentive to action but for many in the Munich audience it resonated with a grain of truth. Preoccupied with

its operations, the Alliance had largely reduced its political focus to those regions- essentially the Balkans and Afghanistan - where it had troops on the ground. This also meant that NATO developed situational awareness of the local political forces and factors only after its initial military plan had been drawn up and agreed – and indeed had even started to deploy its forces.

As a result, issues such as Iran, the turbulence in North Africa and the Middle East or tensions between the two Koreas – which dominate cabinet meetings and national security councils in NATO capitals – have been under discussed at NATO HQ, or mainly in connection with an operation such as Libya. The usual explanation was that NATO had no immediate operational role to play or that a discussion in the NATO Council might convey the erroneous impression that NATO was about to take military action, thereby escalating the situation. However this lack of transatlantic political dialogue excluded the smaller Allies from the results of interaction between Washington and the big European Allies. It also made it more difficult for Europeans and North Americans to reach a common analysis. The most serious consequence, however, was that a lack of transatlantic dialogue made it hard for the Alliance to anticipate crises and act to prevent them before violence erupts. Moreover, by putting its consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, NATO gave them an exceptional character raising expectations that NATO was about to act when, in reality, these consultations will frequently be routine or the conclusions followed up mainly in another institutions, such as the UN, the EU or the IAEA in Vienna. A central function of the new Strategic Concept was therefore to stimulate more security-related political consultations among Allies and to try to use those consultations to harmonize Allied views on situations beyond Europe as NATO has successfully done for European crises for the past 60 years.

If these were the drivers of the Strategic Concept reflections, the process itself has helped to provide the answers. Nominating a group of outride experts, led by Madeleine Albright and Jeroen Van der Veer, and having that group engage with NATO governments and think tankers in a series of seminars and consultations, certainly provided for a thorough analysis of NATO's strengths and weaknesses. All who wanted to have their say were heard. The process of debate also helped Allies to express more frankly their own views and understand better those of other Allies. This undoubtedly helped the drafting of the actual Strategic Concept by NATO

Secretary General Rasmussen and his team from August 2010 up to the time of NATO's Lisbon Summit. It is a testament to the Group of Experts that most of the ideas and proposals contained in their report made public in May 2010 were retained in the final Strategic Concept. So has NATO now answered these existential questions that the Group of Expert had first to define and then to grapple with?

The first part of the Strategic Concept, which deals with defence and deterrence, certainly marks a shift in favour of the new security challenges and from the defence of borders and territory to the protection of populations. Proliferation, cyber, terrorism and energy security are given a much more prominent role, even if it is not yet clear what the resource implications of building NATO response capabilities will be, especially in areas like missile and cyber defence. There will be plenty of follow-up work for the Alliance to do. Missile defence was a key theme of the Lisbon Summit and the new Strategic Concept. But it will take NATO some time to solve the technical, operational and financial challenges in constructing a missile defence to cover all of NATO territory, not to mention solving the many questions related to Russia's association with this project. How will the various national systems be meshed together? How will the consultation and command and control arrangements work, especially under the pressures of a crisis situation? Will the system be commonly funded or will costs "lie where they fall", in other words with the contributing Allies? If NATO and Russia operate separate systems, how can they interoperate and who will be responsible for protecting which territory? This said, the high level political decision in Lisbon to go ahead with missile defence, and the fact that Russia has largely made the future of its cooperation with NATO dependent on the success or otherwise of a joint missile defence system, will no doubt provide the necessary impetus to come up with a NATO missile defence action plan by the spring of 2011.

Cyber security is potentially even more challenging. All the publicity now surrounding cyber attacks, together with the rapid evolution and sophistication of cyber viruses and malware, have pushed this issue to the top of the security agenda. But cyber carries with it some difficult conceptual issues that need to be clarified before NATO can properly define which cyber capabilities it needs to acquire. For instance, what is a cyber attack? When do attacks begin or end? They seem to be rather a constant feature of the daily operations of vital information systems. Is a cyber virus an actual weapon that should be treated as such? Can deterrence work in cyber

space when we do not know for sure who is attacking us? Is cyber retaliation in these circumstances a legitimate or effective strategy? But, at the same time, can we prevent cyber attacks only by defending ourselves better while leaving the cyberspace of putative attackers relatively immune? Should NATO spend as much time and energy on trying to promote new international norms and regulations to govern cyberspace as on developing its own cyber contingency plans and operational capabilities? Probably a bit of both but NATO needs to ask itself a hard question: if classical deterrence and military defence do not work against threats where terrorists and private citizens can acquire a destructive power that used to be the monopoly of states, then how can or must NATO re-think its approach? If deterrence doesn't deter and defence doesn't defend then should NATO put its efforts on resilience and recovery; in other words, try to anticipate attacks, assess and limit the damage, harden vital infrastructure to make it more survivable and help Allies (or partners) to get back on their feet as quickly as possible after an attack through alternative networks and consequence management? These are hard exam questions making it all the more urgent for NATO to define its role in cyber security and put cyber defence capabilities into its contingency and defence planning.

Another issue resulting from the new Strategic Concept concerns the "Global Commons" or the protection of the key communications nodes of our globalised world. Beyond time-limited operations, such as Afghanistan, an enduring role for NATO in the 21st century will be to help to keep open the vital lines of communication for the movement of people, goods, energy resources, money and communications on which the global economy depends. NATO's "Ocean Shield" naval force combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden or its Active Endeavour mission to prevent terrorists exploiting shipping in the Mediterranean are examples of how NATO's forces will be increasingly called up on to police these vast expanses. They could become even more congested and vulnerable if climate change opens up the High North to transpolar shipping or oil and gas exploration and production in the next two decades. As emerging new powers such as India and China, also rely on the "Global Commons" to import their energy and technology they too are showing interest in using their military forces in a protective role. Here may lie opportunities for NATO to engage these two countries and others – in exercises and confidence building.

The emphasis on the new challenges, however, will need to be balanced with more traditional security concerns relating to nuclear and conventional

threats. NATO has stated that as long as nuclear weapons exist it will remain a nuclear Alliance. The Baltic states have obtained the contingency planning and the reaffirmation of the centrality of article 5 collective defence that they have long been calling for. Yet how will NATO balance these measures with its stated commitment to a nuclear free world (as an ultimate goal), to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament and to the re-set with Russia? How to defend against 21st century threats while you strive to remove them politically? How to keep important capabilities for insurance purposes while not making those capabilities an obstacle to disarmament or seem like an iron-clad commitment to the status quo. For NATO historians this balancing act will seem very familiar. It is after all, a reiteration of the defence-détente and deterrence-dialogue doctrine enunciated by the Harmel Report in 1967. But getting this equation right in the 21st century, where there are many more and less predictable actors in play than during the time of the relatively stolid and predictable Soviet Union, will test NATO's political skills and internal unity to their very core. NATO has promised a defence and deterrence posture review. Hopefully it can provide constructive answers and not be only the theatre of the well-known debate between the advocates and detractors of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, or between those wedded to the permanence of nuclear deterrence and those who would like to further reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy through arms control or changes to the Alliance's declaratory policy. NATO needs to be able to defend itself while also adjusting its posture from time to time so as to engage the emerging powers in more arms control and confidence-building.

Crisis management is also an area where the new Strategic Concept looks for answers to NATO's current dilemmas.

The new Strategic Concept is premissed on the expectation that Afghanistan will not be the last NATO operation, and that therefore the Alliance needs to learn and integrate the lessons of Afghanistan. One is to have a coherent military-civilian plan before engaging. Another is to have better intelligence and situational awareness early on, particularly of likely adversaries and the needs and expectations of the local population. Yet another is to have the right political and diplomatic structure to work with the military in theatre, and to engage with important neighbours, such as Pakistan. The result of the new Strategic Concept has been to call for more of the Comprehensive Approach, but this depends critically on NATO's ability to work more harmoniously with the UN, EU and regional organisations,

such as the African Union. To facilitate this, the Lisbon Summit agreed that henceforth NATO should have a small civilian-planning capacity to interact with the major civilian actors. This could help to integrate advance planning or at least better coordinate between military stabilisation and civilian reconstruction and governance aspects. The civilian capacity in NATO can also help to generate civilian staff from NATO capitals to fill a vacuum before the other international organisations are able to deploy. Ideally, it should serve as an interface to make civilian culture move comprehensible to the military HQs and vice-versa. Given the view of some Allies that civilian assets should be provided by other bodies and not by NATO, it was not easy to achieve consensus on this initiative before Lisbon. But it represents an important breakthrough and a victory for the pragmatic approach.

Another aspect of crisis management involves training. Standing up local security forces is the key to a transition or exit strategy from Afghanistan and it will be an essential feature of future NATO operations as well. For instance, in Kosovo KFOR is still fully engaged in standing up the Kosovo Security Force to achieve full operational capacity early in 2012. However as KFOR gradually builds down, many security responsibilities are already being transferred to the KSF, for instance in the protection of patrimonial sites. A similar model will be followed for the Afghan security forces as ISAF's transition begins this summer. NATO has to undertake serious training, capacity building or security sector reform much earlier and be better equipped, organized and funded to carry it out. The idea of a separate NATO training command was not adopted in Lisbon but how to increase training activities, perhaps using Allied Command Transformation, will certainly be part of the follow-up work.

The third area in which the Strategic Concept moves NATO forward is in cooperative security or global connectivity. Partnerships will be reviewed so as to make them even more relevant both for NATO and for the Partners as this is a two-way street. One way to do this is to involve the Partners more closely in the planning and conduct of operations to which they contribute forces as well as in decision shaping. Another proposal is to streamline NATO's partnership structures to focus more on timely political consultations or to give partners greater access to the full tool box of the Alliance's cooperation activities. One challenge will be to preserve NATO's ISAF coalition, built up in Afghanistan and the largest since World War Two, beyond the ISAF mission. After all, this is a network

that could be as useful in fighting cyber crime, terrorism or proliferation as it was in helping to stabilize Afghanistan. Many ISAF troop contributors do not have permanent partnership arrangements with NATO as ISAF has been their one and only reason to approach the Alliance. Can NATO turn them into permanent partners and what can NATO do to make partnerships more attractive and substantive for those partners who do not contribute to NATO; operations – where most of the more substantive and political partnership activities now reside?

On the other hand, NATO-Russia relations are improving with President Medvedev adopting a constructive approach in Lisbon. If NATO and Russia are able to work successively through all the many complicated legal, technical and political issues involved in establishing a cooperative missile defence, they should be able to solve most of the other security challenges facing them. Moreover, and the arrangements worked out over missile defence should facilitate cooperation between Russia and NATO on cyber, terrorism, piracy and other issues as well. NATO and Russia will have their differences and the NATO-Russia Council will be the place to air them; but if NATO and Russia can sustain their dialogue, even in the face of difficulties, while focussing on the positive and their common interests (increasingly larger than the differences), Lisbon will have marked a turning point.

In conclusion, the new Strategic Concept has made NATO enter the 21st century. It gives NATO a clear mission statement. But it will only be as good as the willingness of NATO to implement it, and provide the resources to develop the needed new capabilities: missile defence, cyber, intelligence and expeditionary forces both for Article 5 and out of area contingencies. NATO has made many efficiency cuts to its command structure, committees and agencies; but cutting the fat is the easy part. Investing in new muscle with the resources saved or redeployed will be crucial to the new Strategic Concept's credibility in the long run. The financial environment will remain a difficult one with declining defence expenditure, the bow wave of unfunded legacy systems often too expensive to cancel and the costs of ending conscription and moving to all volunteer forces, as most recently in Germany. This will put a premium on NATO's ability to find innovative, cost-effective solutions, such as role specialisation, pooling of resources, sharing of key assets, merging of testing facilities and headquarters, not to speak of rigorous prioritisation and a responsive defence planning system incorporating lessons learned from operations.

Finally a word on public opinion. Some of the key messages in the new Strategic Concept may not encounter a friendly echo. Doing more operations post-Afghanistan, investing in defence, preserving nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future and keeping NATO's door open to new members are not part of the Zeitgeist. Our publics are focused on economic concerns, declining living standards and job prospects. So a new Strategic Concept that speaks of NATO's greater need to engage with the wider world and take on a larger burden will not sell itself . It will require firm political leadership in the Alliance to explain the need for engagement over the desire for retrenchment. As President Obama put it in Lisbon: "Austerity will not relieve us of our responsibilities".

articles

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The Mediterranean Region, between European Strategies and National Interests

Giuliana Laschi[1]

ABSTRACT

From both a political and a politological perspective, the various actions and policies of the EEC/EU towards the Mediterranean might seem the outcome of either grand strategies or of narrow national interests of the big Mediterranean countries. In order to fully understand changes and continuity in the relations between the two sides of the Mediterranean, going from the concept of Eurafrica to the Union for the Mediterranean, it is necessary to rely on the analysis from the historical perspective which highlights, beyond anything else, a fundamental but little investigated pattern of the EEC/EU external relations: a minor interest of the Community in the Mediterranean. It is a difficult relationship, also at a bilateral level, that hardly meets the economic, political and international strategic interests involved, as the cases of North Africa, Turkey and Western Balkans prove. This paper, entirely based upon documents from the Historical Archives of the European Communities, outlines the many considerable but ineffective policies for the Mediterranean and it depicts the national interests of France, Spain and Italy, along with the endeavors, above all on behalf of the Parliament and the Commission, to foreshadow a comprehensive regional policy.

KEY WORDS

European Economic Community, Mediterranean Policies, Neighbourhood Policy, Western Balkans, European Foreign Policy, External Relations

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Prof. Dr. Giuliana Laschi, Jean Monnet ad personam Chair, University of Bologna-Forlì Campus, Faculty of International Relations, Via G. della Torre 1, 47100 Forlì, Italy, e-mail: giuliana.laschi@unibo.it

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Introduction

From both a political and a politological perspective, the various actions and policies of the EEC/EU towards the Mediterranean might seem the outcome of either grand strategies or of narrow national interests of the big Mediterranean countries. In order to fully understand changes and continuity in the relations between the two sides of the Mediterranean, going from the concept of Eurafrica to the Union for the Mediterranean, it is necessary to rely on the analysis from the historical perspective which highlights, beyond anything else, a fundamental but little investigated pattern of the EEC/EU external relations: a minor interest of the Community in the Mediterranean. It is a difficult relationship, also at a bilateral level, that hardly meets the economic, political and international strategic interests involved, as the cases of North Africa, Turkey and Western Balkans prove.

The Mediterranean policy of the EC/EU hasn't experienced a different development compared to its foreign policy as a whole and, in the last few years, its evolutions has gone fully in the direction of the choices made by the members states, whose national interests may push towards this end or else towards others. Indeed, those who aim the most at strengthening and implementing their vital space in the area are precisely some Mediterranean countries, especially France, Spain and Italy, which try to create some "Mediterranean specificity" that would allow them to keep a sphere of national influence and at the same time their international role.

The EC external relations have focused their attention on the Mediterranean since the very first years of the EEC and such an attention has brought about lots of different proposals and stages of development, of acceleration and stagnation (Pierros-Meunier-Abrams 1999:176-178). It is a policy to which the EC/EU has always attached great importance but that has never managed to become a priority of the EC external relations (Gomez 2000:133).

In order to fully understand the Euro-Mediterranean relations it is fundamental to analyze the EC/EU external relations from an historical perspective to understand if, how and when a common foreign policy was created and a policy for the Mediterranean placed within it.

That is to see if the EC has operated in the Mediterranean area through strategies and formalized policies or if, as it had happened for the whole

foreign activity until the formation of the CFSP, through single actions and bilateral relations.

My assumption is that the European Community has enjoyed a strong international role from the beginning, acting as a real subject in the international system, albeit in an usual way compared to other actors engaged at a systemic level. I claim that the main striking feature of the EC was its ability to create a global role, notwithstanding the lack of a downright foreign policy, through a blend, a continuous mediation between the member states' foreign policies. Furthermore, the EC policies have played a prominent role as, created for internal purposes of the Community, they have characterized it external action through their impact on third countries and have also built the EEC international image. I particularly refer to the Common Agricultural Policy, due to its uniqueness and centrality among the Common policies for decades, as well as to the Environmental policy and many others. In my article I will try and point out how the members states' national interests, expressed by the Common policies as well as by the single foreign policies, are at the bottom of the interest in the Mediterranean and in most of the policies towards it.

The external EEC/EU Relations and the Mediterranean Policy: a Historical Perspective

Until the Nineties, the EC lived in a context of international political relations dominated by bipolarism that, at the beginning, favored integration and cooperation under the Soviet threat but that, in the end, hampered its fulfillment. As a matter of fact, the hegemonic role the US played in the Western World and in the international system limited the EC possibilities of autonomous expression and its international affirmation as an integrated Europe. However, what is unquestionable is that the Community, during its fifty years of history, has developed a growing external dimension, able to influence both political and economic decisions of third countries; it has managed international relations with each and every continent; it has been present, although often in a disjointed and chaotic way, in any international crisis and meetings. To sum up, today the EU is an acknowledge presence in the international system (Bitumi, D'Ottavio, Laschi 2008:8).

There is a very interesting ongoing debate in the European historical studies about the possibility of defining this international action of the EC as a proper foreign policy (Bossuat 2006:13-15).

One questions when and how such a foreign policy was born, if it can be really described as such, who makes it, which institutions and so on. Indeed, a significant part of the historiographical debate on the international dimension of the Community deals with the several EC endeavors to propose and create a political community. Such efforts have often entailed long years of negotiations among the member states and engaged the European institutions in long discussions, getting little more than partial results, much behind the initial proposals and expectations.

If it is not possible to give the external action of the Community in any cases and any historical period the label of foreign policy, nonetheless it is possible to talk about deep and intense external relations (Laschi-Telò 2009:141-145). The European Community has had a significant international influence because, first and foremost, it was created and has existed at an international level. The implicit or explicit question, always asked at the EU debates, is if the Community has exercised its influence only because it exists or whether because it acts as a real actor in the international system. Actually, the answer is articulated and requires a chronological collocation. Undoubtedly, since its very creation, the Community has had an influence on third countries, especially the developing ones and, even more precisely, on Africa (Bitsch-Bossuat 2005:4-5). At the beginning it was about an indirect influence, little understandable from the outside so that the EC institutions, starting from the Council, which was actively engaged in a comprehensive effort to promote the external information about the existence of the Community, trying to present the new international subject in a coherent and united way. To the simple international "presence" a new external "role" was added, through the exclusive competence in some internal policies, that used to have and still have a great impact on third countries, above all the commercial policy (Coppolaro 2008:133-34) and the common agricultural policy (Laschi 2009:38). The fact that the Community has always played a strong international role is not questioned; no matter how new and different it has been in the international system, it has been strong and significant.

Instead the real EC foreign policy has been, above all, a mix, a never-ending negotiation among the foreign policies of the member states. It has

found expression is some choices made by the Council but, more often, it has been impossible to find a common position. Furthermore, within the Community the two levels, the national and the EC level, never disappear and they may not be immediately joined in common policies and goals. So, along with the EC strong external relations and its role (primarily economic) in the international system, that is due to the EC level of the relations with the third countries, there has been another level, which would often go in the opposite direction hardly compatible with the common one, embodied by the position of each and every member state. This double level, often underestimated in the rushed analysis, enables to point out totally different foreign policies of the EC and this is particularly relevant when it comes to the Mediterranean.

One can argue, at the same time, that the EC tries to create a model of alternative development or else that perpetrates a colonial policy, if we look at the endeavors of the fist Lomé Conventions or at the Imperial policy of France and Great Britain (Migani 2008:193-247). So, the analysis has to differentiate between the EC and the member states, especially those which are more tightly linked to colonial logics. These two ever-present levels of the external relations of the EC have taken different shapes that can be investigated with peculiar attention by historians, as some recent historiography shows (Bossuat 2006, Bicchi 2007, Bitumi-D'Ottavio-Laschi 2008, Laschi-Telò: 2009).

Given these premises, it is clear that it is not possible to define the EC external relations, which have developed in ways totally new for the international system, as common foreign policy.

The real meaning of the EC action in the international system, the depth of its relations, conflicts, of the common interests, are better understood through the analysis of its policies, that are the real actions of the EC, beyond the aspirations and the political aims, whether real or simply proclaimed (Laschi 2007:51-60). Indeed at the beginning, since a real foreign policy lacked, some policies, such as the commercial and the common agricultural policy, have shaped the external relations of the EEC/EU, hampering the import from third countries, because of tariff barriers. Just the high common external tariff caused harsh clashes and commercial wars with the powerful American ally, along with hard and unequal relations with the developing countries. So it is clear that the EC action has firstly expressed itself through the commercial policy and then through many

other policies and it is undoubted that such action may well not be considered foreign policy in the most traditional and full meaning, but it is for sure a political action and it is directed towards the external world.

The Mediterranean in the European Construction

The Mediterranean is an integral part of Europe while, at the same time, it is a border and, now, a boundary wall, notwithstanding the EU endeavor to open a more fruitful dialogue with its neighboring countries of the Mediterranean, thus giving its contribution to the main international problems.

The parallel line halving the Mediterranean states from the South and those from the North has been thickening in the decades after WWII. The national interests, the EC policies and twenty years of relations haven't brought about any change or improvement in the reciprocal relations. On the contrary, we could say that, from year to year, walls and barriers have been going higher and higher; as the economic, social and political gap between the two sides of the Sea has got wider, fears and closures on behalf of the Communities have risen. This because, despite the cultural and identity ties binding Europe and the Mediterranean, still the basin is a developing area, economically depressed notwithstanding the massive oil deposit. Hence, if on the one hand the EC had taken a "Mediterranean" shape, thanks to the subsequent enlargements to Greece, Spain and Portugal (Varsori 2007:12-13), on the other hand the relation with the poor side of the area, the developing one, hasn't shifted away from its neocolonial approach (Habeeb 2003). Some countries have entered the Africa, Caribbean, Pacific group ACP, with whom the EC/EU established a special relationship in 1957 that, anyway, came from the colonial relations that especially France kept on having with some of the concerned states (Migani 2008:195-200). As several scholars have pointed out, it is all about the evolution of the French concept "Eurafrica", deriving from a colonialist idea of the 1940s (Calandri 2003:359; Melchionni 2005:11). So the memory of a dramatic history marked by a protean colonialism is still having a deep impact on the whole Mediterranean policy (Mehdi 2005:155).

