EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Journal on European Perspectives of the Western Balkans

contents

Letter from the Editor

The end of the year 2013 brings already the ninth issue of our journal. A small success, heading us definitely towards the tenth issue in next spring. This year hasn't been an easy and a comfortable one: the crisis is still looming globally, although there are signs of a recovery. One might say that the current offer of contributions reflects just mentioned.

Our contributors focus on highly topical issues, from broader security ones to labour, corruption, freedom of travel as well as to soft power in the frame of the regional leadership, having in mind still the situation of young generation. We are glad that our last special issue, which was devoted to young generation, has initiated discussions and elaborations, which span beyond one single set of articles. Albania, Croatia and Kosovo are in the centre of our authors' attention, but also region as a whole, observed and elaborated through strong and diverse security glasses. There are, for the first time, not counting our three special issues, six contributions in this volume. Although we usually try to stick to only five, we should not be too self-limiting when there are good pieces by hand. At the same time this shows the way our journal is developing and evolving, but still remains with its two main missions. Firstly, to focus on the region and its potentials, and secondly, to try to promote promising authors from the very region. It is our impression that we are succeeding fair enough in fulfilling these two goals.

We continue with the new selection, i.e. choice of our guest views and croquis; they point out in an indirect reflection above all various cultural aspects of regional policy and politics. It is our impression that the current and high political stakeholders are somehow far to less aware of this approach and its importance. Prof. Igor Koršič, a distinguished and widely respected expert of history and theory of cinema elaborates in his essay on potentials, challenges and the sensitive frame of this art of creativity in the region, which echoes globally and inspires absolutely.

After contemplating on Sarajevo, which is not only a capitol, a historical and political memento, but a widely respected and accepted symbol, our innovative author deals this time in the Croquis Section with Belgrade, another capitol, symbol and inspiration. Both cities went through a difficult time during last two decades and a half, but both of them show how to stand up, how to shine and look forward. This has not been an easy metamorphosis, though a highly substantial one. There are places not only around the region, but also globally that could learn from this experience and voyage.

The Sarajevo 2014 Section plays – if one should dare to use that idiom – with an ever vibrating topic of mythology. This topic not only reflects history, it also compensates on it and substitutes it. It is a fascinating fact that dwelling on mythology in times of a superb technological advancement still attracts scientific attention as well as that of broader public.

We are also pleased to announce that this issue of our Journal was co-published together with the Chair of Defence Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. This cooperation aims to broaden the scope of the Journal and to strengthen its academic position.

Finally, let me touch again upon our next issue. We would be glad to offer even better and more sophisticated choice of selected reading in the number ten of our journal. Contributors are invited, not only as always, but even more welcome: let academic competition enable us to prepare an outstanding supply for the demand of our readers.

Wishing you again a nice and fruitful critically coloured reading and see you with number ten in spring of 2014.

The Castle of Jable, October 2013   M. J.

guest view

On Globalistation and European Perspective
Igor Koršič

On Globalistation and European Perspective

Igor Koršič[1]

....

For us in the West Balkans or on the edges of it that have lived through electrification and motorization, globalisation should not come as any real surprise. We know that what world politicians, merchants and their PR men are explicitly or implicitly promising us is not true. Globalisation in itself will not solve all our problems. Globalisation is not the great bright future of eternal bliss and happiness. European perspective of West Balkan states goes with globalisation. In any case, we do not want such bright future. We do not want it, because there is none. This we have learned the hard way. We know now, that the only possibility for that greatness and brightens and for final bliss and happiness is heaven. If there is one, of course.

This, evidently, does not mean, that globalisation is not happening. Or that it should not. Or that people of West Balkans have any other except the so called European perspective. Or that we should try to stop it. Or that we can stop it, even if we decided so. No, this means simply, that by now, we should know, that globalisation will bring to us some advantages and probably more disadvantages. And none of them of the calibre of the great bright future of course.

The degree of how beneficial or damaging the process of globalisation will be to us depends to some degree on how democratic our society is. It depends on the degree to which our political system allows authentic interests to articulate themselves. In this way it depends on our political leaders. That means also to some degree on us.

Both advantages and disadvantages of globalisation process will be/are very much earthly matters. Globalisation means basically growing possibility, both technically and politically, of exchanges of all sorts on the global market. The exchange is technically easier to perform and as a consequence less

---

restricted by the individual states. In principle both goods and ideas (in the form of knowledge and culture) should be in this global circuit, benefiting everybody.

It is said that globalisation is made possible by nation states loosing on their power and competence, and free enterprise, free market gaining. This rosy "theory", in fact primitive liberal ideology, is telling us that this is good, because states are selfish and aggressive, enslaving their citizens and instigating wars with each other. And free market economy is good, because it does away with borders that divide people that want to live united and in peace. Divided people live in misery because circulation of goods, capital and ideas, something that is good for economy, are prevented or infringed to freely circulate by those selfish states and their leaders. So, good forces of openness, progress and freedom are fighting bad forces of isolation, backwardness and authoritarian tyranny.

In reality the forces promoting globalisation are selfish and irresponsible. Which is not surprising, since corporate interest is mostly not the same as public one. Human rights and public interest is otherwise something that is all the time on the lips of globalisers. Yet the profits of globalised exchange are far from evenly distributed. True, globalising forces do act against all the nation states. Yet with one small exception - their own. The "real" free market unlike the "ideal" one favours the strong only. Participants on the market are extremely unequal in strength. The poor ones are selling cheaply and buying expensively and the rich are buying cheaply and selling with great profits. The few are mighty and the majority is week. So this free global market resembles mostly a mediaeval society, with few potent feudal lords and a mass of nominally free, but destitute peasantry. Globalised market resembles human society before civilisation, before the reign of law. It resembles the frontier county of the old Wild West.

It is evident that the borders have not disappeared. The people have not been united. Just the opposite, the peoples of the world have been divided into classes. The borders around the rich have been fortified and became impenetrable for the poor, rich have tightened, except for those that can enrich the rich even further but thereby even more impoverishing the poor. The phenomena is called, as we know, the "brain-drain".

The real nature of globalisation was extremely evident during the Bosnian war. The leaders of the "free world" were full of civilised instructions to "warring factions" about the necessity of peace, the evil of nationalism, or something they ascribe to others then themselves, "tribalism". At the same time these same leaders stimulated war by appeasement of the aggressor.

They organised humanitarian help actions for the besieged people in Sarajevo, at the same time with arms embargo disabling them to protect themselves, and sealing them off in their besieged town in order not to get them in their own states as refugees.

It is a fact that globalisation is widening the gap between the rich and the poor part of the world both materially and spiritually. This gap has even up until present intense phase of globalisation meant one of the worst if not the worst and most menacing problems of the mankind.

In principle, in rosy theory in this globalised market, both goods and ideas are supposed to circulate. Something that is supposed to mean dissemination of knowledge and culture from the privileged to the others. In fact what has happened, as it has so many times before with new gadgets, only goods circulate. And some bad ideas that are weakening cultural identity and resistance capability and thus make way for the goods to penetrate unobstructed. The same happened with TV once. TV did not become vehicle for cultural democratisation. It is not the educator of the peoples, as it was once promised. TV has become something quite the opposite, especially in those states, that left it to the free market forces. It became a medium for state indoctrination (or party indoctrination as with Berlusconi). And a medium for mostly anti cultural entertainment, which has as a main objective selling time for advertising and disseminating imported musculature, that usually prevents a genuine local culture to develop.

The problem with this imported entertainment and lack of genuine local culture is not some sentimental need for local folklore, particular colours on folk dresses, and spices in local cuisine. Entertainment is not for fun alone. Man's deep rooted need for stories and songs is the expression for his need to contemplate his life situation, contemplate conditions of his living. Genuine art, both elite and mass variety mean a unique way of thinking. That "thinking" is made possible by cultural identity. And cultural identity is not only any particular brand of sausage one may eat, but means rather a possibility to articulate ones worldly and spiritual interests. You cannot have political identity if you do not have cultural identity before, if it is true, that is, that culture means different ways of thinking. If you instead have a synthetic industrial soul-less variety of *ersatz* that lacks *genus loci* and everything else particular, that is crucial for the quality of everything spiritual, you have a surrogate that promises but cannot deliver. In fact it even prevents fulfillment.

So it even looks like, that disadvantages of globalisation might outweigh the advantages. Of course, if we are not going to find some way to regulate

the disadvantages. As we had to regulate the traffic because of automobiles, so that we now at least can cope with them. But even automobiles brought with them pollution, diseases and annihilation of forests, contributed to the ozone hole, maybe even to the changes in global climate, the battles for oil are continually threatening world peace … If innocent automobiles managed to achieve all that what will not mighty globalisation process manage to bring with it!

In the midst of market turmoil and promises of growth and happiness to all, some increasingly rare wise and honest men are warning us with a bitter truth: Nobody has yet presented us with the slightest idea about what could be done against widening of the gap between the fortunates and unfortunates of this world this, the least desirable and most probable consequence of globalisation. Not even in theory. And most ardent proponents of globalisation, that incidentally are those, that are profiting from it most, do not pay much attention to this vital question, if any at all. Which is not surprising, since the elucidation of the question is not in their, at least immediate, interest.

So it can't be the case, as they are sweetly whispering into our ears, that in a globalised society we will not need states any more, because we will live in community with the whole world on one side, in local village and family on the other. All bad things in - between will just disappear. It is, as often, just the opposite case. More globalisation, stronger states we must have to safeguard our public interests against market forces that cannot articulate and represent them.

Cinema that has been a global business for many decades is a good indicator of how the globalised world is functioning and what it may become. Global film market means, in reality that is, not in dreams, the control of the global market by one state. Huge profits gaining one player on the market alone. App. 80% percent of the world market in the hands of one industry. In many places that number is over 90%, sometimes over 95%. On the other hand 1 % of the home market of the dominating USA belongs to non-American films. This is so in spite of the fact that globalisation of the film market has not been fully achieved yet. There are still national barriers preventing even more American control. There are taxes, quotas, and other instruments of national film policies of different sorts that are trying to secure at least a slice of the "home market" for "home product". The intense conflict between the USA and the EU in the (Uruguay) round of negotiations of WTO (then GATT) over the American demand to remove all the remaining obstacles for the "free flow of film and TV products", shows the nature and the importance of the issue. After all the methods short of war

have been used (there was an CIA espionage scandal in France), status quo, even that not favourable to Europeans, has been more or less kept.

And some European cultural autonomy and identity preserved for at least some time to come.

The situation in the almost globalised world film market should teach us a lesson. Yes, the global circulation of films in theory means taking down cultural barriers, increasing understanding of the cultures of the world, (and not disposing with them in the name of empty universalism, or mundialism), the possibility for all to earn more money with their films overseas. But this happens partly, in small portion only to those non-USA states that are not gullible. Some cultural and political future have those states that have their own national film policies, that regulate their film markets with the help of state and law. With all the others the reality is cruel and completely opposite to the promises of liberalism. They receive one product of one culture only, they are becoming blind for all other cultures including their own, or rather because they are unable to recognise their own culture, they are unable to see and appreciate those of others. They are loosing economically, because all they do is import. Finally they are bound to become cultural, political and economic provinces.

It seams that the size of the state has nothing to do with the possibility of the successful defence. Small Ireland, Denmark, Canada, Australia, are relatively successful in protecting their film industries. Italy in spite of the size of its population and the might of its cinematic past has capitulated. So has Britain and Germany really. At least more or less.

Well, here is a message to all of us, veterans of electrification in the Western Balkans: If we eventually never believed in electrification, why the hell should we believe in globalisation!?

Only with such an attitude we have a slim chance to benefit slightly from many potential promising sides of globalisation process. And the same goes for the so called Euroepan perspective. And this process is inevitably here. We cannot think it away. We cannot avoid it. Which we probably should not either.

articles

Socio-economic Impact of the EU Visa Liberalization for Kosovo and Peoples Motives in Utilising the Freedom of Movement within the EU

Alban Asllani, Shkumbin Misini, Kujtim Bytyqi[1]

....

ABSTRACT
This study intends to identify the main potential positive social and economic indicators of visa liberalisation for Kosovo, analyse the effect of citizens mobility in the attraction of foreign direct investments to the country, and the benefits of citizen mobility in the creation of social and business networks in the European Union, which contribute to the positive economic growth and harmonization as the first steps taken to EU membership. The study argues that visa liberalization for Kosovo is of imperative importance in preparing Kosovo for EU membership. The study also argues that citizens of Kosovo benefit substantially by creating networks with professionals in the areas of research, technology, and education. These networks could potentially lead to local businesses gaining from outsourcing, which would overtime increase economic development of the country. However, the study also outweighs the possible negative social and economic impacts of visa liberalization for Kosovo. Furthermore, the study's focal point is the analysis of the survey of Kosovars on how they would utilize the EU visa liberalisation regime, using descriptive, correlation, and regression analysis. The regression shows a strong negative correlation between employment status, and work and study as a reason for visiting the EU member states after visa liberalisation, while there is strong positive correlation between employment status and business, tourism and research as reasons for visiting the EU. Similarly, strong correlations have been found between education level of the respondents and their age group as demographics in one side, and work, study, tourism doing business,

---

and conducting research as reasons for visiting EU after the visa liberalisation regime is granted to Kosovo. By conducting such analysis, the authors of this study expect to give a comprehensive overview of the current situation in terms of economic and socio-political implications regarding the visa liberalization, and the motives of Kosovars in utilising the visa liberalisation regime based on the responses received from the questionnaires.

KEY WORDS:
visa liberalization, mobility, networking, socio-economic development, economic growth, people-to-people contact

Introduction

In the Thessaloniki agenda announced on 16 June 2003, the EU made a political commitment that Western Balkan countries should be considered for visa liberalisation with an attempt to explore possibilities in promoting people-to-people contacts in the region (EU Council Conclusions 2003). Since then, the EU has managed to ensure that a number of states have adopted EU legislation in many key areas and the majority of Western Balkan countries have enjoyed the visa-free establishment with the EU within the Schengen Area. Since 19 December 2009, the citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, have enjoyed visa-free travel to the European Union (EU) member states, in accordance with Regulation 539/2001 (EU Commission Report 2012). One of the immediate conditions for the citizens of the above countries to be able to travel visa-free within the EU member states was that they had to have biometric passports. Under the same conditions, the citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have enjoyed the same visa-free travel to the EU member states since 15 December 2010 (EU Commission Report 2012).

State building and European integration are two progressions that simultaneously occur and complement each other. Economic and legislation reforms are necessary conditions that have to be met by all countries aspiring EU integrations according to the Copenhagen Criteria, which were created in June 1993 with the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union and further their reforms towards EU integrations. In order to begin the

process and dialogue of European integrations, one country should meet the requirements under the roadmaps for the visa liberalisation dialogues. This is a process that was clearly defined in the visa liberalisation documentation set out by the EU commission and the EU enlargement criteria. These roadmaps comprise guidelines regarding matters of document security, border management, asylum and migration, fight against organised crime and corruption, and the protection of fundamental human rights. Countries wishing to further the process into European integrations are expected to regulate and advance the country policies in these respective fields.

By means of conditionality to enter the EU, the visa liberalisation process has proved to be vital in the Europeanization process of the region through the reform and regulations in the area of justice, freedom, and security. Countries that currently enjoy the visa-free regime have actively reformed their legislations, security policies, migration legislature, and have regulated the political relationships with countries in the region. In turn, the authors of this paper argue that Kosovo too, would benefit from such a regime, both socially and economically. These two aspects are discussed in the paper.

Presently, Kosovo is the only country in the region not to benefit from the visa liberalisation regime. However, The European Commission launched a visa liberalisation dialogue with Kosovo on 19 January 2012, and a roadmap towards a visa-free regime was handed over to the government on 14 June 2012. The EU commission report of 2013 addresses in detail the progress made by Kosovo in fulfilling the requirements of the visa liberalisation roadmap set out in the dialogue. One of the main points discussed in this report is the re-admissions and reintegration of Kosovo citizens returning from EU member states. The report also focuses on other areas which are discussed in this paper.

By analysing the visa-free regime and applying it in the case of Kosovo, this paper intends to contribute to literature regarding the implications and impact of the visa-free regime of the Balkan countries. In what follows, we will give an overview of the existing literature, and research into the field of the visa-free regime for Kosovo. The study will then analyse the social and economic benefits, and costs of the upcoming visa liberalisation agreement, the perceptions of people

towards such a process, and their motives for travel to the EU once the visa liberalisation processes is approved. Thus, the focal point of the discussions and result analysis will be to understand the perceptions of people and their motives. Next, we turn to the methodology and the results of the data gathered for this contribution and scrutinise the enlargement strategies of the EU and Kosovo Government's integration strategies respectively.

Literature Review

Even though literature regarding the visa liberation regimes in different parts of the world has expanded significantly over the years, there is lack of detailed analysis and inquiry into the public opinion with regards to the potential benefits and costs of citizen and resource mobility.

Although there has been some research on the public perception about the visa liberalisation regime with the EU from various reports published by different NGOs in Kosovo, there is still a lack of insight into the motives of Kosovo citizens to travel to countries of the EU (typically countries of the Schengen area), once the visa-free regime launches. This paper analyses and evaluates the theory of the theory of visa-free regimes and their macroeconomic impacts, taking the regional countries as a basis and reference point for the inquiry of the socio-economic advantages, and costs accompanying the liberalization process.

The right to free movement of persons has been anchored in European law and applies since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Hix 2005). The removal of barriers of movements and borders was first institutionalised with the Schengen Agreement in 1985, signed intergovernmentally between the Benelux, France and Germany (Guild 2009). Then, it was believed that the mobility of labour, people, and resources should be beneficial for the countries taking part. This approach is still nowadays valid and remains one of the main arguments put forward by different scholars when addressing the issue of visa-free regimes.

Kacarska (2012) writes about the implications of the visa-free regimes with the EU, the dialogues between the European Commission

and national governments of the Western Balkan countries. The paper concentrates on the Europeanisation of the West Balkan through mobility, arguing that mobility can advance the countries through integration and socio-economic developments.

The visa liberalisation regime affected the whole region, but it has profoundly affected Kosovo. Even though Kosovo's independence has been recognised by the majority of EU member states, Kosovo's political state existence is still not fully recognised by five EU member states[2]. As per the roadmap, the Kosovo government will have to work hard to earn the EU's approval in regard to the fulfilment of the benchmarks set out in the visa liberalisation roadmap (GLPS 2012). This can make it politically more difficult for Kosovo to pursue the visa liberalisation regime at the same pace as other West Balkan countries. Similarly, the EU has its own stake in the process as well: it finds itself between the wheels of the lack of agreement on Kosovo's status and security concerns, and of its desire to be a reliable international partner, inter alia, through a credible application of the principle of conditionality (GLPS 2012).

Even though Kosovo has made significant improvements in the areas of security and biometric passports, the holders of Kosovo passports can currently travel visa-free to only five states: Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Turkey and Haiti. This makes Kosovo one of the most isolated countries in the region and perhaps in the world (Kacarska 2012, Krasniqi 2010). In the absence of the Roadmap from the EU[3], Kosovo's government adopted their own Action Plan[4] for reforming and implementing the roadmap of the Visa liberalisation regime with the EU (Krasniqi 2010, Ministry of European Integrations 2012). The plan has integrated a roadmap based on the reforms and regional country policies which are to be implemented in order to unite EU integrations. However, Kosovo recently received the Roadmap for the Visa Free regime from the EU and now faces the

---

[2] Website http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ consulted on 20.07.2013

[3] European Union Office in Kosovo. (2012). *Visa Liberalisation With Kosovo Roadmap*.
    Available: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/documents/eu_travel/visa_liberalisation_with_
    kosovo_roadmap.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

[4] Action Plan was Implemented initially in 2010, and then extended with greater details in 2012 by
    the Ministry of European Integrations of Kosovo. Ministry of European Integrations, Kosovo.
    (2012). *Action Plan on negotiation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement*.

challenge of implementing the policies stated in that roadmap (EU Commission 2013).

In addition, the civil society in Kosovo has significantly participated in the advocacy of visa liberalisation for Kosovo citizens. They have articulated their conviction that visa-free regime with the member states of the EU is the only promising way forward for Kosovo to begin the process of Europeanisation and EU integrations, to protect minorities in Kosovo and to commence much needed reforms (GLPS 2012). The report from GLPS – Group for Legal and Political Studies (2012) in Kosovo, also highlighted a number of comparative analyses of the visa liberalisation process in the Western Balkan countries and provided in detail the highlights of the differences between Kosovo visa liberalisation roadmap and those of Western Balkans countries. The report in particular distinguishes on the visa liberalisation road-map given to Kosovo on the basis of improving the relations with the neighbouring countries (with emphasis on the relations with Serbia), and the reforms that Kosovo need to undertake with regards to the rights of the minorities living in Kosovo. This was more applicable to Kosovo rather than other neighbouring countries, and while other countries in the region have achieved their goals and been granted visa free regimes with the Schengen area countries, Kosovo's status and talks with Serbia have been prolonging this process.

For the Western Balkan counties that are now enjoying visa-free re-gimes with the EU, the visa liberalisation did not come as a surprise. In fact, it was conditioned upon the countries performing substantial reforms in the field of migration and border control, public order and security, external relations and human rights, which the countries need to put in line with EU standards (Chachipe 2012). Similar to the conditions, Kosovo would have to prove the progress and reform capabilities. The report by Chachipe (2012) discusses in great detail the overall western Balkan approach to the admission of the visa lib-eration regime, but fails to discuss which steps Kosovo needs to un-dertake to be eligible for this process.

Tavares (2012-2013) writes about the economic aspects of European integration. Economic integration stems from the idea of a common base of policies associated with enforcing competition and facilitat-ing mobility of people and resources. Tavares (2012/13) argues that

integration and mobility of peoples and resources between countries opens the way for new partnerships and relations between businesses and countries. It can foster economic growth through trade, economic agreements, and partnerships. This would undoubtedly advance Kosovo as well: it will open doors to more business partnerships being created between businesses in Kosovo and elsewhere in the EU, and this would encourage economic growth and reduce unemployment in the country. The arguments of Tavares are extended to this Kosovo case study. Other countries in the region including the countries in the Eastern parts of the Balkans, have managed to benefit a great deal from the visa liberalisation regimes. Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro have gained in terms of increased trade with the EU and increased inward tourism in their country (according to respective Ministries in these countries). Travel and tourism are one of the world's most dynamic economic sectors, offering enormous opportunities for growth, development and job creation (UNWTO and WTTC 2012).

Economic benefits of EU integrations were truly understood in greater detail only after the establishment of the Single European Act in 1985 (Hix 2005), which entailed the creation of the Single Market along with the removal of all internal physical barriers. At this time the freedom of movement and the question of borders began to have tangible implications for the citizens of the EU. Integration naturally opens the way to a set of new partnerships and other relevant policies which could potentially lead to economic injections into a country (Dewatripont et al. 1996). The authors of this paper believe that this is a significant argument, and Kosovo could benefit from the freedom of mobility of the people and resources.

As markets integrate the international political, regulatory, and legal institutions necessary to enforce market, openness and competitiveness become more important. In other words, the need for public goods provided at a "higher level" becomes evident. Market integration and institutional integration are complementary (Casella and Feinstein 1990). The European founding member states seem to have understood this argument at a profound, intuitive level and have managed to enlarge the market and labour mobility significantly over the years (Tavares 2012). The enlargement of the EU eastwards was seen to be important for the above factors as well. Indeed, East

European countries that have joined the European Union years ago have shown significant reforms in their economies, legislation, and fundamental rights for their citizens.

Economic prosperity and reforms have become of imperative essence in the Kosovo situation. An increasing number of Kosovo citizens have started to ask again for asylum in some of the EU member states – this constitutes perhaps the biggest wave of people seeking asylum in the EU since after the war ended (Zeri 2013). This should in theory act as a deterrent for Kosovo to be considered for the visa-free regime with the EU at this point in time. Even though statistics prove that an increasing amount of Kosovo citizens are asking for asylum, active steps are being undertaken by the government to reduce this number in the form of readmission agreements with a number of EU countries (Ministry of EU Integrations 2013). These regulations are expected to prevent future emigration from the country.

Petrovic (2010) discusses the aspects of conditionality. She focuses on the technical and political conditionality put forward to the Western Balkan countries in the early stages of the visa liberalisation process. Croatia worked in reforming the sectors of justice, migration and security before getting visa-free regime with the EU, and then finally being admitted to the EU as a full member on the 1st of July 2013. This paper will analyse the conditions set out for Kosovo in the Roadmap for Visa Liberalisation with the EU.

Little to no research has been conducted into the perceptions of the Kosovo people with regards to the impact of the visa – free regime. The following few paragraphs in this paper aim at filling this methodological gap by offering some insight about what people think about the visa-free regime. From this the paper will also be able to draw conclusions on what the economic and social impact might be for Kosovo.

Methodology

The main purpose of this study is to obtain insight into the current development of the visa liberalisation dialogue for Kosovo by eliciting people's perceptions about this process. Perceptions are predominately subjective, yet offer adequate understanding into the social,

cultural and economic motives that drive Kosovo citizens to go to EU member states.

According to Sekaran (2003) an exploratory study can be done when there is not much information about the subject, or when no information is available. Therefore, this study aims at gaining familiarity and deeper understanding of the current situation, with regards to the visa liberalisation process for Kosovo, the perceptions of the population and the potential benefits and costs of such a process. We have conducted our research through a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods.

The qualitative part of the research consists of the analysis of the socio-economic factors mainly to help the conceptual part of our research, identifying research gaps, identifying possible responses to those gaps and then formalizing our arguments. A qualitative research method is contextualizing the data or historicizing it in the background of the relevant political, social and economic dimensions.

The quantitative part of our research consists of the analysis of statistical data taken from primary data from the questionnaires. For the purpose of this study, random probability sampling was selected. Roscoe (1975) proposes the following rule of thumb for determining the sample size, "Sample sizes larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for most of researches." Sekaran (2003) added that when qualitative studies are undertaken for exploratory purposes, the sampling design will be convenience sampling, which in our case will be the random probability sampling.

The questionnaires were distributed randomly in the streets, shopping centres, cafeterias and bars of five largest urban centres in Kosovo, which include Pristina, Ferizaj, Prizren, Gjakova and Gjilan. The age of the respondents was the only factor to determine and limit the distribution of the questionnaire. We restricted our respondents to the age category of +16. The reasons for this age constraint relates to the right to travel without assistance.

In total 480 people responded to the questionnaires. With the questionnaire we wanted to find out, what our respondents would most

want to do once the visa-free regime takes place with the EU, in an attempt to try and understand the purpose of their visit. In other words, we wanted to analyse people's motives in utilising the freedom of movement within the EU, and in particular the Schengen Area. This served as a basis for the analysis offering sound conclusions relating to the research topic. Our questionnaire consisted of a total of 20 multiple choice questions and was divided into two parts. Part one consisted of demographic enquiries regarding the age group, gender, level of education and their employment status. Part two turned to the perceptions of the visa liberalisation process in Kosovo and respondents motives for going to the EU. As such, we intended to correlate the social demographic factors of the respondents with the rationale behind their perceptions and motives.

Potential benefits and costs of the visa liberalisation process were analysed in light of the results from our questionnaires and relations were made on those benefits and costs with the motives and perception results from the questionnaires. The descriptive and correlation statistical results were generated using IBM SPSS and MS Excel, a regression was undertaken and served as the basis for the analysis.

Overview of the recent developments

Kosovo was the last territory to break away from the former Yugoslavia. After declaration of independence, on February 17th of 2008, the country engaged in the process of state building. Up until 2008, Kosovo was in the process of rebuilding its infrastructure and institutions from the war, and establishing the rule of law.

The dialogue between the EU Commission and the Western Balkan countries continues under the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process. By making free movement a key value in its relations with neighbouring countries, and promising that they too will be able to share in these great freedoms of movement in the future even if they do not join the Union's political institutions, the European Union has raised hopes beyond its borders (Bigo 2009). EU polices have practically increased the cooperation amongst countries that were in conflict a decade ago. In has significantly contributed to a peaceful territory, which is one of the greatest successes of the EU policies affecting the Balkan region.

The European Commission launched the visa dialogue with the Republic of Kosovo on 19 of January 2013. This dialogue followed by a roadmap, which was handed to the Kosovo government officials in Brussels on 14 June 2012 (ESI, 2012), requires that Kosovo fulfils the entire requirement set out in the roadmap in line with the EU legislation. This roadmap identifies a number of areas and requirements where Kosovo will have to meet, in order for the European Commission to present a proposal to the European Parliament and the European Council to lift the visa obligation for Kosovo citizens by amending the Council Regulation 539/2001, and transferring Kosovo from Part 2 of Annex I to the appropriate part of Annex II, of the above regulation (European Commission Conclusions and Roadmap, 2013).

The roadmap highlights the following key areas where Kosovo should show reforms in line with EU legislation; Kosovo is required to implement and fulfil the requirements with regards to the readmissions and reintegration of Kosovo citizens returning home from all Member States of the EU who no longer fulfil the conditions of entry or leave to remain in a EU member state; Kosovo is required to implement and fulfil the requirements set out by the roadmap with regards to boarder management and migration management and asylum; Kosovo is required to implement and fulfil the requirements set out by the roadmap as far as the security of documents is concerned in an attempt to Kosovo citizens being equipped with a machine-readable biometric passports, travel documents or IDs; the roadmap also requires that Kosovo continues the fight against corruption, money laundering and other economic and financial crimes, prevent organized crime and terrorism, as well as fight and prevent human trafficking; Kosovo should also implement and fulfil the requirement set out in the cooperation section on law and judicial criminal matters and data protection; the roadmap provided to Kosovo, requests that the government of Kosovo should ensure that the fundamental rights (such as human rights of minorities) and freedom of movement is subject to fairness and not subject to unjustified restrictions and discrimination (European Commission Conclusions and Roadmap, 2013).

According to the roadmap and European Commission report handed over to the government of Kosovo, Kosovo will be given targets and will be monitored on their progress. The monitoring will take place

by the European Commission who will be reporting to the European Council, Member States, and the European Parliament on whether Kosovo has met the requirements stated in the roadmap agenda. Particular attention will be paid to a number of performance indicators such as visa refusal rates and refused entry from applicants from Kosovo to the Member States of the Schengen Area, the number of citizens of Kosovo working or staying illegally in an EU member state, the number of asylum applications from Kosovo to the EU member states and the number of rejected readmission applications made by an EU member state to Kosovo about an illegally or expired leave to remain of a Kosovar citizen in that particular EU member state (European Commission Conclusions and Roadmap, 2013).

In light of the above paragraph, this is where Kosovo government has shown a lack of ability to create an environment in an attempt to reduce the number of asylum applications, and reduce the number of illegal travel to the EU member states from the Kosovo citizens.

Although the visa liberalization promises visa-free movement in the Schengen area countries of the EU, according to a number of NGOs in the country, it is believed that about 10 per cent of the Kosovo population will benefit from it - those who have the financial means to travel, and those that are already travelling to the EU for tourism and/or business related activities. While the majority of population mobility is limited by economic and financial situation, which means that if you do not have enough financial means to prove that you can pay yourself throughout your stay for accommodation, health insurance and others - then under Article 5.1 of the Schengen Borders Code, travelling to the Schengen area will not be allowed. However, the majority of our respondents in our randomly distributed questionnaire do not see visa liberalization as an opportunity to move freely as tourists or visiting relatives, but also as an opportunity to work and to change their, already difficult, social and economic situation.

Recently it has been evident that many young people from Kosovo are leaving for EU member countries through a Pristina-Belgrade-Subotica bus line, with the hope they can cross over the border to Hungary, and then from there attempt to go on to other destinations of Western Europe, notably France (Zeri 2013). What prompted them

to take this path, without doubt, are poverty and unemployment in Kosovo. Unemployment in Kosovo is thought to be around 35.1% of all ages, and around 60.2% amongst the youth aged between 15 to 24 (Kosovo Agency of Statistic 2012 – ASK hereafter). Evidently, this is economic asylum and can jeopardise the progress that Kosovo has made in readmissions and reintegration process. In such a case, the government should attempt to inform their citizens on the rights to travel to the EU member states and should actively work with EU to prevent this. Ideally, reduced unemployment might have a positive impact on this; however, unemployment reduction requires macro-economic reforms. It is argued that such reforms go hand in hand with EU and Regional integrations. Kosovo's political status can put a burden on this at times.

However, although young people take this route with a hope of a better life, majority of them believe that this could potentially penalise them, but they want to try and take the risk anyway. On the other hand, in order to show its commitment to fulfil the obligations and requirements set out by the roadmap for visa liberalization the Kosovo government is coordinating with the State Prosecutor's Office and police to take actions accordingly in stopping Kosovo citizens illegally heading for EU member states with an attempt to seek asylum.

Even though the recent developments can contribute negatively to Kosovo's image and efforts to building relationships and agreements with the EU member states and working towards fulfilling the requirements set out in the roadmap for visa liberalisation regime with the EU, the Government of Kosovo believes that by not allowing Kosovo to benefit from visa liberalisation, the European Commission risks on isolating Kosovo. This could potentially present a risk and could potentially further destabilise Kosovo and the region. Furthermore, Kosovo aspires to EU integration and as such visa liberalisation would engage Kosovo actively in this process, (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2013).

Impact of EU Visa Liberalisation for Kosovo

The isolation of Kosovo from the visa free-regime with the EU has had its share in contributing towards preventing economic development of the country. For many of our respondents, as our survey

reveals below, visa-free regime can be considered as an alternative for asylum and as a way of escaping poverty and unemployment. Therefore the real challenge of the government and all the stakeholders involved is to work towards economic reforms and within the country in an attempt to create opportunities for the young and the unemployed in Kosovo.

Even though visa-free regime might seem costly for the EU, as the fear of people leaving Kosovo and illegally working in EU member states is present, the EU and the Kosovo government need to work more closely on a strategy for informing the citizens of the visa-free regulations and the rights to travel under such regulations. Nevertheless, the economic and social impact of no visa-free regime with the EU for Kosovo has had its negative impact. Kosovo's isolation has contributed towards higher than in the region unemployment of the youth, and it has created barriers for the youth to move freely around Europe in search of better education and training opportunities.

Therefore, we can argue that visa liberalisation can trigger positive movements in terms of economic and social stability, which will lead to economic growth. Countries of the West Balkan have seen reduction in their unemployment levels, and have seen better economic growth figures compared to Kosovo. Even though the recent financial crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis has had a negative impact on economic growth, and inward FDI flows into countries considered as peripheries of the EU, the West Balkan countries have also experienced higher inward foreign direct investments than Kosovo (ECFR 2012). It could be argued that the inward FDI has been influenced partly with the freedom of movement of people who generated new markets and networks, and brought in new ideas and investors. Such increases in the inward FDI may act as one of the key promoters of the economic growth of these countries.

Integration and mobility of people and resources between countries opens up the way to set up new partnerships and relations between businesses and countries. The Contact Theory also argues in favour of freedom of movements and people-to-people contact in opening up new horizons for social and economic interactions, which could lead to stable region and better relations with all minorities in Kosovo and the region. Freedom of movement can foster economic growth

through trade agreements and partnerships (Tavares 2012 and Tavares 2013). This would undoubtedly benefit Kosovo as well – it will open doors to more business partnerships being created between businesses in Kosovo and elsewhere in the EU and this would encourage economic growth and reduce unemployment in the country. The responses to our questionnaire also support this argument. The majority of the people, who would visit EU member states after the visa liberalisation takes place, will be visiting Europe for possibilities to network, as one of their main motives. The table with the results below (table 1) indicates some of the reasons why people will be travelling to the EU member states once the visa liberalisation process is completed. This is likely to result positively in creating business partnerships and opening up new markets for citizens of Kosovo. This could result in the technological and know-how expertise being transferred to Kosovo – a much needed expertise for the economic development of the country.

Table 1: Networking Benefits of Visa liberalisation

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Networking for Exports and Imports	143	30%
	Networking for Study	289	60%
	Networking for Innovation	60	13%
	Networking for Business Contracts	164	34%
	Networking for Career Development	264	55%
	Professional Experience	265	55%
	Total	473	98.5%
Missing		7	1.5%
Total		480	100.0%

Networking for business opportunities could also benefit Kosovo in terms of outsourcing contracts. There are a number of firms that currently do outsource to Kosovo. Firms that have outsourced their production and services to Kosovo range from various sectors, such as call centres, IT start-ups, programming and IT development companies, accounting and auditing firms, manufacturing of car parts, etc.

We believe that as people have the right to move to EU member states, this could lead to increased number of companies wanting to outsource their production and business activities to Kosovo. This will benefit Kosovo directly in terms of reducing the deficit trade by increasing exports to the EU and elsewhere and as such stabilising

the current account and balance of payments and reducing unemployment amongst the youth. The country has well-trained labour force, a large number of English and German speakers who have lived in the countries such as Germany or Switzerland, and thus know the environment. According to the last population census of 2011, knowledge of a foreign language is quite common among the population in Kosovo, as in general around 44.25% can speak at least one language other than that spoken at home (ASK 2012). Furthermore, the labour costs are very low in Kosovo, just as the low taxes of about 10 per cent corporate income tax and 10 per cent personal income tax rate. In addition, Kosovo uses the euro as a currency, with a stable macroeconomic, financial and banking environment. Kosovo is in the Central European Time zone, which also constitutes an important advantage compared to countries in Asia, for example. The cultural and geographic proximity to the EU market as well as visa liberalisation process will undoubtedly bring more investors to Kosovo, who would not only be interested in outsourcing, but also to directly invest in the country – increasing the inward FDI for Kosovo. A new industry report identifies that only the IT outsourcing to Eastern Europe is around to 3.7 billion euros annually – as Western European tech companies discover the benefits in countries of East Europe where geographically are more suitable (Tabak 2010). Kosovo may benefit from such investments by participating in sharing those 3.7 billion Euros with other East European countries.

Almost, the only 'ambassadors' of economic development and links with EU business, have been the people living in the diaspora, who have contributed significantly to the economic development of Kosovo, not only because of their remittances, but also because of their investments into the country and links with businesses in the EU. There are already many examples of Kosovar Diaspora, foreign businesses and Non-Governmental Offices, which have been successful in convincing their international partners to invest and outsource to Kosovo (Dalipi 2011). The influence as a result of networking could be greater after the visa liberalisation.

The visa liberalisation regime with the EU will have noteworthy social impacts for Kosovo and its citizens as well. One of the impacts is the possibility of socialisation. Analysts have identified situations in which intergroup and peoples contact appeared to be associated with

beneficial effects such as lower levels of hostility, and fewer negative stereotypes (Deutsch and Collins 1951; Jahoda and West 1951, 137-38). Some refer to this as the "Contact theory" which on the whole offers an optimistic view, predicting that proximity between people or nations will bring beneficial effects. As Gordon Allport wrote in his seminal book on prejudice (1979, chap. 16), "The more one knows about a person the less likely he is to feel hostility toward him." This is likely to create more international interaction between citizens of all walks of life. Now, majority of Kosovo citizens are isolated due to visa restrictions with the EU member states, and only a few enjoy the possibility of travelling freely (although they still have to be equipped with a visa, but are more likely to be successful in their applications) – and this includes: diplomats and politicians, businessmen, celebrities and occasionally some bright students. The majority of 'Common' citizens have not had this opportunity for travel.

One important social impact of visa liberalisation for Kosovo is the possibility that Kosovo could strengthen its democracy and make other important reforms in the process of meeting the requirement of the roadmap, which may be necessary for an effective democracy development. The large number of informal groupings of individuals or organizations which focus on specific political or social issues will increase their mobility and activities. Knowing that Kosovo has a large number of active non-governmental organizations concludes that free visa liberalization will strengthen the process of transition and development of democracy, as indicated by the roadmap as well – discussed in more detail in section 4, Overview of recent developments.

The other social argument in favour of the visa liberalisation for Kosovo is regarding tourism. Tourism is an interface for cultural exchange, facilitating the interaction between communities and visitors (domestic and international). People want to interact with other cultures, learn about traditions and even confront themselves with new perspectives on life and society. Apart from increasing outward tourism, we believe that it will increase inward tourism into the country as well which is likely to foster the economic development of Kosovo. There could also be a potential for Kosovo to benefit from rural tourism, although there is no academic work presently defining this potential.

According to ASK (2012), 44.25% of the population of Kosovo can speak at least one other foreign language. The authors of this paper believe that the other social impact that could come as a result of freedom of movement of the citizens within the EU countries could increase the percentage of people who can speak another language. This will be beneficiary for the country both socially and economically.

On the potential costs of the visa liberalisation process for Kosovo, we would to argue on the basis of increased competition for local businesses, imported inflation, the possibility of 'exporting' talent abroad and the fear that citizens would start working illegally in EU member states. The latter is likely to affect the image of Kosovo as a country trying to reform itself and it's likely to prolong the whole EU Integration process. As our study and data reveal, a large number of young people are aiming to visit EU member states for work purposes (statistics discussed below). This, therefore, is likely to prolong the EU integration process for Kosovo.

While greater competition in the market could be positive for the consumers in terms of cheaper prices and more alternatives, it might harm local businesses and local producers. Business partnerships and networking of Kosovo citizens and businesses with those of the EU are likely to increase the number of imported goods from the EU member states, which could further destabilise the balance of payments of the country. The market of Kosovo could be 'flooded' with imported products and makes from the EU member states which could be perceived by citizens as 'superior' products in terms of their quality, and might be willing to pay higher prices for them. As such, this could result in imported inflation as well, and might drive some local producers out of the market. There is a good number of local producers that currently are finding it hard to compete with producers from neighbouring countries, and additional competition from the EU could make it harder for them to compete.

Results and Discussions on Peoples' Motives in Utilising the Visa-free Travel

We have analysed 480 respondents' completed questionnaires and have found some interesting results regarding the perceptions of the citizens of Kosovo towards Visa liberalisation with the EU, or their

motives for utilising the freedom of movement within the EU. In some of the questions in the questionnaire, the respondents had the option to select two, three or four options.

In order to provide some analysis for the study it might be important to highlight some descriptive statistical percentages of the population sample. Of the 480 respondents who took part in our research, 51.5% were male, 39.8% were females, with the remaining percentage who did not state their gender. 64.4% were single and 31.3% were married, with the remaining percentage not stating their status. The majority of our respondents were aged between 21 to 30 years of age, followed by below 21 years of age, and 31 to 40 years of age, with percentages of 41.3%, 28.5% and 17.1%, respectively.

Our sample reveals that almost 49% of our respondents were unemployed, while 16.10% were earning a monthly salary of *Between 251 and 350* and 12.70% were earning a salary of *Between 351 and 450*. This does correspond with the current employment and unemployment structure of Kosovo. According to ASK (2012), the unemployment figures in Kosovo amount to 35.1% in general and 60.2% among the youth aged 15 to 24. Our higher unemployment rate can be reasoned with the age of our respondents, where the majority of our respondents were aged between 21 and 30. The official government statistics, as well as our sample of statistics signifies that the majority of population in Kosovo is between the ages of 15 and 30.

Table 2: Monthly Salary

Figures are in Euros		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Unemployed	234	48.90%
	Below 250	42	8.80%
	Between 251 and 350	77	16.10%
	Between 351 and 450	61	12.70%
	Between 451 and 550	33	6.90%
	Between 551 and 650	15	3.10%
	Between 651 and 750	9	1.90%
	Between 751 and 999	4	0.80%
	Over 1000	4	0.80%
	Total	479	99.80%
Missing		1	0.20%
Total		480	100.00%

In search of better education and career opportunities, as well as finding jobs, many of the youth that participated in our question-naires are convinced that they would be able to find jobs and place of study in the EU, once the visa liberalisation regime takes place. As the statistics highlight below, the main reasons that people would travel to the EU Member states after visa liberalisation would be for work or education purposes. However, with the visa liberalisation re-gime, people would be unable to work in the EU member states. The majority of people are not aware of this, or are aware but are plan-ning in finding seasonal jobs in the EU member states, in an attempt to send money back home to their families. Respondents were asked to select 2 reasons for going to the EU after the visa liberalisation for Kosovo is granted. As the table below shows around 58% indicated that they would want to go to EU for studying, almost 41% selected 'work' as the reason for the visit, while around 39% and 23%, chose Tourism and Business, respectively. We purposefully did not have 'Family Visit' as an option, since almost all households in Kosovo have relatives living in the EU and as such that would have been an obvious reason for all respondents to select. We wanted to see their responses for the below reasons only.

Table 3: Reasons for going to EU

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Study	279	58.1%
	Work	196	40.8%
	Tourism	186	38.8%
	Business	110	22.9%
	Research & Conferences	34	7.1%
	Total	805	167.7%
Missing		155	32.3%
Total		480 respondents x 2 answers	200.0%

Our data analysis also reveals significant correlations between the age, the level of education, monthly salary and the reasons why the respondents would want to visit the EU member states, part of the Schengen area – shown below in tables 4 to 7.

Table 4: Reasons for going to EU and Respondents Monthly Salaries

Figures are in Euros	Total Selection Frequency	Work	Study	Tourism	Business	Research
Unemployed	399	30.3%	41.4%	17.0%	9.0%	2.3%
Below 250	73	20.5%	38.4%	17.8%	21.9%	1.4%
Between 251 and 350	117	26.5%	21.4%	30.8%	17.1%	4.3%
Between 351 and 450	99	18.2%	28.3%	33.3%	16.2%	4.0%
Between 451 and 550	59	10.2%	30.5%	33.9%	16.9%	8.5%
Between 551 and 650	27	11.1%	33.3%	29.6%	11.1%	14.8%
Between 651 and 750	17	5.9%	17.6%	35.3%	23.5%	17.6%
Between 751 and 999	7	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%
Over 1000	5	0.0%	0.0%	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%

Table 5: Reasons for going to EU and Respondents' Age Group

Age Group	Total Selection Frequency	Work	Study	Tourism	Business	Research
Below 21	243	24.7%	45.7%	15.6%	12.3%	1.6%
21 to 30	337	24.9%	36.8%	21.7%	12.2%	4.5%
31 to 40	133	25.6%	25.6%	27.8%	16.5%	4.5%
41 to 50	61	18.0%	8.2%	39.3%	19.7%	14.8%
Above 50	31	22.6%	16.1%	45.2%	16.1%	0.0%

Table 6: Reasons for going to EU and Respondents' Level of Education

	Total Selection Frequency	Work	Study	Tourism	Business	Research
No Education	1	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Religious Education	1	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%
Primary School	10	60.0%	20.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%
College	403	27.3%	39.5%	16.4%	14.1%	2.7%
High School	103	28.2%	24.3%	30.1%	14.6%	2.9%
Licensed Professional	8	12.5%	25.0%	0.0%	50.0%	12.5%
University Degree	223	17.5%	34.5%	32.3%	12.1%	3.6%
Master's Degree	48	18.8%	27.1%	25.0%	8.3%	20.8%
PhD	3	0.0%	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	33.3%

The study reveals that there is significant negative correlation at both the 0.05 level and 0.01 levels between Employment status/ Monthly salary and Work and/or Study as reasons for going to the EU member states after visa liberalisation (Table 7). There is positive correlation for reasons of Tourism, Business and Research. One would expect this to be the case, as people who are on a higher salary choose other than Work or Study reasons for their EU visit after visa liberalisation.

The data also reveals negative correlations at both significance levels between the age group of the respondents and their level of education. The higher the level of education of a respondent was, the less likely that Work was selected as a reason for this visit to the EU

member states and after visa liberalisation is approved from the EU Commission for Kosovo. Similarly, the higher the age group that the respondent belonged to, the less likely that Work or Study was selected. Again, one would expect this to be the case, as the older people are the less likely to further their studies, and the more educated a person is the more likely they could be to further their studies in a well-known established university in the EU. The positive significant correction is for reasons other than Work and/or Study, when the respondent is older and or educationally well qualified, respectively (Table 7).

Table 7: Correlations

		Reason: Work	Reason: Study	Reason: Tourism	Reason: Business	Reason: Research
Employment status /Salary	Pearson Correlation	-.966**	-.710*	.420	.734*	.915**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.032	.261	.024	.001
	N	9	9	9	9	9
Education Level	Pearson Correlation	-.632	.742*	.768*	-.365	.839**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.068	.022	.016	.334	.005
	N	9	9	9	9	9
Age Group	Pearson Correlation	-.571	-.916*	.992**	.755	.193
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.315	.029	.001	.140	.756
	N	5	5	5	5	5

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

It is also important to note the level of education amongst our 480 respondents. The majority of our respondents were with a college diploma, university degrees, and who graduated from high school. One of our main aims was to see what the youth's responses would be in relation to visa liberalisation, and as such, the majority of the youth who took part in our study, were in the above education categories. The correlation between the level of education and the reasons for going to the EU member states is significant and there is a negative correlation. The higher the level of education of a respondent, the less likely they are to go to the EU for work. From our respondents, 166 were with higher education qualifications (university degree, Master's degree and PhD), and 83.13% chose other reasons than work for travelling to the EU member states, such as tourism, business, research, and study.

Table 8: Education of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	No Education	1	0.2%
	Religious Education	1	0.2%
	Primary School	6	1.3%
	College	240	50.0%
	High School	61	12.7%
	Licensed Professional	5	1.0%
	University Degree	135	28.1%
	Master's Degree	28	5.8%
	PhD	3	0.6%
Total		480	100.0%

Conclusion

The study has analysed the perceptions about the visa liberalisation conditions, and the motives of Kosovo citizens to travel to the EU. The social and economic aspects of visa liberations have been analysed with the aim of filling the literature gap in Kosovo related to this field. The analysis of the data resulted in interesting observations and interpretations regarding the relationship between the demographic factors and people's motives to travel to the EU and their perceptions of the visa liberalisation regime. These and other statistics could contribute to help understand why people are leaving Kosovo even before visa liberalisation approval, and could help the government to shape their strategy for action.

From the analysis and the results on people's perceptions and motives, this paper can conclude that the government has to speed up the reforming process according to the roadmap. The roadmap and the dialogue with the EU will undoubtedly benefit Kosovo in reaching the European standards regarding legislation, the freedom of movement, the fundamental rights of all citizens, including minorities living in Kosovo, and aiming other reforms which could potentially contribute towards the economic development of Kosovo. Reforms in legislation and other areas would be speeded by the government in order to qualify for the visa liberalisation and eventual EU integration, which would not have been otherwise, or would have taken

longer for the reforms to take place. The visa liberalisation process and the conditionality specified in the roadmap is essentially acting as the carrot that Kosovo is chasing towards, and this is speeding the reforming process for the benefit of Kosovo citizens.

As we have evaluated above in the study, the benefits of visa liberalisation for Kosovo are significant. The starting argument is that the countries in the immediate region have contributed significantly from such a freedom of mobility of people and resources. The benefits of visa liberalisation are both social and economical in nature. The freedom of movement of people is likely to attract investments in the country which could benefit the economy and economic development. It is likely that Kosovo will benefit in areas such as outsourcing, potential increases in inward FDI, creating business links with business in the EU and as such increasing the level of exports and thus stabilising the balance of payments. The social benefits can be argued in terms of contact theory and that the visa liberalization will strengthen the process of transition and development of democracy for all in Kosovo, including minorities. Kosovo's isolation as the only country in the Western Balkan not to benefit from visa liberalisation has created pessimism in the country, and many young and unemployed have recently tried to illegally enter EU member states and claim asylum, but ended up in camps in Hungary and other countries. This pessimism is evident in our analysis of the respondents' motives and perceptions on the visa liberalisation process. Visa liberalisation with the EU would create mobility, and as a result of mobility and visa-free regime, citizens could benefit from cultural exchanges that facilitate the interaction between communities and visitors (domestic and international). People want to interact with other cultures and learn about traditions and even confront themselves with new perspectives on life and society. This is also evident in on people's motives for travelling to EU member states, as majority of them want to visit EU for reasons of tourism and study. This would contribute to a more politically and socially stable region.

On the other hand, at this stage of Kosovo's transition and development, one could argue that there could potentially be negative impacts as a result of visa liberalisation for Kosovo. We have analysed that negative impacts may arise as a result of increased competition for local businesses, imported inflation, the possibility of 'exporting'

talent abroad, and the fear that citizens would start working illegally in EU member states. We can support this argument with the results gathered from the questionnaires, where a large percentage of our respondents of ages 30 or less and more evidently of ages below 25, have selected or indicated that their main motive for travelling to the EU would be in search of work. This is likely to affect the image of Kosovo as a country trying to reform itself, and it is likely to prolong the whole EU integration process.

The decisions to grant visa-free travel to citizens of the Western Balkan countries, including the citizens of Kosovo are based on thorough assessment of the progress made in the areas identified in the roadmaps for the visa liberalisation dialogues. The visa-free regime is perhaps the most tangible benefit for the Western Balkan countries in the process of their integration into the EU. EU integrations and in particular visa-free regimes are very strong incentives for accelerating reforms in the area of justice and home affairs, which could potentially lead to economic reforms.

Having discussed both the positive and negative impacts of the visa liberalisation process for Kosovo, and having analysed some of the perceptions of the citizens who took part in our survey, we believe that the whole process could contribute towards the betterment of society and a more accelerated economic development for the country, which could take Kosovo closer to EU integration and a more politically stabilised region.

REFERENCES

Alessandra Casella & Jonathan S. Feinstein. (1990). *Public goods in trade: On the formation of markets and political jurisdictions,* Working Paper in Economics E-92-12, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, May. Dahl, R.A

Alessandra Casella. (1992). *On markets and clubs: Economic and political integration of regions with unequal productivity*, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1992.

Association Alumni of the Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies (ACIPS). (2009). *Towards the White Schengen List: Implementation of the Roadmap on Visa Liberalisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Available: http://www.acips.ba/eng/uploads/research/acips_vize_eng.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Bid Network. (2013). *Outsource to Kosovo.* Available: http://www.bidnetwork. org/en/plan/344006. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Barbara Kawulich. (2005). *Participant Observation as a Data Collection Method.* Available:http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/466/996. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Chachipe. (2012). *Selective Freedom - The Visa Liberalization and Rest restrictions on the Right to Travel in the Balkans.* Available: http://romarights. files.wordpress.com/2012/07/chachipe_visa_liberalisation_report _270612.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Didier Bigo. (2009). Immigration Controls and Free Movement in Europe. *International Review of the Red Cross*. 91 (No. 875), p579-591.

Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild. (2005). Controlling frontiers: Free movement into and within Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate

Dimitar Bechev. (2012). *The periphery of the periphery: the western Balkans and the euro crisis.* Available: http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ecfr60_western _balkans_brief_aw.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

European Commission. (2013). *First Progress report on the implementation of the Commission Staff Working Paper "Pollutant emission reduction from maritime transport and the Sustainable Waterborne Transport Toolbox".* Available: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010 -2014/kallas/headlines/news/2013/06/doc/com(2013)475_ en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kallas/headlines/news/2013/06/doc/com(2013)475_en.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

European Commission. (2012). *Third Report on the Post-Visa Liberalisation Monitoring for the Western Balkan Countries in accordance with the Commission Statement of 8 November 2010*. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012: 0472:FIN:EN:PDF. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Egest Gjokutaj and Elira Hroni. (2013). *Stories behind Visa Liberalization: Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migration*. Available: http://idmalbania.org/ sites/default/files/publications/liberalizimi_i_vizave_-_english _v3.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

European Stability Initiative. (2013). *A visa roadmap for Kosovo*. Available: http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=444. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

European Movement in Albania (EMA). (2010). Monitoring the Visa Liber-alisation Process with Albania: What to expect when you are expect-ing?. *European Movement in Albania (EMA)*. May 2010 (Policy Paper), p3-21.

European Union Office in Kosovo. (2012). *Visa Liberalisation With Kosovo Roadmap*. Available: http:/eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/docu-ments/eu_travel/visa_liberalisation_with_kosovo_roadmap.pdf. Last ac-cessed 29th Jul 2013.

Group for Legal and Political Studies (GLPS) (Andrea Garaiova Albana Merja). (2022). *Kosovo and Visa-free travel regime: The increasing EU Member States' scepticism and regional experiences*. Available: http://legalpoliticalstudies.org/download/Policy%20Report%2005% 202012%20eng.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Jose Tavares. (2012). On the Future of European Integration: Ideas, Economics and Political Economy. *Dahrendorf Symposia Series*. 2012-13 (2012-13), p1-13.

Luan Dalipi. (2011). Let's Outsource in Kosovo. *The Horizon - American Chamber of Commerce in Kosovo.*. July 2011, p10-12.

Kosovo Agency of Statistics (ASK). (2011). *Census 2011*. Available: http://esk.rks-gov.net/eng/. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Kajtaz Gecaj. (2013). *Varfëria, të rinjtë po ikin*. Available: http://zeri.info/ artikulli/5301/varferia-te-rinjte-po-ikin. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Mathias Dewatripont and Victor Ginsburgh (1994). *European Economic Integration a Challenge in a Changing World*. Contributions to Economic Analysis v. 224: Elsevier Science Ltd.

Mathias Dewatripont, F. Giavazzi, J. von Hagen, I. Harden, T. Persson, G. Roland, H. Rosenthal, A. Sapir and G. Tabellini (1996). *Flexible Integration: Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe*. London: CEPR, London.

Milica Petrovic. (2010/04). Freedom of movement in the European Union: Visa liberalisation in the Western Balkan countries. *LSE Migration Studies Unit Working Papers*. No. 2010/04 (No. 2010/04), p1-44.