However, notwithstanding these difficulties and the fact that the EC was born essentially as a group of countries of Central Europe, just for the fact that a member state, namely Italy, is fully immersed in this Sea and that

France is, even partially, a seaside country, the Mare Nostrum has always been present in the history and the projects of the EEC/EU, even if it has never become an international-strategic priority.

The lack of priority of the Mediterranean policy is undoubtedly the outcome of the international-historical contingencies and of the fact that Europe has never been able to fully enter the peace negotiations on the Middle-East. Indeed, the Arab-Israeli crisis has been one of the reasons why the EC Mediterranean policies have failed, as they were conceived, at a political level, always in a collective way through the regional space, but then they were concretely managed in a bilateral way.

Until the early Seventies, the EC had had to put up with the Mediterranean policy imposed by the bipolar clash of the Cold War, without being able to develop an autonomous action. Indeed, even the choice related to the first Association Agreements of the early Sixties follows the bipolar logic, given the fact that they were signed with Greece and Turkey and, soon after, with Israel and Lebanon. After a period of stalemate, due to the crisis caused by General de Gaulle, the negotiations were reopened in 1966 and led to the signing of other agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Spain, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt and a second agreement with Israel. Essentially, by 1972 the most part of the South countries of the Mediterranean had signed agreements with the Community, apart from Libya, Syria and Jordan. Until the end of the Cold War there was a sort of a hole if the geographic map of the coastal countries, represented by the Western Balkans that entered the foreign policy of the EU only in the Nineties, but that have kept on being some foreigner in the Mediterranean policies.

The thick web of bilateral agreements with the countries overlooking the Mediterranean doesn't entail that they belong to a larger and common vision of the European policy in this area. On the contrary, we might say that these agreements have in common only the fact that they were signed with the countries of the Mediterranean but each of them is a different story, with goals and instruments of its own, because it has its peculiar features and doesn't follow rules shared by others. Furthermore, such differences also mirror the different importance attached by the Community to these various agreements, insomuch as it is possible to think in terms of a hierarchy of importance that has a pyramidal structure, where you can find, at the top, Greece and Turkey, countries of strategic importance during the Cold War. Those are the two countries which first signed the Agreements

of Association but also the only two countries for whom the treaties foresaw the possibility of future enlargement. Their centrality has also made it possible to include more policies and goals in the agreements and a major spending in their favor. In all other cases, the agreements have considered different subjects or multiple solutions, with the final outcome of having a range of treatments highly different from one another depending on the country involved.

The lack of priority of the European policy for the Mediterranean also hides a deep differentiation in the national interests as far as the member states' foreign policy is concerned; actually, France and Italy, along with Spain since 1986, have always proved to consider the Mediterranean basin the area worth of major EC endeavors. Then, it has been the negotiation of interests between the Mediterranean countries and the Central-North countries led by Germany (that are, by the way, the majority) that has substantially diminished the priority and the actions directed towards this area. However, this has never caused any real lack of interest in this field; in the contrary, the continuous attention has been growing in the Nineties as far as the Western Balkans are concerned and it has actually increased in the last decade, given the fact that it is a source, real and nurtured, of two phenomena on which the EU has focused most of its endeavors in terms of security: international terrorism and immigration. These two elements are themselves enough to explain the interest and the "Europeanization" of the last proposed Mediterranean policy, introduced by Sarkozy in 2007.

The proliferation of more or less formalized proposals concerning the relations between the two sides of the Mediterranean is due to the dissatisfaction about the results of the various policies that have been implemented during the years. The fragmented proposals of the early decades of the European Community had led to the great and ambitious project of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, through the so-called "Barcelona Process" that had tried to combine differentiated and deep goals together with effective instruments and some institutional structure necessary for their fulfillment. The partnership had been welcomed with great satisfaction from the majority of the coastal countries and it stood for the strong EU interest and explicit commitment in the area. However, for several reasons, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has managed to achieve only a very small part of the goals that had been set, thus nurturing great dissatisfaction both in the countries of the South coast and in the European countries, especially in the so-called troika of the Partnership itself, namely

France, Spain and Italy. In order to safeguard the European interest in the area, in order to keep the close web of relations that exist among the Mediterranean countries and to prevent the Union from being totally absorbed, both politically and economically, by the huge project of enlargement of the Central-East Europe the Mediterranean area has been brought into the Neighborhood Policy (ENP) on the initiative of France and Spain and the support of Italy.

If the Neighborhood policy has made it possible for the Mediterranean to stay, at least, within the main subjects of the EU external relations, for sure the political and economic intensity of such relations is much lower than that belonging to the Central-European countries. Nonetheless, just on the issue of enlargement, the European borders of the Mediterranean regain central stage and rise important questions, such the inclusion of the Balkan states and Turkey.

From the first Mediterranean policies to the Barcelona Process

The first decade of the Mediterranean agreements has not been the outcome of a political linear choice made by the Community, rather some sort of patchwork (Gomez 2000:133-135; Gomez 2003:1-4) of initiatives mostly disjointed from one another; in fact there are not archival documents that let us suppose there has ever been any meeting to set some framework or goals. Given the lack of a common and comprehensive strategy, each and every member state has worked on bilateral national agreements.

The fact the agreements would remain at a bilateral level and that no effort to create any Mediterranean policy had been made testifies the member states gave little attention to the Mediterranean. Besides, in the early decades of the cold war, there were other international-strategic priorities: as the US had given priority to Greece and Turkey, the EC interests towards the South side of the Mediterranean were essentially economic.

Here come the French interest in keeping deep, special relations with decolonized Algeria and in establishing economic relations with Spain and, above all, a solid German interest towards the whole area. Germany experienced an exponential growth of economic relations with Turkey, Greece, Malta, Cyprus and Portugal, hence turned into the leading economic power

in the area in the 1970s. In some cases, the national interest worked against any policy in the field, aiming at postponing the signature of an agreement or at preventing an agreement from being signed at all. The reasons behind such an obstructionism are to be found in the economic problems of some member states such as Italy, that was consistently committed to defend its Mediterranean productions[2] and, to a smaller extent, the Netherlands, attempting to protect themselves from industrial concurrence as well as from international trade negotiations, first of all from the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, GATT (Shlaim and Yannopoulos 1976).

The first endeavor to create a real policy for the Mediterranean dates back to the early Seventies, thus to a time, when the Community was elaborating its foreign policy within the new instrument of the European Political Cooperation. The "Global Mediterranean Policy" in the years 1972- 1974 was about the establishment of a network between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries which were not member states that could help develop trade and cooperation for development (Bicchi 2007). What greatly influenced the necessity to develop a Mediterranean policy was the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that just in those years burst with violence on the European scenario at the Munich Olympic Games. The centrality of this crisis and the perception of the uncertainty coming from it, have been a leitmotiv of the EC/EU Mediterranean policy until nowadays.

In the Eighties, the major change in the EC Mediterranean arrangement was caused by the enlargement to Greece, Spain and Portugal. The new member states strengthened southern Europe and expanded the Mediterranean borders with the countries from the south coast, making European geography more and more Mediterranean. At the same time, the southward enlargement absorbed much of the energy the EC/EU used to dedicate to the Mediterranean in general; it actually excluded the non-member states, not only at a political but also at an economic level since, thanks to the new member states, the EU could satisfy its productions requirements much more easily.

[2] In Europe, the main problem seriously arose in 1964, when Italy, defending its farmers, particularly lemon producers, asked for the citrus fruits to be excluded from the preferential exchanges with the non-member states of the Mediterranean. After tight negotiations, the Community was forced to compromise, essentially imposed by an internal minority, that would levy further import taxes to citrus fruits.

Despite the changes and the actions carried out in the first thirty years of the EC, the turning point in the Mediterranean policy came in the Nineties, with the end of the cold war, through the Barcelona Process in 1995. The main reasons for this change lie in the fear that the Mediterranean area would lose its significance for the EU and would be diluted in the foreign policy which was starting to acquire a global dimension (Khader 2001:20-21). The EU strategic element in the aftermath of the cold war was Central-East Europe, its economic and political transition. For some member states, this shift in priority might have caused heavy national repercussions, in terms of sphere of political and economic influence. Particularly it was Spain that urged on strengthening the connection between the European construction and the stability and security in the Mediterranean, paving the way to the Barcelona Process. It was surely Spain, more than any other member state, to push the EC/EU towards a Mediterranean structured policy, playing somehow a leading role thanks to the high skilled diplomats within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Commission that Spain could count on, who made the implementation of the political aims of the Spanish government possible. The intensive Spanish diplomatic work was supported by Italy and France, being afraid of losing not only one of the strategic objectives of its foreign policy, but also fearing a German strengthening, which would have unsettled the balance of the French-German axis. In fact, Germany proved all its potential after the fall of the Berlin wall, not only through the reunification of the country, but also as a point of reference for the area and as a bridge between Central-Eastern Europe and the European Union. German power was as striking as to allow the country to force the European Union to "Europeanize the German policies", as proved by the diplomatic acknowledgement of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991.

The Mediterranean member states thought it was necessary to link East and South Europe, given the new centrality of the EC oriental strategy. However, the new link didn't entail any common strategy for the two areas, so different from one another and with regard to the national interests of the member states; it was just a way to temporarily alleviate the shift in the strategic and geographic priorities of the Union. As there was not sharing of common goals, it was really hard to create a link between these two areas and, at the same time, it was fundamental to make it become one of the main aims of the external action of the EU and, as a matter of fact, it didn't work that well (Barbé 1998:117-29). Actually the Mediterranean has been overshadowed by the East, not only because its funding opportunities

have been smaller but also because, through the enlargement, the East has rightfully entered the EU space. With the enlargement, the frontier has been pushed further once again and now that the East is linked to the Mediterranean through the ENP, it is much further East than it was after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Moreover, although the policy for the Mediterranean has become more urgent since September 11 2001, there is not a real common interest in this area, nor does there exist a strong axis among the southern member states because of their different and conflicting national interests, especially as far as Spain and France are concerned, although for both countries the relationship with the other side of the Mediterranean is substantial and vital.

Thus, the Barcelona Process was essentially created as an answer to the necessity of keeping the Mediterranean basin within an area of security and peace, after the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Panebianco 2003, Attinà 2003:181-185, Jünemann 2004:1, Panebianco 2008:115). It is about a EU answer that goes in the direction of its prevailing international action, that tries to guarantee security through inclusive instruments, such as the economic and social development. The new Mediterranean policy aimed at creating an area that would be the mirror image of Europe as much as possible, that would be able to contain the marginalization towards which the South coast was being driven (Bicchi 2006:286-288).

So, in December 1994, the Council of Essen singled out the Mediterranean as a fundamental strategic goal for the EU, setting peace, stability and prosperity of the area as Common priorities(Crawford 2004:96). In March 1995, the Council and the European Parliament received a Communication from the Commission concerning the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, on the initiative of the Spanish Vice President Manuel Marin. During the opening of the summit, on 27th of November 1995, Morin recalled that that day was the 9th centenarian of the first crusade of Pope Urbano II against the unfaithful, namely the Arabs (Collotti 2005), hence the EMP symbolically stood for the final change in the relations between the north and the south of the Mediterranean. So the ultimate goal of the Barcelona Conference was to: "Turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity".

Despite the EMP's endeavor to strengthen some common position of the member states towards the Mediterranean, the deep differences between the northern and southern states haven't changed. Nonetheless, it is important to underline that the EMP had managed to formalize and keep the centrality of the Mediterranean as common goal, included the necessity to act on the modernization, stabilization and democratization of the whole area (Joffé 2001:217). This was the big innovation, or at least the endeavor made in Barcelona. If the choice was made at an EC/EU level, some national interests however remained strong and this is why the southern and coastal states have been in charge of the EMP leadership. France, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy, Greece and Portugal, have been particularly active in the partnership.

Despite the groundbreaking potential of the EMP, the outcome of its activity have been unsatisfactory, both at a political and economic level (Del Sarto-Schumacher-Lannon-Driss 2007:3-5). The causes of such difficulties and failures are many but, on my opinion, the fundamental elements are to be found in three precise directions (Comelli 2004:97-100).
The first, at an international systemic level, is due to the settlement of the post cold war period, to the attempt of the EU to give itself, for the first time, a strong international role and, since 2001 to deep changes affecting the international security.

The second element deals more directly with the European environment and the huge EU endeavor, although not really successful, aiming at preparing the big enlargement to the East.

Last, but not least, the European perturbation caused by the crisis and wars in the Former Yugoslavia that has had direct repercussions on the EMP too and on the role played by the relations between the EU and the Western Balkans, leading to a major shift in the priority of the Mediterranean policy itself.

Furthermore, if the two geographic souls of the EMP had always been deeply different and separated, because of the Former Yugoslavia's crisis it became impossible to manage them in one only big unity, as it was clear that the Mediterranean policy was lacking an essential area. Among all these difficulties, which were the main reasons why the Mediterranean policy of Barcelona failed, the most important were the internal crisis of the South Coast of the Mediterranean, first and foremost the Arab-Israeli

crisis, but also that of Western Sahara. As it was foreseen, without the final solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is unrealistic to even talk about security in the Mediterranean. At the same time, it is also true that through the EMP, a stable diplomatic network has been established that, while not being the solution, it has managed to carry out an incisive action in order to prevent further conflicts (Pace 2005:291-295; Aliboni 2008:4).

A relevant change in the Mediterranean policy happened in 2004, when it was agreed, because of the pressure of France, Spain and Italy on the Romano Prodi Commission, to include the area in the coming European Neighborhood Policy, which provides for directions and targets regions so very different from one another that it is hard to look see them as one only effective policy (Cameron 2007:109-114; Barbé-Johansson-Nogués 2008:93-95). Rather than having common interests in the sense of establishing a strong partnership and policies based on a deep reciprocity, what they have in common is the goal of planning an efficient European strategy to guarantee economic, political and energy stability so as to keep and strengthen the security of the continent. (Bosse 2007:57-58). So, this is a policy that clearly aims at achieving a purpose which is, essentially, inward-looking: to create, around the EU, a surrounding area of well-governed states which would ensure stability and security (Balfour-Rotta 2005:19; Smith Michael-Webber 2008:74). The ENP addresses those countries that do not want or are not expected to become EU members, at least in the near future, but that are willing to establish with the EU a special relation, different and deeper than the traditional foreign policy, contemplating a special status in the relations with the EU, political and economic links (Dannreuther 2004:202-217; Kelley 2006:48-52). One of the most relevant outcomes of the ENP is that it detached the member states from the Mediterranean Policy, so now some of them take part in the ENP while some others, for instance the Western Balkans, are within specific area policies (Ortega 2003:101).

The general dissatisfaction towards the commitment and the interest in the area, considered anyway of strategic importance for the EU, has pushed those member states more interested in keeping the priority of the area to find new solutions. The last one, in chronological order, is the Union for the Mediterranean, promoted by the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy; such a proposal, partially modified by other member states, has then become downright a European policy.

Western Balkans

The Western Balkans' perspective to become an integral part of the European project was originated by both a political failure and an historical motivation (Gori 2007:21-25). Indeed if, on the one hand, the EU has shown a dramatic inability to manage the crisis produced by the dismantling of Yugoslavia and the conflicts that tore it to peaces in the Nineties, on the other hand, in contemporary history the security issue has been a leitmotif of the relations between Western Balkans and our continent, given the strong and constant link between the stability of the region and the security of whole Europe. Even if the EC attention towards the Mediterranean is mostly linked to the European security question, the coastal Balkan states have never entered the Mediterranean policy. The EU started to deal with the area only at a late stage as a guilty answer to its inability to handle the crisis that led to the war in the former Yugoslavia and, when it finally decided to create stronger ties with the area, it did so shaping an apposite regional policy, which involves all countries of the area but is not directly linked to the other policies of the Mediterranean. If focusing on the area has undoubtedly had, or could have had, positive implications, the absence of Western Balkans has created some sort of gap on the EU Mediterranean strategy.

In 1991 Europe was divided, doubtful and distracted in front of the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia and in front of the war in the Former Yugoslavia. The member states' governments had different positions with regard to the acknowledgment of the independence of Ljubljana and Zagreb, and this let Germany impose its own position through a very quick acknowledgment. France and Great Britain divided over the action to undertake in the conflict, above all for what concerned the possibility to use the Western European Organization – WEO in Croatia, as proposed by France in August 1991, which Great Britain refused being absolutely against any armed intervention.

The Union and the US too had a serious clash as far as the deployment of the NATO forces in the war of Bosnia-Herzegovina was concerned. So, despite the fact that in those same years the Treaty of Maastricht had formalized a foreign and security policy for the European Union and that the latter was yearning for an international role even in the European continent, the endeavors to manage the Yugoslavian crisis were doomed to failure with dramatic consequences.

The inability to manage this crisis, the failure of the first CFSP actions and the objective political instability of the Former Yugoslavia pushed the Union to include Western Balkans in a European perspective between the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996 (Gori 2007:25). It was some sort of special relationship with the area that didn't yet provide for the adhesion of the states to the EU[3].

This new attention, due to a sense of guilt and necessity and not to any clear political decision, caused an ambiguous approach and alternate intensity. The regional approach of 1996 was the first European policy towards Western Balkans after the Yugoslavian crisis. It was only after the Albania and Kosovo crisis that the EU decided to strengthen its action in the Balkans and started to talk about, although in an indirect way, of some aspiration of such countries to enter the European area. In the aftermath of the Raćak slaughter, after the Rambouillet failure and the beginning of NATO bombing, the EU speeded up and in 1999 it decided to undertake the preparation of a Stability Pact of the South-Eastern Europe, with the concrete perspective of integration in the euro-atlantic structures. For the first time, the goals of an action in the Western Balkans concerned their adhesion to the Union and until 2005, the concrete realization of a European perspective was given a strong and dynamic stimulus, despite the focus on crisis area being diverted towards other international strategic scenarios, even within the Mediterranean. The Enlargement Package presented by the Commission in 2005 concerned Western Balkans too, but it wasn't welcomed very positively by the Netherlands nor by France, countries which, with the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, had shown they were experiencing hard conflicts as far the enlargement process was concerned. They asked for and obtained that a debate on the enlargement would be held in 2006 and that it would be set the principle of the absorption capacity of the EU.

In such a debate, it is reaffirmed the principle of a possible adhesion of the Balkans to the EU, confirming the foreseen adhesion for Croatia and FYRM but the paths gets more troubled for the other countries, as shown by the difficulties of the pre-adhesion process of Turkey against which some European governments, as the French one, are admittedly against.

[3] The policy of regional approach didn't involve Slovenia that followed a different path compared to the countries of the Former Yugoslavia, through the policies provided for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, until the adhesion to the EU in 2004.

The expectations about the adhesion of Western Balkans suggest a reflection over the role of the European Union in the world that is, nowadays, one of the main issues of the European agenda and show the peculiar nature of the Union itself: an international actor whose identity doesn't come from any international clash but from the precise choice of rejecting the use of force as guiding principle of the international relations in favor of those instruments of dialogue and negotiations which are highly demanding, such are the policy of adhesion and the neighborhood policy. The enlargement has been for a long time one of the main instruments used by the Community in its peculiar activity of foreign policy. When, fifty years ago, the Treaties of Rome were signed and the "Europe of the Six" was born, it was called "Little Europe" to highlight the fact the aim was not to create a closed community, a limited élite, an exclusive club of states, but rather to create a community able to be as wide as to become really European. Those who signed the Treaty of Rome accepted the idea of a little Europe as a first step towards something deeply different, as for width and strength, and wanted to give the Community some international powers that were necessary to crate a common market since they thought that, being an expression of the free world, it had to become a dynamic actor in the international system. And in fact, it is possible to argue that one of the fundamental instruments of the European foreign policy has been, since the beginning, the enlargement policy which, by the way, has also been the most successful (Laschi 2006:11-14).

Despite the troubles the last two enlargements have caused to the EU or, better said, that the EU itself created not being adequately prepared, it is still unquestionable that the Community enlargement, from the first six countries to the continental recomposition, has been one of the most important successes acknowledged worldwide.

Conclusion

Although the EU has enlargement in its own DNA, theoretically valid for all countries of the European continent, the process of adhesion is today in trouble. Notwithstanding the fact that some pre-adhesion procedures have been started for Turkey, Iceland, Croatia, FYRM and the fact that many other countries of the Western Balkans, as for instance the Republic of Montenegro (along with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Albania) have proved to be interested in a potential adhesion, many elements allow to think

that nobody in Brussels wants to be hasty with new adhesions (after that of Croatia, foreseen in 2012). What they hope for is rather a phase of absorption for the last enlargements that have already brought the Community 12 new countries. This slowdown has also re-started in Europe a debate strictly linked to the question of European identity, already harshly discussed during the so-called "constitutional phase" of the EU. Especially, there is a lot of controversy as far the Union's borders are concerned because different answers are given to the question about which countries might be considered European, thus eligible for the adhesion process.

The debate over enlargement and the persistent call for an absorption of the previous enlargements before even considering new ones slow even more the already loosen ties between the EU and the Western Balkans, making it even harder and further for them to be fully acknowledged within Europe.