Ministry of European Integrations, Kosovo. (2012). *Action Plan on negotiation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement*. Available: http://www.mei-ks.net/repository/docs/Anglisht.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo. (2012). *Republic of Kosovo*. Available: http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,121. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo. (2012). *Visas for Kosovo citizens*. Available: http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,70. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Nate Tabak. (2010). *IT outsourcing to Eastern Europe on the rise*. Available: http://www.dw.de/it-outsourcing-to-eastern-europe-on-the-rise/a-6347794. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Redaksia. (2013). *Varfëria shtyn të rinjtë të largohen nga Kosova* Available: http://tung.ch/varferia-shtyn-te-rinjte-te-largohen-nga-kosova/. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

Simon Hix. (2005). The political system of the European Union, Macmillan, London, 2nd Edition

Simonida Kacarska. (2012). Europeanization through mobility: Visa liberalization and citizenship regimes in the Western Balkans. *CITSEE Working Papers (The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia)*. 2012/12 (12), p3-33.

Uma Sekaran (2003). *Research methods for business: A skill building approach*. 4th ed. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. p2-31, p48-64.

Uma Sekaran (2000). *Research methods for business: A skill building approach*. 4th ed. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. p2-31, p48-64.

World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) and World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC). (2012). *The Impact of Visa Facilitation on Job Creation in the G20 Economies*. Available: http://www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/downloads/Visa_facilitation.pdf. Last accessed 29th Jul 2013.

In the Name of Corruption: Charting Perception of Corruption and Its Effects on Citizens in Croatia

Patty Zakaria[1]

....

ABSTRACT

On 1st July 2013, Croatia became the 28th member to the European Union, and the main concern for many is the country's level of corruption. Thus, the survey attempts to capture the level of corruption (perception of corruption and experience with corruption) as Croatia transitions closer to Western European and the European Union. The survey examines perceptions of corruption and experiences with corruption and their implications on society in Croatia. Thus, the survey intends to chart the following aspects: (1) perception of corruption, (2) who is most responsible for corruption in the country, (3) the implications of perception of corruption on voting behaviour, (4) whether direct experience with corruption determines voting behaviour. The paper utilizes original data collected from 761 survey respondents from 1st October 2012 to 30th June 2013 in Southern Dalmatia, Croatia. With respect to perception of corruption, the study confirmed a causal relationship between corruption and a lack of trust in government as well as lack of political participation (through voting). On the other hand, the study confirmed a relationship between experience with corruption (through bribery) and political participation. However, no relationship was found between experience with corruption and trust in government. Overall, the study shed light into the issue of corruption, where majority of the respondents perceive that corruption is a major problem in Croatia, especially when compared to its counterparts in European and the European Union.

KEY WORDS:
perception of corruption, experience with corruption, bribes, trust in government, political participation, Croatia

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Patty Zakaria, Visiting Lecturer, School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Dubrovnik International University, Sv. Dominika 4, 20000 Dubrovnik, Croatia, e-mail: al9156@wayne.edu,

"A stocktaking of both past and current efforts to reduce poverty suggests that corruption has been a constant obstacle for countries trying to bring about the political, economic and social changes desired for their development. Across different country contexts, corruption has been a cause and consequence of poverty".
Transparency International, 2008

Introduction

"Politički sustavi korumpirani" is a commonly heard phrase in Croatia, which translates in English to "political systems are corrupt." Since gaining independence in 1991, corruption in Croatia has proliferated at an alarming rate. In 2012, Croatia's former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader received a ten year jail sentence for taking five million Euros in bribes from a Hungarian energy firm as well as an Austrian bank. This case is only one of many acts of corruption that have occurred since the country gained independence in 1991. Abuse of state-owned firms, political patronage used to determine civil service positions as opposed to merit based selection and promotion, as well as bribe taking, have plagued the country. These cases illustrate the nature of political corruption in the country, but what effect have these acts of corruption had on society as a whole? What is the perception of corruption among Croatian citizens? More importantly, how has this perception influenced society and civic participation in the country? This study seeks to examine the influence political corruption has on society and on civic participation—mainly whether corruption has depressed political participation and reduced trust in government and political parties. Beyond examining the perception of corruption level in Croatia, the study intends to chart the following aspects: (1) perception of corruption, (2) what constitutes as acts of corruption in Croatia, (3) who is most responsible for corruption in the country, (4) the implication of perception of corruption on voting behaviour, and (5) whether direct experience with corruption determines voting behaviour. This academically driven survey aims to expand on the existing understanding of corruption in terms of its relationship with society, government, and the economy through a through administrating a survey about political corruption to citizens in the Dalmatian Coast of Croatia. Due to financial constraints the study focused on this particular area of the country.

The paper proceeds in three steps. First, the study discusses the existing literature on political corruption and previous research on corruption in Croatia. Second, the study discusses the structure and implementation method of the survey, which was distributed from October 2012 to June 2013 in the Dalmatian coast of Croatia. Second, it provides a discussion of the quantitative results of the survey and some analysis of its consequences in Croatian society.

The Problem of Corruption

Corruption can be found in any political and economic system; however, the degree of corruption varies from one country to another. In industrialized countries, corruption is considerably low compared to Africa, Latin America, and in post-communist countries. The hidden world of corruption makes it even more difficult to pinpoint factors contributing to this state of affairs; several scholars have theorized on the causes of corruption (see Karklins 2002; Ades and Di Tella 1999; Treisman 2000 Tanzi 1998; Rose-Ackerman 2002). The affects of corruption do not occur in a vacuum, but it affects every aspect of society in terms of its polity, economy, and society. Hence, corruption not only harms a country's polity and weakens its economy, but it also leads to various social problems such poverty, human trafficking, and more importantly confines the civil liberty of citizens. Amdemson (1999) noted that corruption can also be defined as state capture, where the ruling party shapes the rule of the game within the legislative branch so as to illicit and create non-transparent laws that benefit the party and its supporters. For example, indiscretion in the electoral process such as inadequate rotation of power or economic oligarchies influencing elections outcomes, are an indication of institutionalized corruption. This type of corruption is referred to as *grand corruption*. According to Karklins (2005) corrupt practice is evident when public officials misuse their power in order achieve personal gains, which is more commonly referred to in the literature as the *'the misuse of public goods for private gains'*. Corruption at the hands of politicians is not limited to patronage and nepotism, but also includes the embezzlement of state revenues. In addition, corruption also includes *grand corruption* in which corruption occurs at the highest level of the political system, the executive branch of government, as evident with Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in Croatia.

In this case, actors in position of power modify the political and legal structure in the country in order to maintain their hold on power as well as to obtain material and/or financial benefits for personal use. In this sense institutions and laws are at the whim of corrupt agents in government, where such agents continuously abuse the system for their own interest. For example, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines had rewritten sections of the constitution in order to legalize his corrupt actions (Amundsen, 1999, p.3). On the other hand, *petty corruption* refers to small-scale acts of corruption that occur at the administrative and bureaucratic level. This type of corruption is connected to bribery, and more importantly bribes paid to public employees in order to by pass bureaucratic red tape or to avoid certain payments. For example, individuals will offer a bribe to the police in order to avoid a much larger fine for a traffic violation. Thus, *petty corruption* tends to involve public employees and citizens, as opposed to grand corruption, which involves individuals at the highest level of government.

Several studies on corruption have examined the relationship between economic growth and corruption (see, Acemoglu and Verdier 1998; Jain 2001; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1996; Brunetti and Weder 1998). These studies have found that corruption tends to depress economic growth in a given country and deter foreign direct investment. Other studies have examines the relationship between democracy and corruption (see, Hung-En Sung, 2004: Moran, 2001: Rose-Ackerman, 1996: Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000), where they argued that corruption, particularly *grand corruption*, will hinder democratic values.

1. The case of Croatia

Since 2007, Croatia has had a stable Corruption Perception Index [CPI, hereafter] score, where the country's CPI score has ranged from 4.1 to 4.0. The CPI score ranges from 0 - 10, where 0 indicates very corrupt and 10 indicates very clean. The table 1 below presents Croatia's CPI score from 1999 – 2011.

An evaluation of the CPI score indicates that the country's perception of corruption has improved over the years, particularly following the 2005 EU accession. According to Transparency International since 2008 Croatia has aggressively moved to combat corruption and from 2008 – 2010 the government passed 1,200 legislations to deal

with corruption (Transparency International 2011). Despite attempts at combating grand and petty corruption, Croatia's CPI score is still below the score of most EU countries (for the exception of Bulgaria and Romania).

Table 1: Corruption Perception Index for Croatia

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
2.7	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.4
(74)	(51)	(47)	(51)	(59)	(67)	(70)
2006	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	
3.4	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.1	4	
(69)	(64)	(62)	(66)	(62)	(66)	

Source: http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
Note: Country rank in brackets

In a 2011 United Nation's survey about corruption in Croatia, the survey examined the issue of bribery. The study found that 18.2% of Croatia had at one point experienced either direct or indirect exposure to bribery from public officials and the highest level of bribery was found in Zagreb and Dalmatia (UNODC, 2011: p. 3). Additionally, the UN survey found that the majority of Croatian citizens had stated that corruption is the third most important problem facing the county.

Theoretical Framework

More specific studies have examined the relationship between corruption and trust in government as well as the relationship between corruption and political participation. Much of the literature on corruption and trust has found that political corruption tends to erode the trust citizens have for government and politicians (see, Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu 2006). Others have reversed the causal mechanism by arguing that societies with low interpersonal trust and political trust tend to have much higher levels of corruption than their counterparts with low levels of corruption (La Porta et., al. 1997). Thus, this study examines whether participant's perception

of corruption has influenced their trust in the Croatian government, the Prime Minister, and the President. Thus, the study will test for the following hypothesis:

H1: When individuals perceive the level of corruption in the country to be high then they are less likely to trust government and politicians.

The literature on corruption and voting has examined whether corruption influences electoral voting and challengers' support (Aldrich 1993; Chong et al., 2011; Caillier 2010; Peters and Welch 1980; Kostadinova 2009). Simpser (2004) finds that perception of corruption depresses voter turnout in authoritarian countries. This outcome was also found in Latin America (Davis, et al., 2004), post-communist countries (Kostadinova 2009), and in the state of Louisiana (Caillier 2010). Interestingly, Kostadinova (2009) found that widespread perception of corruption tends influence voters decision in two ways, either it can mobilize or discourage them from voting. Aldrich (1993) noted that widespread corruption discourages individuals from voting because they believe that the cost of voting outweigh the benefit. This pattern of decision making is based on the voters perception that a corrupt government will not respond to their constituents needs, and so abstention is more appealing then voting for a corrupt government. Thus, the study examines whether perception of corruption causes Croatian voters to become disenchanted with their government and politicians, and in turn reframe from voting in local and national elections. The study theorizes that widespread corruption will lead voters to abstain from voting or vote for the opposition. The study will test for the following hypothesis:

H2: When individuals perceive the level of corruption in the country to be high then they are less likely to vote in an election (national or local election).

In addition to measuring perception of corruption, the study departs from the exiting literature on corruption, which relies extensively on perception of corruption, and instead measures actual experience with corruption through bribery. The study theorizes that as participants experience actual corruption through bribery, they will less likely trust the Croatian government, the Prime Minister, and the President. With respect to political participation Thus, the study

will test for the following hypotheses with regards to experience with corruption:

H3: When individuals experience corruption then they are less likely to trust government and politicians.

H4: When individuals experience corruption then they are less likely to vote in an election (national or local election).

The reminder of this paper will discuss the survey methodology of the study and the empirical results of the survey.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

1. Study Design

The study established original data to chart political corruption and its implications on society in the Southern region of Croatia. The duration of the study was nine months, beginning on 1st October 2012 and concluding 30th June 2013. The survey was mainly designed to enable a better understanding of perception of corruption and experience with corruption in Croatia and the effects the combination of these two elements of corruption have on politics, the economy, and civil society. This project is particularly important as Croatia moves closer to full membership into European Union. The survey contains 39 main questions and 7 demographic questions. The focal point of the survey is corruption related questions that chart the level of perception of corruption in the country as well as experience with corruption (bribes), and the effect these perceptions and experiences have on society. Respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption (in perception and direct experience) and its implications across a number of dimensions, including central government (President and Prime Minister), political parties, electoral system, judicial system, police, economic growth, and civil society. The survey probes further into the issue of corruption by including questionnaires that investigate direct experience with corruption and its implications for the victims[2]. It is imperative that the study includes both of these dimensions because each variable offers a different understanding of corruption. Perception of corruption is solely based on an indi-

---

[2] A victim in this case is an individual forced to give a bribe to a government official or another authority within government.

vidual's personal opinion, and so this measure is very subjective; on the other hand, direct experience with corruption is based on more concrete evidence, and so this measure is more objective. Additionally, respondents were asked to define what constitutes a corrupt act and compare the level of political corruption in Croatia to the levels in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and European Union member states. Moreover, respondents were asked to rate their interest in politics, participation in politics, and trust in government as well as political parties.

The survey instrument was first written in English and later translated in Croatian. In order to ensure the accuracy of the translation, the survey was sent to Croatian native speakers to be translated[3]. The Croatian translation of the survey was then retranslated back into English to check its accuracy. Prior to implementing the survey, a pilot test of the survey was administrated to a small focus group in Croatia. Afterwards, I questioned the group about whether they correctly understood the questions and whether the format was easily understood. Following recommendations from the focus group, adjustments were made to the survey prior to final administration in October of 2012. The survey was administrated in three ways: (1) personal-in-home survey, (2) survey distribution in public areas, and (3) online. The total sample for the paper surveys (in person surveys) was 667 and the sample for the online surveys was 94.

2. Sampling

The sample (n=761) for the survey was drawn from the Croatian population 18 years and older[4]. This included all residents of the country (citizens and non-citizens). Non-citizen status is defined as living in the country either on a work permit visa or permit residence visa for at least a year. The logic behind the one-year threshold is that it is a sufficient amount of time for respondents to form an opinion about the level of corruption, the Croatian government, and the economy. The study assumes that the respondents have had enough time to engage and take part in the country's social, political, and commer-

---

[3] Certified translator.

[4] The study employed quota sampling. Given financial constraints, quota sampling was the most appropriate method for this study because it ensured some degree of representation of all of the strata in the Southern Croatia. The sample was collected within a statistical margin of error less than 0.025 at a 95% confidence level.

cial entities to be able to form a reliable opinion about corruption, government, and the European Union. More importantly, the study assumes that the respondents have had enough time to interact with the various institutions in the country to form a sufficient opinion about corruption and government in the country. Thus, individuals living in the country for less than a year were not included in the study.

Survey Results

1. Corruption and Politics

This section of the paper will discuss the results of the survey. The issue the survey tackled was the definition of corruption, and more importantly what constitutes an act as being corrupt. Thus, respondents were asked questions regarding whether certain acts in society constituted acts of corruption; interestingly, the results indicated that the following acts are viewed to be corrupt: bribery (giving or taking), price gouging, embezzlement, nepotism, clientalism, political patronage, electoral fraud, business fraud, extortion by public servants, inside trading, and finally, money laundering. Thus, these results indicate that respondents' perception of corruption goes beyond the political arena, and so acts of corruption can also occur in the private sector of the country

Another concern for the survey is civic participation in Croatia, and more importantly whether corruption has affected participation in the country. In order to assess this concern, respondents were questioned about their interest in politics and answered other politically related questions. Table 2 reports the frequency distribution for some of the politically related questions in the survey.

Table 2: Frequency Distribution for Political Participation Question

How interested would you say you personally are in politics?	Very Interested	Fairly Interested	Somewhat Interested	Not Very Interested	Not At All Interested	N
	13.4%	19.7%	29.7%	19.8%	16.3%	759
Have you ever voted in a national election?	Yes	No				N
	75.7%	19.7%				756
Have you ever voted in a local election?	Yes	No				N
	75.3%	21.4%				753
Do you have confidence in the current government?	Yes	No				N
	14.3%	65.6%				750

‡ The "Don't Know" option results were not reported in the table

Though most of the respondents were not very interested in politics, the majority of respondents had voted in national and local elections. Interestingly, the majority of the survey respondents have no confidence in the current government in power. Following these questions, the survey proceeded to ask respondents about political corruption, and the interplay between political corruption and politics in the country. Table 3 reports some of the frequency distribution for the corruption related questions from the survey.

Table 3: Frequency Distribution for Corruption and Politics

What is your perception of the level of corruption in Croatia?	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low	N
	37.8%	41.1%	16.3%	19.8%	16.3%	760
Do you think all political systems are corrupt?	Yes 51.1%		No 28.5%			N 757
Do you think the Croatian system is corrupt?	Yes 79.4%		No 7.8%			N 748
Do you think politicians are corrupt?	Yes 79.8%		No 2.6%			N 695
Do you think president Ivo Josipović is corrupt?	Yes 25%		No 27.9%			N 694
Do you think prime Minister Zoran Milanović is corrupt?	Yes 47.2%		No 10.5%			N 692
Do you think political parties are corrupt?	Yes 76.2%		No 3.5%			N 696

‡ The "Don't Know" option results were not reported in the table

The primary goal of the survey is to evaluate the level of corruption in Croatia prior to European Union accession on July 1, 2013. Table 3 summaries the respondents' perception of corruption, where 78.9% of the respondents stated that Croatia has very high to high levels of corruption. In a further attempt to assess respondents' perception of corruption, more detailed questions were posed with respect to certain political figures and political parties. In all of the results in table 3, the majority of the respondents stated that corruption is a major problem in country's political spectrum. To test whether this perception varied among different demographics in the study, several Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients [Pearson's r, hereafter] were conducted with respect to gender, age, education level, and employment status. After running the correlation tests for the demographic variables and perception of corruption, none of the results were found to be statistically significant, thus indicating that

there is no relation between these demographic variables and perception of corruption.

In addition, the survey probes further into the issue of corruption in Croatia by asking respondents which factor in society is mostly responsible for corruption in the country. The survey respondents were given the following options to be ranked with regards to who is mostly responsible for corruption in Croatia: the president, politicians, political parties, police, courts (judges and court employees), lawyers, civil servants, businesses and private firms, Croatian citizens, and foreigners (non-Croatian citizens). The findings indicate that the majority of the respondents stated that politicians (88.1%) and political parties (85.1%) are mostly responsible for corruption in the country, and on the other hand, Croatian Citizens (52%), the president (40.6%), and foreigners living in Croatia (28.4%) are least responsible for corruption. Again, these results suggest that Croatian citizens perceive that corruption in the country stems mostly from the political spectrum, with the exception of the president. Interestingly, the respondents stated that the prime minister is perceived to be more corrupt than the president; this result can be attributed to the greater governing powers given to the prime minister.

Much of the literature on corruption has discussed the linkage between political trust and corruption, whereby low levels of political trust will contribute to cultivated corruption (see Chang and Chu, 2006; Rothstein and Eek, 2009; Zakaria 2013). The causal mechanism between political trust and corruption can also be reversed, in that high levels of corruption will likely erode trust in politics among citizens (see Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). Thus, the survey examined whether the relationship between political trust (measured through confidence in government variable) and perception of corruption exists in Croatia. In order to assess the causal relationship between confidence in government and political corruption, the study conducted a Pearson's r so as to measure the strength of the relationship between these two variables[5]. The Pearson's r for confidence in the Croatian government and perception of corruption was -.121, thereby indicating that a negative linear relationship exists between individual

---

[5] The Pearson's r was calculated from the raw scores; please contact author for survey dataset.

perception of corruption and confidence in the current government, which is lead by Prime Minister Zoran Milanović. This statistical outcome means that as confidence in government decreases, perception of corruption increases. The correlation between the two variables was found to be statistically significant at .000ρ < 0.01 level (2-tailed test). This conclusion supports hypothesis 1 with respect to trust in government and perception of corruption in Croatia. The statistical findings indicate that individuals have confidence in the Milanović government when corruption levels are not perceived to be high. Thus, the outcome from the Croatian survey supports the consensus found in literature about the linkage between trust in government and corruption. Interestingly, the majority of the survey respondents noted that they did not trust the Milanović government and that the level of corruption in the country is high. To probe further into the relationship between confidence in government and corruption, three additional Pearson's r tests were conducted in the study. The first correlation tested was between confidence in government and whether Prime Minister Zoran Milanović is perceived to be corrupt. The Pearson's r in this case was -.121, which indicates a negative linear correlation between the variables. The Pearson's r was found to be statistically significant at .000ρ < 0.01 level (2-tailed test). The results correspond with the earlier correlation, in that confidence tends to decrease as the perception of corruption in the case of Prime Minister Zoran Milanović increases. In that light, it could be argued that there is no confidence in government when the Prime Minister is perceived to be corrupt. Second, a correlation was tested for the causal relationship between confidence in government and President Ivo Josipović. The Pearson's r was -.092, which indicated a negative linear correlation between the variables. The Pearson's r was statistically significant at (.016)ρ < 0.05 level (2-tailed test). Again, this outcome corresponds with the earlier findings of the study, where confidence tends to decrease as the respondents' perception of corruption in the case of President Ivo Josipović increases. The statistical results about perception of corruption regarding Prime Minister Zoran Milanović as well as President Ivo Josipović also supports hypothesis 1 of the study. The third correlation conducted was between confidence in government and political parties. With this correlation, the study attempted to test whether a causal relationship exists between confidence in government and perception of corruption within political

parties in Croatia. This correlation was included in order to broaden the scope of analysis beyond the ruling party. The Pearson's r was -.0106, which indicates a negative linear correlation between the variables. Pearson's r was found to be statistically significant at (.005)ρ < 0.01 level (2-tailed test). This final finding indicates that respondents also had no confidence in government when they perceived political parties to be corrupt. With regards to political parties, the statistical results support hypothesis 1 in the study about perception of corruption and trust.

An additional three questions were posed to respondents about the interplay of perception of corruption and political participation. The first questions asked respondents whether they voted in national and local elections, and the results indicated that 75.7% had voted in the national election and 75.3% had voted in the local election. The statistical results for the national election question supported hypothesis 2 in the study. The Pearson's r was -.090, indicating that individuals that perceived corruption levels to be high in the country were less likely to vote in national elections. The Pearson's r was found to be statistically significant at (.013)ρ < 0.05 level (2-tailed test). On the other hand, the statistical results for the interplay between voting in local elections and perception of corruption was not significant; thereby, hypothesis 2 for local elections was not supported. These results suggest that perception of corruption tend to impact voting behavior at the national level, as opposed to the local of government. Two assumptions can be made from these results. First, since acts of grand corruption overshadow media coverage in the country; therefore, individuals perception of corruption will tend to be much higher regarding national politicians than local politicians. A key example of this is the media coverage regarding former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader's corruption trial. Second, voting behavior for local elections are driven by different issues then national elections, thus corruption tends to have a much lower influence on the local level.

Another question asked respondents whether they voted in the 2005 presidential election, and the results indicated that 46.6% had voted in that election. These respondents were asked two additional follow up questions in order to evaluate their voting behavior. First, the respondents were asked whether their voting decision in the 2005 presidential election was based on their perception of corruption of the Stjepan Mesić government. The survey results indicated that 17%

of the respondents had been influenced in their voting decision in the 2005 election by their perception of corruption in the Stjepan Mesić government. Second, they were asked whether this perception of corruption led them to vote for the opposition. The results indicated that 17.2% of the respondents (from the 355 [46.6%] sample) had voted for one of the opposition parties in the election. These results about the interplay between perception of corruption and voting behavior illustrated that other factors besides perceived corruption in the Stjepan Mesić government influenced the voting behavior of respondents.

2. Bribery

This section discusses the issue of bribe taking and bribe giving in regards to public officials in Croatia. Interestingly, the findings for questions regarding whether respondents took a bribe or offered a bribe to a public official showed that the majority of the respondents did not take part in this activity. A greater percentage of the respondents claimed to have offered a bribe as opposed to have taken a bribe in their lifetime. As evident from the above question about perception of corruption, there is a disparity between perception of corruption and experience with corruption. Thus, several assumptions can be made from these results. First, that the participants did not take part in this activity, and that the problem of bribery is not as evident in Croatia as opposed to its counterparts in Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania. Second, and more importantly, the fear of punishment for admitting to have taken part in bribe taking or giving may have deterred the respondents from responding truthfully to these answers. The act of taking or giving a bribe to public officials occurs only on the black market because the consequences are dire, and for this reason, it is very difficult to measure experience with corruption. Finally, during EU membership accession into the European Union, the Croatian government has moved to establish legislations to curb petty corruption by implementing harsh penalties for taking part in bribery; this applies to the political elite as well as citizens. Thus, the days of offering a police officer a bribe to overlook a minor traffic violation may have ceased in the country. For future studies, questions regarding the issue of bribery will be more focused on bribe giving to health officials, educational institutions, and other non-government

related institutions. Table 4 presents the bribery related questions in the survey.

Table 4: Frequency Distribution for the Issue of Bribes

Have you ever offered a bribe?	Yes 25%	No 70.4%	N 756
Have you ever taken a bribe?	Yes 10%	No 84.2%	N 759
Were you ever required to pay a bribe to a government official or employee?	Yes 10%	No 84.2%	N 752
Have you ever given the police a bribe?	Yes 26.8%	No 68.9%	N 753
Have you ever given a judge or court representative a bribe?	Yes 7.5%	No 89.8%	N 754

‡ The "Don't Know" option results were not reported in the table

Despite the small percentage of participants claiming to have taken part in briber several Pearson's r test for correlation were conducted to test for hypothesis 3 and 4. In order to further test the impact of experience with corruption through bribery, respondents were asked whether they were required to pay a bribe to any government officials or employees. A follow up question asked the respondents that had given a government official or government employee a bribe whether their experience with corruption had deterred them from voting in the past national election. The results for the first question indicated that 31.8% of the respondents had given government officials or employees a bribe, and out of that percentage, only 10.8% stated that this experience had prevented them from voting in the national election. From these results, two assumption can be made: first, that the act of giving a bribe was not perceived as a negative event but rather as a positive one, so as to achieve a certain goal or bypass government bureaucracy; and second, respondents did not link the act of giving a bribe to the national government. A correlation between experience with corruption (bribes to government official or government employee) and trust in government was conducted, and the Pearson's r was .039. However, the Pearson's r was not found to be statistically significant at (.286)$\rho < 0.01$ level (2-tailed test). Thus, no support was evident for hypothesis 3, regarding experience with corruption (bribes to government official or government employee) and trust in government.

With respect to hypothesis 4, the study examined the interplay between national elections and bribery as well as local elections and bribery. First, for national elections, the Pearson's r was .115, indicating that as individual's were required to pay a bribe to government official or government employee the likelihood of them voting in national elections decreased. The Pearson's r was found to be statistically significant at (.002)$\rho < 0.01$ level (2-tailed test). Second, for local elections, the Pearson's r was .074, again indicating that experience with corruption through bribes played a factor in individuals deciding not to vote in local elections. The Pearson's r was found to be statistically significant at (.043)$\rho < 0.05$ level (2-tailed test). Thus, support was found for hypothesis regarding national and local elections.

3. Corruption in Croatia and the rest of Europe

This section discusses the respondents' perception of corruption in the country compared to other countries in Europe. Two sets of comparison questions were posed to survey respondents; the first asked them to compare Croatia's level of corruption with corruption in Southeast Europe, and the second, more detailed question asked the respondents to compare Croatia's level of corruption with that of Germany, France, United Kingdom, Russia, and the European Union members. Table 5 illustrates the results for survey questions that compare Croatia's level of corruption with its European counterparts.

Table 5: Frequency Distribution for Croatia and its counterparts in Europe

Compared to other countries in Southeast Europe, do you think Croatia has....	More	Less	Same	N
	20.9%	19.8%	45.9%	758
On the whole, how do you think Croatia compares to other countries with respect to corruption?				
Germany	More	Equally	Less	N
	70.2%	10.8%	4.1%	753
France	More	Equally	Less	N
	52.8%	23%	6%	750
United Kingdom	More	Equally	Less	N
	55.5%	19.1%	6.2%	744
All of the EU countries	More	Equally	Less	N
	36.7%	32.1%	6.4%	742
Russia	More	Equally	Less	N
	17%	24.3%	35.1%	751

‡ The "Don't Know" option results were not reported in the table.‡‡ The first question wording is as follows: More = more corruption than other countries in the region, Less = Less corruption than other countries in the region, Same = same corruption than other countries in the region.
‡‡‡ The second question wording is as follows: More = Croatia is more corrupt, Equally = Croatia is equally corrupt, Less = Croatia is less corrupt.

When asked to compare their perception of the level of corruption
of Croatia to Southeast Europe, the majority of the respondents stat-
ed that Croatia has the same level of corruption as its Southeastern
counterparts. This result can be attributed to the fact that Croatians
perceive this region to be more corrupt than other parts of Europe,
a perception grounded in the history of communism in the region
and later kleptocracy. However, the respondents' perception of the
corruption in several other European countries (Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, and the European Union members), and more
importantly Russia, differed significantly. Overwhelmingly, respond-
ents to the survey claimed that Russia is more corrupt than Croatia;
however, they perceived Croatia as more corrupt than the rest of the
states mentioned in the survey. A discussion of salience in corrup-
tion is needed here in order to offer a more robust discussion of cor-
ruption in Croatia. Grigorescu (2006) argues that the increased me-
dia coverage of political corruption and the anti-corruption rhetoric
in East-Central Europe has led to a higher perception of corruption
among citizens than the actual level of corruption present in the
country. This argument brings us back to the earlier case of Ivo San-
ader, and whether the increased media coverage of the Sanader case
has led individuals to believe that the level of corruption in Croatia is
much higher than in its counterparts in Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union member states. The issue of sali-
ence in corruption might also be a factor in the respondents' percep-
tion that Russia is much more corrupt than Croatia because of the
increased media coverage of political corruption in the Kremlin and
the Putin regime. At the same time, the issue of salience in corrup-
tion can also be applied to the results found for the European Union
member states, where 32.1% of the respondents stated that Croatia
is equally corrupt as the European Union member states. This out-
come can be attributed to the increased attention given to Bulgaria
and Romania with respect to their levels of corruption since entering
the union. In order to account for salience in corruption, the sur-
vey questioned respondents about their participation in bribe taking
or bribe giving in order to test the actual level of corruption in the
country. The basic premise of this test was to assess whether actual
corruption, as opposed to perceived corruption, is relatively com-
mon practice. This test would eliminate the possibility that saliency
in corruption exists in Croatia, and prove that indeed the country
does have a high level of corruption. However, the results were too

skewed to allow for a robust analysis[6]. Thus, the assumption about the issue of salience in corruption influencing individuals' perception of corruption opens the door for additional research in examining the relationship between corruption and media coverage.

Conclusion

This original data on corruption in Southern Dalmatian coast of Croatia yielded interesting results about participants' perception of corruption, experience with corruption, definitions of corruption, and the implications of corruption on politics. The survey charted vital information about corruption and its implications on society in Croatia. Overwhelmingly, the respondents' perception of corruption was high; however, the measure for experience with corruption yielded skewed results. With respect to hypotheses tested in this study, the theories regarding perception of corruption, trust in government, and political participation found support in the survey results for the exception of the interplay between perception of corruption and local elections. On the other hand, experience with corruption theories found limited support in the survey results, where only hypothesis 4 found support in the results.

The outcome regarding experience with corruption can be interpreted in two ways. Perhaps the sample surveyed did not experience corruption through bribery (giving or taking bribes) in their lifetime. On the other hand, as bribery in Croatia operates outside the legal norms of society, respondents were less likely to state that they have taken part in illegal activity; this situation is especially problematic since Croatia has harshened its punishment mechanism for engaging in bribery. New avenues of research are needed to understand the unique nature of corruption in the Balkans, as it became evident in the research that corruption in this region is much different than other types of corruption.

---

[6] Many of the survey respondents did not claim to have taken bribes or given bribes; these results do not indicate that the practice does not occur, but rather that bribery operates on the black market, thus making it difficult to measure.

REFERENCES

Ades, Alberto and Rafael Di Tella. 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption", *The American Economic Review*, 89(4): 982-993.

Aldrich, J. H. 1993. "Rational Choice and Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(1): 246-278.

Amundsen, Inge. 1999. "Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues", Development Studies and Human Rights, working paper.

Anderson CJ and Tverdova YV (2003). Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes towards government in contemporary democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1):91–109.

Caillier, J. 2010. "Citizen Trust, Political Corruption, and Voting Behavior: Connecting the Dots." *Politics and Policy* 38 (5):1015-1035.

Chang ECC and Chu Y-H (2006). Corruption and trust: Exceptionalism in Asian democracies. *Journal of Politics* 68(2): 259–71.

Chong, A., De La, O., Ana, L., Karlan, D., and Wantchekon, L. 2011. *Looking beyond the incumbent: The effects of exposing corruption on electoral outcomes* (No. w17679). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Davis, C.L., R.A. Camp, and K.M. Coleman. 2004. The influence of party systems on citizens perceptions of corruption and electoral response in *Latin America. Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703

Grigorescu, A (2006). The Corruption Eruption in East-Central Europe: The increased salience of corruption and the role of intergovernmental organization. *East European Politics and Societies* 20(3): 516-549.

Karklins, Rasma. (2002). Typology of Post-Communist Corruption. *Problem of Post Communism* 49(4): 22-32.

Peters, J. G and Welch, S. 1980. "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections". *American Political Science Review* 74(3): 697-708.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 2002. "Corruption and Criminal Law" *Forum on Crime and Society*, 2(1): 3-21.

Rothstein B and Eek D (2009). Political corruption and social trust: An experimental approach. *Rationality and Society* 21(1):81–112.

Simpser, Alberto. 2004. "Making Votes Not Count: Expectations and Electoral Corruption", presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL

Tanzi, Vito. 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Cause, Consequences, Scope and Cures" *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*, 45(4):559-594.

Treisman, Daniel. 2000. "The Cause of Corruption: A Cross National Study" *Journal of Public Economics*, 76(3): 399-458.

United Nations. (2011). "Corruption in Croatia: Bribery as experienced by the population. UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Zakaria, P (2013). Corruption an Enemy of Civil Society: the case of East and Central Europe. *International Political Science Review*, 34(4): 351-371.

Security Belongings in South East Europe: Divergences and Convergences

Gökay Özerim[1]

....

ABSTRACT

This study purposes to draw a framework on how South East European countries have been defining themselves in terms of belonging to a security community in the Post-Cold War era and aims to present remarkable differences and similarities between the South East European countries in this respect. It is one of the significant questions whether South East European countries define themselves within the same security community or their "security belongings" are differentiated. The response to these questions also reveals the structural and historical differences between the South East European countries and therefore they are worth to analyze. The paper examines the concrete outputs of the security belonging perception of these countries by analyzing their alliances with the other countries in the region, their membership of international organizations and their approach to the specific security challenges in a comparative perspective. Taking "security community" approach as a theoretical base, the methodology of the study is constructed upon a comparative perspective by focusing on the security alliances and initiatives in South East Europe in scope of four case countries, namely Turkey, Greece, Serbia and Croatia. The study revealed that it is more likely for the South East European countries to become a part of a larger community (political or security based) than to compose a new security community and the European Union is the most significant convergence point among these countries.

KEY WORDS:
security, South East Europe, security community, security belonging

---

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Gökay Özerim, PhD, Lecturer, Yaşar University, Department of International Relations, 100 Sok. N: 38 D: 9 Hakimevleri İzmir, Turkey, e-mail: mgozerim@gmail.com, ISSN1855-7694 © 2013 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)

INTRODUCTION

Although they are framed within the label of same geographical area, South East European countries demonstrate remarkable differences in terms of history, policies and identities. These differences induce serious problems both for the external and also internal efforts to integrate this area with regards to cultural identity, sense of belonging and policies. Geographically, the term of South East Europe covers Turkey, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Moldova and Montenegro[2]. As much as the on-going or recently resolved conflicts in the region; these problems might be seen highly interrelated also with the constrained nature of the "South East Europe" term which is imposed intensively by the rhetoric particularly produced by the European Union. Vucetic discusses that the change of the name in discourse from the Balkans to South Eastern Europe is a systematic attempt of extra-regional players (in this case, particularly the EU) in order to construct a regional framework for security and to impose a verbal reflection of the idea of one Europe (Vucetic, 2001: 112). However, comparative analysis of the cooperation and alliances in the region, as well the conflicts, is also crucial in order to understand the meaning of this change.

Interestingly, more than the common identity elements and shared aspirations, the countries in the region share the common problems such as ethnic tensions, political disputes, economic transition questions, organized crime, migration and corruption. Perhaps it might be naive to expect the sense of a common belonging or a spontaneous internal motivation for a security community among the countries of the South East Europe since these countries experienced or has been experiencing several conflicts with each other more than with the actors from outside of the region. Within this context, the external actors become pivotal to construct the sense of collective security in the region. In this respect, the European Union, more definitively European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been the key ac-

---

[2] South East Europe is a contested concept and there is no commonly agreed definition. In this study, the extent of the concept is defined by stemming from the existing literature, and also target countries in international organization's specific initiatives or cooperation schemes, particularly of the European Union.

tors in this construction process by imposing the common initiatives or gathering these diversified countries within the same umbrella of the same security belonging.

The purpose of this study is not to question whether there might be a common identity or security community among the East European countries but to analyze and underline different or similar choices in security policies and the belongings of the South East European countries by exemplifying the security policies of four significant countries from the region, namely Turkey, Greece, Serbia and Croatia. By stemming from the Adler's concept of security communities, the question of whether these countries define themselves within the same security community or their security belongings have been differentiated will be responded. To this end, the paper examines the concrete outputs of the security belonging perception of these countries by analyzing their alliances with the other countries in the region, their membership of international organizations and their approach to the specific security challenges in a comparative perspective and taking "security community" approach as a theoretical base. The methodology is constructed upon a comparative perspective by focusing on the security alliances and initiatives in South East Europe by stemming from four case countries. The case countries in this study were selected by considering to reflect significant contrasts among the countries in order to reach more explicit remarks and responses while searching the possibility of a security community formulation within the region.

Within this scope, the first part of the study will explain "security community" approach as a theoretical basis of the analysis. The second part will focus on the overall picture of security cooperation in the region while the last section will analyze the security orientation of the countries in the region by exemplifying from the four case countries of the region.

Security Community as a Tool of Constructing Common Security Belonging

South East Europe is a precious case for discussing security community concept and its' basic elements. A common feeling of belonging or identity is an important component in order to constitute a security community and this was conceptualized with "we-feeling" or "we-ness" in the approach of Adler and Barnett. The existence of this sense of community is explicitly suspicious in South East Europe, particularly due to the long-lasting or recently resolved conflicts in the region which become a kind of cultural inheritance. More importantly, there is no vision of full integration between the South East European countries.

While questioning the security belongings of each country in South East Europe, the term and the approach of security community may provide a functional perspective. On the other hand, there is a common perception that there is no common sense of community in South Eastern Europe while the possibility for the constitution of this kind of a community is also ambiguous. One of the main reasons of this situation might be that there are several groups and security belongings in the region. Similarly, Economides emphasizes that the concept of "group security" and discuss that certain group of people with a sense of ethnic, religious or political belonging (Economides, 2003: 108) by exemplifying Bosnian Muslims , Kosovar Albanians and Krajina Serbs (Economides, 2003: 109). In this respect, these are also several "group security" belongings in the region which was sharpened by the conflicts.

On the other hand, the concept of security community has been one of the most frequently cited approaches while trying to explain the development of collective security initiatives in a specific region. As a theoretical base, the concept was firstly has driven by Karl Deutsch in 1957. In his work, he defines as "the agreement of a group of people to overcome common social problems in a process of peaceful change". Integration, sense of community and peaceful change are the basic elements within the security community definition of Deutsch (Deutsch, 1957: 2). In the perspective of Deutsch, security community is a kind of cure for the communities for the resolution

of the disputes not with a fight, but by a peaceful change process. For the community building with peaceful relations, Deutsch states that "communication" and "transaction flows" among nations are the key elements.

However, the term of security community has not been employed frequently and didn't get the attention that it deserved till the end of the Cold War. Adler and Bernett's book titled as "Security Communities" might be accepted as a milestone for the wider dissemination of the concept through international security studies. The added value in their re-design of security community concept might be its' constructivist essence. After almost 40 years, Adler and Barnett resurrected the concept of the security community by defending that the concept is widely appropriate and fashionable for the existing circumstances in the world politics by supporting with some cases. While doing this, they have also addressed intensively to the constructivist nature in the security community definition of Deutsch (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 71). The development of shared understandings, transnational values and transaction values were stated again as encouraging factors for community building. It should be noted that one of the significant contributions of Adler and Bartnett lies in their perspective which considers that security is a basis of community construction (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 64). In addition, they conceptualized the questions on the international community as "when does it matter, where does it matter, and how does it matter" (Adler and Bernett, 1996: 65).

Adler and Barnett states the high degree of trust, a shared identity and future, low or no probability that conflicts as the main indicators for the emergence of a security community. They also indicate that (i) multilateralism, (ii) unfortified orders, (iii) changes in military planning, (iv) common definition of a threat, (v) discourse and language of community are the conceptual elements of a security community (1996:92). Similarly, Grillot and others state that trust, belongingness and reconciliation are the main tiers of a security community (Grillot et. Al, 1997: 2). Among two types of security communities, namely amalgamated and pluralistic, Adler and Barnett focused on pluralistic security communities which means "a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain depend-

able expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 73). Moreover, they classified the pluralistic security communities as tightly and loosely coupled security communities. In the example of Adler and Barnett, they address to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) as the organizations that "teach" states how to settle their differences (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 82).

It is important to note that Adler and Barnett consider that security community is not only a geographical and/or spatial entity as Deutsch described. According to their point of view, a security community may involve members from the different geographic areas. Moving from this point, it might be an accurate inference that sharing the same geography is not enough to generate a security community, too.

The constructivist essense of this approach is also worth to mention. During the Cold War period, realism is the dominant perspective for the security studies while constructivism brought an alternative approach to the security studies by the end of the Cold War years. This perspective in security studies defines security as a result of relations between perceptions and actors by assessing the security understanding as an outcome of a process. In constructivist security understanding, identities, cultures and belongings are as important as the material and concrete components of the realist perspective.

Adler and Barnett also underlines that to recognize that they can mutually benefit from some modest coordination of security policies is in the essence of the security community and it is the triggering factor (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 82). They claim that this awareness canalizes these countries to a collective action for overcoming the problems and they initiate the cooperation process in order to develop the security programs for specific threats.

A Brief History of Common Security Initiatives among South East European Countries

There is a lack of common identity in general of the South Eastern Europe (Dehnert & Taleski, 2013: 115) although the focal point is common identity debates in the Western Balkans. The remark of Dehnert and Taleski is important, because they indicate that the reason of this situation is the countries in the region which consider their neighbor countries as a hostile due to the incomplete post-conflict reconciliation and the nationalistic narratives. As a result, the countries in the region still have different security concerns and historical anxieties towards each other. Dangerfield's remark is also thought provoking and ironic which claims that the organized crime is in itself probably the most successful form of regional cooperation (2004: 222)

However, there are several cooperation initiatives in the region which cannot be ignored with a general overview. Some of these initiatives are external actors-led, as the EU, while some of them are revealed by the encouragement of the countries from the region. Among the several initiatives, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is worth to mention since it was an institutional initiative which proposes to strengthen peace, democracy, human rights and the economy in the countries of South Eastern Europe from 1999 to 2008. This process has been transformed into the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) by the EU for five countries of South-East Europe as part of the Stability Pact program. As another EU-led initiative, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) which was established in February 2008 is the successor of The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative and South-East European Cooperation Process were the other significant initiatives. Apart from these EU led initiatives, Adriatic Charter was signed in 2005 and it was the basis for the creation of the Adriatic Group by gathering Croatia, Albania and Macedonia in a form of regional alliance within NATO.

On the other hand, it might be a misreading to consider EU as the only external factor in the region. Behind the EU, NATO is also a significant actor particularly by reflecting and imposing transatlantic security concerns on the region. In this respect, international organizations are also important tools for the countries in the region

in order to socialize with the international community. Therefore, perhaps the need of this region is not an isolated security community but integration with the other existing international organizations in order to strengthen their positions in the global scene and tighten their ties with the other regions not only for security but also for trade and culture. It cannot be neglected that there is a need in the region to have a common security concern to develop common and effective responses which might be achieved by the common action. There are also other initiatives on regional cooperation on 'soft' security issues such as the South East European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC), Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group (SEEPAG), Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI) and the Migration, Asylum, Refugees, Regional Initiative (MARRI) Center. The Regional Secretariat of the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative (DPPI), South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), South East Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM), USAdriatic Charter A5 and the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse (SEEC) might be stated as the other cooperation initiatives, too (Taleski, 2012: 116)

SECURITY BELONGINGS OF SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: SOME CASES FROM THE REGION

Within the scope of this study, the concept of "security belonging" describes "the community, group or identity that a particular country considers itself as a part of it in terms of security". The previous parts of the study briefly portrayed the overall picture in South East Europe regarding the regional cooperation initiatives. However, specific countries' security policies is worth to mention in order to response the main questions of this study giving concrete examples. Hence, the remaining parts of this paper will demonstrate security belongings of four countries from the region as an example, namely Turkey, Greece, Croatia and Serbia.

Turkey
The geostrategic position of Turkey has always swung the balance of overall Turkish foreign policy and particularly also of the Turkish security policies and orientations. As a country having lands both in

Asia and Europe, located in a strategic position as a trade and energy corridor and in the center of several challenging international conflicts, Turkish security policy has also had multilateral characteristic in line with foreign policy since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Balkan Entente of 1934 with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia; the Sadabad Pact of 1937 with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan might be exemplified as the multilateral regional security cooperation initiatives of Turkey within the interwar period between 1923-1939.

Turkish foreign policy is accepted as "Western oriented" after the establishment of the Republic. Following the end of Second World War, Turkey has positioned herself within the Western Block as a part of collective security understanding and NATO membership by 18 February 1952 might be accepted as a consequence of this choice (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-a). This choice has also intensively influenced security strategies and approaches of Turkey during the Cold War era. By being the second largest army in NATO, Turkey actively contributed to the peacekeeping operations of NATO as in the Afghanistan (ISAF- International Security Assistance Force) and Kosovo (KFOR- Kosovo Force). Moreover, NATO functioned as a reflection and a framework for the Turkish - American relations in terms of security cooperation. In case of the Balkans, Turkey was also a part of SFOR (Stabilization Force) and IFOR (Implementation Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, EU constitutes another tier of Turkey's security cooperation and as a pivotal actor in the region; Turkey has become a part of EU-led operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) and Kosovo (EULEAX), Macedonia and Congo in the scope of the EU Security and Defense Policy.

Beyond the security triangle consisted of EU, NATO and UN, Turkey has been partner of some important regional security initiatives such as the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM), the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE) and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR). On the other hand, The Balkan Pact of 1954 with Greece and Yugoslavia and the Baghdad Pact of 1955 (latter CENTO Pact) with Britain, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan have been the other security initiatives of Turkey which reflects a multidimensional approach in security policies.

In the context of this study, SEDM and MPFSEE are notable as the initiatives targeting South East Europe region. Turkey, the USA, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro are the members and Moldova and Georgia are observers of SEDM which was founded 1996 by the purposes of providing border security, cooperation in the South East Europe and the fight against terrorism. Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE) which was established in 1998 by the initiative of SEDM and Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine are the members of this initiative. These countries established MPFSEE with the purpose of building peaceful relations with the neighbors in South East Europe and supporting to the security of the Europe-Atlantic area. Turkey is also a member of The South East Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI).

Turkey signed military agreements with Albania in 1991 and with Macedonia in 1995. Turkey had also active responsibility by pioneering mediation between Serbia and Bosnia, and between Serbia and Kosovo (Linden & İrepoğlu, 2013: 231). On the other hand, Turkey is a participating state of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since 1975, too. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey contributes OSCE by providing technical and financial assistance with expertise to the OSCE projects in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans in a wide range of areas such as border management, counterterrorism, good governance, democratic policing and minority protection (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-b). In this context, South East Europe is also an important component of Turkey's initiatives under OSCE participation.

Finally, the new activism in Turkish foreign policy after 2007 with a multidimensional pro-active foreign policy with the debates on "a shift of axis" is worth to mention since it also covers the Balkans and South East Europe. This new approach positions Turkey as an extension of the Ottoman Empire that ruled in this region for almost 500 years and has an explicit intention to transform Turkey to a "power hub" in the region again. Sözen proposes that Turkey by and large followed a typical mono-dimensional and mono-track foreign policy that was shaped by NATO's security preferences during the Cold War; but the end of the Cold War expanded Turkish foreign policy

horizons and this situation caused to "Multidimensional" and "Multi-Track Policies" (Sözen, 2010: 116). On the other hand, as Linden and İrepoğlu has also underlined, the Balkans now has another powerful actor, namely EU. Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia are the EU member states, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro are in the accession process while Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina are the potential candidate members (Linden & İrepoğlu, 2013: 230). As a result, the important magnet for this region is the EU and it is suspicious whether the region needs to search for a new actor as Turkey or not.

This new activism has also caused some policy shifts in Turkish foreign policy. For instance Turkey rejected sanctions on Iran that had risen from the nuclear program at the United Nations Security Council in June 2010. According to Öniş, it was a significant case that Turkey acted against the interest of Western alliances that she has been actively contributing for long years (Oniş, 2010: 7).

Greece

Greece is a member of NATO since 1952 and significantly contributed to NATO's southastern flank. On the other hand, As an EU member country, Greece is a direct responsibility for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU with a contribution to contribution to the European Rapid Reaction Force. In addition, Greece is active in UN and also a participating state of the OSCE. In the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Greece has participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia (UNSOM I) and other missions in Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Western Sahara, former Yugoslavia (IFOR & SFOR, with an upgraded Greek presence), and Albania (Operation ALBA).

Liaropoulos emphasizes that Athens had to adjust to the new security environment that emerged after the end of the Cold War as the other members of NATO and EU (Liaropoulos, 2008: 26). Greece is geographically located in an unstable zone. The disintegration of former Yugoslavia, political instability in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the future status of Kosovo and Albanian nationalism have been listed the main reasons for this instability.

On the other hand, Turkey has been a traditional security concern for Greece. The emergence of the Cyprus problem in the 1950s and the

Greek-Turkish crises of the 1960s became to main security concerns of Greece with instability in the Balkans which also shaped her security choices. Besides the Cyprus issue, the problem of the continental shelf; Aegean territorial waters and Turkey's concerns and worries related to the militarization of several of the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean have been the main problems in Greek- Turkish relations. In addition, Turkey's position as a determiner of the Greek security and foreign policy choices cannot be neglected. For instance in 1991, Greece became a member of the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU was important for Greece as a shelter against a possible attack from Turkey. In addition, the EU's decision that Article 5 of the modified Treaty of Brussels that guarantees the security of members against an attack to members will not apply between member-states of NATO and the WEU made Greece upset and NATO became the principal tool to deter and guarantee Greece (Moustakis & Sheean, 2000: 101). Moreover, there is a strong linkage with the NATO membership of Turkey and Greece and it can be said that hesitations and security concerns / mutual suspicion of these two countries resulted with the involvement in the same security community.

According the information provided Greek MFA, Greek-Turkish Relations, the Cyprus issue and FYROM name issue are the main issues in Greek foreign policy after the end of the Cold War (Greek MFA). On the other hand, Turkey is not the only source of concerns in Greek foreign policy. As Moustakis and Sheean also noted; the collapse of Yugoslavia generated more crucial outcomes for Greece more than the collapse of Soviet Union by the emergence of an independent Macedonian state, and by the possibility of the emergence of a Greater Albania (Moustakis & Sheean, 2000: 105).

Moreover, Greece has been an important actor of security cooperation and initiatives in South East Europe. Greece pioneered the first EU-Western Balkans Summit (called as Thessaloniki I) in 21 June 2003 and According to Greek MFA, Greece aims to constitute an EU-Western Balkans Summit (Thessaloniki II) in its EU Presidency in the first half of 2014 for adopting a political declaration that will set a specific target date for completion of the accession processes of the Western Balkan countries. Greece also started The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) which is an informal cooperation platform participated in by Greece, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ser-

bia, Croatia, Slovenia and Italy. Besides, Greece has played an active role in shaping and also imposing EU security policies and initiatives towards the region, particularly in the Balkans. The South East Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), the Royaumont Initiative, the Stability Pact for the Balkans and also Stabilization and Association agreements with these countries might be stated as the examples of these initiatives.

Briefly, it can be stated that there are three important parameters of the Greek security policies in the region. The first one is the notion of Greece for a leadership in the region. The second one is the EU membership and in general this is combined with the Greece's expectations for a leadership in the region. In some cases, Greece undertakes the responsibility within the EU to initiate or disseminate EU security strategies towards the region while in some cases Greece benefits from the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy as a tool for the efficiency in the region. The third parameter is the relations of Greece with Turkey as explained other parts of this study.

Croatia

Croatia obtained independence in 1991 and involved in an economic, social and political transformation process. Within this transformation process, the EU has been the foreign policy priority of Croatia. The Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU was signed by Croatia in October 2001 and eventually she has become a member of the EU in July 2013.

On the other hand, NATO is the other significant determiner of Croatia's security choices and the NATO Membership Action Plan was signed in May 2002 and became a NATO member in 2009. As a small country, these organizations which provide her Euro-Atlantic integration is pivotal for handling security concerns of Croatia by attaching country to the global security framework more powerfully (Stanicic, 2007: 86). Besides the long term impacts of the war with the Serbs, Croatia experienced border disputes with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Montenegro. Particularly these problems that arose from the border disputes increased the added value of international organizations for Croatia in order to guarantee her security and survival.

On the other hand, Croatia does not isolate herself from the Western Balkans and gives priority for security cooperation in the region, too. Croatia is active in several regional initiatives, such as the South-East European Cooperation Initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Central European Initiative, and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative. Croatia executed the chairmanship of South East European Cooperation Initiative for 2006-2007. Croatia participates in several regional defense cooperation mechanisms such as the US-Adriatic Charter (US with Albania, Croatia and FYRoM), the Central European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support, the Quadrilateral/Multinational Land Force (Croatia, Hungary, Italy, and Slovenia), Project Adrion (Western Balkans, Greece, and Italy) and the South Eastern European Defense Ministerial process grouping NATO and Partnership for Peace Countries (Stanicic, 2007: 88).

Croatia is also active in establishing bilateral relations with all respective countries in the region. For example, in August 2005, the Presidents of Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina signed a joint declaration on the development of partnership cooperation in the European context and the settlement of significant issues between them. In addition, Croatia has signed bilateral agreements also with the neighboring countries for strengthening international police cooperation especially towards the common problems of the region such as international illegal trade, drug and organized crime. As in the other case countries, Croatia has become a part of also UN peacekeeping operations by taking part in eleven of United Nations' operations including also Afghanistan.

Serbia

Among the case countries of this study and also within the region of South East Europe, Serbia might be exemplified as one of the most challenging and controversial countries in terms of integration with the region on the issues of security and cooperation. According to Stojanovic, this situation is due to the lack of an official regional security strategy of Serbia (Stanicic & Stojanović, 2007: 115). On the other hand, Serbia's resistance to the recognition of Kosovo and relations with Russia and also China have dominated the foreign policy and security alliance choices of Serbia.

Blocking the independence of Kosovo has been the foreign policy priority of Serbia since 2008 when The Republic of Kosovo declared their independence from Serbia. As a result, this issue became one of the conflict and tensions in the region. Serbia is strongly opposed to the Kosovo's independence and after 2008; this opposition has been the focal point of Serbia's relations and foreign policy choices. In 2012, EU has undertaken the role of mediator to foster dialogue between two countries and to normalize relations. By the EU mediation, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia concluded an agreement on 19 April 2013 to improve the relations. This agreement might be accepted as a result of EU's conditionality to push forward membership negotiations with both of the countries.

Negotiations for the EU accession and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) might be stated as the contemporary agenda setters in the foreign security policy of Serbia. Serbia has been involved in Stabilization and Association Process of EU in 2000, signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on 29 April 2008, applied for the membership in 2009 and received full candidate status on 1 March 2012. Serbia is also a participating state of the OSCE since 10 November 2000 and it is important to note that this membership might be considered within the same package of Serbia's ambition to integrate herself to Europe.

Even not a member, Serbia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program in 2006. On the other hand, Serbia is an unusual case in the region with her approach to NATO. As a result of the history and past conflicts, particularly due to Kosovo experience NATO and US are the potential elements of military aggression and threats (Stanicic and Stojanović, 2007: 123). NATO operation (Operation Allied Force) and bombing during the Kosovo War in 1999 has generated a historical trauma. However, history is not the only reason and Western support to Kosovo's independence and Serbia's relations with Russia might be stated as the other factors that alienate Serbia to NATO membership.

Besides all efforts to normalize relations with Serbia and Kosovo, tension still continues to be a factor in the foreign relations of Serbia. On the other hand, as Ejdus and Savkovic stated based on the National Security Strategy documents of Serbia, the perceived regional threats

of Serbia are being a transit for terrorist and criminals, economic and social problems and failure of European and international integration (Ejdus and Savkovic, 2008: 14).

A New Security Community: Is It Possible?

By considering all dimensions of a security community mentioned in this paper, South East Europe case differs greatly from a regular example of a security community. Primarily, due to the several historical and existing factors, there is a lack of necessary internal dynamic among the countries in the region. On the other hand, there are several initiatives to generate common actions for security (See Table 1). As a result, one can ask or questions the reason of the existing common security initiatives that have been experienced in the region. The response to this question is clearly not the internal dynamics of the region but external enforcement or encouragements which are particularly triggered by the external actors such as the European Union and NATO.