It is my conviction that the debate on enlargement and the dwelling on the absorbment of the previous one before making others weaken the already loose binds between the EU and the Western Balkans, complicating and moving further away their complete acknowledgment within Europe. On the other side, the uncertain expectations of Western Balkans membership bring us back to the delicate position the EU enjoys today in the international system: one of the most debated issues questioning the Community cohesion and its peculiarity at the systemic level.

The EC has raised internationally starting from the basic choice – along the line of the United Nations – of refusing clashes and the use of force as principal element in the management of international relations, preferring much more complex and demanding instruments such as, at a European level, EU membership and the neighborhood policy. Undoubtedly, as we have seen, the main outcome of the short history of the EC/EU at a systemic level is enlargement, that the Community has used for an action of foreign policy *sui generis*. But, if enlargement faces a crisis or the time for membership sensibly slows down how will the EU be able to keep a driving role in the European continent? How will it stay strongly attractive and persuading? With the effort to create new policies and new ties with its neighbors, the EU has developed the neighborhood policy that could have possibly created an area, around the Union, where pacific relations and international security would be granted. But the neighborhood policy seems not to be working as it should; maybe because, being divided as it is

between two areas so different from one another in economic, social and cultural terms, it is in the end ineffective and insufficient, thus it stirs up dissatisfaction in most of the countries belonging to it. Furthermore, the EU inability – if not to solve - at least to play a rounded and active role in the major crisis erupting in the South side of the Mediterranean, from the Arab-Israeli question to the Saharawi-Morocco crisis, alienate EU centrality in the Mediterranean relations and prove the ineffectiveness of the neighborhood policy.

A linear and clear policy for the Mediterranean could have partly solved the uncertainty that has marked the relations with a relevant part of EU neighbors but, as we have noticed this has never materialized above all because of national interests of the member states (Amato 2008:129).
We have seen how much the lack of priority in the European policy towards the Mediterranean hided the strong difference in the national interests of the diverse member states' foreign policies and that only France and Italy, later Spain since its membership, have conceded the Mediterranean basin a central place among the Community goals. Due to the fact that no member state, Germany first, has ever acknowledged southern European states' priority over the Mediterranean, it has never become pivotal, rather instrumental in the Community external relations (Ramírez 2008:137-140). The relations between the EEC/EU and the Mediterranean have been created and handled on the basis of single national interests or special emergencies, such as security and emigration.

Given their general ineffectiveness, the Neighborhood policy and the Mediterranean policy cannot, in any way, substitute the Western Balkans' request for membership also because the Balkans cannot be considered, both from an identity and a political standpoint, something different that Europe itself.

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Eurocentrism and the Obstacles for Entrance of Western Balkans and Turkey in the European Union

Mladen Karadzoski, Julijana Siljanoska[1]

ABSTRACT
Turkey and Western Balkans, which includes Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, as candidate and potential candidate countries, explicitly declare their will and intention to join the European Union. Unfortunately, the severe standards and criteria which are required for fulfillment from these countries are not the only obstacles for their membership in EU, i.e. the so-called eurocentrism, the concentration of the decision-making and rule-making power in several states, the euroscepticism in some EU countries etc., are also obstacles for Western Balkans and Turkey towards their membership in the European Union. For these reasons, the main goal of this paper will be to identify which are the biggest obstacles for entrance of Western Balkans and Turkey in the European Union, which are the consequences of the eurocentrism for the enlargement policy of EU and to determine a "model" for a faster integration of the candidate and potential candidate countries into European Union, without jeopardizing the interests of the older EU countries, and relativizing the influence of the eurocentrism for the enlargement of the Union, at the same time. The comparative method, but also the inductive and deductive methods will be used in this paper.

Key words
eurocentrism, Balkans, European, Union, Turkey, integration

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Mladen, Karadzoski, PhD, Faculty of administration and management of information systems – Bitola, Department of public administration, Samoilova street 7/2 – 16, 7500 Prilep, Republic of Macedonia, e-mail: mladenkaradzoski@yahoo.com.
Julijana Siljanoska, Msc, Faculty of administration and management of information systems – Bitola, Department of public administration, Fifth Prilep brigade 68 - 2/10, 7500 Prilep, Republic of Macedonia, e-mail: j.siljanoska@yahoo.com.
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Introduction

"United Europe" was the motif represented by Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and many other statesmen which life-desire was integrated, united Europe. The World wars, conflicts among the nations, big economic crises and social problems were all events which harmed the European continent and generated big instability, in and among the European states.

The membership of the candidate countries (Turkey, Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro and Iceland) and the potential candidate countries (Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) in The European Union is determined as a main strategic priority, and consequently all of the administrative, judicial, executive, human and infrastructural capacities are pointed to this essential goal. But, the European "road" is full of different obstacles and challenges, so fulfilling of many criteria and standards is needed. The quality, dynamics and the intensity of the euro-integration process of the candidate and potential candidate countries will depend on the international political constellation, on the fulfilling of the criteria established by EU, on the enlargement policy which will be promoted by the Union, but mostly on the solving of the opened political questions which are obstacles for Turkey and the countries from the Western Balkans on their way to membership in EU.

Still, other "criteria" are appearing as an obstacle for the integration of the above mentioned states in the European Union. That is the "eurocentrism" phenomenon. Although it is not a formal criteria for membership in EU, still it is a big obstacle for a successful eurointegration process of the Western Balkans and Turkey. So, the main goals and intentions of this paper will be the examination of the level of influence of the so-called eurocentrism to the process of integration of Turkey and Western Balkans' countries into the European Union, but also, to try to solve this problem by giving a concrete proposals and models of reduction and marginalization of the eurocentrism.

Eurocentrism: definition, history, ways of manifestation

Eurocentrism is a practice of conscious or unconscious favorizing of the European cultures (dominantly Western ones), values and scientific

achievements, which has a consequence of marginalizing and underestimating on the other cultures. (Risantijevic 2009: 1-2). The eurocentrism revokes the existence and the values of the non-European cultures, and implements methods and instruments of de facto deleting these cultures of the worlds' cultural heritage. In Great Britain, this term is used in political discussions for marking the supporters of the idea on the European integration, i.e. the European Union. The theory of European economic and cultural progress was often criticized as an ethnocentric one, through emphasizing the role of Europe in the creation of the modern world and marginalizing the role of the others.

Since Euro-centrism suggests that nationalism was invented in Europe, it could be asked if there will ever be such a thing as European nationalism, encompassed in one religion-Christianity. Broadening Eurocentric theory and attributing to Europe the features of civilization would certainly raise the possibility of similar future outcomes, implications, results and situations. Europe's main achievement culturally and politically remains, not the state, but international and multi-religious society. One of the problems in final creation of `European` could be explained by the following: `While ethnicities can fade into nations, nations cannot so easily merge with one another`. One of the more drastic examples of a eurocentric worldview has been formulated by Samuel Huntington. He said that: "Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures." (Huntington 1996: 40). Another aspect of this problem is that many of the "values" mentioned may have less to do with "Western" culture, but with economic modernization. The weakening of religion in Europe, the growth of individualism, or, again, the decline of the family, all not necessarily are "Western values" at all, but results of capitalism, of mechanization, of the market mechanism. In this case they would just appear "Western", because these phenomena have first happened on a large scale in Europe, but they would in fact be above cultural specifics. These trends would then not constitute European values, but shape them. Only the societies affected would obviously perceive them as something forming part of their "original" identity.

Eurocentrism is a variant of Ethnocentrism. In general, ethnocentrism puts the own ethnic, national, religious or linguistic identity as the norm

to judge other countries and cultures, or even subgroups in the own society. Since the other cultures or groups can never fully conform to the standards or criteria defined by another group to apply to itself, it tends to imply a biased judgement about "good" and "bad". The own cultural context is automatically perceived as positive, as good, and as the proper yardstick for everybody else, and any deviation from this yardstick will be interpreted as a weakness, as something "uncivilized", or as morally inferior. Eurocentrism is a mental attitude to perceive non-Europeans (or today, non-Westerners) as less relevant, less modern, and less civilized. Obviously people always will observe and judge others as soon as they come into contact with each other. They recognize differences in skin colour, language, customs, economic conditions and similar. And the only way to compare these differences and form opinions and judgements about them is to hold them against the own experiences, against the own habits, traditions and conditions. They judge what they do not know against what they do know. The only way of overcoming this situation, is to integrate all the people in Europe in one entity – the European Union, so they can act together and live together, at the same time getting known each other. As Anderson says: "one crucial difference between the 'old' and 'new' communities, was the older communities' confidence in the unique sacredness of their language and culture"(Anderson 1983: 15-16). To find out that someone else is black instead of white or Muslim instead of Christian or atheist is by itself a quite innocent discovery. The problems may start when being black or Muslim is not being perceived as a difference, but as a deficit. This question raises two quite distinct points. First, it deals with problems of "internal" production of identity and homogeneity in one specific society or group. In this context the "external", "other" culture is not really the topic, but only a pretext for fabricating a positive self-image. The reality of "the other" does hardly matter, since it is only an arbitrary occasion for self-reflection. Second, the arbitrary transfer of difference into a negative value judgement historically has been linked to uneven power-relations. Eurocentrism, in that sense, has been a result of European colonialism and global domination by Western powers. In the past, one of the goals of the colonization was to show that European culture and thought is universal. (Amin 1989: 6). Since colonial times Europeans have perceived most of the World as open to conquest, control and domination. However, Helena Motoh says:"the Eurocentrism, as a discursive form, understands the geography of the world in a kind of pseudo-chronology of the progress and explains different social orders as levels of the progress, determined by the criteria of the European continent's history" (Motoh 2009: 478).

If we want to give a better explanation of the Eurocentrsim phenomena, we should give some historical notes about the etymology and development of this term. The Cartezian maps in the history were famous for the reason that Northern and Western part of Europe always have had a special place on it. According to the implemented examinations in the European schools, it was noticed that only the European history was studied in details (not all European, but only Western one), the history of Northern America was also well studied, but the history of Africa, Asia and Latin America was studied form the time when they were colonized by some European states.

The end of the Cold War considerably strengthened the foreign policy position of the West in international relations, since its main antagonist had disappeared. But at the same time it had created several problems of ideology and legitimacy: the Cold War had partly defined Western political identity, in the framework of anti-communism. The West could easily perceive itself as democratic, freedom-oriented and liberal, by contrasting itself with the opponent and its Stalinist or repressive practices. The East-West-Conflict was interpreted as a struggle between Freedom and Repression, Democracy and Dictatorship, Capitalism (or market economics) and Command Economy, and the West could feel confident to be on the right side of history. Being Western meant being democratic, liberal, and all the other things that the West liked to be (and the ones Huntington had portrayed as "Western values", Huntington 1996: 56), and its fighting Communism provided the proof. When formerly Western powers had supported doubtful governments or dictatorships in the Third World, it could always argue this to be a lesser evil compared to a communist threat. Also its tremendous military expenditures and the build-up of the 1980s could be legitimized similarly. But after the end of Communism, these convenient justifications lost credibility, and support for repressive regimes or human rights abuses became much harder to explain. Indeed, in many regards the simple notions of people and cultures of the Middle East being "fanatics", "medieval", "aggressive" and "anti-Western" has not convinced the foreign policy elite in Europe and North America. They may be fashionable in some parts of the media and reflect a certain pattern of prejudice existent in the general public, but they are hardly ever part of the decision-making process in Western governments.

Eurointegration processes of Turkey and the countries from the Western Balkans

The Accession Partnerships launched for candidate and potential candidate countries for accession in the European Union is the most important legal instrument, among the many actions taken by the Union in the reorientation of these countries from the aim of association to that of accession (Gugu 2010: 3). The fact that Turkey will become the EU's largest member state in population terms soon after accession is one of the biggest impacts of Turkish accession. Turkey's strategic geographical location, and its large Muslim population also have implications for the EU. It is in the EU's strategic interests that Turkey is democratic, stable and prosperous and a friendly ally. Turkish EU membership can – as with earlier enlargements – contribute to these strategic goals. The impact of Turkish accession – and of opening accession negotiations – in demonstrating that the EU is a secular, multicultural body not a 'Christian club' – will also have important geopolitical implications. Institutionally, Turkey will have a large impact on the Council and the European Parliament but not on the European Commission. Assuming a double majority system of voting operates in the Council (of countries and population), in an EU of 28 (this is an anticipation if Turkey enters EU, so the number of actual EU members and Turkey will be 28, not 27) both Turkey and Germany will have around 14.5% of the vote each. They will be strong players but unable to block proposals even together but they will be able to block proposals with a third large country. The large countries are not in a position to push through proposals on their own due to the need for a majority of countries as well as population. The largest 5 countries in an EU of 28 will account for 60.3% of the vote by population. This is only 3.4 percentage points higher than the share of the 'big 4' countries in an EU of 25 (where they have 56.9% of the vote). So Turkey will be an important powerful player and will add to the already complex set of alliances and blocking combinations that are possible. It will show its' importance and 'weight' in its' environment. Turkey will have an important impact on EU foreign policy interests given its borders with the Middle East, Caucasus and the Black Sea. This will shift the Union's borders to the South-East and increase the Union's range of interests in these difficult regions. Turkey will be a significant player in the development of EU foreign policy but it will not be as important 'bridge' to the Middle East as some expect. Turkey will impact more widely on the already complex political dynamics among member states, including the larger member states, but Turkey alone will not determine the future political evolution of the Union. And many issues around whether the enlarged

Union can find strategic leadership and direction, and whether it will aim for further political integration, will become clear in the next decade before Turkey joins. Regarding the criteria for entering EU, Turkey fulfils the economic criteria and criteria for adoption of acquis communautaire, but is lagging in the realization of the political criteria. So, Turkey must improve the relations with minority groups and must fully respect the human rights.

European Union had renewed the consensus for enlargement which is based on consolidation of commitments, fair and rigorous conditionality, better communication and the EU's capacity to integrate new members. The Process for Stabilization and association encompasses Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo. The recent historic changes are opening the way for regional reconciliation and cooperation. They enable all the countries in the region to establish new relations, beneficial to all of them, for the stability in the region and peace and stability on the European continent. They give new impetus to a policy of good neighbourliness based on the negotiated settlement of disputes, respect for the rights of minorities, respect for international obligations, a lasting resolution of the problem of refugees and displaced persons and respect for States' international borders. They strengthen regional security and are bound to assist the conclusion by the countries concerned of the negotiations on weapons control and reduction at regional level, as provided for in the Dayton agreements. The impact of the countries from the Western Balkans on the structure and activities of the institutions of the European Union, i.e. the European Parliament, European Commission and Council of EU will be minor, because of the number of inhabitants (around 25 million). Even together, they will not be able to block some of the EU policies, decisions and solutions, so they will not be able to bring into danger the interests of the current member states in the European Union. If these countries enter the European Union, they will not have neighbours which are outside the EU, because their current neighbours are already part of the EU, and this is important for prevention of criminal and illegal activities, as well as illegal migration. The European Union confirms its wish to contribute to the consolidation of democracy and to give its resolute support to the process of reconciliation and cooperation between the countries concerned. It reaffirms the European perspective of the countries participating in the Stabilisation and association process and their status as potential candidates for membership in accordance with the Feira conclusions. This stabilisation and association process is at the heart of the Union's policy towards the five countries concerned. It takes account of the situation of each country and is based on respect for the

conditions defined by the Council on 29 April 1997 concerning democratic, economic and institutional reforms. The prospect of accession is offered on the basis of the provision of the Treaty on European Union, respect for the criteria defined at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 and the progress made in implementing the stabilisation and association agreements, in particular on regional cooperation. Some of the "products of the Process of stabilization and association" are: the development of economic and trade relations with the region and within the region; the development of the existing economic and financial aid; aid for democratisation, civil society, education and the development of institutions; cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs; the development of political dialogue; etc. The Stability pact, which is the generator of the Stabilization and association process, represents the first coherent long-term strategy to bring stable and long-lasting peace to this conflict-ridden region through integration into the European Union. (Busek 2003: 199). Still, these countries have to improve their economic performances, to increase the institutional capacities for adoption of the so-called acquis communautaire, and most of all to fulfil the political criteria, i.e. to respect the human and minority rights, to increase the level of religious and ethnical freedom, to establish completely the rule of law in every sphere of the society, etc. By achieving these standards, Turkey and countries from the Western Balkans should prove to some of the sceptic political elites and citizens in some countries of the European Union, that they deserve to be part of the Union, on "equal foot" as they are. Definitely, Turkey and the countries from the Western Balkans need the European Union, more than the Union needs them. That's why they have to do their best to become part of the "European family" and to participate in the "European daily life". Being part of the European Union is not an advertisement. It is a real need for these states and their citizens. It is a way for a better life, higher progress of the economy, political and security certainty, etc.

Eurocentrism and its consequences and implications for Turkey and the countries from the Western Balkans

After we have described the essence of the Eurocentrism and the main points of the eurointegration process for Turkey and the countries from the Western Balkans, it is useful to note how the different types and varieties of Eurocentrism impact on the eurointegration processes of the above mentioned countries. European political elites declare a strong will for an enlargement of the European Union with the countries from Western

Balkans and Turkey. But, their concrete actions, unfortunately, do not correspond with this declarative statements. i.e. the European Union representatives are not always in favour of promoting the entrance of Turkey and countries from the Western Balkans in the European Union, at least not in an explicit manner. Eurocentrism can mean either a tendention of creation a strong, specific "European" identity, or a model for revoking and underestimating the states from South-Eastern Europe and Turkey, but also the citizens who live in them. If it means the first one, the accession of all these countries into the European Union will be followed by pro-European attitudes and adoption of the "European values, identity, habits and cultural heritage". But, if it means the second one, the implications of the Eurocentrism will be disasteorous, because it will stimulate "Euroscepticism", aversion of the candidate and potential candidate countries to the EU and its' member states, but also to the politics and activities of the Union. That is very inconvenient situation and may be reflected on the stability and security in the whole European continent. As Immanuel Wallerstein says: "Social science is a product of the modern world-system, and Eurocentrism is constitutive of the geoculture of the modern world." (Wallerstein 1997: 10). This can also be said about the European Union. The great importance of EU as an entity and its' member states, implicates creation of a special "European culture and civilization". For all these reasons, political leaders from EU and its' member states should be aware of the consequences of "promoting a Eurocentric attitudes" and demotivating the people from Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo to work on their "European agenda". Sometimes there is some ambiguity about the affiliation of the people: are they Balkans or Europeans? (Baskar 2003: 3). Usually, when some of the countries will reach some "European standards", they like to claim that they are not Balkan people any more, i.e. that they are Europeans. But, this is not very close to the truth. The concept of Eurocentrism can generate Euroscepticism, and can produce stagnation or regression of the process of unification for Europe. For these reasons, the only way for painless integration of Turkey and Western Balkans in the European Union is by promoting "eurointegrative model", released from stereotypes, prejudices, vanity and negative energy pointed to the "Non-Europeans" and "less Europeans". For return, Turkey and the countries from the Western Balkans should fulfil all the criteria and to reach all the standards which are posed by the European Union, to behave themselves like real Europeans, to respect the other cultures, nations, ethnical and confessional groups, and to show that they deserve to be inherent "piece of the European mosaic".

Conclusion

From all that we said in this paper, there is only one logical conclusion: "respect the others as you respect yourself". That is the only way to promote equality, solidarity, cohesion, and tolerance in the European Union. This "rule" should be also applied to the people who live in the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey, so they can feel themselves as a part of Europe. In that way, they can contribute to the establishment of the "New Europe", which will be modern, progressive, released from stereotypes and discrimination. Despite the fact that Europe is the oldest continent and "possess" most of the world cultural and civilizational heritage, it should not monopolize these achievements and forbid the others to be part of it. Politicians from the European Union and its member states should not forget that Western Balkans is a geographical, historical and cultural part of Europe, and also that Turkey, although Muslim is a modern state with clear aspirations for membership in the European Union. If the European Union wants to avoid dividing on social, national or religious base, it should immediately leave the concept of "Eurocentrism", practiced by some political elites and some nations, and point out to the concept of "Eurointegration". The final result of this will be integrated Europe, harmonic European Union with Turkey and the countries of the Western Balkans in it, and Europe with sustainable peace, democracy and security. Undoubtedly, Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo should be members of the European Union, after they will improve the respecting of the human rights, ethnic and religious freedoms, economic performances and after they will achieve the required standards, because the European Union will be completed at the moment when the citizens from all European countries will be treated equally, not only in a declarative and nominal modality, but also in practice.

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Foreign Direct Investment and Global Economic Crisis in the Western Balkans

Jelena Žugić[1]

ABSTRACT

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the biggest developmental chance of companies from the Western Balkans and the best way to increase production, employment, export and living standard in the long term. FDI is the only form of international capital movement that could help production companies from the Western Balkans ensure domestic and international competitiveness of their products as well as increase the gross domestic product (GDP), build infrastructure and attract advanced technology. In general, all Western Balkan countries have high public spending, inefficient administration, poor investment in research and development and serious problems regarding the quality of education. The global economic crisis has resulted only in further decrease in gross domestic product (GDP), the rise in deficit, unemployment, a lack of liquidity in the real sector throughout the Western Balkans. With respect to Montenegro, a decrease in industrial production on the global level has particularly affected this country, since the Montenegrin export is largely based on the export of aluminum. Generally, all Western Balkan countries have already missed the opportunity given to them through FDIs in the period before the global crisis and it is an open question how these small countries, which depend on the benefits of European integrations and export, will recover from the crisis whose end can hardly be foreseen.

KEY WORDS

foreign direct investment, global economic crisis, Western Balkans, European market, European integration, production, export, competitiveness

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Jelena Žugić, PhD, Assistant Professor Faculty of Business Studies, Serdara Jola Piletica bb Palada, 81000 Podgorica, Montenegro, e-mail: jelena_perovic@yahoo.com
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Introduction

Foreign direct investment is the major form of international movement of capital and the most attractive type of international cooperation and achievement of strategic goals. When we analyze FDI, we must start from the definition of international finance in wider and narrower terms.

Iinternational finance in narrower terms means a credit of goods and services, feedback and simultaneous financial transaction or export and import of capital. International finance in wider terms includes the transfer of goods, services, capital and money from one country to another in the form of economic assistance, reparation and gifts. (Dunning 1992: 109).

The international movement of capital directly responds to international diversification of business activities and indirectly, to recruitment of competitive edge and making a global competitive product. Simultaneously, the international movement of capital responds to growth in economy, changes in economic structure, balance of payment, employment and stability of a country. The international movement of capital is an authentic generator and accelerator of globalization. (Draskovic 2002: 49)

FDI is a long-term placement of private capital abroad in order to claim appropriate control in a foreign company. FDI begins when a company invests directly in the capacity.This form of international movement of capital includes a long-term relationship between a direct investor and a foreign company, as well as significant influence from the direct investor to the management of a foreign investor.

FDI is more than international capital movement, and more than the element of control in the company. FDI dynamics is attributed to the activities of transnational companies that are holders of foreign direct investment, as well as the impact of the changes that are occurring in the global business environment. Moreover, foreign investors must buy at least ten percent of the initial capital of the company and then acquire ownership control of the company.

The thesis of this paper is that the global economic crisis has seriously threatened the Western Balkans. It has worsened the existing local crisis in the Western Balkans. Generally, Western Balkan countries have a common problem: their economic growth is not based on their own

production, their own export and competitiveness of their products and services. The economic growth of Western Balkan countries is primarily based on FDIs. The global economic crisis has shown that such a model of growth is wrong and unsustainable. In addition, the paper analyzes how long this model of growth can last, especially how the citizens of Western Balkan countries can benefit from this model.

To sum up, this paper analyzes FDIs in Western Balkan countries in the global economic crisis using the methods of analysis and synthesis, and a large number of cases from practice. Furthermore the paper points out to some obvious shortcomings of the existing model of growth in the Western Balkans and proposes certain measures to create a new and more suitable model.

FDI - The Major Form of International Movement of Capital

Global FDI flows have been severely affected worldwide by the economic and financial crisis. Inflows are expected to fall from $1.7 trillion to below $1.2 trillion in 2009, with a slow recovery in 2010, to a level up to $1.4 trillion (World Investment Report 2009a: 17). In the short run, with the global recession extending into 2009 and a slow growth projected for 2010, as well as the drastic fall of corporate profits, FDI is expected to be low. The medium-term prospects for FDI are more optimistic.

There are three components of FDIs inflows: equity investments, other capital (mainly intra-company loans) and reinvested earnings. In late 2008 and the first few months of 2009, significant declines were recorded in all three components of FDI inflows. For example, lower profits by foreign affiliates drove down reinvested earnings, contributing to the 46% drop in FDI outflows from developed countries in the first quarter of 2009 (World Investment Report 2009b: 72-4). The proportionate decline in equity investments today is larger than that registered during the previous downturn. Since mid-2008, divestments, including repatriated investments, reverse intra-company loans and repayments of debt to parent firms, have exceeded gross FDI flows in a number of countries. For instance, divestments amounted to $110 billion in the case of FDI outflows from Germany, accounting for 40% of its gross FDI flows in 2008. This depressed FDI flows further.

In 2008, inward FDI flows in South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) reached a new record high, despite the global

financial and economic crisis and armed conflicts within and between countries in certain parts of the region. FDI inflows started to slow down in the second half of 2008, and were showing signs of a sharp decline in the first half of 2009.

In 2010, FDI will fall in Central and Eastern Europe to the level of 2001 and 2002 (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 2009). Reduction in investment between 20 and 80% was reported in this region in the first quarter of the year. The crisis in Eastern Europe has not yet passed even though the reduction of industrial production is currently lower than in the previous period. FDIs in Central and Eastern Europe were reduced last year, so they fell by nine per cent per year or EUR 44.86 billion in ten new EU countries. FDI dropped in Southeast Europe by more than a fifth, reaching the figure of EUR 7.4 billion.

FDI entry into transition countries brings capital, technology, know-how, maintenance and development of their international competitiveness. In today's business conditions, it is necessary to rely upon those foreign direct investments that would contribute to the restructuring towards the production of products that are competitive at the international market. There is a direct link between capital inflow, faster increase of gross domestic product and export strategy of countries. That is the reason why strategy of export competitiveness should be precisely coordinated with the strategy for attracting foreign direct investment.

The following table presents the inflows and outflows of FDI in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 for the Western Balkans (World Investment Report 2009c:73).

Table 1: The Western Balkans: FDI flows of selected countries, 2008-2009, by quarter (millions of dollars)

Country	FDI inflows		FDI outflows	
	2008:Q4	2009:Q1	2008:Q4	2009:Q1
Albania	331	161	15	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	294	40	-	-
Montenegro	183	144	13	15
Serbia	338	828	62	2
The FYR of Macedonia	93	71	-	-

Source: Miroux, Fujita, 2009

All these countries, except Serbia, recorded decline in FDI inflows in the first quarter of 2009. The worst situation was found in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where FDI inflows have fallen 7.5 times. On the other hand, in *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, the lumpiness of privatization-related FDI, with exceptionally large transactions in 2006 and 2007 but few in 2008, led to a lower level of inflows in 2008. FDI outflows in the period increased only in Montenegro.

In Croatia, FDI in the first quarter of 2009 amounted to EUR 399 million, which is, compared to the same period in 2008, a decline of 42%. The structure of FDI is still dominated by investment in financial intermediation. It is certain that the balance of payment deficit this year will be covered with FDI and a further decline in FDI during 2009 was caused, among other things, by the global economic crisis.

Meanwhile, liberalisation of the import of capital, goods and services in the countries of the Western Balkans should be profound and rational in order to produce a maximum effect and decrease negative effects of the global economic crisis. The state must have its own role in this process. It must have a refined and very prudent strategy in order to enable its own companies to enter international markets and improve their competitive position.

Two Sides of FDI

The countries of Central Europe assumed that there were neither good nor bad companies in the conditions of transition. They opened the door wide for FDI. Most countries had substantial foreign direct investment which was part of a targeted plan. In other words, the countries of Central Europe had a strategy for attracting FDIs.

A good example is Ukraine, which is planning to attract FDIs. However, the open question is how the country could be improved by FDI. Ukraine has ten years of consecutive decline in recorded output, and the year 2000 recorded growth for the first time. Only five years after the given period, FDIs in Ukraine amounted to EUR 6.6 billion.

In Central Europe there are three phases of the inflow of foreign investment. In the first phase, the investors were most interested in the privatization of

the state property. The selling of state enterprises served as the impetus for a wave of greenfield investments, which were export oriented and which are characteristic of the second phase.

The third stage is crucial for sustainable economic growth: the third phase is primarily related to reinvestment of profits. Central Europe has reached the third stage, but in the global crisis, there is a danger that the countries of Central Europe will remain stuck in the third phase.

Unlike the countries of Central Europe, the Western Balkan FDIs stagnated in the first phase, characterized by privatization. The Western Balkan countries received relatively small amount of FDI. Increasing but still meagre inflows were booked by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia while significant declines hit Croatia and Serbia. These developments correspond to the occurrence of privatization deals. Export-oriented manufacturing FDI is still rare.

Neither Montenegro nor other Western Balkan countries think long term and they believe that the solution is to find any kind of investors. It will be difficult to create new jobs by direct investment through privatization because, after the sale of domestic enterprises, there is a surplus of workers who become redundant.

However, in the Western Balkans the key question is not „how many investments", but „how effective FDIs are and what is their contribution to the economic development of the country?"Foreign investors wanted to profit from the privatization of former state enterprises in the Western Balkans.

More economically justified are those FDI projects that are leading to significant improvements in competitiveness of products and services, increasing efficiency and export orientation of the host economy. Greenfield investment should play a key role in this process rather than investment through privatization.

If some investors want to establish a new company or want to buy an area of land to build a new factory and facility, this investment will be called a greenfield investment. This kind of FDIs enables employment of many new workers and brings out new products. Theoretically, greenfield investment exists in industry, but, practically, it expands into a lot of areas, including services.

There is a possibility of buying an area of land with an existing facility and this is called a brownfield investment. If a company wants to buy an existing facility abroad, it may be done in two ways: merger or acquisition.

Therefore, the key issue for Western Balkan countries is a lack of strategy for attracting FDIs. They will not move further than the first phase if they do not consider the economic feasibility of investment, the true motives for the arrival of foreign investors and the origin of their capital. FDIs will not be in the function of the growth of competitiveness of their enterprises, international competitiveness of their products, increased employment rates and achievement of better living standard.

For instance, there are very few greenfield investments in Montenegro. The biggest greenfield investment is the mobile operator Promonte. Other greenfield investments are usually associated with the services sector, such as the Splendid Hotel, the financial sector, such as the Hypo Alpe Adria Bank and LB Leasing. The investments in production were meagre, and one of the rare examples is the plant for bottling Coca-Cola, where two million euros was invested.

The company ProMonte is an example of the importance of a greenfield investment for the economy of one country.The company was founded in 1996 which marked the arrival of the first foreign investors in Montenegro, Greece - Norwegian consortium ETL (European Telecom Louxembourg), which consists of Telenor Mobile Communications AS, Wcom Investment, West and South Tel TopStar Shipping. Telenor is the leading telecommunications company in Norway and has major investments outside the home country, in Hungary, Russia, Southeast Asia and Montenegro.

It was the first mobile operator in Montenegro which started writing the history of mobile communications on 10 July 1996. Promonte has been a part of the Telenor family from the first day, and since 11 August 2004 it has been 100% owned by Telenor. With its headquarters in Norway, Telenor is the world seventh largest mobile operator with close to 150 million subscriptions in 12 mobile operators across Europe and Asia. Telenor is emerging as one of the fastest growing providers of mobile communications services worldwide.

Since the commercial launch of GSM in 1996, Promonte has been positioned as an innovative and quality operator within all segments, focusing

its products and services on simplicity of tariff structure and user-friendliness. Promonte, with licenses for GSM, 3G and WiMax technologies, offers mobile voice, roaming, value-added services and mobile data services over GPRS-EGDE-3G-HSDPA-WiMax-WiFi to its subscribers on both, prepaid and contract basis.

Being among the most attractive employers in Montenegro, currently Promonte has almost 300 employees, out of which more than half are university and college graduates. Of the total staff number, 45% are women and they are equally represented in the company's management.

In Montenegro, total FDIs in 2008 year amounted to EUR 685 million and were little more than 2007, when they amounted to EUR 678 million (Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency Statistics 2009).

However, in the structure of inflow, FDIs had the largest share of investment in real estate, which, according to the Central Bank of Montenegro, was even 51% or more than a half of EUR1 billion in 2007.

In 2008, almost 40% of FDIs was invested in real estate, and 30% in local companies and banks, or intercompany debts.(Progress Report on Montenegro 2008) These data are seriously disturbing. The practice has proved that FDIs in Montenegro have not stepped up production or introduced new, internationally competitive products, but are mostly used for personal consumption. FDIs were used for the purchase of attractive lots on the Montenegrin coast and other resources that are not directly in the function of creation of gross domestic product, and raising the efficiency of the local economy.

FDI should contribute to the development of enterprises and is the best chance for a long-term increase in production, employment, exports, competitiveness and living standard. FDI in Montenegro is in the function of consumption, which is an economic anomaly.

The statistical data for 2009 is slightly different. In the first two quarters of 2009, the capital and financial account recorded a surplus of EUR 290.9 million, which is substantially less than that recorded in the comparative period of 2008 (EUR 698.4 million). The net inflow of FDIs in the first two quarters of 2009 amounted to EUR 323.5 million, which is 1.1% more than in the same period of 2008. The total FDI inflow in the reporting

period amounted to EUR 396.2 million. The FDI structure changed substantially compared to previous years when investments in real estate were prevalent. The investment in domestic companies and banks has increased in the first half of the current year, amounting to EUR 231.4 million or 38.9% more than in the comparative period of 2008. Some EUR 83.1 million (21%) was in the form of intercompany debt, while investment in real estate amounted to EUR 81.4 million (20.6%) or 52.5% less than in the comparative period. (Chief Economist Annual Report 2009a: 127)

Most of the investments in the reporting period came from Italy, Great Britain and Austria. The upcoming recapitalization of EPCG (Electric Power Company of Montenegro) and announced capital investments will create real conditions for an inflow of fresh capital and positive multiplication effects on the economy.

In structural terms, the situation in Serbia is similar. The Serbian privatization is almost completed, but the expected effect has failed to take place: local companies have become sufficiently competitive in the international market and have started to create new jobs in the sector which should be export oriented. One could say that Serbian economic structure is a consequence of economic collapse at the end of 20th century and the privatization and economic policy of 2001-2008.

The Serbian privatization is implemented in the following way: companies are often sold to the owners of capital of suspected, insufficient business competencies. FDIs through privatization include the layoff and the sale of property. The owners use the assets to maximize short-term goals and not to increase employment and economic activity in the long term. New jobs have been created mainly in the sectors that are unable to export (financial intermediation, trade, real estate, rental services). The development model in Serbia is predominantly based on banks, shopping malls, betting shops and construction of luxury housing and business facilities. In this way Serbia cannot build a significant export industry capable of supporting the economy of the country.

If you look at the structure of gross value added (gross domestic product without taxes and subsidies) for 2009, 60% of GDP comes from services, and only 29% from the industry and construction (Statistical Annual Report of Serbia 2008:134).

Albania has the same access to the attraction of FDIs, although the data shows that FDIs highly increased in 2009. In the first nine months of 2009 Albania attracted EUR 565 million of FDIs, which is 214 million more than in the same period of 2008. Investments are the result of government reforms and the continuing privatization of state enterprises (Monthly Statistical Report of Albania October 2009).

The structure of FDIs in Croatia is still dominated by investment in financial intermediation. The largest amount of total direct investments came from Austria (EUR 325 milion), and since 1993 investments worth 6.1 billion EUR have poured from Austria to Croatia, which is one third of total investments. The balance of payment deficit in Croatia in 2009 will be covered with FDIs and their further decline during 2009 was, among other things, due to the global economic crisis (World Investment Report 2009c: 75).

It is obvious that all these countries have the same problem. They do not use FDIs for production or export projects. In this way, the crisis in which the Western Balkans has been for a long time is deepening.

Another structural problem of the Western Balkans is as follows: a model of growth of all countries is based exclusively on FDIs, which is a huge mistake. If you are solely dependent on FDIs and do not think about production, export competitiveness and better quality of life you are bound to become a loser in the long term. FDIs must be permanent value, and not the parameter on which the model of growth is based.

Regarding industrial production, Montenegro has recorded a huge drop by 32.2%. Moreover, Montenegro is faced with the problem of underdeveloped industrial processing. On the other hand, Montenegro has a highly developed services sector, which is the result of final expenditure arising from FDIs. The services sector must be in accordance with the manufacturing sector in each economy. For example, in the wood industry, which has the potential for export, the most important export items are simply treated wood or crude wood. This Montenegrin export product has a low degree of processing, low added value and is often based on insufficient productive use of existing natural resources. In this respect, the export of Montenegro has the export characteristics of the „third world"countries.

The main Montenegrin export product is aluminum. It is true that in the global economic crisis, export-oriented economy will be affected by the

narrowing of global market opportunities. In some sectors, particularly in the production and processing of metals dramatic breakdowns should not be expected, and in the case of a small state economy, such as Montenegro, the collapse of one large company (Aluminium Smeltery) can have catastrophic consequences. Aluminum Smeltery (KAP) was sold to Russian CEAC (Central European Aluminium Company) and KAP accounts for 40% of GDP.

Take the example of Serbia. The global crisis has withheld a part of the inflow of capital from abroad, and showed that Serbia has no economic structure capable of productively employing the citizens to return the debts and to maintain macroeconomic stability. Despite the development of the Serbian economy from 2001 to 2008 and before the outbreak of the global crisis, Serbian industrial production has been reduced by half compared to that in 1990. For example, the total value of construction work performed by developers from Serbia in the first quarter of 2009, compared to the same period last year, was reduced by 11% at current prices, and 17% at constant prices. The value of contracts in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 2008 at current prices decreased by 45.5% and the number of issued building permits decreased by 16.7% (Macroeconomic trends and Conjuncture barometer 2009:1)

Furthermore, what will happen when Montenegro (and other countries) privatizes all state-owned enterprises and realizes FDIs through privatization? On the basis of which will it build its model of growth? The following table shows the most important companies that will be sold by means of public tender.

Table 2: The most important companies that will be sold by means of public tender (in millions of EUR)

Company	State share (%)	Estimated value
Luka Bar	54	133
Plantaže	54.2	68.7
Duvanski kombinat	51.1	19.7
Jadransko brodogradilište	62.7	31.6

Source: Own field research

Besides these companies, the privatization process was initiated, with the adopted restructuring programmes, for the following companies: „Željeznice Crne Gore", „Montenegro Airlines" and „Pošta Crne Gore". Preparation and realization of public procedures for the selection of investors for the implementation of valorisation projects referring to the exclusive tourist locations: „Ada Bojana", „Velika plaža", „Njivice", „Utjeha", „Buljarica" and „Jaz" are expected.

Montenegro expects much from construction of the highway Bar-Boljari, because the investment should launch many activities. It remains an open question how this will help long-term investment in Montenegro, which does not have a well developed construction industry, metal industry or wood industry . It remains to hope that these investments will increase employment and develop services even further.

Generally, the Western Balkans, instead of looking for a new, more appropriate model of growth, is constantly hiding behind the global economic crisis. The local crisis in the Western Balkans is still very relevant, but is analyzed in the context of the global crisis, which is unacceptable. We need to see exactly what effects are global, and what are the local effects of the crisis. In general, all Western Balkan countries have high public spending, inefficient administration, poor investment in research and development and serious problems regarding the quality of education. The global economic crisis has resulted only in further decrease in gross domestic product (GDP), the rise in deficit, unemployment, a lack of liquidity in the real sector throughout the Western Balkans.

The most dramatic example is Croatia, which has had the problem of external debt for years. Last year the Croatian GDP amounted to around EUR 39 billion (The Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). The external debt at the end of 2008 amounted to EUR 39.1 billion, and for the first time in history it was greater than the annual GDP (Report of Croatian National Bank 2009).

The Western Balkan countries urgently need another transition. The previous transition has pushed the countries into much bigger problems than those they had before. It is now necessary to create a serious economic development strategy and favorable legal and economic conditions for investment in export-oriented sectors, aimed at long-term development of infrastructure, human resources and relatively high rates of economic growth.

External Development of the Western Balkans

The countries of the Western Balkans have a high foreign trade deficit and, at this moment, FDI is an added burden for their balance of payment. FDIs cannot improve the balance of payment position of countries in the first year, because foreign investors use their own contractors and traditional partners, thereby increasing imports. This situation should not last for long and a country must not be demoralised as FDIs should change this situation.

Montenegro is now confronted with insufficient level of training of the local economy that is struggling with competitors in the international market. Inadequate quality of local product, uncompetitive pricing and a lack of quality standards are the main reasons for the increasing imports into Montenegro, which is shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Foreign trade of Montenegro from 2007 (in thousands EUR)

Period	Import	Export	Trade balance
2007	2,072,480	487,119	-1,585,362
2008	2,527,151	433,158	-2,093,993
2009	1,654,043	276,982	-1,377,061

Source: Statistics of foreign trade, 2009

As for 2009, the total foreign exchange of Montenegro amounted to EUR1.931 million, indicating a decrease of 35% compared to 2008. The value of the exported goods was EUR277 million, a decrease of 36.06% compared to the same period last year, and the value of imported goods was EUR1654 million, which is lower by 34.55% compared to 2008. The export-import ratio was 16.75% and less than the coverage in 2008 when it was 17.14%. The structure of the export of non-ferrous metals amounted to EUR113.16 million and the amount of the exported iron and steel was 32.8 million. The structure of imports was as follows: the most represented products, food and live animals – EUR299.41 million, meat and meat products - EUR75.5 million and grain products - EUR50.46 million. This is further disconcerting, because we have the potential to reduce this figure by domestic production.

The foreign trade in Serbia is shown in Table 4. The fall in exports is the result of a large decrease in prices of primary products in world markets. These products have great participation in the structure of the Serbian export. The main cause for the reduction of imports lies in industrial production and domestic consumption.

Table 4: Foreign trade of Serbia from 2007 (in millions $)

Period	Export	Import	Trade balance
2007	8.825	19.164	-10.338
2008	10.974	24.331	-13.356
2009	8.344	16.056	-7.710

Source: Statistical Annual Report of Serbia, 2010

The visible export of Serbia in 2009 amounted to $ 8.34 billion, which is 24% less than 2008. The visible import of Serbia in 2009 amounted to $ 16.06 billion, which is 31.9% less than in 2008.The coverage of imports by exports amounted to 52%, which is 5.2% more than in 2008 (Statistical Annual Report of Serbia 2010:289). A declining trend in exports and imports continued during 2009 and the main factor for this was the world economic crisis, which led to the fall in economic activity.
The trade deficit in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 2009 decreased by 33% compared to the same period in 2008. This means that there was a fall in economic activity and reduction of production in the conditions of economic crisis.