Table 1: International Organizations and Regional Security Initiatives Engagements of Four Case Countries

		Turkey	Greece	Croatia	Serbia
International Organizations	NATO	Member (1952)	Member (1952)	Member (2009)	Not Member
	European Union	Candidate (1999)	Member (1981)	Member (2013)	Candidate (2012)
	United Nations	Member (1945)	Member (1945)	Member (1992)	Member (2000)
	OSCE	Participating State	Participating State	Participating State	Participating State
Important Regional Initiatives	Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM)	Member	Member	Observer	Observer
	Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE)	Participating State	Participating State	Observer	Not Participating
	The South East Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI)	Member	Member	Member	Member
	Regional Cooperation Council (Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe)	Partner	Partner	Partner	Partner
	Central European Initiative	Not Member	Not Member	Member	Member

It might be stated that amalgamation is only possible under the framework of the EU for the South East European countries, particularly for the ones from post –Yugoslavia. The EU is an important push factor in order to generate main elements of a security com-

munity ranging from transnational identity, increased transactions to mutual trust. Especially EU SAP programs are the significant tools for social learning in the region. Formulation of a political community requires having cohesion and coherence by an enforcement mechanism from above and self-enforcement mechanisms from below (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 78). While the initiatives for a self-enforcement mechanism among South East European countries may not be neglected, it is explicit that the EU is an important mechanism generator from above.

In addition, the perspective of security community approach claims that "Power can be a magnet; in a community formed around a group of strong powers, weaker members will expect to share the security and (potentially) other benefits associated with the stronger ones." (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 82). In the case of South Eastern Europe, there are no enough strong integral magnet and, as a result, the most powerful magnet might be accepted as the EU and it is conditionally towards particularly post-Yugoslavian Balkan states. On the other hand, the initial purpose of the EU conditionality or NATO programs towards these states is not to generate a common identity or a separate security community in the region. Therefore, the experience of South East European countries might be explained as a process for integration to an existing community, namely EU rather than creating a new one in the region (Grillot et al, 2007: 20).

However, stemming from this fact, EU and also NATO might be also one of the reasons on why these states cannot generate a separate security community. Because EU provides required umbrella of security for these states and they do not need to formulate a mutual understanding of security beyond the EU and NATO have been imposing them. For instance, in the case of South East European countries, the EU provides the security programs (SAPS) to provide guidance but also an inducement towards these countries. Grillot and others demonstrates by their study how third parties and particularly international organizations influence generating a security community post conflict societies by the examples of EU and NATO (Grillot et. Al., 2007). Particularly, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro are problematic for also EU due to the ethnic tensions, border disputes, immigration and refugee con-

cerns, infrastructure problems, and other organized crime and corruption (Grillot et. Al, 2007: 3). Even so, this region is important for the EU in order to complete fully its idea of "one Europe".

Conclusion

By taking "security community" approach as a theoretical base, this study is constructed upon a comparative perspective by focusing on the security alliances and initiatives in South East Europe in scope of four case countries, namely Turkey, Greece, Serbia and Croatia. In terms of "security community" approach, the South East Europe is a precious case in order to seek a response on how the common feeling of belonging or identity is an important component in order to constitute a security community which is also a central question of Adler and Barnett by addressing the "we-feeling" or "we-ness" in their theoretical framework. The study revealed that it is more likely for the South East European countries to become a part of a larger community (political or security based) than to compose a new security community and the European Union is the most significant convergence point among these countries.

If briefly explained, international organization, namely the EU, NATO and UN have been the convergence points for the security cooperation of the South East European countries. However, Serbia is an exception with its' anti-membership stance to NATO among these case countries. Moreover, common problems of the region such as organized crime, minority rights etc. might be stated as a convergence point which push the countries in the region for a security cooperation, at least for functional cooperation on specific issues. However, diverse cultures, identities, religion, conflicts (incomplete, resolved or on-going) have been the divergence points with the trauma that generated in these countries.

Finally, it should be stated that it is more probable for the South East European countries to become a part of a larger community (political or security) than to compose a new security community. In this case, the most appropriate option is the EU since almost all of the countries in the region have a relation with the EU as a member or candidate country perspective.

REFERENCES

Adler, E and Barnett, M 1996, "Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda For The Study Of Security Communities", *Ethics & International Affairs*, Volume 10, Issue 1, Pages 63–98, March 1996 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adler, E and Barnett, M 1998, "A Framework For The Study Of Security Communities", in E. Adler And M. Barnett (Eds) *Security Communities*, pp. 29-65.

Dangerfield, M 2004, "Regional Cooperation İn The Western Balkans: Stabilisation Device or Integration Policy?", *Perspectives On European Politics And Society*, 5.2 Leiden, The Netherlands.

Dehnert, S and Taleski, D (Eds) 2013, *Monitoring Regional Cooperation In South East Europe*, Berlin, Germany.

Deutsch, KW et. al. 1957, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton : Princeton University Press.

Economides, S 2003, "Balkan Security: Which security? Whose security?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 3 (3). pp. 105-129. ISSN 1468-3857.

Ejdus, F and Savkovic, M 2008, "Emergent Concept of National Security Policy In Republic of Serbia", *Slovakia and Serbia Experiences from Transatlantic Integration and Security Sector Reform*, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, Bratislava, Slovakia Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, Serbia, Bratislava, pp:29-45

Grillot, S. et al. 2007, "*Developing Security Community in The Western Balkans*: *The Role of the EU and NATO*", Montreal, Canada. (Unpublished).

Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (www.mfa.gr)
Liaropoulos, A 2008, "The Institutional Dimension Of Greek Security Policy: Is There A Need For A National Security Council?", *National Security and the Future*, 3 (9).

Linden, RH & İrepoğlu, Y 2013, "Turkey And The Balkans: New Forms of Political Community?", *Turkish Studies*, pp. 14:2, 229-255.

Moustakis, F & Sheehan M 2000, "Greek Security Policy After The Cold War", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 21:3, pp. 95-115.

Öniş, Z 2011, "Öniş Multiple Faces of the 'New' Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.:13 , Issue:1 , Jan , 2011, Ankara, Seta Foundation.

Sözen, A 2010, "A Paradigm Shift İn Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition And Challenges", *Turkish Studies*, 11:1, pp. 103-123.

Stanicic, M 2007, "View From Croatia - Study On The Assessment Of Regional Security Threats and Challenges in The Western Balkans". István Gyarmati And Darko Stančić (Edis). Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Taleski, D 2012, "Regional Security Framework İn Southeast Europe: Just A Step Away?" in *A Future Securıty Archıtecture For Southeast Europe*, by Valeska Esch, Juliane Kabus, Charles King Mallory Iv (Eds.). The Aspen Institute.

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-a
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_-turkey_s-security-perspective_-historical-and-conceptual-background_-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa (7 October 2013)

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-b
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-organization-for-security-and-cooperation-in-europe-osce.en.mfa (7 October 2013)

Vucetic, S 2001, "The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-building Institution?", *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. 2, Number 2 (October 2001), pp. 109-134;

Vukadinovic, R 1999, "Challenges To Security In Southeast Europe", *South-East Europe Studies*. Vol. Xxxvi, No. 5, pp. 3-14.

Challenges of Multilateral Regional Security and Defence Cooperation in South East Europe

Iztok Prezelj[1]

....

ABSTRACT

Regional security and defence cooperation in South East Europe (SEE) has become increasingly important since the end of major armed conflicts. The first wave of such initiatives was established in 1996 after the war ended in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g. SEECP, SECI and SEDM), while the second wave led to the establishment of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, presently the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), and many others after the war in Kosovo and democratic changes in Croatia and Serbia. Multilateral cooperative initiatives have played a relevant role in reconnecting the region in many areas and preventing further wars or related deterioration of security. I argue in this paper that South East Europe has not faced a lack of multilateral security or defence cooperation in the past 10 years, but a problem of the efficiency of the regional initiatives. The paper first maps the network of regional initiatives and then addresses several related challenges that hinder efficiency in regional cooperation, such as the changed problem of regional ownership, the lack of a regional identity, the escape syndrome and related distorted perception of regional cooperation, the problem of artificiality and superficiality of certain regional initiatives and the lack of a coherent approach to regional cooperation.

KEY WORDS:

South East Europe, Western Balkans, multilateral security and defence cooperation, region, initiatives, Regional Cooperation Council

---

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Iztok Prezelj, PhD, Assistant Professor, Faculty for Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: iztok.prezelj@fdv.uni-lj.si, ISSN1855-7694 © 2013 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)

Introduction[2]

South East Europe has been the least stable area of Europe since the early 20th century. Several armed conflicts that took place in this area, such as two Balkan wars, two World Wars, armed conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, have contributed to the area's negative reputation. In the minds of most Westerners, the term Balkanisation still refers to unreasonable fragmentation and related violence. The post-war situation of the last 10 years reflects a delicate mixture of positive and negative trends. Karl Bildt (2004) rightfully described the region as being captured between the forces of integration and disintegration. It is therefore not surprising that the political and security situation in the region has been labelled by some analysts as "unstable security" (Vukadinović, 2003: 65) and "relative stability" (Gazdag, Poti, Takacs and Talas, 2007: 17). Presently, the region is predominantly facing non-military threats, especially organised crime and corruption, while the legacy of the mentioned wars still acts as a burden slowing down the progress of democratisation, liberalisation and regional cooperation. Potential further secession moves are off the political agenda, but the sporadic indications suggest they remain alive. A key challenge for politicians in this situation is to find and maintain working regional solutions and structures to balance the forces of disintegration with the power of integration.

The South East European regional approach should be comprehended as a very specific part of wider trends of stronger regionalism. Lake and Morgan (1997: 5) predicted that efforts to cope with violent conflicts in the future, as well as to achieve order and security, would primarily involve arrangements and actions devised and implemented at the regional level. This trend towards the 'new' security regionalism means that, in the foreseeable future, violent conflicts will mostly arise out of regional concerns and be viewed by political actors through a regional, rather than a global, lens. In this respect, it is surprising how little academic attention has been devoted to multilateral security cooperation in South East Europe. This paper aims to fill this gap by defining the regional security cooperation network,

---

mapping the main initiatives and processes and by discussing the primary challenges that prevent their efficiency. In this respect, the paper represents a critical survey of security and defence initiatives. The regional security cooperation network in South East Europe is defined for the purposes of this paper as a complex and dynamic network of initiatives, projects and processes in various security fields with various security actors of a governmental and non-governmental character. International organisations can also take part in these regional processes as observers, participants, donors etc. This network has a complex history that has not been reflected on enough by the academic community. It started to take shape immediately after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, when the region needed to be reconnected bilaterally and multilaterally. The first relevant post-war foundation for regional cooperation was an arms control regime called Dayton 4. Other regional initiatives mainly emerged in two major waves. The first wave in 1996 led to the establishment of the SEECP (South-East Europe Cooperation Process), the SECI (South-East European Cooperative Initiative) and the SEDM (Southeast Europe Defence Ministerial). The second wave after the war in Kosovo led to establishment of the Stability Pact for South East Europe and the SEEI (South East Europe Initiative). The former was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 2008. Democratic changes in Croatia and Serbia in 2000 removed the last serious barriers to regional cooperation. As a consequence, several other security-related initiatives have been established, such as the SEEC (Southeast Europe Clearinghouse), the SEESAC (South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse), the Center for Security Cooperation – RACVIAC, the US-Adriatic Charter, the DPPI (Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative), the SECI Center, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, the MARRI Center, the Ohrid Process, the Brdo Process etc. However, the number of these initiatives does not reveal much about this network's actual effectiveness. I argue in this paper that in the past 10 years we have not faced a lack of multilateral security and defence cooperation in SEE, but a problem of the effectiveness of these initiatives. The main problem that seriously hinders these initiatives in fact stems from the preference of the participating countries to join Euro-Atlantic integrations over fostering truly efficient regional cooperation per se. If enough evidence can be collected in this direction, then this paper will reflect the acquired level and

maturity of regional cooperation (see Vukadinović, 2002: 22). This would remind us of the old constructivist truth that international institutions in general and specifically in the SEE only work if and to the extent member states make them work (see Cremasco, 1995: 49).

Multilateral Security and Defence Cooperation in South East Europe

SEE is a subregion or security subcomplex within the wider European security complex. A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved independent of each other (Buzan, 1991: 190; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 12). The power of the surrounding actors is so overwhelming that SEE and the Balkans can only function as a subregion within the larger Europe. There is also no doubt that such interdependence is forcing countries of the Western Balkans to cooperate in the search for security and welfare (for a general discussion on this, see Holsti, 1995: 9), but all of these processes have been overshadowed by external Euro-Atlantic processes that seem even more relevant and vital for the participating countries. In practice, this has led the participating countries to contribute to the regional initiatives, but not in the best way they can. They have adjusted their behaviour in a coordinated way to achieve certain shared regional objectives but, as Bjurner (1999: 14) found, such subregional cooperation cannot be regarded as a sufficient contributor to national security from either a subjective or objective viewpoint. It can only play the role of a very important supplementary contributor to security. Subregional cooperation can promote wider regional (Euro-Atlantic in our case) integration, provided it is structured appropriately. The new subregional cooperation has been particularly fruitful precisely where it has been linked with efforts to achieve integration, especially in connection with EU and NATO enlargement processes. Such links give confidence to those participating and those outside that the subregional initiative will be transparent, not directed at any other state/region and will not cut states off from their wider integrative goals. They also help provide an agenda for subregional cooperation based on the integration criteria. Further, Dwan (1999a: 2) stressed that

subregional cooperation in SEE is not integration in that particular area. She found basic arguments for such a claim in the fact that no supranational authority has been created, no ceding of sovereignty has been involved, and no body of common laws and obligations has been established.

After the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Commission on the Balkans called for the creation of a regional framework to resolve dangerous disputes and problems in the Western Balkans. Three specific proposals were put forward. First, the Commission proposed creating the International Conference on Security in the Balkans that would represent a deepening of the Stability Pact (proposed by the EU and sponsored by the OSCE at the time). The framework would be based on bilateral and trilateral negotiations on stability, open borders, minority rights etc. Second, it was proposed to create the Conference on the South Balkans under the sponsorship of the USA and EU with the goal of creating the Southern Balkan Confederation. The main purpose of such a conference would be to prevent conflicts between Albanians and Slavs that could occur in Kosovo and Macedonia. The Commission was aware that such a proposal would represent a top-down solution that would encounter implemental problems in the region. The third idea was to create a network of regional commissions that would deal with questions and areas of potential conflict among the countries. These commissions would consist of governmental and non-governmental representatives from the region and the West, and focus on specific questions such as interethnic relations, minorities, religious cooperation, civil society, economic development, infrastructure, crime prevention and cooperation with Western institutions. The leading role in such an initiative was supposed to be taken by the USA and the EU, while Russia and Ukraine could also cooperate. The work of these commissions would be coordinated by an office that would collect their periodic reports and recommendations. The Commission also identified several possible obstacles to regional cooperation:

- Croatia claimed that it was a Central European country that does not want to be involved in any plans or activities of such con ferences;
- Serbia was being boycotted due to its behaviour towards its neigh bouring countries;

- fears in Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Skopje and Zagreb that such regional activities could lead to the restoration of Yugoslavia;
- strong mistrust among countries in the region, especially among Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks; and
- wars had created a perception that countries need to exit this region and enter Europe as their new home. Europe was perceived as a panacea for all of their difficulties. Many perceived the efforts towards regional cooperation as delaying the entry to Europe and not as part of preparation for Europe (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996: 139-143).

For these reasons, the Commission identified the need to stimulate regional cooperation from the West, that is from the top down.

Up until 2012, a very complex network of regional security initiatives had been created in the region. Figure 1 shows a network of 33 regional initiatives. The upper part of the figure presents the defence initiatives, while the lower half shows initiatives related to justice and home affairs. In fact, the figure shows the perceived cooperation among the initiatives from the perspective of RCC experts (based on interviews with Radev, 2012; Ivan-Cucu, 2012; Vujičić, 2012). This mapping of regional initiatives shows two distinctive features: the centrality of the Regional Cooperation Centre and a subnetwork of some regional initiatives from the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) field.

Figure 1: The Network of Regional-Security-Related Initiatives in South East Europe

A frequently missed but very important regional document that has influenced regional security cooperation is SEECAP (A Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges). This was the first regional joint paper where countries (including Yugoslavia at that time) jointly defined threats (political, military economic, social and environmental) and priorities for regional cooperation. The states stressed the importance of the regional level and outlined the principle of regional ownership, complementarity and non-duplication (NATO, 2001; SEECAP, 2001a; SEECAP, 2001b; SEECAP, 2002). It should also be stressed that a comparative assessment of strategic documents of countries in the region showed that regional stability represents a joint and fundamental national interest for all countries and regional cooperation is a necessary tool for achieving a better future (see Gazdag, Poti, Takacs and Talas, 2007: 17-18). The international community's main interest in the SEE is "regional stabilisation through integration". Integration has been promised on several occasions (e.g. in Thessaloniki in 2003 it was declared by the Heads of States that the future of the Western Balkans is in the EU), and it is this promise or belief that has driven most of the regional stabilisation and cooperation activities. The international community has been trying to implement Deutch's idea of a security community in this geographical area as well. Deutch believed that any political community was eventually successful if it became a security community – that is, if it achieved integration – and that it was unsuccessful if it ultimately ended in secession or civil war (see Deutch et al., 1957: 6). The promise of integration has become the best tool for preventing new conflicts and a motivation for political, economic and military transition in the region.

An Overview of Selected Regional Initiatives and Their Role

South East Europe has seen a proliferation of initiatives and projects in various policy areas. In this section, I will only briefly present some of the most important ones as there are too many of them for a single paper. In fact, the OSCE attempted to grasp this complexity in 2003 by mapping all on-going projects in the JHA field alone. The project was aborted due to it having identified 800 projects and many related problems with mapping. The purpose of this section is to introduce the scope and complexity of these initiatives to the reader and prepare the grounds for a critical assessment in the next

section. It is impossible to follow the critical debate without knowing the basic underlying facts about the regional network and its key elements. All network assessments have to provide basic data on the basic elements being researched (initiatives in our case) (see Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj, 2005).

First, I should mention the regional arms control system that was established after the end of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Agreement contains specific provisions on establishing a regional structure for stability and arms control through cooperation aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defence forces. The so-called **Dayton 4 subregional arms control and CSBM regime has been a similar regime** to the pan-European Vienna Document CSBM regime. Each participating country (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro) sends specific military data each year and then the countries can verify such data via inspections and evaluations. The Presidency of this regime rotates twice per year, and the whole system is working under the loose control of the OSCE Presidency. The regime also underwent a transformation when two militaries became one (in Bosnia) and one military became two (in Serbia and Montenegro) (interview with Col. Vujović, 2013). The inspectors are trained by the RACVIAC, a regional initiative that will be described later.

The key strategic steering role in the region is played by the **SEECP (South East Europe Cooperation Process)** which is a truly regionally owned and managed forum. Conceptually, it is supposed to be a successor to the Balkan Entente from the 1930s (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, 2006). Its main document (SEECP, 2000, amended in 2007) defines the SEECP as a coordinative, political and consultative forum that aims to improve relations in the region and build an area of peace, security, stability and cooperation. The cooperation has been carried out in three areas: political and security cooperation; economic cooperation; and cooperation concerning the humanitarian field, democratisation, justice and fight against illegal activities. This cooperation has also been connected with integration into the EU. It was stated in this regard that the region aims to become the EU's South East European Dimension (Croatian Chairmanship-in-Office, 2007). Operational and administrative tasks of the SEECP are carried out by the **Regional Cooperation Council**

(RCC), the successor to the Stability Pact. The RCC has become a regional network organisation that consists of 46 members from the region and beyond, including international organisations. The RCC wants to create all-inclusive cooperation at all levels and among all participants (Regional Cooperation Council, 2011: 4). It took the RCC two years just to map the regional scene in order to create a networking approach involving all relevant institutions. The RCC adopted horizontal functions of supporting, monitoring, coordinating and streamlining the regional activities with the aim of achieving enhanced effectiveness, synergy and coherence. It also helps regional initiatives to fill the gaps and reduce redundancies and overlaps (Regional Cooperation Council, 2010: 9). The RCC directly works with the following initiatives in the security priority area: the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative (DPPI), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW (SEESAC), the South East Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM), the US-Adriatic Charter, and the Centre for Security Cooperation (RACVIAC). It also works with the following initiatives in the area of justice and home affairs: the Migration, Asylum and Refugee Regional Initiative (MARRI), the Regional Anticorruption Initiative (RAI), the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC, the former SECI Centre), the Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group (SEEPAG), the Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA), the Women Police Officers Network (WPON), the Secretariat for Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe (PCC-SEE Secretariat) and the Western Balkan Prosecutors Network. It should be stressed that RCC activities should be consistent with the integration efforts (Stabilisation and Association Process – SAP) of participating states and should contribute to them (Stability Pact, 2008). The RCC also found that there was no more problem of duplication of effort, but the lack of effective coordination was still present in the region. Official documents of this initiative also stress the need to further enhance coordination at the national level in support of regional cooperation (Regional Cooperation Council, 2011: 6-27).

In the defence field, perhaps the most important initiative has been the **SEDM**, a regional initiative for the cooperation of the Defence Ministries of South East European countries. The initiative was launched in 1996 in Tirana based on a proposal by the USA. The general goal of this initiative has been the enhancement of peace, security and stability, as well as building trust among the countries of

South East Europe, while the priority projects have included the following: CBSC (Defence/Military Support to WMD Counterproliferation, Border Security, and Counter-Terrorism), the SEESIM (South Eastern Europe Simulation Network), MCEP (Military Civil Emergency Planning), IMIHO (Interconnection of the Military Hospitals, formerly SIMIHO), SEEDIRET (Cooperation on Defence Industries, Research and Technology among SEDM Countries), SEMEC (SEE Military Education Cooperation), the MPFSEE military unit (Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe) and the SEEBRIG multinational land brigade (South-Eastern Europe Brigade) (see Prezelj, 2008; Miladinovski, 2007). The most usable process for improving regional cooperation within the SEDM has been the SEESIM simulation network. Several simulations with region-wide scenarios of terrorism, natural disasters and so on have been carried out. They have tested various national and regional cooperative procedures (see SEDM, 2006b; SEDM, 2004; Dayioglu 2004). The next most visible project of the SEDM has been the SEEBRIG. After its official establishment in 1998, it took the brigade until 2006 before it was finally sent for its first mission in Afghanistan. Its role in humanitarian help in the region was also contemplated and planned, but has also gone without much practical effect (see SEDM, 1999; SEDM, 2006a).

The South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) was established in 1999 to improve communication and cooperation between NATO and non-PfP countries from SEE in the light of growing tensions with Yugoslavia over Kosovo. The group of countries met once a week during the peak of the intervention in Kosovo (SEEI, 2002). Interestingly, the SEEI was intended to supplement the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the PfP at the regional level. Many saw this as a quasi-Article 5 guarantee by NATO for the security of the frontline states during the Kosovo war. Due to NATO's high profile, countries preferred cooperating on security matters through the SEEI than through Table III of the Stability Pact (Bechev, 2011: 57). Later, the so-called SEEGROUP was established, leading to several new projects being started on counterterrorism (Compendium of Measures adopted against Terrorism), border security, comparing the national security strategies (SEESTUDY), including the monitoring of organised crime and corruption in the region.

The Southeast Europe Clearinghouse (SEEC) was established in 2004 as a very specific database of regional offers and needs to im-

prove national defence systems and related reforms. The initiative has aimed to match offers and needs in the fields of defence strategy, policy and organisation, personnel management, training, capabilities, homeland defence, international operations, the fight against terrorism, CBRN defence, disarmament and demining, arms control etc. (Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, 2009). My assessment of this mechanism for 2007 showed that 88 offers and 138 needs were posted by the participating countries on this website. An assessment over the years shows that NATO member countries or countries closer to its membership tend to post more offers than needs.

The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW (SEESAC) was established in 2002 and has been a very important mechanism for reducing the indirect threat arising from the continuing presence of weapons after the end of wars. The existence of these weapons has fuelled organised crime and terrorism in the region and beyond (see Prezelj, 2010). The initiative has been contributing to the SALW collection programmes and SALW destruction programmes in various countries, building better border control in this field, improving legal protection, the creation of an information and communication strategy in this field, the establishment of various databases, improving management of stocks of SALW, issuing a SALW survey (statistics) etc. (see SEESAC, 2007a; SEESAC, 2007b; SEESAC, 2008). **The Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC)** was established in 2000 with the aim of providing arms control training, promoting confidence and security-building measures and broadening cooperation in SEE. It was renamed the **Centre for Security Cooperation** in 2007 and shifted its emphasis to a wide range of politico-military issues, including security sector reform, defence conversion and even the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and the fight against various forms of organised crime. Currently, its main activity is organising seminars on many military and non-military issues, such as the Vienna document, disarmament, border security, search and rescue – SAR, private military security companies, NBC weapons etc. (RACVIAC, 2007; RACVIAC, 2010).

The US-Adriatic Charter (A-3 and presently A-5) reflects the special relationship of some countries from the region with the USA. Some interpret this mechanism as a mechanism to compensate for non-membership in NATO. It was created in 2003 with the goal of

creating a peaceful and stable SEE that would be completely integrated into the Euro-Atlantic associations. The participating countries believe that Europe will not be free and stable so long as its South East part is not completely integrated into the Euro-Atlantic associations. The initiative was created to follow the same path as the Baltic and other Eastern and Central European countries by creating a Vilnius Group. The original Adriatic Charter partners (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) decided in September 2008 to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to join the Charter (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US State Department, 2011). The initiative supports participating countries to join the Euro-Atlantic associations through political, defence and economic reforms, including democratic reform, respect of human rights, minorities, engagement in the fight against terrorism, inter-border traffic, weapons of mass destruction etc. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Macedonia, 2004). After Albania and Croatia joined NATO, their activities decreased, but they are still participating in the initiative. Some of this initiative's achievements are: Joint medical team, joint exercises (e.g. ADRIATIC PHIBLEX 04 – ENGEENEREX, EAGLE SAR 04, ADRIATIC EAGLE 06, EAGLE SAR 06, ADRIATIC EAGLE 07, LOGEX-07, MACEDONIAN FLASH-2 and BOVILLA 07), establishment of the Regional Centre for Public Relations and Training in Macedonia to educate personnel of regional armed forces, establishment of a Senior Security and Defence Course in Tirana, preparing training and monitoring teams for deployment in Afghanistan etc. (Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, 2012).

The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative for SEE (DPPI) is a specific initiative established in 2002 aimed at developing a cohesive regional strategy for disaster preparedness and prevention for the countries of SEE. The initiative stimulates broader, multi-level and multi-dimensional cooperation between the member countries at every stage of the disaster risk management process so as to enable them to face disasters more effectively and ensure the full cooperation of SEE with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Specifically, the initiative stimulates daily cooperation among the national authorities, supports and encourages countries in the region to develop, adopt and/or enforce state-of-the-art disaster emergency legislation, environmental regulations and codes designed to prevent and mitigate disasters, strengthens the national capacities in terms of preparedness for all kinds of disasters etc. The initiative has also

been working on developing a regional early warning system, re-
gional standards, the synchronisation of legislation, organised joint
trainings, harmonised the national seismic charts, established a joint
emergency response unit etc. This initiative is also an excellent ex-
ample of regional ownership that usefully interacts with foreign part-
ners and donors (see DPPI, 2013; Stability Pact for SEE, 2002).

**The Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC, for-
merly the SECI Centre)** was established in 2000 and transformed
in 2011. It represents a true case of a successful regional initiative.
Its main objective has been to provide support for member states
and enhance coordination in preventing and combating crime where
such crime involves or appears to involve an element of transborder
activity. Specific tasks of the SELEC involve the coordination of re-
gional operations and supporting investigations and crime preven-
tion activities of the member states in transborder cases, providing
them with the opportunity to exchange information and criminal in-
telligence and offer operational assistance in a quick and timely man-
ner, collecting, collating, analysing, processing and disseminating
information and criminal intelligence, producing strategic analyses
and threat assessments related to its objective, as well as establishing,
operating and maintaining a computerised information system for
the exchange of information in the regional context. The core idea of
this centre is that liaison officers from national police and customs
authorities exchange information among the capitals in real time (see
SELEC, 2009; SELEC, 2013; SECI Center, 1999). Its focus has been
on topics like people smuggling, drugs and weapons, transborder
computer crime, stolen vehicles, counterterrorism, illegal trade with
SALW, the security of container traffic etc. Perhaps the most relevant
output has been the SEE OCTA (Organised Crime Threat Assess-
ment) that was made based on a similar methodology to that used
in the EU (interview with Močnik, 2007). Operation Mrak can be
cited as an example of a successful type of operation that required
strong multilateral police cooperation in the region. The Slovenian
Criminal Police identified an organised criminal group in Slovenia
with strong connections with the Albanian underworld in Macedo-
nia. Police ascertained that the main activity of this group was smug-
gling drugs and weapons along the Balkan route from Macedonia
to Italy. A 'controlled delivery' operation started, involving the po-
lice forces of Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and
Italy. Operation Mrak was a success because the entire network of

smugglers and traffickers (suppliers, buyers and smugglers) along the route was exposed. Figure 2 shows the path of the drug transport and geographical scope of this international operation.