Table 5: Foreign trade of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2007 (in thousands of KM)

Period	Export	Import	Trade balance
2007	5.936.584	13.898.242	-7.961.658
2008	6.711.690	16.292.516	-9.580.826
2009	5.531.199	12.355.179	-8.823.980

Source: Foreign trade 2009, Agency for Statistics of BiH

The year 2009 was characterized by a reduction in external trade activity of Albania, supported by the deteriorating economic indicators of the main trading partners, and the slowdown of demand in the country

Table 6: Foreign trade of Albania from 2007 (in millions EUR)

Period	Export	Import	Trade balance
2007	786,3	-2.890,4	-2.104
2008	917,5	-3.348,9	-2.431,5
2009	750,7	-3.054,4	-2.303,7

Source: Annual Report of Albania, 2009

The degree of economic openness was estimated at 46.2% of GDP, roughly 4.5 percentage points less than in the previous year. However, this indicator settled above the historical average of the last six years. During the year, the narrowing of the annual trade deficit by about 5.9% was recorded, mainly due to decreased imports. The relative ratio of covering imports by exports was 23%, i.e., 2.6 percentage points lower compared with the coverage ratio recorded in the previous year.

The Macedonian cross selling dropped from January to November last year by the third compared to the same period of 2008. The deficit reached $2.1 billion. The coverage of import by export was 53.6%. The visible export of Macedonia in 2009 amounted to $ 2.4 billion and the visible import in 2009 amounted to $ 4.5 billion. The exports are still dominated by products of iron, steel and garments. Macedonia mostly imported crude oil, electricity and motor vehicles (Annual Report of Macedonia 2009).

From all these data we can conclude that Western Balkan countries are import-dependent, and that they have high trade deficit, especially Montenegro. FDI for the Western Balkans have exaggerated the economic justification for these countries obviously cannot boast with export projects.

The companies from Western Balkan countries must consider a more lively trade exchange with countries in the region and the EU markets. The Western Balkan countries must offer only neccessary goods and services to those markets. But, some of them lack competitive products and prices,

quality standards and knowledge. Generally, those countries have to fulfill a lot of conditions in terms of time, resource, rule of law, infrastructure and they should try to avoid „the best in the village" pattern of behaviour. FDIs can play a key role in this process.

The Necessity of Foreign Trade Liberalisation

The Western Balkan countries have made varying progress regarding EU integration. Croatia is the most developed and it entered the final phase of negotiations for the EU membership. Important progress has been made in Montenegro with a candidate status and Serbia has entered a new phase in meeting the requirements for obtaining the status of the candidate. There has been no major shift in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia, but an important signal from Brussels for BiH and Albania was the abolition of visas for citizens of these countries who travel to EU member states. This visa liberalization expanded to the entire Western Balkans, except Kosovo.

Political, economic and institutional stabilization of the Western Balkans and the region as a whole is one of the objectives of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. It contributes to the establishment and strengthening of a stable European order based on the EU as its foothold.

The Stabilization and Association Agreement is a special form of association agreement which creates a basis for improving relations and establishes "the highest form of cooperation" between the Western Balkan countries and the EU. Until now, the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Communities and their Member States was signed by the FYR Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina initialed the Agreement. These agreements confirm the Union's readiness to contribute to the full integration of these countries into European political and economic developments. The achievement of this goal implies democratization, rule of law, respect for human and minority rights and freedoms, civil service reform and institution building, promotion of cooperation in economic and other areas, such as justice and home affairs.

The free trade zone in South Eastern Europe and the accession of transition countries to the EU are parallel activities, necessary for liberalization

and integration into European economic flows. Integration of South Eastern Europe countries is the strategic goal of the EU. The Western Balkans includes six countries: Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Croatia. All activities in these countries aim to reduce complexity of current trade procedures. This process is realized by simplification of tariff procedures, increased sincerity of trade regime and recruitment of trade flows in the region. Currently, the trade systems of these countries are becoming more liberal on the international level and open for international cooperation and trade exchange.

The South Eastern Europe will be a free trade zone only with liberalisation of services. Currently, there are a lot of holdbacks in the market, especially in transport, telecommunications, finance and public service. In the last years, all data represent an increased interest of foreign investors for countries from South Eastern Europe, just because of the liberalization of foreign trade, development of financial market and cheaper raw materials and labor.

The unique free trade zone will bring trade without tariffs for all industrial products. The agreement on free trade means that at least 90% of the value of current goods has been free of tariffs since 2001. The most susceptible products will be free of tariffs gradually until 2007.

The goal of all these countries is a membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO was established in 1 January, 1995 and WTO member countries have more than 90 percent of the world trade of goods and services. WTO was based on fundamental provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the first and only act of achievement of foreign trade.

WTO arranges international trade relationships between member countries, makes business environment for free trade relationships between partners in the region and increases foreign trade exchange. The main goal is free and predictable foreign trade, (making effective multilateral trade regime), raising the living standard and full employment.

Of all the countries in the region, only Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are not the WTO members and, together with Russia and Byelorussia, they are the only ones in Europe. Croatia became the WTO member country in 2000, Albania in 2000, and Macedonia in 2003.

Currently, the WTO includes 153 countries and covers 97 percent of world trade. There are 30 countries in the accession process to the WTO, including Montenegro. This membership is the best way of attracting international capital. (Đurovic 2006a: 8)

Central and Eastern Europe Free Trade Agreement – CEFTA 2006

CEFTA was established in 1992 and includes the countries which entered the EU in 2004. CEFTA 2006 is characterized by its modern and comprehensive provisions, a high level of liberalization, efficient procedural arrangements and its openness to all parties in the region under conditions mutually agreed upon. CEFTA 2006 should also constitute the beginning of a new era characterized by greater political stability, economic development and good neighbourly relations for all its parties. CEFTA 2006 is also an appropriate framework to facilitate the parties' efforts to implement the economic reforms necessary for closer connections with the European Union and further integration into the multilateral trading system. (CEFTA Summit, Bucharest, 2006a: 1)

New CEFTA members are: the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Montenegro, Romania, the Republic of Serbia and the Special Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Interim Administration Mission on behalf of Kosovo. The network of 28 bilateral agreements, grounded on the principles of GATT – 1994 and the WTO, outgrew in CEFTA 2006.

The scheme of countries Serbia and Montenegro has signed and ratified agreements with, as well as dates of coming into force, is represented in the table. (Djurović 2006b: 7)

Table 7: The scheme of countries with which SCG has signed and ratified agreements

Country	Date of signature	Date of coming into the force	Pending period
Albania	13/11/2003	1/8/2004	until 1/1/2007
BIH	1/2/2002	1/6/2002	until 1/1/2004
Bulgaria	13/11/2003	1/6/2004	until 1/1/2007
Croatia	23/12/02 - 14/1/04	1/7/2004 1/7/2004	until 1/1/2007
Macedonia	4/9/1996 Revised 2005	7/10/1996 1/6/2006	without pending period
Moldova	13/11/2003	1/9/2004	without pending period
Romania	22/12/2003	1/7/2004	until 1/1/2007

Source: Djurovic, 2006

Subscript:
- An agreement with BIH was concluded in September 2003
- An amendment to the agreement on free trade between SCG and Croatia

The priorities of CEFTA 2006 are (CEFTA Ministry for Economic Development, 2007c: 9):
- Free flow of people, goods and services, increased exchange, coordination of economic development, making of larger market and improvement of economic cooperation
- Inward FDI into the region
- Improved production technology, productivity, efficiency and use of modern management
- Improved living standard through versatile and cheaper supply of goods and services
- Acceleration of the accession process to the EU and the WTO

CEFTA 2006 exercises an enormous influence in Montenegro:
- Business at the markets with dozens of millions of customers
- Increase of competitiveness, productivity and efficiency
- Increase of foreign direct investment
- Improvement of export and import structure

As a CEFTA member, Montenegro has become more attractive for foreign investors, which will acculturate the production, accelerate economic growth, increase productivity, efficiency and competitiveness. For example, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia (valid members of the EU) have a very positive experience with CEFTA. This means that CEFTA is a very good model for joining the EU for all of these countries.

Generally, the small economies, as Western Balkans countries, will have benefits from regional cooperation and integration. If the Western Balkan countries want to attract foreign direct investment, they must not ignore European integrations. This hypothesis is proved by the next example. If transition countries ignore European integrations, they will have to produce larger scale of products, under more unfavourable conditions. However, the lack of specialization will decrease revenue and efficiency. That is why the harmonization in the tariff policy and reduction of barriers in free trade of goods and services are very important for transition countries.

A big problem of CEFTA members is non-recognition of certificates of quality and phytosanitary, sanitary and veterinary documents. An additional problem with the application of CEFTA is that the Western Balkan countries are technologically obsolete industries which compete in exports to the EU and do not have that much to offer to each other. A company with relatively high-quality supply will have most benefits from duty-free area since it will be easier to reach new consumers in this way. Despite the losses, the implementation of CEFTA is useful because businessmen are faced with markets that adopt the standards of Euro-Atlantic integration. CEFTA is a good basis for new steps on the road to EU accession.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The impacts of the global economic and financial crisis in the Western Balkans have shown the following structural problems:

1. The key issue for Western Balkan countries is a lack of strategy for attracting FDIs. They will not move further than the first phase if they do not consider the economic feasibility of investment, true motives for the arrival of foreign investors and the origin of their capital. In the first phase of the inflow of foreign investment , the investors were most interested in the privatization of the state property. Selling state enterprises served as the

impetus for a wave of greenfield investments, which were export oriented and which are characteristic of the second phase. In such a way, FDIs will not be in the function of the growth of competitiveness of the enterprises, the international competitiveness of products, the increase in employment rates and achievement of the growth of living standards.

2. The big problem of the Western Balkans is that it is constantly hiding behind the world economic crisis. The essence is as follows: the local crisis in the Western Balkans is still very relevant, but is analyzed in the context of the global crisis, which is unacceptable. The Western Balkan countries have a high public spending, inefficient administration, poor investment in research and development and the disintegration of quality education. The global economic crisis has brought the fall of GDP, deficits, unemployment and high external and internal debt for the Western Balkans.

3. Although FDIs have positive implications for the Western Balkans, it is necessary to perceive them through the prism of the secondary and not primary determinants of the growth in these countries. The primary determinant of development must be our own production, an active attitude towards the market, an increase in exports and attraction of high technology.

4. The Western Balkan countries urgently need another transition. The previous transition has pushed the countries into much bigger problems than those they had before. It is now necessary to create a serious economic development strategy and create favorable legal and economic conditions for investment in export-oriented sectors. The enormously high growth of import in all countries of the Western Balkans was not followed, nor will be accompanied by an adequate growth in export due to uncompetitive domestic economy.

5. In general, if the Western Balkans does not have an explicit "rule of game" and "healthy" environment in the form of rule of law, CEFTA and the EU integration will not be able to help them. The legislation in the Western Balkans can be a magnet for dirty capital and a holdback for serious investors. If host companies do not respect their own rules, foreign investors will not respect them, either. The Western Balkans should not make an independent and responsible system for Brussels (and because of the pressure from Brussels) or other centers of power but for their citizens and their living standard.

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Analysing EU's Civil Society Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Anže Voh Boštic[1]

ABSTRACT

The article assesses the scope and successfulness of the EU's policies for the development of civil society in BIH. Firstly, the article presents why Bosnia should be the beneficiary of civil society development assistance and why the development of a civil society matters in a post-conflict reconstruction process. In its empirical part, the article analyses the EU's policies for the development of civil society organizations (CSOs) as such; policies for improving their cooperation with the government and state institutions; measures for addressing the conditions of the most vulnerable levels of civil society (e.g. refugees); and whether civil society is included in local ownership of the EU's policies towards BIH. The analysis shows that even though the EU does have various programmes for the development of civil society that address multiple issues, the results of those policies are mixed, as the influence of Bosnian CSOs, among others, on the decision-making process is still small, the EU's projects are short-term oriented and incoherent, and the wider civil society still does not trust local non-governmental organizations, while local ownership of the EU's policies towards BIH is very weak. Because of that, changes in the EU's policy toward civil society development in BIH are needed.

KEY WORDS

Bosnia and Herzegovina, civil society development, enlargement, EU's foreign policy

1 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Anže Voh Boštic, Tkalska 5, 3000 Celje, Slovenia
e-mail: anze.bostic@gmail.com

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Introduction

15 years after the Dayton Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH)[2], the situation in the country is still far from perfect. Even though BIH has benefited from a large amount of international assistance in the years after the Dayton Agreement, it appears that today it lingers "somewhere in between", where the possibility of the recurrence of violent conflict is small, while the country is still far from being a fully-functional autonomous state (Chandler 2010: 82).

Post-war international intervention in Bosnia was done by numerous actors: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), other international organizations, development agencies, and a large number of international non-governmental organizations (Belloni and Hemmer 2010: 129). This article aims to analyse the EU policies that address the development of Bosnian civil society, because, on the one hand, the EU has, through its enlargement policy, become the main international actor in the area of the western Balkans, since the EU integration process is regarded as one of the main driving forces for reforms in the region (Balkan Civil... 2009: 2), and on the other hand, since the development of a civil society, as it will be argued below, plays a very important part of post-conflict peacebuilding[3], but often does not get due attention.

The article will first present the meaning of BIH for the EU's foreign policy. Then it will show why the development of a civil society plays an important part in a peacebuilding process, and which levels of civil society development need to be addressed in the process. In its empirical part, the article will analyse the state and shortcomings of civil society in BIH and present the EU's policy in addressing the development of BIH's civil society. In the end, the article will analyse those policies in order to identify good practices or shortcomings and to assess whether the EU's actions resemble the normative paradigm or not.

[2] The abbreviation BIH stands for the Serbo-Croatian name of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e., Bosna i Hercegovina.

[3] As regards the definition of peacebuilding, this article uses Galtung's (1996) definition that states that the peacebuilding process addresses the causes of conflict in order to ensure that the conflict will not erupt again. Causes of conflict are those underlying characteristics in a society that could lead to a start or a renewal of a violent conflict

The EU's foreign policy: Why does Bosnia matter?

The EU's actions in the international arena are often explained with the "normative power" theory. According to the theory, the EU's foreign policy is based on promoting the norms, enshrined in the article two and three of the Treaty on European Union[4]: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (Gerrits 2009: 5), sustainable development and good governance (Manners 2009a: 12). This norm promotion is not done by physical force, but through persuasion (Manners 2009b), and is in Manners' opinion an important alternative that is needed to address the destabilizing issues, which the international community will face in the future (Manners 2009a).

Looking through this slightly idealistic lens of the role of the EU in international politics, it could be argued that the EU's enlargement policy, and with that, its involvement in BIH, follows this normative paradigm, since the goal of the enlargement process is for candidate countries to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria of, inter alia, "stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for and the protection of minorities" (European Commission 2010a). Indeed, Toje (2009: 39) acknowledges that the deep level of commitment to addressing the issues of the former Yugoslav republic makes the EU perceived as a legitimate actor in the region, while its power of persuasion through the offer of EU membership is acknowledged as a source of stability in the region and is thus probably the EU's most effective foreign policy tool. However, if the EU wants to maintain this legitimacy, its policy of norm promotion towards BIH, arguably the most difficult case of all enlargement countries has to produce a result – a country that will be rebuilt to such a level that it will be able to become an EU member state.

This legitimacy needs to be created also if one sees the EU´s foreign policy from Laïdi´s perspective, who argues that this norm promotion serves not as the noble goal of solving the "world´s troubles", but rather that the EU has to resort to norm-promotion because of its lack of hard power, in order to be able to "mollify power politics through norms" (Laïdi 2008: 5).

[4] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, *Official Journal C 83/13*, 30 March 2010.

However, this strategy can only be successful if the EU is able to persuade other members of the international community that such norm-promotion can achieve the goal of addressing contemporary security threats that come, among others, from states emerging from civil wars. Again, such advocacy for norm promotion that could replace the power politics can only be successful if it can be built on a positive example. But for now, Bosnia cannot play such a role: even though the situation in Bosnia now cannot be compared with the situation 15 years ago, the task of ensuring that BIH becomes a fully functional state which is based on democratic standards and where its people are capable of governing themselves without foreign assistance[5] is still far from complete.

Some (e.g. Youngs 2004, Warkotsch 2006) argue that the EU´s foreign policy is often more of a strategic calculation than an indiscriminate norm promotion, and Warkotsch (2006) further argues that the EU invests in norm promotion only when there exists a reasonable probability that such norm promotion could be successful. In the case of BIH, it would be hard to argue that such norm promotion is not prudent, since a stable BIH cannot be achieved without fulfilment of the norms described above, and an unstable BIH is hardly an option from the EU's point of view. Arguably, those norms can only be fulfilled through a comprehensive reconstruction strategy and tasks. Since the EU has a great power of persuasion towards the enlargement countries, it can be safely assumed that there exists a reasonable probability of success of the EU´s norm promotion in BIH and thus in the EU´s peacebuilding/post-conflict reconstruction policy towards BIH. However, taking into account the current situation, it seems that the EU will have to invest substantially more resources into BIH, since the country is lagging behind other candidate and potential candidate states in the western Balkans. Besides, BIH faces some unique challenges in its road to accession that stem from the legacy of the civil war. Perhaps the most difficult of challenges that need to be overcome is a reform of BIH´s polity that is based on obsolete provisions of the Dayton constitution that hamper the political and thereby also the economic and social development of the country. Because of that, this article aims to address an important but often neglected aspect of post-conflict reconstruction, i.e. the development of a civil society, on the case of BIH.

[5] In the form of the High Representative.

Why does the development of a civil society matter?

The development of a civil society is to be important for three reasons: to achieve democratic governance; to address specific issues that arise as a consequence of an armed conflict; and to contribute to the local ownership of a post-conflict reconstruction process.

a) Achieving democratic governance

A developed civil society is indispensable in modern democracies. In research, civil society is most often addressed through an analysis of civil society organizations (CSOs). According to Paffenholz (2010, 60), "[c]ivil society consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations and comprises non-state actors and associations which are not purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, show civil virtue, and interact in public sphere" According to the UN definition, CSOs are:

- Mass organizations that represent interests of particular population groups (e.g. women, children, unemployed etc.);
- Trades-related organizations that represent people through the profession or means of employment they pursue;
- Faith-based organizations;
- Academe;
- Public Benefit Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (environment, development NGOs etc.); and
- Social movements and campaign networks (feminist movement, anti-globalization movement etc. – they often overlap with mass organizations) (United Nations 2010).

In modern democracies, a developed civil society increases the citizens´ freedoms, promotes the rule of law, reduces state corruption and establishes greater government effectiveness. CSOs also act as information sources for state elites that can pass the message of what people want and expect from the state. States with a strong civil society are thus politically stable, not least because CSOs train citizens to be tolerant, cooperative and reciprocal (Tusalem 2007: 379–80).

There exist two types of civil society organizations: the so-called advocacy civil society is comprised of large, membership-based organizations that are focused on representing their members´ interests to the political elites. Those CSOs that include, for example, human rights, environmental,

youth and women organizations, and other CSOs that deal with politics in general, perform the function of interest articulators and checks of state power. On the other hand, the second type of CSOs is comprised of smaller, apolitical CSOs, performs the function of strengthening democratic values of their members and increases the capacity of the individual for political participation. Both versions are essential if one wants to speak of a consolidated democracy (Uhlin 2009: 288).

This article aims to analyse the EU´s assistance in development of a civil society in BIH on three levels:

- Organizational level: support that is aimed directly at CSOs in order to improve their functioning, development and networking. This support entails for example grants for research, operation and technical assistance, and grants for networking. Obviously, support on this level is important for CSOs of all kinds, i.e. for those who perform advocacy and those who are apolitical and perform the function of strengthening the democratic values and increasing the capacity of an individual for political participation.
- Governance level: support that is aimed at the improvement of advocacy and influencing the decision-making process on the one hand, and legal framework for the operation of CSOs on the other. Here support to CSOs is given indirectly, through addressing government structures and media in order to become more open for CSOs´ advocacy and to establish such a legal framework that would enable CSOs to operate without obstacles. As regards the advocacy dimension, this is of course most relevant for advocacy CSOs, while the establishment of a friendly legal framework is obviously important for all types of CSOs.
- Socialization level: support on this level is also not aimed directly at CSOs, even though they could be implementers of programmes on this level. Instead, assistance at the socialization level is aimed at enabling neglected or unprivileged groups of individuals to form or join CSOs and thus become members of a pluralistic civil society. This empowerment can be done through support for specific vulnerable groups, such as refugees, support to the reforms that would improve the respect for human rights, support for education, or support to the office of the ombudsman (Voh Bostic 2011)[6].

[6] Such a clear divide is, however, often not possible: for example support of the development of higher educational institutions serves both as empowerment to individuals (by providing for better education), and as direct support of CSOs since universities (academe) are also CSOs by themselves; or, funding a project of an NGO that deals with the reintegration of refugees is both support of a CSO in its operation and support of a vulnerable group.

b) Addressing specific issues, connected with the legacy of an armed conflict

In post-conflict countries, CSOs are also important for performing specific functions that can address various causes for conflict in a society. Paris (2004), for example, distinguishes between good and bad civil society, i.e. between CSOs that promote democratic values and CSOs that preach, for example, hatred and intolerance. Because of that, bad civil society should be suppressed, even if that means shutting down organizations that e.g. openly encourage violence against other ethnic groups, while good civil society should be supported, since pluralistic CSOs can "help to break down social barriers between formerly warring communities and provide grassroots support for political parties that support intergroup accommodation" (Paris 2004: 194). Those good CSOs could thus have specific functions, connected with peacebuilding issues, such as monitoring transition, support for education sector reform, establishing "peace cultures" (incentives for overcoming cultures of war via cultural or artistic events), facilitating inter-religious dialogue, reintegration of returnees, documentation of past war crimes, psycho-social support for victims and veterans, dealing with the past and reconciliation initiatives etc. (Fischer 2006: 6–7).