Figure 2: The route of the controlled delivery (Operation MRAK)
　　　　　(for more, see Prezelj and Gaber, 2005)

The Regional Anti-corruption Initiative (RAI, previously SPOC) was established in 2000 and renamed in 2007. It is the only regional centre devoted solely to fighting corruption – one of the most serious threats to the recovery and development of SEE. The RAI is actually a regional process through which governments of the region, local and international civil society organisations, bilateral aid agencies, and international organisations combine their efforts to help curb corruption in SEE. Its main task is to improve the coordination of all efforts in the region by: adopting and implementing international anti-corruption instruments as well as implementing regional agreements, promoting good governance and reliable public administration, strengthening national legislation and promoting the rule of law, promoting transparency and integrity in business operations, promoting an active civil society and raising public awareness. The RAI has also tried to share best practices in fighting high-level corruption, assessing the regional anti-corruption needs and specific requirements, and promoting public-private partnerships in reducing the impact of corruption in the business environment (see RAI, 2007; RAI, 2013).

This overview has only shed light on part of the scope and complexity of the regional cooperative networks. But it is sufficient to understand that the numerous initiatives have different but connected purposes and different numbers and statuses of members. They all try to coordinate their members for the purpose of improving regional cooperation. The question is how effective these efforts actually are and what is their potential for the future in SEE. Answers to these questions are provided in the next section and in the conclusion.

SOME CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

It would be a wonder if multilateral defence and security cooperation in SEE were a perfectly running mechanism, especially if we take into consideration the well-known thesis that the Balkans has always been Europe's security laboratory. All of the big questions of European post-Cold War security have been tested and sometimes settled in political competition, such as the NATO-EU relationship, the relationship of the West/NATO to Russia, the UN/regional division of labour on peacekeeping (see Buzan and Waever, 2004: 391). It has also been a place of experimentation and a microcosm of shaping the relations among powerful states and international security organisations after the end of the Cold War (Grizold and Prezelj, 2003). In the remainder of this section, I will identify several problems that hinder truly effective regional cooperation. The ambition in this paper is not to cover all of such problems, but only those that prevent regionalism from flourishing in SEE.

The Problem of Regional Ownership. It is a well-known fact that most regional security and defence initiatives were initiated in SEE by external countries and not countries from the region (see Clement, 1999: 71). This external push as the chief determinant of regional cooperation has varied in intensity and scope over time: it first focused on resolving problems and establishing good bilateral relations with neighbours and later on institutionalised cooperation on a regional scale (Bechev, 2011: 61). In addition, more theoretical literature has pointed out that the overall pattern of regional security has been decided outside the Balkans, in the EU-Europe core (Buzan and Waever, 2004: 395). This external initiation and pressure to cooper-

ate was initially the best possible solution for the region, yet it also created serious problems in terms of achieving the required level of participation by countries from the region. At a time of improving the security situation in SEE and shifting the strategic focus from Europe to Asia, the external countries proposed an increase of regional ownership in many regional initiatives. Regional ownership has also become one of the key principles and mantras of the RCC. Regional countries have been taking on extra responsibilities in directing, managing and financing the existing initiatives. However, these countries do not have as many financial and human resources as richer external players. Interviews with representatives of ministries of defence, foreign affairs, interior affairs and civil protection agencies from Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Croatia in 2007 confirm this problem. Many interviewed representatives responsible for international cooperation stressed their human and financial incapacity to follow such a high number of regional initiatives, not to mention the intellectual and physical limits of their activity in these initiatives (see Prezelj et al., 2007)[3]. Due to this, regional ownership has become a necessary and more legitimate beacon for regional cooperation which, however, shows cracks at first glance. Theoretically, regionalism should be the spontaneous growth of societal integration through a bottom-up process of interaction (see Hurrel, 1995), but in our case regional ownership was initiated from outside to worrying levels. It is therefore not surprising that regional cooperation has sometimes looked like homework given by the Euro-Atlantic community to the regional states. Those who have done it better, have better chances of integration (see Gazdag, Poti, Takacs and Talas, 2007: 38).

The Lack of Regional Identity Affects Regional Cooperation. Regionalists have stressed that geographical location is an important component in the construction of a region but it is not the sole or even essential condition (Dwan, 1999a: 3). Besides the geographical propinquity of states, other elements are important. These include the self-consciousness of members that they constitute a region, and perceptions of others that one exists (Morgan, 1997: 26). It has also been stressed that regionalism depends on the emergence of com-

---

[3] The interviews were carried out by the following members of the research group: Iztok Prezelj, Erik Kopač, Uroš Svete, Klemen Grošelj and Juvan Jelena.

mon regional awareness. Regionness is rooted in people's mental maps rather than being a simple reflection of institutional frameworks (Bechev, 2011: 63). According to Thompson (1973: 11-12), the constructivist theories treat regions as socially created entities that take on meaning because states perceive themselves as cohabiting a common area and sharing a common future. In this sense, Alexander Wendt rightfully claimed that regions are what states make of them (Wendt in Lake, 1997: 47). As I have already mentioned, the reputation of the region discussed in this paper has been poor, especially in the eyes of the West[4]. Historically, this geographical area has been frequently divided among different empires, with the exception of the period of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The SFRY was an experiment in uniting several ethnic groups in the area, but it did not succeed. Consequently, only a weak regional identity exists. Some would even claim that there is no regional identity at all. Others would claim (see Bechev, 2011) that regional identity in the Western Balkans has been built around discourses of partial belonging or exclusion from Europe presented as an unattainable ideal. Serbian B92 includes a comment on its website describing the region as a group of states sharing a geographical space, but not time. Instead of defining the region bottom-up, the Western Balkans has been defined top-down by external actors. In the Stabilisation and Association (SAP) process (in order to deal more easily with the area), the EU has defined the Western Balkans as former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania (see Delević, 2007: 13-16). Such an absence of a regional identity has constrained regional cooperation in SEE. To put it in terms more akin to sport: the teams that play in the second league do not feel that they belong to this league. Who can expect that these teams will do their best when playing if they do not identify themselves with the whole concept of the second league? They are being forced to play there by teams from the first league.

The Escape Syndrome and Related Distorted Perception of Regional Cooperation. In a region with a weak identity, states have thought that solutions to their problems exist outside of it. They have believed that joining the EU and NATO would resolve all their prob-

---

[4] Todorova argues that towards the end of the nineteenth century a negative image of the Balkans had crystallised in the Western psyche as the antipode of the self-congratulatory vision of enlightened Europeanness. If Europe had set a standard of civilisation and progress, the Balkans was a site of backwardness, perpetual strife, tribal warfare and resistance to modern rationality (Bechev, 2011: 66).

lems. Some countries have even suffered the escape syndrome which has distorted or contorted all perceptions and many actions blindly towards the Euro-Atlantic integrations. On the other hand, the international community's main interest in the SEE has been 'regional stabilisation through integration'. Integration has been promised on several occasions (e.g. in Thessaloniki in 2003 it was declared by the Heads of States that the future of the Western Balkans is in the EU), and it is this promise or belief that has been driving most of the regional cooperative activities. The international community has tried to implement Deutch's idea of a security community also in this geographical area. Deutch believed that any political community was eventually successful if it became a security community – that is, if it achieved integration – and that it was unsuccessful if it ultimately ended in secession or civil war (see Deutch et al., 1957: 6). The promise of integration has become the best tool for preventing new conflicts and a motivation for political, economic and military transition in the region.

For the effectiveness of regional cooperation, it has been vital how the relationship between the Euro-Atlantic integration and regional cooperation is perceived in the region. In the beginning, it was quite unspecified (Clement, 1999: 71), but then two interpretations emerged. The first one made a strong connection between the two, and pointed out that the whole purpose of regional cooperation was to improve the chances of joining the Euro-Atlantic integrations. In other words, Euro-Atlantic integration has become a key motivation for regional cooperation[5]. As Dwan (1999b: 207) pointed out, regional cooperation has been seen as a preparatory stage on the way to EU and NATO membership, and a way of socialising government, business and civil society groups in the environment of dense networks of interaction that characterises larger Euro-Atlantic processes. The downside of this logic is the risk of viewing the whole regional cooperation instrumentally for achieving something other than genuine regional cooperation. In this way, all of the regional cooperative initiatives might be in danger when countries of the region enter the EU and NATO. The second interpretation was a direct consequence of the first interpretation and was based on the mistrust and fear

---

[5] Proof of this can be found in the fact that the Stability Pact has always remained in the shadow of the SAP. The governments and citizens of SEE countries have been much less interested in regional cooperation than in European cooperation (see Hadžikadunić, 2005: 71-74).

of regional countries that regional cooperation might become like a "potential alternative framework, waiting room, or substitute to enlargement into broader European and Transatlantic institutions" (Clement, 1999: 71-72; also see Dwan, 1999: 4). This was also a fear for Turkey. Accordingly, it has been feared that performing well in regional cooperation might satisfy the West to the point that integration would be slowed down or even stopped. This line of thinking led one Serb diplomat to make the following informal statement at a meeting with an EU delegation: "we pretend to be cooperating, and they pretend to be serious about integrating us in the EU" (Delević, 2007: 31). But this has not been the only fear. The second fear shared by countries in the region is that regional cooperation might lead to the reconstitution of former Yugoslavia. These fears have been based on many relatively specific proposals to create some kind of new unions in the Western Balkans or more broadly. For example, Judah (2009) wrote an influential piece about the re-emergence of Yugosphere. Greek Foreign Minister proposed the formation of a Balkan Federation in 2003 (Voice of America, 2003). In his public address in Dubrovnik early this century, Zbigniew Brzezinski discussed the possibility of creating 'Balkania' based on the positive example of Scandinavia. The Macedonian think tank Analytica has even prepared a report on such a possibility. The report finds that the regional initiatives have not succeeded in creating a strong regional identity which is a precondition for normal regional cooperation (like elsewhere in Europe). Countries from the region have manipulated their regional identity to improve their chances of fast accession to the Euro-Atlantic integrations. Regional cooperation has consequently become more like a good cause and not something that brings real results. The report finishes with the claim that Balkania could be one of the results of regional cooperation, but that would only be possible in the context of the creation of a comprehensive European identity (Analytica, 2007).

It is therefore not surprising that some countries have suffered from the so-called escape syndrome. They have wanted to leave the region, they do not want to be connected to the region's problems and, interestingly, also not to the solutions for the region because this would link them again to the region. This syndrome has been most obvious in Slovenia and Croatia, those countries with the greatest chances of 'exiting' the region. For example, when establishing the

SECI, Slovenia and Croatia declined to participate initially due to such fears, but then the USA persuaded Slovenia to join, while Croatia opted for observer status (Bechev, 2011: 44). When establishing the SEDM, Slovenia initially chose to be an observer. The Drnovšek government was criticised for participating due to the risk of being dragged back into the Balkans (ibid.: 112-3). The third example is the Slovenian attitude to establishing the Stability Pact in 1999. Public opinion was predominantly against this since it perceived the initiative as an attempt to reconnect Slovenia to the economically underdeveloped, war-prone, war-torn and unpredictable region (see Prezelj, 2003). Similarly negative was the initial attitude of the Slovenian government, but it then adopted (partially under external pressure) a cooperative approach conditioned by a special interpretation in the founding act of the pact. There was a special footnote in this act providing that Slovenia is cooperating as part of a solution (a security exporter) in this pact and not as part of the problem (a security consumer). Later, Slovenia managed to overcome this syndrome and became an exemplary member of the Stability Pact.

The Problem of Artificiality and Superficiality of Regional Cooperation. In SEE, it has turned out that agreed or declared political statements do not necessarily lead to their implementation. The previously discussed lack of regional identity and distorted perception of regional cooperation has led to a small will to implement what was agreed on at some point in time. In this respect, a discrepancy has emerged between nominal and actual regional cooperation. Numerous meetings have taken place where representatives of the regional countries have listened disinterestedly, and then approved whatever was on the table or clearly avoided the acceptance of any obligations. The author's overview of the transcripts of some working groups operating within the SEDM show that state representatives were practically only talking for several years about what to do instead of actually doing something. One could call this virtual cooperation, but from a more bureaucratic and diplomatic perspective one could say that these people have been working productively because they are exchanging opinions. Radoman (2007) addressed this problem by adding that actually no sanctions are defined in the regional initiatives in the case of non-implementation. The whole concept of regional cooperation is not like an international regime, it is more

like the concept of cooperative security. In this concept, there are no sanctions and there are only rewards for cooperation. As a result, several initiatives have produced only a limited output. Bailes and Cottey (2006) called this phenomenon the artificiality and superficiality of regional cooperation. They found that rhetorical regionalism can be based on structures that are set up to distract attention from the region's true security problems, to make the region look good to other regions, or to glorify the country or countries taking the initiative. Alternatively, artificiality and superficiality may set in during a group's declining days as members turn up to its meetings only out of habit, sending representatives of an ever lower level or rank. However, they stress that even in such apparently hopeless cases it is hard to say that security will actually be harmed by the nominal existence of such initiatives. Rhetorical regionalism of this kind acknowledges that actors in general see cooperation as valuable. It makes sense to keep such creations as long as confidence needs to be built up and participants are learning to understand each other's priorities. In their view, the greater risk of misjudgement may come when artificial groups appear just good enough to confuse – and create a sense of false security about – the real internal and external challenges of the region.

The author's overview of the regional initiatives in SEE suggests that the more efficient regional initiatives are definitely those which conduct operational cooperation because they have to show something or much more than merely papers and statements. However, the above theory is persuasive enough to prevent us from condemning some less operational initiatives or their parts for being completely useless. In order to stress the importance of this problem, I will offer an ultimate example of a regional initiative that completely reflects the gap between the initial political intention and subsequent political and operational implementation: the Joint Declaration on the Fight against Organised Crime and Terrorism signed in Karađorđevo in 2006 between Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania and Albania. The declaration provided that the countries would jointly strengthen the legal basis to fight both threats, assure the compatibility of the legal basis with the EU *acquis*, improve their intelligence, police, security activities against both threats, improve capacities to prevent the financing of organised crime and terrorism etc. It was foreseen that political dialogue

and cooperation at the professional level (among experts) would take place annually (see Government of Serbia, 2006), however already by the next year most of the planned things had not been realised. During the phase of establishing this initiative, Romania expressed a concern that this initiative could mean a duplication with the existing SECI Center (presently SELEC). We can say that this initiative was not successful because in the next year only some countries identified experts for cooperation and absolutely nothing happened at the interstate level in the following years (Interview with Dragišič, 2008, repeated interview in 2013).

The Lack of a Coherent Approach to Regional Cooperation. Building an integrated region requires a coherent and coordinated approach. The coordination mantra has emerged in the past 10 years in many dimensions of security, but it is very easy to talk about it in comparison to implementing it. The typical problem is normally that there are too many actors with diverse interests that need to be coordinated. The coherence problem in the region has two dimensions beside the mentioned sheer number of actors: external and internal. The external dimension refers to: (1) external countries' individual agendas in the region that are also implemented through multilateral frameworks; and (2) international organisations' individual agendas are also implemented through various mechanisms. The internal dimension refers to individual agendas of regional countries and their limited ability to coordinate their ministries which conduct various aspects of regional cooperation. The SAP and MAP enable regional countries to have such individual agendas and this is allowed by the EU and NATO. The collateral damage has been regional cooperation because the countries that enter both or one of these organisations tend to forget about the region and active regional cooperation for a while. This remains the case until their security policy becomes a little more mature in terms of international cooperation. Then, they tend to become interested in regional cooperation again (the cases of Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria).

From 1995 until establishment of the RCC, we can say that there was only limited coordination among the initiatives in the region. In fact, occasionally elements of confusion, duplication and even competition among regional initiatives were detected. The Stability Pact tried to coordinate only a relatively small number of initiatives. Especial-

ly defence and security initiatives were mostly not included in this framework. The RCC has changed the situation significantly in the security and defence field. It even took regional initiatives from the heart of national security under its umbrella, such as the initiatives for cooperation among civilian intelligence agencies (SEECIC), military intelligence agencies (SEEMIC) and national agencies for the protection of classified information (SEENSA). However, it is unlikely that the RCC truly coordinates and completely streamlines these initiatives. According to Radev (2012), some regional initiatives are independent bodies and the RCC cannot actually direct them what to do (e.g. SEDM, US-Adriatic Charter, SEEC, RACVIAC etc.). It becomes even more interesting with the relationship between the RCC and the DPPI where, according to the MOU, the RCC manages the DPPI's finances. Figure 1 showed that some regional initiatives cooperate with each other, while others have no cooperation (which might be the first sign of potential duplication).

CONCLUSION

I have argued in this paper that South East Europe has not faced a lack of multilateral security and defence cooperation, but the problem of the efficiency of regional initiatives. After mapping the numerous regional security and defence initiatives, the paper then addressed several challenges that hinder efficiency in regional cooperation. Regional ownership is the right principle, but it has much more limited financial and human capacity than externally driven regional cooperation. The lack of a regional identity affects the regional cooperation and, in combination with the escape syndrome, it has turned the regional cooperation into a hostage of the perceivably much more important integration process. Consequently, some regional initiatives or parts of them have become artificial and superficial. Finally, despite many efforts to improve the coordination of regional cooperation, a coherent and streamlined approach to regional security and defence cooperation remains a goal to be attained in the future.

Three extreme future scenarios can be contemplated at this point in time. The first scenario is a worst case where one secession war triggers another and breaks most of the existing linkages. As a result,

most of the regional initiatives would become inoperative due to the absence of some members or even direct or indirect hostilities among some members. The second scenario refers to the continuation of the present situation with regional security and defence cooperation becoming a hostage of the integration process. In this scenario, the regional security and defence cooperation would suffer instantly as a country becomes a member of the EU and NATO, but the whole regional cooperation process would be artificially kept alive in order to control the remaining countries. It is questionable how long such a situation could be maintained. The third scenario refers to the best case of the creation of a regional network of networks independently of the integration process and related success. The RCC would become a politically and financially powerful regional body that would steer, monitor and streamline many cooperative processes. The regional initiatives would start cooperating among themselves as a supreme sign of the network awareness of the participating countries. The countries would share a regional identity, would not want to escape from the remaining countries and would see their future in the SEE and Western Balkans. Consequently, the regional initiatives would become more efficient, related duplications and any superficiality would be immediately identified and remedied. A probable scenario for the future of SEE is a combination of the above extreme potential future scenarios.

REFERENCES

Analytica, 2007. *Has regional cooperation led to the establishment of Balkania: Europe's southeastern dimension?* Skopje: Analytica: Available at: http://analyticamk.org/files/ReportNo7.pdf [Accessed 19 August 2011].

Bailes, A.J.K. and Cottey, A., 2006. Regional security cooperation in the early 21st Century. In: SIPRI Yearbook 2006: *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Stockholm: SIPRI, pp.197-223.

Bechev, D., 2011. *Constructing South East Europe: The politics of Balkan regional cooperation*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bildt, C., 2004. Between integration and disintegration. *NATO Review*, December, pp.10-13.

Bjurner, A., 1999. Reflections on subregionalism and wider European security. In: R. Dwan, ed. *Building Security in Europe's New Borderlands: Subregional Cooperation in the Wider Europe.* New York: EastWest Institute, pp.11-18.

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US State Department, 2011. *Adriatic Charter, fact sheet.* Washington: US State Department: Available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/112766.htm [Accessed 25 May 2013].

Buzan, B. and Weaver, O., 2004. *Regions and powers: the structure of international security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, B., 1991. *People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era.* London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Buzan, B., Waever, O., de Wilde, J., 1998. *Security: a new framework for analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996. *Unfinished peace: report of the International Commission on the Balkans.* Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Translated reprint, 1997, Zagreb: Hrvatski Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava.

Croatian Chairmanship-in-Office, 2007. *Joint statement of the ministers of foreign affairs of the SEECP.* Zagreb: Croatian Chairmanship-in-Office: Available at: http://www.stabilitypact.orgabout/SEECP%20MFAs%20JOINT%20 S T A T E M E N T % 2 0 2 % 2 0 M a r c h % 2 0 - % 2 0 f i n a l % 2 0 2 0 0 7 . p d f [Accessed 1 November 2009].

Dayioglu, I., 2004. *SEESIM 04 – Overview.* PP Presentation, Istanbul: MOD.

Delević, M., 2007. Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. *Challiot Paper*, July, (104), pp.1-106.

Deutch, K.W., 1957. *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

DPPI, 2013. *Official website.* Sarajevo: Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South Europe: Available at: www.dppi.info [Accessed 3 June 2013].

Dwan, R., 1999a. Introduction. In: R. Dwan, ed. *Building security in Europe's new borderlands: subregional cooperation in the wider Europe.* New York: EastWest Institute, pp.1-10.

Dwan, R., 1999b. Conclusion. In: R. Dwan, ed. *Building security in Europe's new borderlands: subregional cooperation in the wider Europe*. New York: EastWest Institute, pp.197-214.

Gazdag, F., Poti, L., Takacs, J. and Talas, P., 2007. Assessment of the security in the Western Balkans and a comparative analysis of the threat perception in the countries of the region, regional threat analysis. In: I. Gyarmati and D. Stančić, eds. Study on the assessment of regional security threats and challenges in the Western Balkans. Geneva: DCAF, pp.9-56.

Government of Serbia, 2006. *Joint declaration on fight against organized crime and terrorism*. Karađorđevo: Government of Serbia.

Grizold, A. and Prezelj, I., 2003. The interorganizational dimension of security cooperation: pre-Dayton crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: A. Grizold and I. Prezelj, eds. *Security and cooperation in Southeastern Europe*. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, pp.241-264.

Hadžikadunić, E., 2005. Od *Dejtona do Brisela*. Sarajevo: ACIPS.

Holsti, K.J., 1995. *International politics: a framework for analysis*. Seventh Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall International.

Hurrel, A., 1995. Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics. *Review of International Studies*, 21(4), pp.321-358.

Judah, T., 2009. *Yugoslavia is dead. Long live the Yugosphere*. LSEE Research Paper. London: European Institute London School of Economics: Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/LSEE/PDFs/Publications/Yugosphere.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2013].

Lake D.A. and Morgan P.M., 1997. The new regionalism in security affairs. In: D.A. Lake and P.M. Morgan, eds. *Regional orders: building security in a new world*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Miladinovski, J., 2007. *SEDM Process and Chairmanship of SEDM CC and PMSC of MPFSEE*, PP Presentation. Skopje: SEDM.

Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, 2012. *Adriatic Charter (A-5)*. Tirana: MOD: Available at: http://www.mod.gov.al/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1066:karta-e-adriatikut-a-5&catid=200:international-organisations&Itemid=591 [Accessed 25 May 2013].

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Macedonia, 2004. *The Charter of Partnership among Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and USA*. Skopje: MFA of the Republic of Macedonia.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, 2006. *The Balkan entente*. Bucharest: MFA: Available at: www.mae.ro/seecp/balkan_pact.html [Accessed 27 July 2007].

NATO, 2001. *Background note – SEECAP*. Brussels: NATO: Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-5E765862-CAF07829/natolive/news_18705.htm [Accessed 24 July 2007].

Nooy, W., Mrvar, A. and Batagelj, V. 2005. *Exploratory social network analysis with Pajek*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Prezelj, I. and Gaber M., 2005. Smuggling as a threat to national and international security: Slovenia and the Balkan route. *Athena Papers*, December, 5,pp.1-100.

Prezelj, I., 2003. Slovenian national security and Southeastern Europe: public opinion perspective. In: A. Grizold and I. Prezelj, eds. *Security and cooperation in Southeastern Europe*, Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, pp.133-152.

Prezelj, I., 2008. Counter-terrorism cooperation in South Eastern Europe: analysis of an example of SEDM Regional Initiative. B*ilten Slovenske vojske*, 10(3), pp.59-81.

Prezelj, I., 2010. The small arms and light weapons problem in the Western Balkans. In: W. Benedek, ed. *Transnational terrorism, organized crime and peace-building: human security in the Western Balkans*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.207-226.

Prezelj, I., Kopač, E., Svete, U., Grošelj, K., Juvan, J. and Kolak, A., 2007. *Varnost in sodelovanje v Srednji in Jugovzhodni Evropi, Raziskovalno poročilo*. Ljubljana: FDV.

RACVIAC, 2007. Strategy Paper. Rakitje: RACVIAC: Available at: http://www.racviac.org/downloads/documents/RACVIAC_Strategy_Paper.pdf [Accessed 3 June 2013].

RACVIAC, 2010. Official website. Zagreb: RACVIAC: Available at: http://www.racviac.org [Accessed 3 April 2010].

Radoman, J., 2007. Regional initiatives in South East Europe. *Western Balkans Security Observer*, 6, pp.18-24.

RAI, 2007. *Strategic document*. Sarajevo: RAI; Available at: http://www.rai-see.org/images/doc/31/Strategic_document.pdf [Accessed 3 June 2013].

RAI, 2013. *Official website*, Sarajevo: RAI: Available at: www.rai-see.org [Accessed 3 April 2010].

Regional Cooperation Council, 2010. *Strategy and work programme 2011-2013*. Sarajevo: RCC: Available at: http://www.rcc.int/admin/files/docs/reports/RCC-Strategy-and-Work-Programme-2011-13-text.pdf
[Accessed 2 April 2011].

Regional Cooperation Council, 2011. *Annual report of the secretary general of the regional cooperation council on regional cooperation in the SEE 2010-2011*. Sarajevo: RCC.

SECI Center, 1999. *Agreement on cooperation to prevent and combat trans-border crime*. Bucharest: SECI Center.

SEDM, 1999. *Second additional protocol to the agreement on the Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe*. Bucharest: SEDM: Available at: http://www.google.si/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=second%20additional%20protocol%20to%20the%20agreement%20on%20the%20multinational%20peace%20oforce%20south%20eastern%20europe%20.%20obucharest%3A%20sedm&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDIQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.seebrig.org%2Fpublications%2Finfo-booklet%2Fdoc_download%2F43-2nd-additional-protocol.html&ei=I-bnUbXgCsfMswaYhoHoBw&usg=AFQjCNE3CKf5KBGtpQDEFXMC_YYkROrUjg [Accessed 4 January 2008].

SEDM, 2004. *SEESIM 04, Draft national scenario for SEESIM*. PP presentation. Skopje: MOD.

SEDM, 2006a. *Employment of SEEBRIG in disaster relief operations*. Tirana: SEDM: Available at: www.mod.gov.al [Accessed 6 August 2007].

SEDM, 2006b. *SEESIM 2006*. Tirana: SEDM; Available at: www.mod.gov.al [Accessed 1 August 2007].

SEECAP, 2001a. *Declaration on the South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on regional security challenges and opportunities – SEECAP*. Budapest: SEECAP: Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_18886.htm?selectedLocale=en , [Accessed 24 July 2007].

SEECAP, 2001b. *South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on regional security challenges and opportunities – SEECAP*. Budapest: NATO: Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_18886.htm?selectedLocale=en [Accessed 24 July 2007].

SEECAP, 2002. SEECAP One year on. Reykjavik: SEECAP: Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-icl/d020515-seecap.htm [Accessed 24 July 2007].

SEECP, 2000. *Charter on good-neighborly relations, stability, security and cooperation in South-Eastern Europe*. Bucharest: SEECP: Available at: http://missions.gov.mk/getmedia/2b62b8fe-ad18-4feb-8e24-a2700a0460f1/Charter-on-good-neighbourly-relations,-stability,-security-and-cooperation-in-Southeastern-Europe.pdf.aspx/ [Accessed 1 September 2010].

SEEI, 2002. *NATO's SEEI – background information*. Brussels: NATO: Available at: www.nato.int/seei/home.htm [Accessed 24 July 2007].

SEESAC, 2007a. *SALW awareness support pack*. Belgrade: SEESAC.

SEESAC, 2007b. *SEESAC brief*. PowerPoint Presentation. Belgrade: SEESAC.

SEESAC, 2008. *SALW surveys. Belgrade*; SEESAC: Available at: www.seesac.org [Accessed 12 December 2007].

SELEC, 2009. *Convention of the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center*. Bucharest: SELEC: Available at: http://www.selec.org/docs/PDF/SELEC%20Convention%20%5Bsigned%20on%2009.12.2009%5D.pdf [Accessed 3 January 2012].

SELEC, 2013. *Official website*. Bucharest: SELEC: Available at: www.secicenter.org [Accessed 3 June 2013].

Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, 2009. *Official website*. Ljubljana: MORS: Available at: www.mors.si/seec [Accessed 2 April 2009].

Stability Pact for SEE, 2002. *Declaration on cooperation in disaster preparedness and prevention in South Eastern Europe*. Bucharest: Stability Pact for SEE: Available at: www.sos112.si/eng/tdocs/deklaracija_nivo_03.doc [Accessed 1 December 2006].

Stability Pact, 2008. *Conclusions of the final meeting of the regional table of the Stability Pact*. Sofia: Stability Pact: Available at: http://www.stabilitypact.org/rt/RT%20Sofia%20Conclusions%20Final.pdf [Accessed 25 July 2009].

Thompson, W.R., 1973. The regional subsystem: a conceptual explication and a propositional inventory. *International Studies Quarterly,* 17(1), pp.89-117.

Voice of America, 2003. *Balkanska federacija umjesto individualnog pristupa*. Voice of America, 6 January: Available at www.voanews.com [Accessed 14 October 2007].