However, civil society cannot replace the state and other stakeholders in a post-conflict reconstruction process. This is because CSOs usually have limited financial and management expertise, limited institutional capacity, low levels of self-sustainability, lack of inter-organizational communication, usually do small scale interventions, and usually do not understand the broader socio-economic picture (Fischer 2006, 25). Because of that, CSOs should be seen as partners in a peace-building process and not as the "magic cure" that will transform the society and bring a self-sustaining peace.

Our question here is how much attention the EU devotes to supporting CSOs that address specific issues that are connected with addressing the legacy of an armed conflict.

c) Assuring local ownership in a peacebuilding process

According to the definition of Pouligny (2010: 174), local ownership "refers to the capacities of political, social and community actors in a particular country [...] to set, and take responsibility for the peacebuilding agenda and to muster and sustain support for it." If local partners are not included

in a peacebuilding process, they will most likely protect themselves from outsiders instead of cooperating with them, since they will be unable to see the gains of foreign intervention (Pouligny 2010: 179). On the other hand, when local ownership is applied, local actors can highlight the special characteristics and capacities of various local social actors that can and should be used in a peacebuilding process. Because of that, a tailor-made strategy should be made for each country of intervention, to make sure that local actors will have the means and the capacity to be actively involved in all levels of the peacebuilding process (Pouligny 2010: 180). However, Reich (2006) stresses that in foreign-funded projects, it is impossible to ensure that the project is completely locally owned, since foreign donors will always have their own interests regarding the objectives of the projects they are funding. Because of that, it is not the most important thing that local actors are the only ones in charge of a peacebuilding process, but instead, that the nature of the relationship between foreign and local actors in individual projects is one where the power of decision-making is shared (Reich 2006, 3).

Thus, since local CSOs are, according to Uhlin and Tusalem, important social actors in a given society, they should be included in the formation and implementation of peacebuilding/post-conflict reconstruction programmes that are led by foreign entities. Since the EU is the main reform driver in the enlargement countries (Balkan Civil... 2009: 2), it should be analysed, to what extent the reform process is owned by representatives of local CSOs. In order to do that, the article will analyse whether there exist any mechanisms for local ownership of EU policies towards the western Balkans and if they do, what is the impact of such mechanisms.

State of Bosnia's Civil Society before the EU "intervention"

Throughout recent history, the development of civil society in BIH was hampered. During the Ottoman rule that lasted for four hundred years until 1878, the Turks allowed the existence of only those forms of civil society associations that were closely related with the confessional institutions. In the period under the Austro-Hungarian rule that lasted from 1878 until the end of the First World War, this feature became even stronger. The situation was similar in the period of the first Yugoslavia, when power was heavily centralised in Belgrade – an absence of the rule of law was a cause

for a hostile environment for CSOs, while there was censorship and self-censorship present in the civil society and media. Such exclusive support to those CSOs that had religious affiliations[7] caused a constant fragmentation and division along ethno-religious lines and was one of the main causes for weakness of civil society, because it hampered the development of BIH's civic identity (Zivanovic 2006: 33). The situation did not improve in the second Yugoslavia – until the last few years of the regime, the only CSOs that were allowed to exist were connected with the communist party or were apolitical and besides, they were closely monitored so that any taking of political roles could be prevented[8] (Belonni and Hemmer 2010: 135).

Civil society that advocated the respect of human rights began to develop during the 1980s. However, it did not prevent nationalistic parties that used divisive rhetoric which demonized other ethnic groups from winning the election in 1990. Even though the media passed on the ideas represented by CSOs, Zivanovic (2006: 33–35) believes that the reason for this electoral victory of nationalists was that the people were preoccupied with economic survival and found empty promises and hatred, preached by nationalistic leaders, more attractive than values of mutual tolerance, dialogue, cosmopolitanism and peace resolution that were preached by the emerging CSOs.

The war meant a further setback for the Bosnian civil society. Kaldor (1998) describes it as a war against the civil society, since most violence was perpetrated against civilians in besieged towns and villages, but apart from some instances there was not much direct fighting between the soldiers of the warring parties. During the war, the vast majority of educated young people who should be the building bloc of the future civil society left the country, while many of those that remained were killed. Also, when the warring parties were conducting ethnic cleansing, the "intellectuals" were their first targets and were usually executed, instead of being only imprisoned or raped. Thus, the Bosnian war of the 1990s was a war against the values of tolerance, mutual respect and individual autonomy – against the centrepieces of the original 18th century conception of civil society (Kaldor 1998: 205).

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[7] Those were various types of CSOs; however, they explicitly supported the ideology of one confession.

[8] Unions, for example, served the communist party more that its members. Faith-based charities were allowed to function, as were associations of veterans, pensioners, women, youth, and various sports associations (Belonni and Hemmer 2010:135).

Also, it has to be noted that even a civil society that did exist in the 20th century in BIH was developed exogenously. Its development was imposed from above and by external forces. Because of such a history of imposition of policies from above, Bosnia's political elites, and also the society at large, are accustomed to seeking solutions to their problems and being guided by outsiders, neighbours, allies or great powers (Fagan 2010: 78)[9]. Thus, the local sources of political development were never mobilised, and because of that, the Bosnian elites are still suspicious towards a decision-making process that is based on participative democracy, i.e. policy argumentation, seeking of compromise and inclusion of interest groups in the decision-making process. On the other hand, the interest groups are not interested in cooperating in decision-making process, while public expectations towards government are low (Knaus and Cox 2004: 62–64). The use of Bonn powers that are vested in the Office of the High Representative (OHR) further encourages local political elites to conduct simple, ethnonationalistic politics and to rely on the OHR for addressing real political issues. This current "protectorate" is thus reinforcing the old political culture (Belonni and Hemmer 2010: 133). Something similar happened with the development of civil society right after the 1990s war – when NGOs began to emerge after the violent conflict, priorities of international donor agencies had more influence in their development than the actual needs of citizens that should be the main beneficiaries of local NGOs' activities. Also, other forms of CSOs, such as trade unions and sports clubs, were largely neglected by international donors (Zivanovic 2006: 36).

As a consequence of war, BIH was also faced with a large part of its civil society being displaced internally or externally. Around 2,2 million people were forcibly displaced during the war, while at the end of the war in December 1995, 1,2 million Bosnian refugees were still living abroad (Kleck 2006: 107).

As regards the legal environment for the operation of CSOs, it was considered unfavourable. Even though international pressure for reform was strong, legal and structural reforms were slow, mainly because of the complex legal and political situation. The new NGO law that was based on international standards and pushed by the international community

[9] In contrast to that, the European Commission regulary consults with CSOs when developing legislation proposals, ans also supports CSOs with grants. Such a system is also an end goal in Bosnia, so that the country would turn to their own civil society when seeking guidance and solutions, and would not be dependend on foreign entities.

was implemented only in the Federation by 2001, and the law still does not distinguish between various types of organizations (service providers, political parties and other types of non-profit and for-profit organizations). The consequence is that the same salary tax burden is placed on NGOs as it is on businesses (Smillie and Evenson 2004: 295).

Another important aspect of Bosnian civil society is the existence of the "uncivil society" that is similar to what Paris (2004) names bad civil society. Bosnian uncivil society is formed of "formal and informal associations of citizens whose activities are characterised by rudeness, incivility, and even violence" (Zivanovic 2006: 40). In a Bosnian society, this uncivil society is a consequence of a history of violent conflict and totalitarian forms of government in the area, which never offered an opportunity to the people to develop an ability to organize themselves in non-violent CSOs. Thus, the prevalent organizations were those that were based on kinship and nepotism or were state-sponsored. Such associations tend to have negative effects, since they can lock the poor into prolonged poverty by acting as a barrier to outside opportunities, and are thus deepening clefts and conflicts in society. In BIH, uncivil society is very strong, since it has connections with the ruling elites. It manifests itself in associations such as football fans, veterans' associations and radical national movements. However, a large part of it remains hidden and operates as informal networks, which are also known as informal centres of power, that are often involved in organized crime or connected with past war atrocities (Zivanovic 2006: 40–41).

The EU's assistance for civil society development in Bosnia[10]

Civil society development has, since PHARE funding for Central and Eastern European countries in the early 1990s, been a key objective of the EU and the European Commission (EC). Also, by the end of the 1990s, the EU had become the largest single donor that funded post-conflict reconstruction of

[10] Unless otherwise noted, all the information about the programmes and EU activities mentioned in this section was obtained from:
- CARDS: Multiannual indicative programmes and annual programmes for Bosnia, available under http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm;
- And IPA: List of project fiches for Bosnia, available under http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement.

BIH (Fagan 2010). The involvement of the EU in civil society development in Bosnia began in 1996 with the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Then, in 2000, the newly established Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme aimed to comprehensively address the reconstruction of the western Balkans countries. Among others, the objectives of CARDS were aid for the return of refugees and displaced persons, support for democracy, human and minority rights, civil society, independent media poverty reduction, gender equality, education and training (EUROPA 2007). However, in Bosnia, the national CARDS programme channelled all the help only onto the socialization level: reintegration of refugees, addressing the country's media environment, and, through the Tempus programme and support for vocational education schemes, to education. Reintegration of refugees was addressed through activities like housing repair, de-mining operations, legal help for returnees, and also capacity-building for local organizations/institutions and a grant scheme to non-state actors to diminish discrimination against returnees. Assistance to the media sector was comprised of grants for technical assistance and equipment, but also for the empowerment and independence of the Communications Regulatory Agency. However, in some western Balkans countries, the CARDS programme addressed much more diverse issues in connection to civil society as it did in Bosnia (Voh Bostic 2011).

As regards the educational dimension, the projects in Bosnia were similar to those in other potential candidate countries (Voh Bostic 2011). As mentioned above, Bosnia was a part of the Tempus programme for the modernization of higher education, which addresses the issue through joint projects (partnerships between higher education institutions in the EU and partner countries) and structural measures (European Commission 2010b), while the EU also provided for capacity-building for vocational education (VET).

All in all, the CARDS programme earmarked around 72 million Euros for the programmes described above, out of the 295 million that BIH received under CARDS funding, which puts the percentage of funds meant for the development of a civil society at around 24 %. This was a rather large percentage, compared to other countries, since Croatia was the only western Balkans country where the share was above 20 % (Voh Bostic 2011).

From 2007 onwards, the funds for civil society development are channelled through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), under the heading of Transition Assistance and Institution-building, for candidate and potential candidate countries. In Bosnia, 12 projects that address civil society development were presented in the 2007–2009 period, and together those projects address civil society on all three levels (organizational, governance and socialization level). The projects aim to implement several measures to improve the social situation of BIH by addressing government structures responsible for social protection of the citizens, and by rendering support to the office of the Ombudsman, in order to improve the social dialogue[11]. On the governance and organizational levels, they aim to enhance cooperation between NGOs and other stakeholders in migration management, to strengthen the civil society sector to become an effective partner to the government in different reform processes, as a watchdog and as a representative of people's needs, measures for the encouragement of partnership between NGOs and municipalities, and further assistance to municipalities in the field of refugee return. The EU also envisaged the creation of dialogue debate to facilitate the country's progress towards EU membership. The projects also targeted education, with the continuation of support for vocational training and assistance for the development of higher education. Under IPA, the Tempus programme is a part of the regional programme (Bosnia thus remains the beneficiary of Tempus funds), while under this regional programme, BIH is now also a part of the Youth in Action programme (scholarships for voluntary work abroad) and the Erasmus Mundus programme (scholarships for graduate studies abroad).

Even though the IPA addresses a much wider spectrum of activities, the share of civil society assistance in comparison to the whole IPA assistance, received in 2007 – 2009, is less than three percent – 13 million in comparison to 476.6 million (Voh Bostic 2011).

As was already briefly mentioned above, BIH is also included in EIDHR. The EIDHR programme awards relatively small projects that grant funds

[11] Office of the Ombudsman considers cases, put forward by individual persons, legal entities or ex officio, which relate to violation or poor respect of human rights by any authority of BIH, its entities and Brčko District. If allegations of violation or poor respect of human rights are confirmed, Ombudsman issues an official statement with which it calls uopn the relevant authorities to correct the wrongdoing, and offers legal counsel to the affected persons (Institucija Ombudsmana za ljudska prava BIH, available at http://www.ombudsmen.gov.ba/).

to individual CSOs and also various governmental bodies that are seen as important for democracy, civil society and human rights development. In the period of 1996 – 2000, BIH received around 4,7 million in those projects (European Commission 2001: 51). For the period of 2000 – 2006, statistics are available only for all enlargement countries together – they received around 40 million Euros; however, BIH was the country that got the most EIDHR projects during this period[12]. According to the indicative programme, the enlargement countries received 7.5, 9.25, 11.15, and 12.45 million Euros for the years of 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively (Rihackova 2008: 19).

EIDHR projects also give support to those NGOs that deal with what was defined above as specific issues, connected with the legacy of an armed conflict. For example, EIDHR funded projects aimed at achieving reconciliation, rehabilitation of the victims of torture, human rights protection mechanisms, reintegration of refugees, exchange programmes for youth of different ethnicities, and some others[13].

Assessment of the EU civil society assistance

As described above, the topical scope of the EU's civil society assistance was gradually enlarged, while the funds were gradually reduced, mainly because the heavily-funded projects of assistance to returnees were concluded. However, the results of the assistance are mixed, and according to the Freedom House (2009a: 1) report, from the beginning of the CARDS programme until now, BIH's civil society improved only slightly. The report states that even though civil society remains independent, it is facing growing pressure when dealing with minority or corruption issues[14]. One of the reasons for that is probably the fact that funds from the EU are, compared to the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, clearly less abundant, while the tasks are more difficult (Szemler 2008). However, the aim of this article

[12] EIDHR Statistics, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/eidhr_statistics_en.pdf.

[13] The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Compedium January 2007 - April 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/eidhr_compendium_en.pdf; and Updated Report By Location 2000 – 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/updated_report_by_location_en.pdf.

[14] On the 1 (best) to 7 (worst) scale, the civil society reached a score of 4,50 in 2001 (beginning of CARDS programme) and 3,50 in 2009. For comparison: in the 2004 accession, Latvia, with the score of 2,00, had the worst score among the 2004 accession countries (Freedom House 2009b).

was to go deeper and analyse the problem on the above described levels, which is presented below.

As regards direct support to CSOs (organizational level), it was often noted that the application process for funding is far too complex. In the case of NGOs, this complexity causes that the larger, older and well established NGOs that are usually situated in urban centres get most of the funding, since they have the time, staff, and capacity to successfully fulfil the application process. Also, they are able to get a supplementary funding from other sources, which is a condition if the organization wants to contend for the EU funds (Belonni and Hemmer 2010: 137, Fagan 2010: 98–99). Thus, the process is managerial and bureaucratic, since the official emphasis on sustainability and capacity-building is not adhered to in practice, while the main goal of the donors is value for money, visibility and tangible evidence of their assistance, which counters the principle of long-term sustainability (Fagan 2005: 417). Sustainability is also hindered by the fact that the area and topics of the EU's funding vary from year to year (Fagan 2005: 413). In an effort to overcome the barrier of complicated applications for grants, the EU's solution is to offer more training to NGOs for acquiring the skills needed to complete grant applications, instead of simplifying the application process (Fagan 2005: 414). As an overall assessment, Fagan (2010: 92) emphasizes that "the professionalism and capacity of domestic NGOs has been developed as a consequence of donor (usually EU assistance), and that the role and function of NGOs have become well established". However, on the other hand, a significant proportion of aid was not beneficial in the long term. Also, NGOs still tend to be prioritized, while the other forms of CSOs are neglected (Zivanovic 2006: 37, Fagan 2005: 407).

As regards the relationship between CSOs and the government (governance level), Belonni and Hemmer (2010: 134) suggest that advocacy and intermediations between citizens and politicians by the NGOs are growing in frequency, ambition and sophistication, albeit slowly. However, few organizations are involved in policy analysis, which limits the ability of the civil society to perform monitoring and advocacy. Also, very few CSOs are active across the BIH, or represent their stakeholders at the level of the state. This is because many politicians still see civil society organizations as competitors and not as partners (Belonni and Hemmer 2010: 138). Thus, the successful advocacy for wider reforms by the CSOs is dependent on more fundamental institutional and political change (Fagan 2005: 407), since CSOs are the victims of two impediments: unresponsive politicians

(especially nationalists), and the "distracted and disempowered mind-set of the citizens" who need to be mobilised in order for CSOs to gain stronger political influence. The consequence of those two impediments was that CSOs prefer lobbying the OHR or other international organizations, instead of directing their attention towards the national political elites, since only the international community is able to pressure Bosnian politicians (Belonni and Hemmer 2010: 142). Thus, dependence of national elites on foreign persuasion is still persistent.

However, in some instances, the situation is improving – as mentioned, ruling elites from all three ethnicities and the wider public regarded the adjective *non-governmental* as being against the government, and NGOs were thus perceived as threatening. Now, there are several examples of good practices of cooperation between networks of NGOs and government, such as cooperation between the Tuzla municipality and the "Tuzla reference group" of 50 local NGOs (Fagan 2010: 93). Indeed, on the local levels, the EU pressured municipalities that were unwilling to cooperate, and if they refused, they were criticized and even denied funds from structural funds and other assistance (Fagan 2010: 97). Also, the municipalities have an interest to cooperate with NGOs since NGOs provide services, such as skills training, that the EU demands. However, those good practices are still very localized and limited to urban centres, while in rural areas, such as mono-ethnic villages of Republika Srpska (RS) or in parts of western Slavonia, NGO activity practically does not exist (Fagan 2005: 410). Also, the donor-driven approach (the above mentioned dependency of NGOs in donor-driven assistance), which was also adopted by the EU, causes that NGOs do not engage with and consequently do not represent indigenous civil society (Fagan 2010: 93).

The legal environment for the operation of CSOs is also still not optimal. Even though the Law on Personal Income Tax and the Law on Company Profit Tax that stipulate for tax deductions for donations that had been adopted in 2007 in both entities and entered into force in 2009, local support to the NGO sector has not increased. There is a similar result in regard to the Law on Lottery and Games of Chance, adopted in RS in 2008. Besides, only a narrow spectrum of CSOs fall under the definition of public benefit organizations and are thus able to benefit from these laws (USAID 2010: 75). Thus, it seems that the EU could be more engaged also on this level.

As shown above, on the socialization level, the EU put the most emphasis on refugee return, media and education. As regards refugee return, Belonni and Hemmer's (2010: 134) findings are quite optimistic, since they state that the significant portion of minority return was permanent. However, a large-scale return started only in 2001, which was, according to Kleck (2006: 119), five years too late. Also, the return was disparate: until 2006, three quarters of all refugees returned to the Federation, while only a quarter returned to the RS. Besides, the return has often not been voluntary and no guarantees of security for the returnees that were members of a minority in a given area have been provided, while there were numerous forms of discrimination in the process of reconstruction of property. The consequence of all this is that returnees are often living in sub-standard conditions (*ibid.*).

As regards education, Freedom House (2009a, 129) predicts that education in BIH "remains a major issue that could prove a catalyst for even greater instability in the future". One of the most significant reasons for this assessment is without a doubt the continuous existence of the so-called "two schools under one roof" practice. This practice stands for physical segregation of children of different ethnicities. Even though children from different ethnic groups visit the same school building, they have classes at different times of the day in different classrooms, and separate curricula often teach ethnic hatred, especially in history class. The Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) had tried to reform this appalling school system, but did not succeed, because of a lack of support from the local political elites (ICG 2007: 17). Similar segregation is also happening in higher education (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2006: 14). It is thus most urgent for the EU to tackle this issue, while another positive step would be to open the Erasmus and Leonardo da Vinci exchange programme (short-term study or internship period on undergraduate or graduate level abroad) for Bosnian citizens, since these programmes are perceived to have a positive effect on the development of individuals, especially as regards their intercultural skills (Voh Bostic 2011), and youth should be the primary target group for civil society development, since they are more receptive and have greater capacity for change than older generations (Barnes 2009: 142).

The engagement of the EU in the media sector also seems to be relatively unsuccessful.[15] The media environment is still shaped by ethnic divisions

[15] Since the independence of the media is one of the key democratic principles, EU's intervetnion in this sector seems justified, even when some of those media are in private hands.

and alliances between politicians and business interests, which continue to influence reporting and editorial independence. Lately, those attempts of influencing were also visible in electronic media, which were before relatively less subjected to it. On the Freedom House's scale, the media score of 4,50 shows that the media environment remains relatively bad (Freedom House 2009a).

As regards addressing specific post-conflict issues by CSOs, it was shown above that the EU did support CSOs that addressed those issues. However, another problem is emerging, and that is that CSOs are now conducting tasks that should be conducted by the government or state agencies, which causes overreliance on a non-governmental sector, and is thus contradictory to the principle of good governance (Fagan 2010).

But the international community's, and with that also the EU's, weakest spot is arguably the lack of local ownership in their endeavours in BIH, as there seems to be no official mechanism for assuring such local ownership. The international community's strong intrusive hand in Bosnian affairs often seemed necessary to achieve security and democratic and economic reforms, but it has inhibited the development of local civil society's participation (Belonni and Hemmer 2010: 130). However, the case of the Bosnian police reform shows that strong guidance of the EU in important domestic reforms was, in the end, counterproductive. Because of their structure, the divided police forces of the two entities were ineffective and the division assured such absurdities as, for example, the police of one entity not being able to pursue a suspect if he fled over the entity boundary. The European Commission and the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) provided the draft of the reform that was, in the opinion of politicians from the Federation and the RS, well formed. However, because of political reasons, the RS accepted only a watered-down reform that failed to address many shortcomings of the previous system, and even the provisions of the new reform have not been implemented in practice (Voh Bostic 2010, Memisevic 2009). Had the Bosnian CSOs been able to cooperate and pressure the politicians into accepting a reform, the outcome could have been different.