Vukadinović, R., 2003. Security issues in Southeastern Europe, In: A. Grizold and I. Prezelj, eds. *Security and cooperation in Southeastern Europe*, Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, pp.49-68.

INTERVIEWS

Dragišić, Z. 2008. Regional Cooperation in SEE against Crime. Professor at the Faculty for Security Studies, Belgrade, Interviewed by the author, telephone interview Ljubljana/Belgrade. 1 April.

Ivan-Cucu, V. 2012. Regional Cooperation in the Field of JHA, Senior Expert on JHA, RCC, interviewed by the author, Sarajevo, 6 February.

Močnik, M. 2007. Regional Security Cooperation and SECI, Director of the SECI Center, interviewed by the author, Ljubljana, 22 November.

Radev, E. 2012. Regional Security Cooperation, Senior Expert on Security issues, RCC, interviewed by the author, Sarajevo, 3 February.

Vujičić, P. 2012. Regional Cooperation in the Field of JHA, Expert on JHA, RCC, interviewed by the author, Sarajevo, 6 February.

Vujović M. 2013. Dayton 4 and Regional Cooperation, Military Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to OSCE, interviewed by the author, Vienna, 18 June.

Soft and Smart Power in the Light of Leadership with Some Policy Remarks on the Western Balkans

Anja Fabiani[1]

....

ABSTRACT

The article is dealing with the changing role of the diplomacy in modern world, which is emerging into the "sociologisation" of international relations (result of globalization, of new space and time entities, of information revolution). In this new perspective, the soft / smart power diplomacy is gaining on the importance. The phrase was invented by the American theoretic Joseph S. Nye, but has been used – intentionally or "unconsciously" also in other countries. For us it is most important how soft / smart power is functioning in the aspects of world leaders. We presume that the personality as such is a holder of soft / smart power issues. The Western Balkans region was the testing field for soft power of the EU; unfortunately the test has failed. We do believe that it will not be the case for the future and that soft / smart power will gain on importance also in the fragile zones of the world. This is valid for the fragile time of economic crisis as well, whereby our attention should be focused on proper judgement. We believe that soft / smart power diplomacy is not a playground for superficial actors; it comprehends much more. It is still the most benign tool for achieving the political aims through attraction, based on deeper understanding.

KEY WORDS:
diplomacy, globalisation, soft power, smart power, leaders, Western Balkans.

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Anja Fabiani, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Postgraduate Studies, University of Nova Gorica; Bratov Učakar 76, 1000 Ljubljana, e-mail: anja.fabiani@gmail.com, ISSN1855-7694 © 2013 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)

Introduction[2]

Diplomacy in nowadays era is going through the fundamental changes what is nothing new to say. One cause for the changes is globalization with all its characteristics (for example, the decline of traditional national state, appraisal of other non-state actors), the other cause is technical revolution (especially new communication technologies). Both factors are interconnected. They drive diplomacy towards its social dependency, having in mind the preposition that each historical and social situation influences diplomacy in its own way, fostering it to adapt and develop tools and approaches for its further modus operandi. The increasing and interdependent complexity of globalisation is the main social actor for the current stream of change in diplomacy (Jazbec, 2012).

The changes are also challenges for the new valuation of old-fashioned theories, which are dealing with concepts such as power. Power has always been closely connected with politics. The common denominator between both is – relation. It is about relation how to affect others. Till now, there was a little questioning in political theory about how power relates to the notion of alternative forms of influence. Realistic doctrine of international relations has connected power to military force and economy (typical especially in the era of the Cold War). As the matter of fact, one can estimate it was about a primitive comprehension of power in the relation to others.

Nowadays we can see a kind of transformation in the conception of power to the distinction – soft power. The connection of words has been invented by theoretic Joseph S. Nye in the early nineties *(Bound to Lead)*. Later the phrase has gained the international recognition and kind of swing in the political and diplomatic practice. Nye has developed the idea of power in two categories: first is hard (connected with military and economy), the second is soft. The crucial difference between both is that the hard power is linked to coercion meanwhile soft is linked to acquirement, to cooperation. You convince someone that he / she wants to follow you. The essential kit is – attraction. Soft

---

[2] The article is part of the author's PhD thesis with the title »Soft Power Diplomacy in the Elements of the Analysis of World Leaders«. She analyses, compares and interprets 23 world leaders and 11 social-territorial entities (regions, countries and cities).

power consists of culture, political values and international relations (Nye 2004).

But Nye goes further. In the year 2004 he has transformed the phrase soft power to the "future of power" or "smart power". In this sense, the smart power means the combination of coercion and attraction. The central role has the context. The 21. Century cannot prolong the old thinking. Namely it is not most important who has the strongest military capacity. The policy processes are too diverse. Information revolution has speeded up the diffusion of power. New actors, who are not only state-related, have gained on influence. They are less and less controllable. The essential part of the new power is the higher degree of diffusion in the direction of non-state actors and to the cyber-space. Smart power is – the power for the future, as we speak about the combination of different sources to the successful strategies, rather than about the hegemony (Nye 2011).

Smart power has gained on importance in the time of Obama's administration and has been a part of a political vision of the Secretary of the State Hillary Clinton, as a heritage of liberal internationalism, which claims for the long lasting evolution of world's order with the responsibility of the main actors in the international system and with the stress on contextual intelligence *(ibid.)*. But of course this fact does not exclude other participants in the chess game, neither small countries nor non-state actors in rise.

As such, soft and / or smart power have been mentioned and also used in the China's or Russia's foreign policy, although criticised by Nye. Nye affirms that both states do not understand the underlying message. The essence of soft powers is namely in the – civil society. To combine culture, political values and foreign policy is not always an easy task. American soft power, upon Nye, is created by universities, foundations, Hollywood…, but most of all, by strong and critical civil society, not being under the pressure of censorship. China, for example, has difficulties with human rights and its declarations differ from acting. Therefore, the government and propaganda are not the main factors of soft power. Propaganda in nowadays world is rarely credible. Best propaganda is the one, which is invisible. Nevertheless, the development of soft power is not a *zero-sum* game. All parties gain if they attract each other. Crucial is to be self-critical and acts in compliance with words (Nye 2013).

We can state that the most important for soft power is to be part of international community in the largest scale. It is crucial to switch focus on new sociological role of diplomacy, which is interrelated to globalization. This is also a great opportunity for a new, more democratic society, where different players come to forefront and have their autonomous voice.

In case studies we have examined the most important world leaders and how they correlate to soft / smart power (to its implementation to policy processes and especially to diplomacy). The leadership is very important phenomenon and we believe personality is a milestone for soft power because of the power of decision making process, which is affected not only by external factors. We have examined also how soft / smart power has been introduced to the policy processes, which have occurred in Europe and especially in the Western Balkans. Our attention has been put on the processes of highly vulnerable region with its special demands regarding the use of hard, soft and smart power. Upon our opinion it is mostly important to re-focus from the old-fashioned concepts of diplomacy to the new reality, which is not only cultural, public, even economic, but seen in the broader aspect of soft / smart power (which comprehends different approaches not only disciplines). This new understanding, we believe, will ease also our path to more modern society which seems to be an urge.

Some Methodological Aspects

The aim of the article is to define notions, which in our space occur relatively rarely, especially when we speak about political applications. Diplomacy of soft / smart power is new idea, the doctrine born out of American theoretical background (although the diplomacy of soft / smart power existed during centuries, just not defined). It is in our interest to show the approaches of soft / smart power in the processes of world leaders, having considered some selected case studies. Our aim is also to look into the future and to find out how the world leaders should implement the ideas of soft / smart power when dealing with the dilemmas of nowadays society. Does the nowadays society face the challenge of infinite exploitation or will it choose cooperation and self-restriction? How can we predict if the chosen path would be right?

Following the above presented we will focus our attention to the fragile countries in the region of the Western Balkans, which has gone through profound concussion and is on a long way to recovery. Our approach will progress further onto the question if such troubled regions do need soft / smart power and to what extent or shape. We will try to see if the soft power concept could be placed within the frame of seeking solution for the region, which is currently – almost two decades after the end of the war – in a stalemate (particularly having in mind Bosnia as its nexus).

Our hypothesis lies in the presumption that diplomacy of soft / smart power is essential for the qualitative international relations in the future. For us, diplomacy of soft / smart power is the essential co-product of globalization and at the same time the theoretical doctrine. The other hypothesis lays in the presumption that world leaders have the crucial role by taking the decisions of soft / smart power. World leaders are for us the key for better understanding of soft / smart power. But does this – or could – also work in the Western Balkans? From the methodological point of view we will use presentation, case studies, analysis, comparison and synthesis, combined with the method of observation with one's own participation (Gilli, 1974)[3].

Case Studies: Angela Merkel, François Hollande, Hillary Clinton and Carl Bildt

Angela Merkel

Angela Dorothea Merkel is in many aspects the first lady of Germany. She is the first woman federal chancellor, first ex-DDR *(Deutsche Demokratische Republik)* citizenship chancellor, first woman leader of Germany since 1871 (formal unification of Germany) and the youngest chancellor after the Second World War. Far more. Many calls Merkel de facto leader of the EU.

Grown up in a family of the protestant priest in the former DDR she firstly joined left wing movement and afterwards, after the reunifica-

---

[3] The author was engaged in policy process during the period of the Slovene Presidency of the EU Council in the first part of 2008, including the preceding and succeeding period.

tion of Germany, joined the party *Demokratischer Aufbruch*, which later on emerged with CDU *(Christian-Democrat Party)*. She was the Helmut Kohl's favourite (called "Mädchen"), but later his strong opponent because of the financial affair of the politician Schäuble (whom Kohl protected). Merkel has started her serious political path as a minister of women and youth in the third Kohl's cabinet and was raised to the top of CDU in 2000. In her political line, Merkel has differentiated herself from the hard line of CDU, into the direction of free market and deregulation, but also into the direction of reform of working time for the support of more competitiveness, whereby she reflected the former "liberalism", what seems to be an urge in the time of economic crisis (Grass 2013).

At a glance, Merkel acts more strongly in the international arena because of her attitude to compromise and consensus (Conolly 2013). In the year 2007 Merkel was the president of European Council and the president of G8. She has held the major role by the Berlin Declaration and negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty. The second great success of German Presidency referred to clear climate and environmental (energetic) goals. Germany has the long tradition in the field of environment and the environmental politics as such was born in Germany *(German Green Party* in 1980). Merkel has become in 2007 the "new climate leader", a "new European Al-Gore" (Bals, 2013). Coming out from a profession of nature science (physicist) she was aware of a great importance of the proofs of basic science about the climate change and CO_2 emissions. With that orientation, she again avoided the hard line of CDU, which protects industrial giants with the lack of environmental feeling. Surprisingly, Merkel has cancelled her presence on Rio+20 Summit (June 2012) what especially regretted Achim Steiner, director of environmental programme at UNEP (by UNO)[4].

After all, this might be the sign of the necessarily adaptation to the time of economic crisis.

---

[4] More about it on Spiegel Online (2013) »Umwelt-Gipfel Rio+20: Bedauern bei Uno über Merkels Fernbleiben« [Environmental Summit Rio+20: Wondering by UNO about Merkel's Absence]. At: http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/umwelt-gipfel-rio-20-uno-bedauert-fernbleiben-von-merkel-a-839478.html (accessed on 10 July 2013).

The economic crisis has been also the constant issue in the talks between Germany and France. Both countries have built excellent relations when Merkel and Sarkozy were on power (nevertheless they belong to the same political orientation); less is to be expected in the era of Holland. The main difference is in the speed of political and financial reforms. Merkel advocates more control over the national budgets and prefers "quality". Upon the idea of Merkel, the European super-commissioner ("to-be") for economic and financial matters should have a *veto* over national budgets if they would violate the common rules. Meanwhile Holland wants to have as quickly as possible the supervision of the banking system. In short, Hollande wants the bank union, Merkel wants the budget union[5].

In the insecure times the difference between two big countries could lead to unpredictable results. Strong leaders, with the attitude for the common good may have the key role. Merkel as a woman, for whom is typical the ability to compromise, to be pragmatic, can use her skills of soft power, which comes to full effect in the international arena. Woman's touch should remain soft in its characteristics of power, no matter if it will be put in man's hands or not.

Angela Merkel won her third federal elections on 22 September 2013, which has a historical significance and her triumph could be compared to Kohl's once. What is the enigma of her power? Meanwhile the euro-zone crisis has damaged most of leaders, Merkel seems even more strong by it. Her mantra "nations must reform", with the doctrine on austerity and resistance to mutualisation of euro-zone debt, leads Germany to superficial position. Germany is very well aware of its independence on export, that's why no other political choice would put into question the general (international) economic strategy. But being in the position to be the most powerful has the obstacle in itself and for sure it is mostly important to hide the greatness. Merkel, in its image of a "mother", being very genuine, not artificial and – upon her modest upbringing – also a hidden figure, is not just typical for the German spirit. She is also typical for the German situation – Germany in all its complexity as a huge country, prefers to behave like a small one.

---

[5] More about it on Times Online (2013) »Začetek vrha EU v znamenju razlik med Francijo in Nemčijo«, [The Begin of EU Summit in the Sign of Differences between France and Germany]. At: http://www.times.si/svet/vrh-eu-veliko-idej-in-malo-odlocitev--585b9ccc0e-6eb7a615b7.html (accessed on 10 July 2013).

In this assumption maybe lies the answer why Merkel is so extremely popular and what is the source of her attraction, of her soft power[6].

François Hollande

As the Sarkozy's follower, the new French President has therefore an uneasy task to do. First, he has overtaken his mandate in the middle of crisis. Secondly, after the populist Sarkozy (who was extroverted, charismatic, sometimes exaggerating) he seems to be a quiet and modest politician.

Sarkozy was a very special politician – as Merkel was in many aspects first in Germany, he was in many aspects first in France. He was the first president, born after the World War II. He was the first "Gaullist" president who never served directly under de Gaulle. And – most important – he was the first president with non-French roots (his father was a Hungarian Jew).
Interesting enough – Sarkozy had a strong background in the intellectuals, who describe themselves as the new French philosophers ("nouveaux philosophes"). They are strongly against the liberalism and advocate the right wing movements. They have interrupted the French tradition of left wing intellectuals. Euro-nihilism for them should be regarded as the fail of "social market economy" (which results finally also to first French veto on European constitution).

As such, they are the soft power advocates of the regime on French way –in their freedom of interpretation and in the nexus of the established thinking. They have been supportive to Sarkozy's image; Holland in this sense lacks the "typical French dimensions". After all, Holland has gained the nickname "Mr. Unpopular". He was unable to fulfil the socialistic promises in the times of crisis (Von Rohr 2013).

The same unpopularity has been seen also in the relations between France and Russia, especially because of Holland's sharp criticism of Syrian regime of Bashir al Asad. There could not be more discrepancy between Russia and France as it was in the case of Syria. The relationship between Paris and Moscow has literally come to a more

---

[6] More about it: Mayer, Catherine (2013) »Angela Merkel's unfinished Business«, Time, 182, 13, 18 – 23.

or less frozen state when Hollande came to power. As a curiosity we can add that some days before Holland's visit to Moscow, a famous French actor Gerard Depardieu has taken the Russian citizenship, because of Holland's decision to put 75% tax on French billionaires. We could say, the soft power (as a mean for attraction) is in this case working in opposite direction (Frelih 2013). Should it be also possible to speak of the slight end of the strong and powerful axis Berlin – Paris, due to Holland's accusations of double standards of Germany? Upon his opinion, Germany demands a lot from Europe, but aside this demands, protects its own national interests. Merkel, who has always pledged for "less government", upon Holland's opinion is now a burden for European competitiveness. However, it is a fact that since the Holland has become the president, the relationship between the two countries has steadily worsened[7].

Let put aside the question, if this aspect of soft power is connected with inter-personal chemistry or political orientation; the continent is in a phase where every deviation from the common path could be severe. However, soft power is the new-born out of the American doctrine, invented by Nye. But more than just this – if we translate the word *power* to Slovene language, it has the female noun form (the same is for example in German). Does it mean that power indeed is female? Could we play with words and predict the power will have in future other role as now, because it will be soft and therefore more than ever rooted into the female domain? Whose politics and diplomacy can be a proven standard to such stance? Is the power ability to influence or to dominate? This question could lead us to major revelations in our investigation. Therefore, we can figuratively connect soft / smart power to the conception of alternative way of thinking to power.

Hillary Clinton

Probably in the history of the United States about no other female politician so many books have been written as it is in the case of Hillary Clinton. Besides, there are lots of articles, which are in "anti-

---

[7] More about it on (2013) Spiegel Online (2013) Pararell Universes in Paris and Berlin: is the Franco – German Axis kaput? At:http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/crisis-of-confidence-develops-between-merkel-and-hollande-a-862644.html (accessed on 11 July 2013).

Clinton" spirit (bearing in mind the both spouses Clinton). Mostly, Hillary has been regarded either in positive or in negative way; the middle position seems somehow out of the perception. For sure Hillary is highly ambitious woman, who has spent over 33 billion USD for her election campaign, as if she would fight on life or death. But especially the national security is always the sharpest test for democrats, because they lean rather on more soft issues of internal policy matters. This was also the case by Hillary (children care, health, education…) (Tumulty 2013). By this, Hillary already sticks to area of soft power domain.

After the years of liberal feminism Hillary was confronted with the outburst of sexism (for example Facebook sites with sexual connotations when having Hillary as a figure (Fortini 2013). On the other hand, younger female voters have been liberated from the old feminist battle of their mothers and have not elected Hillary only because she is a woman (Kantor 2013). What voters do not recognise by Hillary is that she is a person of expressive personal transformation. Hillary is namely the woman, who has supported his husband's career in the most delicate moment (affair Lewinski). This means she has overcome her own stereotype (feminism), which was not the case by her voters (Hit, 2013). Hillary has had a double difficult task. On one hand, she had to overcome her female role in the relationship to her husband. On the other, she had to overcome her own ego, after she has given up the hope to be the president of the United States and accepted the offer to be the Secretary of the State.

How has Hillary implemented the idea of soft / smart power?

Before Barack Obama became the president of the United States, Hillary had a hearing before the senate committee (January 13, 2009). This appearance was very important for the understanding the future indicators of American foreign policy. Hillary stated that it is the time for America to recover the image in the world. America itself cannot solve the world problems, but neither the other world without America could do it. For the United States therefore it is crucial to have more partners and fewer enemies. For this intention, Hillary for the first time has used the phrase "smart power". Among others, this means that States should lean on combination of different

paths (military, political, juridical, and cultural) to solve particular problems. But military force is only the utmost exit. Further strategic orientations of Hillary have been, besides "cooperation and dialog", also transfer of help programs from *Pentagon to State Department*. By that act, Clinton literally connected the concept of security with the role of diplomacy and with the soft approach (for example also with the fight against the corruption in the problematic regions). The main topics have become: defence, diplomacy and development (Dombey 2013).

Besides this, Clinton gives much attention to the sharing of the competences in the power on military and on civil, whereby more stress have been given to the civil part. The striving has gone in the direction of strengthening USAID *(U.S. Agency for International Development)*. For this purpose 1.108 new administrators have been employed, for the departments all over the world, to support American values and interests. USAID therefore has become one of the best organizations for development, for stimulation of sustainable development and democratic governance. But Clinton did more. She wanted to work on three words: rethink, reform, recalibrate. Upon the pattern of the Department of Defence she has introduced the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, with the aim for better efficiency of American diplomatic and development doctrine in the world. It was far more than just review. It was about the definition how to coordinate diplomacy and development, their complementarities (looking back to past and on to future). Global challenges are namely the mixture of diplomacy and development and are part of more holistic approach to the civil power (this is the new notion in the context of power). The inter-connected work of *State Department* and USAID is therefore effective on three domains: modernization and coordination of diplomacy in the American state agencies, with assurance of sustainable development; creation of strong link between diplomacy and development; better coordination between partners in the military, in conflict zones and problematic states (Clinton 2013).

Adjustment, harmony, linking… What lies behind smart power? The connection of diplomatic and military means goes into the direction of liberal internationalism of Bill Clinton (like globalization, multilateralism, humanitarian intervention, and the most important role of USA in the world market economy). It is a fact that the world still

functions on the principle of billiard balls (dependency between actors). Fukuyama is right in this sense – liberalism is the only path to modernity. But neither liberal internationalists nor neoconservatives – regarded from the point of view of American superiority – are really different. Could Obama's policy therefore get trapped into the same noose as the politics of Carter after Vietnam? With highly sounded rhetoric? Without practical power? The criticism of Obama gets right in this line (his policy should be too "messianic"). Nevertheless, Obama during his first term really represented the change, the decline from exclusively "white America". It is not possible to speak about the continuation, because the wish to break with the past is real and not just declarative (Keller 2009, 98-101).

Hillary is also a symbol – symbol of woman's independence and autonomy. She was the first woman candidate to take over the White House. She overcame the affair of her husband, which has made her even stronger. Could we put it: the power in the 21st Century has indeed woman's sex? But Hillary Clinton has not decided to accompany Obama in his second mandate. In her final speech (Washington, *Council on Foreign Relations*, 31 January 2013) she again stressed out the necessity of the use of smart power, but also of "creative solutions" in the uncertain times for the American nation. In the dangerous and complicated world, the American diplomacy is changing. Therefore United States have to assume the leading role for structuring a new, more modern architecture, being able to govern the international challenges. The main role will play: science and technology, human rights and the gender equality (Madison, 2013).

We could see, how literally has Hillary Clinton striven to be in step with the theoretical approach of smart power. If smart (soft) power is the new-born child of American doctrine, Hillary is her wet nurse. She deeply understood the meaning of smart power and has tried to combine different policies into a renewed discipline of diplomacy, which could become a leading source for others.

This also differs from the situation in Europe. Meanwhile Europe has a strong capacity of soft / smart power in the field of human rights; it has never deliberately used them in the field of international politics (as a doctrine). For sure most important European leaders, throughout the history, have been stacked on the specific characteristics of

soft power, but the awareness how important soft / smart power is for the future of the continent and also for the world peace was never consciousness. Soft / smart powers are not innocent means, being free from any kind of manipulation. But the comparison with the sister hard power shows us, how much more damage has been done through the last one. This is especially important for the Europe; because it is a fragile continent, gone through major bloody wars in the history and even now, in the most civilised phase, under the consideration of its future. Europe should be in the future more aware of what is the profound meaning of soft / smart power.

Carl Bildt

As a distinguished Swedish politician, he has a long career in the field of foreign policy. He has been serving as a minister for foreign affairs since 2006. He has become especially known because of his role on the Western Balkan.

Bildt is in many aspects controversial. He is known for his support of the war in Iraq in the year 2003, which seems to be a position fallen into disuse. On the other hand, he goes in a line with the modern technologies, using internet for the main communication. In the year 1994 he was the first politician to use electronic wish-card (sent to Bill Clinton). He has also established "Swedish Embassy" on the network *Second Life*. Bildt has been very much criticised in several countries and also neglected as a politician because of his remarks towards several governments. He said, for example, that the former President of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, was guilty of war crimes[8]. Bildt's role on the Western Balkan is historical. He was European Union Special Envoy to former Yugoslavia from June 1995, co-chairman of Dayton Peace Conference in November 1995 and the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from December 1995 to June 1997, immediately after the Bosnian war. From 1999 to 2001 he served as the United Nation's Special Envoy for the Balkans.

---

[8] However, in the year 2007 he has been visiting Croatia, whereby both ministers (Bildt and Jandroković) have estimated the relationship between the two countries as good and with the strong support of Sweden for Croatian accession to the EU.

Bildt was especially criticised for his role as mediator in the Bosnian war. In that time he was also a prime minister of Sweden. He was accused of not making a sharp judgement for ethnic cleansing and genocide committed by Bosnian Serbs. He actually opposed any military intervention. Most sensitive was his indifference for the massacre in Srebrenica. Bildt was accused of ignoring Serbian war crimes (Attila, 2013). Also during years after the end of the Yugoslavia war Bildt updates his importance in the region. He was the first foreign minister who visited Kosovo after the declaration of independence (8 March 2008), where he held talks with Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi and President Fatmir Sejdiu as well as with representatives of UNMIK and the EU[9].

Playing active role both as politician and as a person with great attitude to Western Balkan, we could estimate Bildt's importance for Western Balkan will not decrease soon. He is bound to the difficulties in this troubled part of the world and it seems that in the future his words will have at least advisory weight. To understand and to see more closely the politics of Bildt and his orientation towards the soft / smart power issues seems to be crucial.

Might it be possible to compare Bildt's attitude on Western Balkan with his observations on soft power? Before Bildt assumed office of the foreign minister, he had written an article on soft power. He expressed an interesting thought about soft power and the EU. Upon his opinion is clear that United States is losing on hard power. But not less obvious is that the EU is losing on – soft power. Europe has fallen asleep due to her success story and therefore lost strategic orientation, but also a faith in itself. Politicians in EU the have become defensive and self-oriented. This is connected with insufficient economic reforms (how visionary Bildt was at that time!). Will the EU succeed with the third phase of globalization? Upon Bildt's opinion this is connected with the efficient enlargement process. In this sense, the decline of soft power in the EU could represent a potential threat, which could lead to unstable situation (especially for the EU's neighbourhood). The EU, when denouncing on soft power and clos-

---

[9] More about it on (2013) Spiegel Online (2013) Pararell Universes in Paris and Berlin: is the Franco – German Axis kaput? At:http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/crisis-of-confidence-develops-between-merkel-and-hollande-a-862644.html (accessed on 11 July 2013).

ing the door for the Balkans and Turkey, could impose very negative consequences for different forces inside the Muslim countries. The EU's averting on soft power has become the most urgent problem. We should ask ourselves again about the security of the EU (Bildt 2013).

It is interesting, how Bildt is connecting soft power with his main focus – the Western Balkans. This lead us to very specific observation, namely, how the political attitude of a leader influences his position towards the doctrine of soft power. We could also assume that personal characteristics, which bring a leader to act in a specific way, also influence the soft power orientation. Would it be possible for our modest knowledge to presuppose how Bildt's soft and for that reason hardly criticised position in the frame of the Western Balkan's politics – affects also his thoughts on soft power? Nevertheless Bildt is among very rare politics who has been occupied with soft power, which gives us the reason to believe in this case the both directions (towards Western Balkan and towards soft power) are not apart from each other.

This brief overview of four outstanding world politicians within the concept of a soft power and the comparison of them, which particularly referred to the Western Balkans, should serve as a background for more detailed look at the discussed region. We have chosen two male and two female leaders (all from different political and conceptual environments) on purpose to initially show the complex set of relations (among them, towards the use of soft power ant towards the region discussed).

Europe, Western Balkan and Soft / Smart Power

The very fact is that bloody fall of Yugoslavia and European reactions afterwards have been the most evident proof of how soft power is / is not functioning. For the first time, Europe as a whole has been put on trial whether it should intervene in more determined way or whether wait and see how the diplomatic skills will furthermore be able to manage the outrageous events. Put it simply – whether to bear in mind that soft power will succeed or not. Soft power has got in the case of Yugoslavia a dangerous dimension, kind of laboratory value,

for the results were completely unclear. We presume that all actions have been led without a clear consciousness of soft power. The intention was deeply rooted in the European cultural history, in its inherited values (after being the causing continent of two world wars). So far, we can only see how soft power has or has not worked, by which we maybe put into question "the unconsciousness" itself. As Yugoslavia disintegrated into savagery the Europeans at first could not agree on a diagnosis and then refused to do more than just monitor and barrier forces. After Dayton on the one hand, the EU as a whole accepted a responsibility for securing peace in Bosnia through the administration of what became a virtual protectorate. On the other hand, UK and France concluded that they need more support from their European partners in such cases, especially in the form of a rapid reaction force, which would not depend on Washington. Was this claim a beginning of hard power for the EU?

But maybe one of the answers lies in the historical background of the nations of the Western Balkans, which has been too long overseen by the other more out striking facts. Namely, the country of ex-Yugoslavia has been for a long time influenced by the cult of personality, by the commander and president Tito[10]. His figure is often described in the context of "benevolent dictatorship" which means absolute political power of political leader, but with some concessions of democratic decisions making processes. Benevolent dictator is the contradiction in itself; it is such contradiction as to speak about power in the relation of soft. But as we have shown it is more than a doctrine, it is a political practice, often vivid by the most important bearers of power, the individuals themselves. As such, it is inherent that they are all the time in the process of getting out from the trap of absolute to relative power, from hard to soft – anything which gives the expression doubled meaning and shift to democratisation, pluralisation or civilisation. The more than 45 years of history with the leader Tito was crucial for the nations on the area of ex-Yugoslavia.