Also, the decision which areas will be supported by individual projects is reached by the EU, while the local NGOs are only reacting to specific themed calls for projects. Furthermore, the coordination between the EU and other actors of the international community is ad-hoc, uncoordinated, and with considerable duplication of initiatives (Fagan 2010: 92). Besides,

even though country ownership is officially central to the Stabilization and association process (SAP), this promotion of ownership is "being pushed by the EU itself and does not involve any real equality of input over policy guidelines" (Chandler 2010, 75). At the informal level, ownership is exercised by the European Commission, since it guides donor coordination and works closely with other international institutional actors. With the signing of the Stabilization and association agreement (SAA), this patronizing relationship of the Commission towards BIH has even become legally binding (Chandler 2010: 75–76). Things are similar in the case of EIDHR programme: Since 2002, from when on the minutes of consultations between NGO representatives and EU officials are available, only western-based NGOs were participating in the consultations, while no representatives from countries to which most EIDHR funds are channelled were part of the dialogue[16]. It would perhaps be wise to organise separate discussions between the EU and CSO representatives from separate regions, to which EIDHR assistance is channelled, e.g. having one such meeting for each EIDHR region[17].

Conclusion

Even though EU policies do address civil society development in BIH, this article highlighted several shortcomings of those policies and showed that Bosnia's civil society is still underdeveloped. Since it was argued that norms such as good governance and respect for human rights, as well as the whole reconstruction process, cannot be promoted and conducted efficiently without a developed civil society, it can be concluded that the EU will have to place substantially more attention in improving its policies and practices of civil society development in BIH. Also, the EU has to recognise the fact that civil society development is connected to other policies, such as poverty reduction and economic development, which could, among others, counter the existence of the uncivil society. If the EU will not address these shortcomings, it risks that its image and

[16] For minutes of meetings, see EIDHR Meetings with Civil Society, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/meetings_en.htm (12 April 2011).

[17] EIDHR regions in the so-called Objective 2 part of the Instrument that (among others) offers assistance for the development of civil society are: Western Balkans and candidate states; States included in European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (north African and eastern European states - for the list of states see http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm), Central and Latin Amercan states, African, Carribean and Pacific group of states, and Asian and Central Asia states.

philosophy of being a normative power will be compromised on its first tougher challenge, as was its image of peacemaker with its unsuccessful intervention in the Balkan wars in the 1990s.

It thus seems essential for the EU to invest not only more material, but also human resources in BIH, and not only to individual projects that address civil society development, but also to assuring the long-term dimension of the process, local ownership, and lastly, research with an aim to develop new practices in this field.

On the other hand, this article argued that for Bosnia, further development of civil society is essential in order to deal with issues of weak governance and specific consequences of the violent conflict in the country. Unfortunately, the EU invests most of its resources into top-down institution-building (see e.g. Bechev and Andreev 2005, Voh Bostic 2010, 2011, Chandler 2010), and neglects bottom-up action, which further distances Bosnia from becoming a stabilised and in the end, an EU member state.

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reviews

Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu
Slovene diplomats in slavic countries
Ernest Petrič et al. (ed.)
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SLOVENSKI DIPLOMATI V SLOVANSKEM SVETU
SLOVENE DIPLOMATS IN SLAVIC COUNTRIES

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For diplomat's work language is one of the most important tools. Being familiar with the language of the host country is a great advantage as it gives a diplomat a possibility to interact with more people, a possibility to follow national media etc. Knowledge of the language is useful in today's globalised world and it was even more so in past centuries.

Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu (eng. Slovene diplomats in Slavic world), a third book from Personae series of *Studia diplomatica Slovenica*, puts a spotlight on Slavic cooperation. Its three language composition – Slovene, Russian, and Czech – further stresses the Slavic dimension. A foreword and eight contributions draw a sketch of presence of diplomats of Slovene origin in other Slavic countries.

A foreword *Slovenci in slovanski svet* (eng. Slovenes and Slavic world), written by Igor Grdina, outlines history of and some impediments to closer Slavic cooperation, especially in 19th and early 20th century. Most of appeals for stronger Slavic cooperation were based on idea of political emancipation and state formation. Despite the linguistic proximity Slavic nations differ greatly; and therefore were not able to form any stronger form of political cooperation.

First chapter by Neža Zajc, titled *Habsburški diplomat Sigismund Herberstein, Rusija in Moskovski zapiski* (eng. Hapsburg diplomat Sigismund Herbestein, Russia, and Notes on Muscovite Affairs (*Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii*)). Žiga Herberstein most known work is his Notes on Muscovite Affairs and is often marked as the discoverer of Russia and Russian life in the Early Modern Period. His diplomatic work for Hapsburg monarchy

largely exceeds his work in Russia: Herberstein was involved in Hapsburg endeavors for Hungarian crown, in their relations with Polish state. Author dedicates a significant part of the chapter to the Russian and East-European history in 16th century and to the historical inaccuracies in Herberstein's Notes. In this manner she emphasizes Slavic dimension of Herberstein's work and offers a critical look on his writings.

Matevž Košir in the second chapter *V spremstvu Katarine Velike – Kobenclovo krimsko potovanje* (eng. In suite of Catherine the Great – Kobencl's Crimean travel) represents a diplomatic activity of Ludvik Kobencl on Russian court during the reign of Catherine the Great in 18th century. Ludvik Kobencl belonged to a prominent Slovenian diplomatic family; its members were Hapsburg diplomats between 16th and 19th century. The chapter puts emphasis on his Russian carrer and especially to his correspondence with emperor Joseph II on meeting of the emperor with the Catherine the Great in Crimea in 1787. The meeting of two sovereigns reaffirmed the alliance of Hapsburg and Russian empire. This chapter outlines diplomatic activity of another diplomat of Slovene origin in Russian empire.

In chapter *Na Razsvitu – Bogumila Vošnjaka zgodnja percepcija ruske družbe, politike in diplomacije* (eng. On Razsvit – Bogumil Vošnjak's early perception of Russian society, politics and diplomacy) Jonatan Vinkler elaborets on Vošnjak's study of Russian society and politics at the beginning of the 20th century. The monograph *Na Razsvitu* is considered as the fundamental piece of modern Russian studies in Slovenia; in it Vošnjak represents his Slovenian predecessors in Russia as well as his knowledge on social and political situation in Russia at early 20th century. Author emphasizes that Vošnjak improved his writings not only with his own observations but also findings of other authors. Author also represents the weak points of Vošnjaks's monograph and its significance for Slovenian humanities and social sciences.

In the fourth chapter *Od aneksijske krize do Ženevskega sporazuma: slovensko-srbski odnosi 1908–1918* (eng. From annexing crisis to Geneva accords: Slovene-Serbian relations 1908–1918) Andrej Rahten writes about relations between Slovenian and Serbian political leaders on the eve of establishment of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Author leads us through the years between 1907 and 1919 that witnessed a rise of pro-Yugoslavian sentiment in Slovene political elites. During the World War I Serbia actively supported pro-Serbian Slovenian and Croatian politicians. In October

1918 State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was established. Large part of the chapter is dedicated to Geneva Conference of 1918, during which the newly established State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs united with Kingdom of Serbia.

"Praški Triglav" – delovanje slovenskih dpilomatov v Pragi v času med obema vojnama ("Prague Triglav" – work of Slovene diplomats in Prague in between the Great Wars) by Borut Klabjan represents the cooperation and diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and especially activity of Slovenes in Prague. Slovenes and Czechs started to cooperate more closely in the 19th century in the eve of Spring of Nations in 1848 when Slavic conference was organized in Prague. In the main part of article author represents *Praški Triglav*; with that he refers to three Slovenes who were Yugoslav ambassadors in Prague during the great wars – Ivan Hribar, Bogumil Vošnjak and Albert Kramer. He represents their diplomatic activities and outlines the relations between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in that period.

Bojan Godeša wrote *Iz diplomatske dejavnosti dr. Antona Korošca – srečanje s slovaškim predsednikom Tiso v Bratislavi maja 1940* (eng. On diplomatic activitiy of Anton Korošec – meeting with Slovak president Tisa in Bratislava in May 1940). That chapter analyses last years of Anton Korošec's political activity on the eve of the World War II. His meeting with Slovak president Jozef Tiso, who he met before, in May 1940 changed his view on Slovenia's future position in European geopolitical arrangements. Author elaborates also on Yugoslav political affairs between both World Wars, on the role of Korošec in Yugoslav politics and on the international activities of his political party.

Seventh chapter *Titov diplomat v Pragi* (eng. Tito's diplomat in Prague) by Irena Bratuša represents life and work of Darko Černej, first Yugoslav ambassador in Czechoslovakia after the World War II. As the ambassador he strengthened traditionally good relations between both countries in numerous fields, especially on economic and cultural affairs. He was also very actively involved in preparations of Tito's first visit to Czechoslovakia after the war. After the end of his mandate in Prague he was also an ambassador in Italy and France.

The last chapter *Slovanska dimenzija slovenske diplomacije* (eng. Slavic dimension of Slovene diplomacy) written by Milan Jazbec looks into the Yugoslav diplomacy between 1945 and 1990. The beginning of chapter is dedicated to life and work of Sigismund Herberstein. Further

on, author elaborates on experiences and achievements of Slovenian ambassadors during their mandates in Slavic countries.

The monograph *Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu* puts together papers on individual Slovenian diplomats and their work in different Slavic countries. The biggest part of the book is dedicated to Hapsburg diplomats of Slovene origin in Russia – Russian work of Sigismud Herberstein, Ludvik Kobencl and Bogumil Vošnjak. Next three chapters put limelight on activities of Slovenes not as Hapsburg diplomats but as representing Slovenian interests to other Slavic nations in Austro-Hungarian Empire and beyond. The last chapter represents Yugoslav ambassadors of Slovene nationality between 1945 and 1990. Put together the individual papers represent a diplomatic history of Slovenes in other Slavic countries in more than 500 years. I would recommend this book especially to everyone interested in Slovene diplomatic history as to those interested in biographies of prominent Slovene politicians and diplomats.

Daniel Sheppard

Vasilka Sancin (ed.)
LOKALNI ZLOČINCI – UNIVERZALNI ZLOČINI: ODGOVORNOST ZAŠČITITI
LOCAL CRIMINALS – UNIVERSAL CRIMES: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

GV Založba, Ljubljana, 2010
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It does not take much more than a glance at the daily newspaper headlines for one to realize that horrific events, both accidental and by design, are constantly occurring all over the globe, causing the loss of hundreds and thousands of innocent lives on a daily basis. Two of the most recent such examples are certainly the devastating earthquake-tsunami double-punch that hit Japan and the revolutionary clashes occurring in the Middle East, Libya in particular. In cases such as these, the state where such destructive events are happening is often either unable or unwilling to provide assistance and help resolve the matter, and sometimes is even the one causing such despicable bloodshed. The onus to act and aid thus shifts to outside actors, states and international organizations – the United Nations above all – and it is from this universal moral standpoint that the concept of humanitarian interventions became established in the post-World War II global system.

It quickly became clear, however, that states were reluctant, to say the least, of going along with the idea, fearing both a diminishing of their own sovereignty and misuse of interventions by powerful states for their own purposes. Coupled with disagreement in the Security Council about when even to approve humanitarian interventions, the concept proved to be inefficient and, ultimately, failed. However, it was from the ashes of its failures, of Yugoslavia, Rwanda and numerous others, that the notion of responsible sovereignty began to emerge, "*paving the way for the creation and recognition of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect*" (p. 248). It is the development and characteristics of this doctrine that *Local Criminals – Universal Crimes*

aims to chronicle and present to the reader.

Under the editorial supervision and co-authorship of Vasilka Sancin, PhD, esteemed member of the Chair of International Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ljubljana, six students at the same Faculty banded together to provide an in-depth look at this concept of international law principle that is as important as it is problematic. It is perhaps worth mentioning that five of the six co-authors, mentored by Dr. Sancin, placed 30th among over 550 participating teams in the 2009 Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court competition, tackling the topic of humanitarian interventions and the responsibility to protect.

Following forewords by the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Dr. Danilo Türk, and the Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General for the Responsibility to Protect, Mr. Edward C. Luck, the book is divided into eight chapters, including a final summary in English. The first chapter is merely of an introductory nature, outlining the topic and structure of the remainder of the book, beginning with Chapter 2 – Sovereignty of States and Human Rights, which provides an overview of the two concepts that are at odds when discussing the responsibility to protect – state sovereignty and human rights or rather, interventions in state sovereignty and the protection of human rights, their development and relationship. While brief, the chapter provides more than enough information for the basic understanding of the concepts required for the remainder of the book, as well as emphasizing the role of the Security Council in the matter.

It is with the third chapter that the discussion of the responsibility to protect begins in earnest, with the first part of the chapter dedicated to humanitarian interventions, their development and failure, complete with an overview of the interventions (or lack thereof, as in Rwanda and Srebrenica) that occurred in the second half of the 20th century, from Belgium's 1961 intervention in Congo to NATO's Kosovo campaign in 1999. Such an overview is certainly welcome, not to mention required, both to understand the background from which the responsibility to protect developed, as well as the crucial differences that separate the two concepts.

After presenting some of the other concepts that attempted to determine the correct response of the international community to grievous violations of human rights and affected the development of the responsibility to protect, the book focuses on the International

Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was established by Canada in response to Kofi Annan's 2000 call for resolving the tension between sovereignty and human rights by Canada in 2000, and whose 2001 report first presented the concept of responsibility to protect, defining it as a three-part composite of the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild, each of which is presented in detail.

It was at the 2005 World Summit that the responsibility to protect was finally set down, culminating in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome Document, which "*synthesized the new concept of the responsibility to protect into its current form*" (p. 252), and the 2009 Secretary-General's Report – Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, which introduced the three pillars of the responsibility to protect: the protection responsibilities of the state, international assistance and capacity building, and the timely and decisive response to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanities.

It is this structure that Chapter 4 presents and analyses, starting with the four categories of atrocities that the responsibility to protect encompasses (see previous sentence), explaining what the normative concept is focused on and emphasizing that it is still unclear which subject of international law may categorize certain conditions as such. The second part of the chapter explains the above-mentioned three pillars from the viewpoint of the main carrier of responsibility for each pillar (the state, the state and international community in cooperation, and the international community, respectively), concluding with the 2010 Secretary-General's Report on prevention as the main force behind implementation of the responsibility to protect.

Chapters 5 and 6, however, provide the true added value of *Local Criminals – Universal Crimes*. The first places the responsibility to protect in a broader context, tackling its relationship with state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility, including national and international mechanisms of establishing individual criminal responsibility, then presenting the role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council, and finally addressing the issues of refugees, internally-displaced persons and persons without citizenship within the context of the responsibility to protect, and the possibilities for expanding the scope of concept to include natural disasters and starvation. As emphasized by Luck in his foreword, these are all questions that

are often overlooked when discussing responsibility to protect.

Chapter 6, on the other hand, contains an analysis of selected cases of (non-)implementation of the responsibility to protect around the world, beginning with the Darfur conflict and ending with Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. It is true that global events have moved forward at a fast pace, as usual, and this section is therefore already not as current as one might wish it to be – nonetheless, it is an excellent overview of the main crisis hotspots of this day and age. With each case presented in two parts – the basic facts of the conflict, followed by the description of how the responsibility to protect was or should have been implemented, as well as suggestions for future improvements –, both those merely looking to inform themselves about the conflicts and those interested in more detailed application of the responsibility to protect will find the text enlightening.

The Conclusion summarizes the points made throughout the main part, particularly the questions and issues that the discussed concept raises and that still have not been answered, and gives broad suggestions for the road still ahead, rounding the book off.

All in all, *Local Criminals – Universal Crimes* is systematic, well-written and comprehensive in its treatment of a very complex topic, managing to be informative and thought-provoking. While a certain level of previous knowledge in the field of international law may be desired prior to reading the book, its text should nonetheless be accessible to the vast majority of its intended readership, students of law looking for a beginner's foothold in the subject, as well as more senior experts looking to enhance their knowledge. And especially considering the importance of the topic, reading this book is certainly recommended.

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Behind and beyond the Lexicon: Anglophone Terminology and Western Balkan Realities

Tony Thorne

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Behind and beyond the Lexicon: Anglophone Terminology and Western Balkan Realities

Tony Thorne[1]

ABSTRACT

When considering how the Western Balkans and their current circumstances have been imagined by outsiders, the linguistic and semantic difficulties begin with the very naming of the region(s) under scrutiny. Neither previously published reference guides nor analytical essays serve adequately to clarify the nuances of contemporary usages and the complex, shifting state of affairs they refer to. Working from a lexicological perspective and an 'outsider' stance, this article highlights some contemporary issues by citing examples of keywords used recently in geopolitical, diplomatic and popular discourses. The article tracks transitions that have taken place in representation, focusing in turn upon the language used to describe progression towards Europeanization, upon terms which may be perceived differently by those within and those outside the speech communities in question, and upon changes in meaning and interpretation of key terms, as well as the generation of relevant new terminology taking place in the Anglosphere, but yet to be disseminated across global English. A conclusion briefly notes some lexicographical projects in preparation in the Western Balkans and suggests that these need to be complemented by further analysis of the lexicon of geopolitics and integration.

KEYWORDS

lexicon, keywords, jargon and buzzwords, terminology, rhetoric and discourse, EU enlargement, Western Balkans

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Tony Thorne, Slang and New Language Archive, ELC, King's College London, 26-29 Drury Lane, London WC2B 5RL, UK, email: tony.thorne@kcl.ac.uk
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Introduction

When, in a 2010 article entitled 'The Souring of Turkey's European Dream', Nobel literature laureate Orhan Pamuk lamented a growing callousness on the part of Europeans towards migrants and minorities, he invoked an older, more positive imagining of 'Europe' by him and his fellow Turks. Pamuk's meditations, coming soon after Angela Merkel's intemperate remarks on the supposed failure of multiculturalism, made however no distinction between states inside the EU which pursue very different policies on immigration and enlargement (the UK as opposed to Germany, for instance), and seemed to ignore altogether those states which belong to the imagined continent but remain for the time being outside the European Union.

If a certain 'fuzziness' can be forgiven in a *littérateur*, far greater fuzziness obtains in the Anglophone nations where those European, yet outsider, states are concerned. The fact is that the Western Balkans, (unlike, increasingly and incidentally, Turkey) are in the currently fashionable phrase, 'off the radar' for all but a few specialists. They do not form part of the national conversation in any part of the Anglosphere, most 'native –speakers' (to used a contested term) of English are ignorant of their geography and history, their current circumstances are under-reported in the media and when mentioned at all, they are frequently subject to stereotyping.

Ignorance and indifference is evidenced -or compounded –by confusion over primal categories, over the very naming of the region –or sub-region- in question. Eastern and Southeast(ern) Europe are themselves unstable designations. In a lighthearted challenge to readers of the *Economist*, Edward Lucas dismantles the stereotypes of a Europe divided crudely on post-cold war lines between 'West' and 'East', reminding his audience in the process that 'western' Greece lies 'in the continent's far southeast'. (Lucas 2011)

Balkanism and Balkanization

The word Balkan itself is freighted with all kinds of associations, beset by multiple potentials for misunderstanding. Of what do the Balkans consist? How far do they stretch? I remember Slovenia being explained as 'the Sweden of the Balkans' at the time of independence; more recently it was

dubbed 'the Surrey of the Balkans', after the part of Southeastern England that scores highest in wealth and quality-of-life surveys. In branding or rebranding exercises employing the discourse of travel and leisure, Macedonia, Albania and Croatia have all recently proposed themselves, or have been proposed as 'the pearl of the Balkans', but the ambiguous 'wild Balkans' has been used both to promote adventure holidays and to characterize sensationalist reports by outsiders which are based on preconceptions and inaccuracies (Knaus 2010).

'Balkanization', of course, is a well-known pejorative in popular, journalistic and official registers, based on a continuing notion of, in the words of one commentator, 'a concatenation of quarrelsome peoples endlessly embroiled in obscure, yet intractable wrangles' (Batt 2009), though an internet search shows that it is now more commonly applied to locations outside Europe, and even more frequently in French than English. Interestingly, an attempt has recently been made (in the field of spatial planning and architecture) to reinstate an appreciative sense of the same word, (Weiss 2008) illustrating the mutability of even the most contentious categorizations, a theme that will be taken up below.

In historical, literary and cultural studies there have been several notable attempts to track and analyse 'western' constructions and representations of the Balkans by focusing on rhetorical and discourse strategies, yielding a notion of 'Balkanism', by analogy with Said's 'orientalism' and revealing a sometimes (though not uniformly) insidious intellectual tradition that has gone largely unquestioned. (Todorova, Goldsworthy). Meanwhile, in linguistics, 'Balkanism' can refer to shared features of grammar and vocabulary which originated through close contact, ironically, under conditions of predominantly peaceful coexistence.

'Western Balkans' as a subdivision is very rarely encountered in popular discourse. Possibly the only significant current example of the formulation is in the title of the Lonely Planet guidebook to the area; '…that sassy chunk of southeast Europe knows how to thrill a traveller: Croatia's glamour coast, Serbia's wild music festivals, Belgrade's nightlife and more… get to grips with some of Europe's most fascinating up-and-comers.' Ironically, the latest mention by news media has been the announcement that the BBC World Service is stopping its broadcasts to the region as part of a cost-cutting exercise.

If we try to apply a lexical analysis to discussions of the Western Balkans, we are not without resources in the form of pre-existing glossaries and lexicons. The EU's bureaucracy is necessarily conscious of the particularity and importance of its jargon, if not of its ideological baggage, and provides a number of guides (ec.europa.eu). Published lexicons treat the language of international relations in general and in specific sub-fields such as peace-building and aid provision (Chetail 2005). The cultural analyses, however, take us only up to the beginning of the last decade, while the glossaries remain at the neutral level of offering ostensibly stable definitions without examining connotations, ambiguities and context-specific interpretations, let alone changes of meaning over time.

It can be fruitful, then, to concentrate on discourse and rhetoric in close-up, specifically considering the keywords and 'buzzwords' employed in English, in order to surface assumptions made and to question the stances adopted in constructing the Western Balkan narrative. Such an essay, necessarily brief in this context (and perforce tentative since undertaken by a linguist rather than a specialist in geopolitics), may complement and update those larger-scale historico-cultural analyses referred to above, and can begin to assemble a lexicon that is more nuanced and more highly contextualized than the glossaries mentioned previously.

The Language of Transition and Enlargement

In the words of blogger Gerald Knaus, 'As numerous European leaders are looking for excuses to slow down the EU accession path of Western Balkan nations it becomes all the more important to be extremely precise when it comes to describing the problems of the region.' We can track the fraught progression towards integration through its phases and bifurcations by looking at some of the keywords most commonly associated with it.

In the official jargon, **peace-keeping** and **conflict prevention** gives way to **peace-building**, **state-building** and **capacity-building**. **Stabilization** goes unquestioned, despite the hints of **social engineering** and **predatory reconstruction** that sometimes adhere to it. The word, exotic to most Anglophones, **lustration**, makes a brief appearance. As a main imperative **containment** yields to **integration**. The notion, emphasizing order and regularity, of enlargement **waves** or more usually **rounds** gives way to the idea of **tailormade enlargement** or **tailored country strategies**, more

recently recharacterized as the **regatta approach**, with its implication of 'every man for himself.' Metaphors assuming unhindered progression along a pre-existing route – **path**, **road map**, **accession track**, **milestone** – are replaced by more neutral terms like **(accession) package** and the realist Americanism **catch-up**. Relationships to be mended rely less on reconciliation or **rapprochement** than (a vogue term of the moment) **re-set**.

In 2006 CEFTA was seen as a way of inculcating a spirit of collaboration in parallel with the political processes, in the words of one EU diplomat, a way of turning 'spaghetti to lasagne' (McTaggart 2006). Optimistic vocabulary was widespread pre-2006; the Western Balkans were for the World Bank 'Europe's next highgrowth business location'…. 'dynamic' was a favoured adjective. Five years later progress is most often described in negative terms, repetition resulting in cliché: a frequency count across a selection of texts brings up a distinct set, among them **constraints**, **stalled, unresolved, stalemate, bottleneck**, and, notably, many instances of the word **intractable**. After something of a hiatus since the time of actual fighting there are now recurrent instances of immoderate language: Kosovo is described in 2010 as a 'black hole'; most of the region continues to be threatened by 'the dark hole of ethno-nationalism.'

Outsiders react with impatience verging on disbelief when confronted with the FYROM/Macedonia nomenclature issue. As one commentator asserts, 'It is hard … either to understand the depth of the passions involved, or to avoid calling down a 'plague on both your houses' for a dispute which nationalist politicians in both countries have exploited with self-serving short-sightedness.' Controversies around the status of the name Kosovo have been equally exasperating.

In that pivotal area of state-building and consolidation, from the crude epithet of **failed state** we move to the more suitable, yet equally damning **unfinished states** and the concept, variously stated, of **virtual statehood**, **unresolved statehood**, **diminished statehood**.

Enlargement fatigue on the part of potential hosts begins to be mirrored by **accession fatigue** on the part of candidates. Ironically, pejorative terms such as **spillage**, **spillover**, and **externalities**, formerly describing the threat of dangers spreading beyond normal confines, may take on a positive sense of the achievement of critical mass yielding benefits available for sharing and advances in one place influencing neighbours.

Europeanization, once employed widely and unselfconsciously despite its lack of specificity (not to mention its condescending exclusivity), now seems to demand more care in its application: does it imply an imagined set of values to be emulated, simply mean stricter conformity with EU criteria, underline the diminution of direct US influence – or all of the above? **Euroization** – adoption of the single currency – suddenly seems a distant prospect again, this time not only due to internal factors but to yet more uncertainty in the Eurozone itself. Undeterred, those oriented towards a wider western perspective continue to exhort the countries of Southeast Europe to embrace – or be embraced by - **the Euro-Atlantic community**.

'Terminological Inexactitudes'

In his own defence Winston Churchill memorably used the humorous euphemism 'terminological inexactitudes' instead of 'lies'. The phrase should more properly denote misunderstandings arising from ambiguities of language, and it is these are under consideration here.

Conditionality (let alone **functionality of conditionality**) is a term which still provokes consternation in some circles in the UK. Though it has in fact a long pedigree in formal English it sounds to non-specialists like a *calque*, a translation/borrowing from French, and symbolizes the alienating workings of the Euromachine. In this case, for once, we have a jargon item whose denotation and implications will be clearer to inhabitants of the Western Balkans than to bemused members of the UK public. Seemingly less complicated words, when deployed in this complicated environment, begin to lose their clarity: what exactly do **consolidation**, or **deepening**, or **European vocation** mean in the WB context? Where and what is the **periphery** – or should it be '**the periphery of the periphery**'? And are such designations neutrally objective or openly or covertly derogatory?

The semantic field which includes what locals have referred to as '**connections**' (again, for outsiders a relatively lightweight term, but here carrying a particular contextual charge) entails degrees of semantic fuzziness as commentators struggle to characterize various forms or levels of corruption. The predominantly British **cronyism**, the mainly US **patronage**, a WB favourite, **clientelism**, and occasionally the more usually neutral or appreciative **mutualism** (see below), have been applied without any

distinctions between them being addressed. **State capture** (as opposed to the Anglosphere collocation **regulatory capture**; the neutralizing of independent watchdogs by industry or government) describes the 'grand corruption' that occurs when oligarchs or pernicious interest-groups manipulate policy formation and suborn officials, thereby perpetuating weak governance.

The current catchword **resilience** (US **resiliency**) denoting the ability of capitalism to survive recession, in the Western Balkan context refers to the resilience of ethnic tensions and illiberalism in general. **Minority**, **ethnic grouping** or **bloc**, **ethnicity**, **interethnicity**, even **clan** and **tribalism**, are terms that western commentators feel able to apply to 'alien' contexts, but which sound outmoded and too contentious for domestic consumption (see the remarks on **multiculturalism** below). A distinction between **plurality** and **pluralism** is not always observed, but this in fact reflects the overlapping or ambivalence that have continued to beset the words since they were employed by Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt.

Absorption capacity was previously assumed to refer to the EU's readiness to integrate new members, while it now refers to the potential for absorption of funds by aspirant members. When **integration capacity** (on the part of the EU only) is substituted there seems to be a subtle shift in emphasis towards the fraught and problematical.

Inflow, of capital/investment in particular, has given way to **outflow**, sometimes **exodus**, of media, for instance. **Innovation**, the catchword or *sine qua non* of late modernity, is frequently addressed in terms of **innovation determinants** and **innovation outcomes**, invariably seen by external assessors as problematical and deficient.

There are interesting examples, too, of English, or at least English-sounding oddities being used locally; **tycoonization**, **tycoonery** and **destructionology** are instances. The exact provenance of these terms is unclear, but in the case of the last two may been influenced by the language of online gaming. Invoking the neologism **humanitarization** (a notion with some similarities to Naomi Klein's **disaster capitalism** and the related **predatory reconstruction**) BiH, according to Mujkić (2010), is reimagined as disaster zone: not *terra nullius*, perhaps, but *tabula rasa*, its weakness in the face of outside interference leading to the **depoliticization** of local actors; the national entity and the individual citizens.

A Lexicon for the Future

Just as we become comfortable with language encountered during the past decade or so, that language is destabilized: familiar terminology mutates or is supplanted by an onrush of neologisms. In the speech communities in which they have originated, in the Anglosphere itself, a number of relevant keywords are already undergoing subtle transformations of meaning. Other potentially useful terms have been coined but may have yet to be taken up by users of the lingua franca of global English.

A case in point is the use in the Western Balkans and elsewhere of the related terms **social** and **human capital** and of **soft power** (the absence of the latter being lamented, for instance). These expressions retain their validity but in the case of soft power have been revisited by luminaries such as Joseph Nye Jr who re-emphasises the 'power' element, reminding that what matters is not just cultural affinity but a state's ability to persuade, attract and, crucially, set the terms of debate. The appearance of the collocation and seeming oxymoron **soft dictatorship** complicates things further. All three of the terms in question have been subsumed in some recent discussions into the idea of the **intangible infrastructure**, in other words a nation's capital structure viewed as its potential in education, healthcare, communications, legal compliance and **transparency**, opportunities for women, etc. rather than its industrial capacity. The extent to which the **emerging economies**, in the first instance the **BRIC** bloc (Brazil, Russia, India and China), have, or have not developed such 'invisible' potentials is said to be pivotal to their future prosperity. Credit Suisse has formulated a set of indices for potential investors by which a nation's **II** can be measured, while other specialists apply the concept to corporations as well as political entities. The phenomenon whereby refocusing on **intangibles** and boosting **post-industrial technocapitalism** and new **business ecologies** can move wealth from where traditional industries have been based to completely new, formerly peripheral locations, is known as **regional inversion**.

To take another example from the UK, the terms making up the semantic field of ethnic, national and local identity have undergone some interesting transformations in recent years. The once central term **multicultural**(**ism**) had ceased to feature in official discourse (surviving only in the mocking demotic 'multiculti'), until David Cameron resurrected it in 2011 only in order to repudiate it. As with 'minority' and 'community' before it, those the designation was designed to boost or patronize turned against it, while

observers began to equate it with **ghettoization**, first prompting some specialists to replace it with the rather ambiguous variant 'multiculturism' and refer to workers in 'western' societies, 'living in multicultures in conditions of hyperdiversity.' **Diversity** itself remains a central tenet of public sector and corporate practice and retains its importance for discussions of political contexts overseas. However, as long ago as the early 1990s US Human Resource manuals were discussing where diversity training had gone wrong and why the term **difference** was to be preferred. According to Christopher Metzler of Cornell University; '…diversity has become a pejorative and must be replaced by the word 'inclusion', which business executives believe drives a different philosophy.' Politicians have realised that diversity can emphasize separateness and in some contexts are 're-purposing' as alternatives **cohesion** or **convergence**, in doing so risking yet further difficulties of interpretation.

The long-serving UK Labour government was adept at coining resonant neologisms to describe a succession of theories and policy initiatives: seeking to export such novelties as **PPI** and **PFI** (**public-private initiative** and **private finance initiative**, in other words partnership financing), the never-quite-defined **third way**, emphasis on **the third sector**, and more recently **flexibilism** and **mutualism.** The former denotes trust-based partnerships between employee and employer offering new and creative alternatives to Fordist manufacturing philosophies, command-and control business models and the 'nine-to-five' office routine. Not just, it was claimed, a coping mechanism in the face of economic meltdown, the willingness to embrace unorthodox working hours and radical new patterns of employment was given a positive spin, but was derided by critics as **flexploitation**, a feature of **recessionomics** whereby employees are forced to take pay-cuts/work longer hours/pay back bonuses/relocate, etc. Some pundits suggested facetiously that flexploitation would result in **freakoutonomics**; civil unrest among the disadvantaged, among whom may be counted **NEETs,** the acronym coined by the UK government in 2009 to designate those 'not in education, employment or training' (replacing the clumsiness and lack of specificity of 'unemployed'). Slightly more soberly the commentariat invoked the notion of the **precariat**, the term used by NYU professor Andrew Ross to describe a rootless, uncontracted pool of workers most vulnerable to the vicissitudes of recession and globalization. Members of the precariat may come from the highly mobile specialist or creative sectors, or belong to the huge reserve of migrant, semi-skilled, unskilled or deskilled workers on which the global economy increasingly relies.

In its latest, British incarnation **mutualism** referred to co-operative ownership of an organization by its managers, its workers *and* those who use its services. Touted as the means whereby, 'progressives can recapture the ownership agenda', mutualism promised to '**embed** democratic accountability' and turn staff into '**champions** of reform'. The inbuilt contradictions – that stakeholders' interests may differ drastically, that mutualism should occur by consent and not be imposed, were glossed over.

While two of New Labour's other key preferred locutions, **stakeholder** (economy) and **sustainability**, survive and thrive, those other formulations have been sidelined by the succeeding coalition government in favour of their own buzzwords which include Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein's fashionable notion of **nudge economics** (for **nudge**, read subtle coercion), based on research into **cognitive bias** (decisions based on misunderstanding), **conformance** (bowing to peer-pressure) and **priming** or **wedging** (planting thoughts and opinions). A resultant practice is **choice architecture**; **framing** the choices presented to consumers, investors or stakeholders (by language, layout, number, the right to opt in or out, etc.) and/or providing guidance and support (in the form of supplementary information). The concept is a key component of so-called **libertarian paternalism** – simultaneously helping and persuading individuals faced with unlimited or complex choices, while maintaining **agenda control**. Its appeal (not least to the Obama administration, Britain's Tories and online marketing) may in part be that **behavioural economics**' grounding in psychology and statistics contrasts with the cruder persuasion techniques associated with the commercial sector's obsession with **branding**.

Conclusions

Fairclough (2003) and others have examined how social practices are discursively shaped, as well as the subsequent discursive effects of social practices, have highlighted the relationship between discourse and power and the critical analysis of discourse as a corrective to the perpetuation of unequal power relations at all levels of society. By concentrating on language in use, specifically upon the lexicon, we can surface and interrogate the assumptions behind rhetorical strategies and at the same time empower ourselves by expanding our own cultural repertoire. New lexis and the concepts it encodes can assist marginalized entities in increasing their visibility and in repairing their poor images. Many of the expressions

discussed here, some of them dauntingly modish and idiosyncratic at first hearing, have a resonance over and above their denotations and can serve as slogans or mantras, something which is often disparaged, if naively, by non-linguists (Poole 2006). Familiarity with them and with the concepts they encode, however, confers insider status and a sense of belonging; the ability to deploy them empowers their users. (Thorne 2006). The converse is also true: put more crudely, by an NGO director working on aid projects, 'If you don't know the buzzwords, you hardly have a chance to apply for funds' (Economist 2011).

At the end of the 18th century Daniel, a Vlach or Aromunian-speaking priest from Voskopojë, published a quadrilingual lexicon of the main Balkan languages 'to Assist the Learning of Young Philologists speaking other Tongues' (Tachiaos 1990). Its modern counterpart is the Balkan WordNet, a multilingual lexical database which aims to represent semantic relations between words in each Balkan language, but in its first stages concentrating on general rather than specialist vocabulary. A Serbian Lexicon of Economic Diplomacy and International Business is currently nearing publication, and there may be other wordlists and glossaries in preparation that have yet to be publicized. Given the need to share information in the medium of English, and to translate key concepts from English into local languages and vice versa, at the same time appreciating their cultural and ideological baggage, it would be very useful to produce a digitalised resource that incorporates the language of accession, enlargement and development and which takes account of the additional semantic features of such language. It is essential that local actors and stakeholders apply their own critical perspectives to the language which is being used – whichever language that is – to analyse their circumstances and make decisions about their futures. This article has merely glanced in passing at a very small sample of the terminology that matters: it is for others, 'insiders' from inside or outside the region, to take the process further.

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Croquis

Lovćen is a mountain and national park in Dinaric Alps in southwestern Montenegro. Covering 6.400 ha, the national park is dominated by Mount Lovćen and the Njegoš Mausoleum, rising from the borders of the Adriatic basin and descending to the marshes of Skadar Lake. It comes out almost as a huge torso, a piece of art spanning not only across land and geography, but also reaching out to future. Mount Lovćen has twin peaks, Stirnovik at 1.749 meter and Jezerski at 1.657 meter.

LOVĆEN – A MOUNTAIN AND A SYMBOL

Standing on the border between two completely different natural wholes, the sea and the mainland, Lovćen is under the influence of both climates. The specific life conditions have stipulated the development of the different biological systems. There are 1158 plant species on Lovćen, out of which four are endemic.

The road from Kotor to Boka Kotorska to the Lovćen Mountain is made up of a series of serpentines, each curve disclosing a yet more sensational vista below. This is a portrait of a life cycle, crafted out by the forces of nature – when you climb up, it is difficult, narrow and winding, but you can succeed. In *Ivanova Korita*, which is a part of national park, there are several tourist facilities designed for recreation. Body and mind need to recreate, to absorb energy and spirit. This is Lovćen.

Lovćen was proclaimed a national park in 1952. Beside natural beauties, the national park protects rich historical, cultural and architectural heritage of the area. The old houses and village *guvna* are authentic as well as the cottages in *katuns* – summer settlements of cattle breeders.

Upon the Kotor, the village of Njeguši is situated, where the birth house of Montenegrin royal family of Petrović is positioned. The dynasty ruled the Montenegro from 1696 to 1918. The village is also significant for its well-preserved traditional folk architecture. *Njeguški sir* and *Njeguški pršut* (local forms of cheese and prosciutto) are genuine contributions to Montenegrin cuisine.

Petar II Petrović – Njegoš lived in 19th century and was a Prince – Bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church of Montenegro and a ruler who transformed Montenegro from a theocracy into a secular state. However, he is most famous as a poet. His most notable work is *The Mountain Wreath* – an incredible masterpiece of epics, which springs out of history, tradition and wisdom, vibrating messages, atmosphere and vision.

For the memory of Njegoš, the biggest and most important monument of Lovćen is Njegoš's Mausoleum. The location at the summit of *Jezerski vrh* was chosen by Njegoš himself. It was destroyed in the First World War. Njegoš's remains were then transferred into Cetinje, but the chapel was rebuilt in 1920s by King Alexander. After the Second World War the communist regime destroyed the chapel and built instead a monumental mausoleum in Viennese Secession Style, the design of the famous Croatian architect Ivan Meštrović, who – paradoxically – had never set a foot on Lovćen. The mausoleum is supposed to be the highest mausoleum on the world.

When George Bernard Shaw once visited Lovćen, he was very much amazed by expressing the following words: Am I on Paradise or on the Moon? Also Byron never stopped admiring the surrounding, too.

Lovćen remains the most important symbol for Montenegro. Njegoš, saying in his monumental epic saga how important and difficult is to be a friend in need, who is a friend indeed, has placed in numerous verses that what nature promises around Lovćen – it is what makes people stand high and be proud as well as honest.

Anja Fabiani

GENERAL SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Articles

European Perspectives is a scientific journal that publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific articles focusing on relevant political, sociological, social, security, economic and legal as well as ethnic, cross-cultural, minority and cross-ethnical issues related to European and Euro-Atlantic integrations and South-Eastern Europe.

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Ernest Petrič et al.
Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu
(Slovene Diplomats in Slavic Countries)
2010 / 472 pages / ISBN 978-961-92839-0-5
Price: € 40



This is an excellent and rare book which analyses and reflects the role of Slovene diplomats in the Slavic countries up till 1990. The main message of the book is that Slavic component is part of the Slovene diplomatic experience. It has contributed to enhanced diplomatic relations between the Republic of Slovenia and several Slavic countries. Contributions are published in Slovene, Czech and Russian languages. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Andrej Rahten
Izidor Cankar – diplomat dveh Jugoslavij
(Izidor Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias)
2009 / 420 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-8-2
Price: € 40



The biography Izidor *Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias* is an account of the diplomatic career of Izidor Cankar in the first and second Yugoslav states. The book outlines Slovenia's progress from the end of the 19th century to the late 1950s in broad social terms as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the monarchist and communist Yugoslavias. Special attention is given to the international point of view – debates on the Slovenian issue in correspondence involving Slovenian diplomats serving at Yugoslav missions. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Franc Rozman

Baron Josef Schwegel – spomini in pisma (Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters)

2007 / 376 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-0-6
Price: € 34



The book *Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters* contains an autobiography of Baron Josef Schwegel and his notes from the Congress of Berlin. The book sheds light on Schwegel's work in diplomacy and foreign affairs based on his memoirs and the letters he wrote his wife when he was a member of the Austro-Hungarian delegation at the Congress of Berlin. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Ernest Petrič

Slovenci v očeh Imperija - Priročniki britanskih diplomatov na Pariški mirovni konferenci leta 1919

(Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919)

2007 / 524 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-1-3
Price: € 35



The book *Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* includes a collection of handbooks prepared by the Historical Section at the British Foreign Office for the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Political analyses, texts containing historical and general information (Slovenes, the Yugoslav movement, the Austrian Primorska (Littoral) and Kansan (Carniola) regions, Koroška (Carinthia), Štajerska (Styria)) that were intended to help shape British policy on Central and Southern Europe following World War I. The book was published as part of the *Fontes* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Ernest Petrič
Zunanja politika – Osnove teorije in prakse
(Foreign Policy - Basic Theory and Practice)
2010/509 pages/ISBN 978-961-92839-2-9
Price: € 45



The author, an experienced professor of international law, ambassador with remarkable career and currently the president of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, presents in this book a comprehensive overview of foreign policy. He combines in-depth theoretical expertise and long year experience both in foreign policy decision-making process and in its exercising through diplomatic means. This monograph is the first of its kind in Slovene language and represents a pioneering contribution to science.

The ***Studia diplomatica Slovenica*** is a collection of books divided into three series: the Fontes series – a collection of sources and international diplomatic documents; the Monographiae series – a collection of key periods of development of Slovenian diplomatic heritage; and the Personae series – biographies of prominent Slovenian diplomats working for multinational states (the Habsburg Monarchy, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Socialist Yugoslavia).