In their sub-consciousness of deeper political mind they became used on paternal figure of dictator, yet this dictatorship has not influenced (especially in the last years) their lives in the way of feel-

---

[10] For the study of his life and principles comp. Pirjevec, 2011.

ing uttermost un-free. Therefore, the confusion after Tito's dead was doubled. First – can we live without a dictator? Second – can we live without a benevolent dictator? The first question was tragically answered; with the appraisal of the new fake Titos, new little dictators who caused the tragedy and war. The second question was never rightly answered. It is still in the mind of folk that benevolent dictatorship is not such a contradiction as one might have been presumed; nevertheless the soft over power is always a good outcome of the reality, not being transformed, but at least in the state of *epiteton ornans*. What we wanted to point out is that the answer lies in the history of the nations itself and is less related to the look of others. And if the look of others has to be oriented towards the soft power, the Western Balkans is a scholar case of how personality (cult) has been influencing the item itself. Moreover, the personality gains the same contradiction in itself, when we compare "soft power" to benevolent dictatorship. History is not something to be challenged again; therefore it is not our main orientation for policy hints. But for sure, deeper understanding without the knowledge of history is not possible. Only by this we could orient towards future.

For the future, at least in the EU context, it will make no particular sense to distinguish between hard and soft power, because the EU has gained confidence over the use of the coercive instruments (threats of economic sanctions) but has been also acquiring an aspect of the traditional military power. What has to be done is the EU "soft power strategy". If soft power as a concept can add value for the European foreign policy – lies not in an outmoded distinction between "civilian" and military power, but in a need for all actors in the international system, including the United States and other powerful nation-states, to engage more in the arts of negotiation and linkage politics. That means understanding the interplay between domestic populations and governments, whether their own or others'. In this complex phase of international politics, which is requiring lots of sophistication (more than in the light of realistic doctrine) the EU is a leader. It has a power of language and of branding, and is better to avoid the association with soft power, which understates the capacity for coercive behaviour present even in the EU's economic instruments. Europeans have certainly shown what can be done with this kind of approach – and, sadly, what cannot (Hill 2010: 182-198).

By that suggestion we have come to what we have described as smart power. We could easily see how soft power, through the demands of political practice, mingles with the smart power issues. It is not about the soft power in its rudimental phase; it is about the refined combination of many actors in the interplay of different situations, which have to be adopted from case to case.

The future of the Western Balkans is still uncertain. The EU has many times confirmed its readiness to accept new states, but specified that future admission will be granted on a country-by-country basis and the fulfilment of specific criteria for admission will be monitored more closely. New lines of division between "candidates" and "potential candidates" have been reinforced. Today the Balkans are best understood as a transitional concept, something not yet Europe, or not quite European, but on its way to European integration. Best the phenomenon is described by the title of Danis Tanović's remarkable 2002 film "No man's land". Although no large-scale conflict has broken out since 1999, this "no man's land" remains politically unstable.

The need for an active EU involvement in transforming the conflict dynamics in these states is often invoked, but the impact of the EU's policies remains unclear. The process of European integration faces limits or obstacles. European institutions still do not possess military capacity to address a major crisis when breaking out. There are many European-led initiatives and different views of the EU member states (also on such crucial issue as enlargement). The process of integration is top-down, despite the stated commitment to rely on local institutions and civil society. The situation cannot be overcome without the reform of European institutions. It calls for the further development of European military capabilities and a re-definition of Europe's self-understanding as a primarily civilian power. Waiting on these actions, Europe with its soft power could do its uttermost to support domestic reforms in the Western Balkans and to mobilise civil society groups. The good solution seems also to involve political leaders in the Western Balkans by developing meaningful partnership with them. The experience with European integration has demonstrated that political leaders respond positively to the incentives provided by tangible rewards. Simple measures such as the relaxation of the visa regime could contribute much in increasing the pro-European

outlook for the marginalized population of the Western Balkan (Belloni 2013).

Could we therefore state that soft power is still crucial for the EU's actions in the area of the Western Balkans (if we hope that history in its terrible executions will not repeat)? Is the soft power in this area more than ever depended on the regional leaders? Could they learn from the above discussed examples? Are they willing and capable to? Do the regional leaders demand special attention due to the vulnerability of their states – the attention which could be performed by facilities regarding the approach to the EU? Is this "case by case" situation again – the proof of development into the smart power direction?

All of those statements seem to be valid. We could also have more ambitious and provocative question. Being in the time of severe economic crisis often it is said that political stability of the country will prevent the possible sanctions of the EU and troika. Now let's see the problem vice versa, from different angle. If the countries are imposed by the economic restrictions – how could we not presume the political instability will take place, regarding especially the region of the Western Balkans?

The logic is inherent in decisions, which do not contradict each other, otherwise soft / smart power is just a camouflage for empty essence. Also Slovenia is not excluded from such point of view, being on the very edge of this region.

Crisis

Putting aside the conflict zone of the Western Balkans, we can estimate that the current economic / financial crisis is even more urgent. We live in a highly demanding and critical time. We still do not know what will happen next. The war in Yugoslavia was cruel but regional; nowadays nobody could exclude from the possible existential threats (no matter if the consequences will not be grave).

In June 2013 some European leaders whom we have analysed have presumed that crisis is over. Some arguments for such belief were

the lower unemployment rate in Spain, but we are dealing with small numbers (for example 265 new jobs compared with 5 billions still unemployed) (Ewing 2013). Hollande courageously stressed out that crisis in euro zone is over. His comment has emerged after the thousands had conquered European streets, protesting against troika and their measures. The unemployment in Euro zone has reached the peak. Meanwhile, Merkel has been repeating that the countries of the EU should follow the German example and restrict the budget and reform the labour market (Neate 2013).

Could we be so sure that in the future the optimistic French suggestions will not be in contradiction with reality? Or that the German persistence on the conservative way of solving the problems will not be furthermore exposed to deeper criticism?

Future is out to see what will happen; but we could orientate on lessons learned from soft / smart power issues. The current crisis might well be a new frame for understanding and implementing the soft / hard power approach and its transition in progress. The western Balkans region is an illustrative example within this regard. It's comprised of societies, which still to much of an extent go through the post-conflict recovery, during which means of soft power gain on importance and momentum (like civil society, media in public)[11]. Particularly the stalemate in Bosnia shows the importance of soft power understanding and approach. The top of the political elite in this country lacks this awareness and its constant application in daily politics.

CONCLUSION

We have seen how diplomacy of soft / smart power is exceeding the doctrine of American foreign policy. It is more than just theoretical approach, being implemented into the Obama's administration.

Diplomacy of soft / smart power, even if (unconsciously) old as the diplomacy itself, is nowadays connected with the sociology of diplo-

---

[11] For more on this compare Jazbec, 2005.

macy, of globalization (space re-construction, with cyber entities and minimalization of physical relations). Besides this, postmodernism presumes the pleonasm of policy processes (also fictive). Thus, in this new and complex reality the diplomacy of soft / smart power will have a significant role in the international relations. Soft power, with main characteristic – attraction – has three milestones: culture, political values and foreign policy. The civil society is vital for all factors.

How do the world leaders in this new picture of the world correlate to soft / smart power?

The use of soft / smart power has been intentionally invited and "properly" used only in the United States. Other countries – by which we especially bear in mind the EU member states – are using it elementally and with no outstanding aim. Sometimes soft / smart power is inter-connected with personal chemistry between politicians or with belonging to the same political orientations. In the times of crisis, it has been deeply hindered, which is not a good sign. Soft / smart power in the region of the Western Balkans, when connected to the EU politics, could be observed as a failure in the case of the war in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, if we look into the future, it is still one of the best tools for preventing the possible conflicts to come. This even more, having in mind the political and policy stalemate in the Western Balkans as well as the region's vast and historically proven potentials (particularly the ability to survive). And for no reason it should be used as the measure for punishment when fragile countries are not able to compete in the deadly marathon of who will win and who will lose.

Soft / smart power is about attraction. It is not about competition and not about maintaining the first position in the world. In the world, where actors are connected, inter-depended and where the whole is worth as much as every single point in the net. Attraction is namely not a vain phrase for something superficial; it is about the deeper emotional intelligence and the compassion. It influences decisively the creation of loose, but strong networks, which help to overcome crisis and stalemates, but only with a personal input of leaders. If they are capable of interaction, of communicating, having in mind their political, cultural and historical background as a means of advancing

relations, solutions are within the reach. This is in particular important in the post-war situations, when post-conflict recovery of societies is going on. The more this phase advances from the war situation, the more soft power approach is important and necessary.

In this – and maybe only in this – regard we highly appreciate the involvement of persons (world leaders) in the world's politics and in the context of soft / smart power. Some of them, as we have tried to show, demonstrated also in the Western Balkans, where the historical tradition of strong leaders still echoes in the appearance and minds of current leaders.

REFERENCES

Attila, Marko (2013) Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt denies over half the Srebrenica massacre. At: http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2009/07/21/swedish-foreign-minister-carl-bildt-denies-over-half-the-srebrenica-massacre/(accessed on 13 July 2013).

Bals, Christoph (2013) Angela Merkel – the new climate leader.At:http://www.climateark.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=68988 (accessed on 10 July 2013).

Belloni, Roberto (2013) European Integration and the Western Balkans: Lessons, Prospects and Limits. At: http://www4.lu.se/upload/LUPDF/Samhallsvetenskap/Just_and_Durable_Peace/Roberto Belloni.pdf (accessed on 13 July 2013).

Bildt, Carl. (2013) The Decline of Soft and Hard Power. At: http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/the-decline-of-hard-and-soft-power/ (accessed on 13 July 2013).

Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2013) Leading through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development. At: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66799/hillary-rodham-clinton/leading-through-civilian-power (accessed on 12 July 2013).

Conolly, Kate (2013) Merkel's modest rise to Summit. At: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/13/g8.germany (accessed on 10 July 2013).

Dombey, Daniel (2013) Clinton hails new era on diplomacy. At:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1dd5e25e-e8b3-11dd-a4d0-0000779fd2ac.html (accessed on 12 July 2013).

Ewing, Jack (2013) Down So Long, It Looks Like Up to the Euro Zone. At: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/business/economy/euro-zone-leaders-hail-even-weak-economic-news.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed on 14 July 2013).

Fortini, Amanda (2013) The Feminist Reawakening. At: http://nymag.com/news/features/46011/ (accessed on 12 July 2013).

Frelih, Polona (2013) »Françoise Hollande v Moskvi: doma ni priljubljen, v Rusiji pa še manj« [Françoise Hollande at Moscow: not popular at home, even less in Russia]. At: http://www.delo.si/novice/svet/francois-hollande-v-moskvi-doma-ni-priljubljen-v-rusiji-pa-se-manj.html (accessed on 11 July 2013).

Gilli, Gian, Antonio (1974) Kako se istražuje: vodić u društvenim istraživanjima. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.

Government Offices of Sweden (2013) Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt to visit Kosovo and Macedonia. At: http://www.government.se/sb/d/10358/a/100096 (accessed on 13 July 2013).

Grass, Günther (2013) We must not be blackmailed by Merkel's neoliberal Gang. At: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/16/germany.comment (accessed on 10 July 2013).

Hill, Christopher (2010): Cheques and balances: the European Union's soft power strategy. In Cox, Michael, Parmar, Inderjeet (eds.): Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 182-198. Oxon, New York: Routledge.

Hit, Jack (2013) Harpy, Hero, Heretic: Hillary. At: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2007/01/harpy-hero-heretic-hillary (accessed on 12 July 2013).

Jazbec, Milan (2005) Vloga, organiziranost in delovanje OZN, Nata, EU in OVSE pri izvajanju operacij v podporo miru. In: Pipenbaher, Bojan (Ed.). Vključevanje civilnih zmogljivosti v operacije v podporo miru. Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo. Pp. 108-117.

Jazbec, Milan (2012) Uvodna študija: Sociologija diplomacije – od ideje do poskusa konceptualizacije. In: Jazbec, Milan (Ed.) Sociologija diplomacije. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Pp. 11 – 43.

Kantor, Jodi (2013) Women's Support for Clinton Rises in Wake of Perceived Sexism. At: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/us/politics/10women.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed on 12. July 2013).

Keller, Patrick (2009) »Die Smart-Power-Präsidentschäft« [The Smart-Power presidency]. Internationale Politik 2728: 98-101.

Madison, Lucy (2013) In farewell speech, Clinton calls for "smart power" on global stage. At: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57566994/in-farewell-speech-clinton-calls-for-smart-power-on-global-stage/ (accessed on 12 July 2013).

Mayer, Catherine (2013) »Angela Merkel's unfinished Business«, Time, 182, 13, 18 – 23.

Neate, Rupert (2013) Françoise Hollande: the Eurozone Crisis is over. At: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/business/economy/euro-zone-leaders-hail-even-weak-economic-news.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed on 14 July 2013).

Nye, Joseph S. (2004) Soft Power. New York: Public Affairs.

Nye, Joseph S. (2011) Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs.

Nye, Joseph S. (2013) What China and Russia don't get about Soft Power. At: http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/ (accessed on 9 July 2013).

Pirjevec, Jože (2011) Tito in tovariši. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga.

Spiegel Online (2013) Pararell Universes in Paris and Berlin: is the Franco – German Axis kaput? At: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/crisis-of-confidence-develops-between-merkel-and-hollande-a-862644.html (accessed on 11 July 2013).

Spiegel Online (2013): »Umwelt-Gipfel Rio+20: Bedauern bei Uno über Merkels Fernbleiben« [Environmental Summit Rio+20: Wondering by UNO about Merkel's Absence]. At: http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/umwelt-gipfel-rio-20-uno-bedauert-fernbleiben-von-merkel-a-839478.html (accessed on 10 July 2013).

Times Online (2013) »Začetek vrha EU v znamenju razlik med Francijo in Nemčijo«, [The Begin of EU Summit in the Sign of Differences between France and Germany]. At: http://www.times.si/svet/vrh-eu-veliko-idej-in-malo-odlocitev--585b9cccoe-6eb7a615b7.html (accessed on 10 July 2013).

Tumulty, Karen (2013) Hillary: Love Her, hate Her. At: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1229103,00.html (accessed on 12 July 2013).

Von Rohr, Mathieu (2013) Monsieur Unpopular: Hollande's Spectacular Fall from Grace. At: http://beforeitsnews.com/economy/2013/03/monsieur-unpopular-hollandes-spectacular-fall-from-grace-2499854.html (accessed on 11 July 2013).

The Young Generation and Labor Market in Albania

Romina Radonshiqi, Sanie Doda[1]

……………………………………………………………………………………..

ABSTRACT

This paper tries to explain the importance of participation of young people in the labor market, and tries to argue why this is a very important issue, not only in the global context, but especially for our country. The changes in the economic system during the transitional period are also reflected in each sector's employment composition. Albania is considered as one of the nations that suffered most severely from the consequences of transition and, in comparison with its neighbors, it endured some of the gravest blows to youth employment. Each country must initiate policies that promote youth employment. Unemployment, under-employment and informal work of youth have a high cost for the country. Informal employment, and its specific repercussions for the youth demographic, is not a phenomenon restricted only to Albania. Young people encounter more employment obstacles than adults because, in most cases, they possess less knowledge about their rights as employees and, therefore, fall victim to the shortage of legitimate employment opportunities more easily. The young generation is perhaps the most valuable asset that a country possesses for its steady development in regards to both economic productivity and social cohesion, which are two of the prerequisites necessary for political stability. In this context, it is of utmost importance that a special emphasis be placed on this generation's comprehensive inclusion into the job market.

KEY WORDS:
young generation, market, employment, education, development.

Introduction

Globalization and technological improvements have had a profound impact on labor markets throughout the world, and young people, as new workers, have faced a number of challenges associated with these developments. Trends in the labor market of youth tend to reflect changes in the labor market of adult[2]. An increasing number of young people are also finding work in the informal economy, where jobs are usually characterized by insecurity and poor wages and working conditions. Evidence from a range of countries shows that education clearly enhances opportunities in the labor market, as those with the best qualifications enjoy superior job prospects[3]. In a number of developing countries, however, many highly educated young people remain unemployed in Albania. The key to reducing youth unemployment therefore lies in remedying deficiencies in the labor market as a whole rather than in addressing isolated difficulties within specific subsections.

The situation in Albania

The economy of Albania has undergone a transition. After collapse of economy in Albania the system economic based in Small and Medium Enterprises (SME)[4]. Economic activity, measured by real gross domestic product (GDP), has grown and in the period between 1996 and 2010 the annual growth rate was 5.6 percent despite the 1997 shock caused by the collapse of the pyramid schemes and the 2008-2009 contraction of GDP growth due to the impact of the economic and financial crisis[5]. Such high growth rates were driven by economic and structural reforms such as privatization, banking, economic reforms, and the fight against crime and corruption. The expansion of the service and construction sectors fuelled by the earnings stemming from workers' remittances and informal activities.

---

[2] Labor market of adult is the market in which adult workers compete for jobs and employers compete for workers

[3] European Commission, Youth in the European Union: from Education to Working Life.

[4] "Doing Business in Albania 2012". World Bank. Retrieved 2011-11-21.

[5] The collapse of the pyramid schemes is the explanation most often given for the Albanian crisis, however, D. Vaughan Whitehead, argues in his book "The Albanian Crisis" that this thesis is far from exhaustive and even misleading.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have a crucial role in the transition process. SMEs already make up the vast majority of private businesses operating in Albania. Most common in mature market economies, a vibrant SME sector will eventually become not only a provider of employment, but also a key source of innovation, entrepreneurship and productivity growth. For these reasons, improving the business environment for SME development is a key objective of the policy framework in Albania. The Albanian authorities are increasing the support given to the SME sector, in recognition of the growing importance of SMEs to the national economy. This political support is manifested in developments such as:

    a. The approval of a medium term-strategy for SME development.
    b. The efforts to improve the legal and institutional framework for the business sector.
    c. The efforts to create a Small Business Development Agency.

Changes in the employment patterns in Albania, as in most other countries in region, have been very important. Like its neighbors, Albania has found the transition from guaranteed full employment to a market based employment model difficult, and job creation in the formal private sector has as weak[6]. The business sector in Albania still faces serious problems, mostly related to the successful legal implementation of these policies and the high levels of informality and corruption.

In Albania, the function of human resources has often been limited to some specific activities[7] such as: employee salaries, vacation, absences, etc. The modern concept of function of human resources includes the evaluation of strategic needs of human resource needs assessment, identification of competencies in order to realize the strategies and the organize vision the management, recruitment management, integration of employees, training, promotions and its evaluation management.

In Albania the modern concept of human resource management, conceived like in the West is far away from the application in local

---

[6] World Bank, Albania: Labour market assessment, op. cit.
[7] These activities are known as office of staff

companies. This analysis presents some factors that influence human resource practices in Albanian companies. The informal economy is an important contributor to employment and production in Albania but is also characterized by tax evasion and avoidance of legal regulations, which is why it is a hotly debated issue.

Informal employment has grown steadily throughout the world in the last twenty years. In developing countries in particular, most jobs created during this time evolved from the informal economy. In 1991, the ILO[8] recognized this evolution and called it the 'informal sector[9]. Informal economy, a hotly debated issue. The informal economy is an important contributor to employment and production in Albania but also fiscal and regulatory evasion and, as such, is a much debated issue. The government of Albania, trade unions and employers' associations recognize that informal activities provide a substantial contribution to the economy. They also acknowledge, however, that this contribution comes with significant costs in terms of lost tax revenues, lack of employee protection and unfair competition among enterprises.

Informal employment can be defined as an additional one performed by ignoring the employment rules or tax payments. The informal employment is present phenomenon in Albania. (ILO) has given a number of suggestions for private companies but also to the Ministry of Labor that to take measures to reduce this phenomenon. According to the study in Albania construction sector is the most problematic[10]. Paid employment in this sector is dominant (70% of the total informal work), while the other services, the majority of informal employees are self-employed or work without being paid. In industry, employment is separated in both formal and informal sectors. In this sector, informal employment is characterized mainly from the secret employment. Within the secret employment sector in industry, the probability of being informal is closely related to the fact of being male, less educated and young.

---

[8] International Labor Organization
[9] Compare, International Labour Office, The Dilemma of the Informal Sector, 1991
[10] The plan of employment in Albania 2010-2013, Tirane 2010

Informal employment[11] is significantly related with low earnings, poverty, and vulnerability. The average monthly gross salary in Albania is €150 and the average gross salary for a manager is less than €1,000 per month. Political and economic instability (differences in salaries in Albania are very high in comparison with other European countries), that exists for a long times in Albania has caused a major disadvantage which has a direct impact on human resources. The major job losses that occurred during the early years of transition could not be compensated by jobs in newly emerging sectors[12], such as manufacturing, construction and services. This disadvantage is emigration, which has brought a clime of uncertainly for human recourse managers. The lack of skilled workers represents a major constraint on further.

However, the attempts to minimize the inequalities between men and women have been made. Concluded that human resources are called by most Albanian entrepreneurs as an addition cost that do not generate profit in an investment with long-term perspective. As a result, an efficient career management is not the priority of Albanian owners. The Government has adopted a strategy[13], which aims to reduce the unemployment rate in Albania by 2013 to a level comparable to EU Member States by improving employment policy and the VET[14] system. The important factor is even the social and cultural environment. Albanian society is a society with moderately masculine trend.

According to statistics a large percentage of women holds an important position but the most important positions are still held by male employees[15]. Albanian social culture in the majority of organization is "variable", which means the employees still have not determined their specific duties, they still cover many positions at the same time. Organizations do not make a description of position, they apply a horizontal specialization of work, not vertical as Anglo-Saxon enterprises. Selection of employees is another problem. In Albania, in

---

[11] OECD Investment Compact, The informal economy in Albania: Analysis and policy recommendations, report prepared for the Ministry of Economy of Albania, OECD, 2005.
[12] Central Bank of Albania, Annual Report 2009.
[13] STRATEGY ON EMPLOYMENT
[14] Vocational education and training
[15] INSTAT, People and work in Albania: Labour force, employment and unemployment in the transition, Tirana 2009.

state and private enterprises they do not have transparent process in recruitment. Nepotism is a phenomenon present in Albania. Nepotism it is a special way managers and directors use to keep the business in the family, regardless of their merits.

There is a strong need to improve Business Planning, Management Systems and Human Resource Management among Albanian enterprises. Furthermore, there appears to be a lack of awareness about the importance of strategic and business planning, as key functions in the company. This is particularly true among the very small enterprises, where management is often centered around the enterprise owner. Moreover, the relationship between enterprise owner and the management workers (often organized by work descriptions, incentive schemes and organizational schemes) needs strengthening. For the manager the communication between employers and employees is an important issue. The role of communication is to cultivate positive employee relations, encourage employee goal setting, limit turnover, increase competencies and develop skill levels. Without clear communication between management and employees, goals, expectations, rewards and incentives will not be understood. The effects of excellent communication within human resources departments is the basis for good relations between the employer and its employees. Excellent communication between human resources personnel and the company's employees keeps employees constantly well informed. With effective communication, the manager can maintain a good human relation in the organization and by encouraging ideas or suggestions from employees or workers and implementing them whenever possible, the organization can also increase production at low cost.

These should be an integrate part of training modules aimed at strengthening the overall management capacity of Albanian SMEs. Furthermore, some communication skills, such as appraisal, counseling and disciplinary, are integrating parts of an enterprise's human resource management system. The expressed perceptions of needs for improvement focused also on human resource management, namely in relation to staff hiring and day to day management and orientation. The understanding of the value of enterprise's human resources is less developed among Albanian enterprises. This is manifested by low scores in staff training and by lack of delegation of managerial responsibilities. The centralization of power and leaving

decisions to one person only or having a small management group are indications of a less developed human resource management system or culture, which in turn acts as a bottleneck which negatively impacts performance of the enterprise overall and slows down the growth. The enterprises need to formalize their operations in order to make management more effective and result oriented. According to Meyer (1998), quality management systems as well as, organization and human resource management offer effective solutions and tools to make management more effective.

In practice, individual roles and responsibilities, work processes and procedures should be written down and documented, creating a transparent organization, which is easily transferred to new staff members and easy to monitor by management. Mostly enterprises in Albania do not have a formal human resources department with well defined procedures. Often it is the general manager who plays the role of human resources manager. In public administration there is a civil service law No. 8549, dated 11.11.1999. "sets forth uniform regulations on conditions and procedures for entering the public service, the mode of establishment and termination of the work relations, career advancement, to guarantee the rights and define the duties of civil servants aimed to create a professional stable and efficient civil service" for Albania[16].

Young people in Albanian Labour Market

Albania is a country with mostly young population, since the avarage age of Albanian population is 31. The elderly population, 65 years and over, is still a minority but, as we can see in figure 1, is growing rapidly while the proportion of younger age groups is declining.

The public policy discussion on youth employment has increasingly captured the spotlight during the past few years, especially in the view of the global economic crisis. The official unemployment rate in Albania is around 13 percent, while the unemployment of youth is twice as high[17].

---

[16] Modern Human resource Management, The COMPASS Project 2009, Tirana, Albania
[17] INSTAT, Treguesit ekonomikë, Tiranë, 2011.

Figure 1: Proportion of children (0-14), young population (15-24) and elderly population (65+)

Source : UN population prospects, 2002 www.un.org/popin

Albania is considered to be one of the nations that suffered most severely from the consequences of transition and, in comparison with its neighbors, it endured some of the gravest blows to the employment of youth. Over the last several years, growing political attention has been given to employment of youth in Albania, where the difficulties young people face in entering and remaining in the labour market are compounded by the additional burden of large numbers of young people who are engaged in the informal economy. Young people consider employment within the government a golden opportunity, even though there is no more job security Participants noticed that this is a trend throughout the Balkans, and is probably primarily culture related.

The development in Albania has its roots in private entrepreneurship and non-public employment. For this reason the United Nations participants in Albania argued that job security and stability should not be the reason for seeking employment in the public sector.

The labour market of youth is characterized by relatively low participation and employment rates and high unemployment rates. In 2009, young people in the labour force represented 45.6 percent of the population (15 to 29 years old), compared to a national average of 62.2 percent. The low rate of participation for young people is mostly due to school attendance (around 34 percent of the youth population

is in education and training) and to the low labour market participation of young women (39.7 percent)[18].

According to the INSTAT (2011) that three out of every four employees in Albania are working on the black market. In the nonagricultural sector, excluding self-employed individuals and professionals, 55% of employed people are classified as informal. Young people, individuals possessing a low level of education, and poor people are the groups most severely affected by the informal employment sector[19]. Only 15 percent of the people who claimed unemployment in 2002 were able to successfully transition into the formal employment sector by 2004. Only 10 percent of those who have yet to enter the workforce were able to successfully transition into the formal employment sector. In contrast with this data, 38 percent of unemployed people found work in the informal sector. Informal employment, and its specific repercussions for the youth demographic, is not a phenomenon known only to Albania. Young people encounter more employment obstacles than adults because, in most cases, they possess less knowledge about their rights as employees and, therefore, fall victim to the shortage of legitimate employment opportunities more easily. As the International Labor Organization observes in one of its studies, young people are more vulnerable to the informal job market[20].

Table 1: The statistics of Albanian employment

Labour Force	1.071 million (2011 est.)		
Labor force - by occupation	Agriculture:		47.8%
	industry:		23%
	services: 29.2% (September 2010 est.)		
Unemployment rate	13%	(2012	est.)
	13.3%	(2011	est.)
	Note: *These are official rates, but actual rates may exceed 30% due to preponderance of near -subsistence farming*		
Unemployment, youth ages 15-24	Total:		35.5%
	Male:		41.6%
	Female: 27.1% (2001)		

Source: The Bank of Albania

---

[18] INSTAT, Anketa e Forcave të Punës 2009, Tiranë 2011.
[19] Albania: An Evaluation of the Job Market", May 2006, World Bank, pg.18.
[20] Global Employment Trends for Youth", August 2004, ILO, pg.22.

The fact that many young people are currently still partaking in the education process signifies that a more qualified workforce is being cultivated for the future. The second reason for low rates of employment of youth is the considerable number of daunting obstacles that young people must overcome to successfully cross the job market threshold.

This fact particularly rings true for young people who possess a low level of education. This contingent is often unemployed, sometimes even refusing to seek out employment, thereby creating a very disturbing number of dejected young people.

The review of research on young people, employers are increasingly looking for more skilled workers and frequently use qualifications as an indicator of technical capabilities. (Hasluck. C 1998)

Recessions can have a stronger effect on the employment of young people than others:

- Employers may reduce or freeze recruitment. Opportunities for new entrants to the labour market may therefore be disproportionately reduced.
- It may be easier and cheaper to make less experienced employees redundant. Employers may also be more inclined to retain more experienced and trained employees in whom they have invested more. Younger employees may therefore be more likely to lose their jobs.
- Firms retained more employees than many economists expected during the recession. However, this could mean that young people lose out in the long run, with firms slow to build up staffing levels during the recovery.

The global crisis has played an essential role in the labor market, where youth is generally in disadvantage. With low level of education, little to no skills, young people are not competitive or attractive enough to operate in such labor markets. Accordingly, their employment prospects are worse in periods of contraction of employment opportunities. Apart from this, there are other labor market realities that might have accentuated unemployment among the youth during the crisis. However, the consequences of the global recession vary across regions, with such impact producing different results even

within the same region and usually being more relevant in the developed Western European countries. For example, the first full year of the crisis (2008-2009) produced unequal effects on the European regions.

Impact of Unemployment of Youth

The world is facing a crisis of employment of young people which is getting worse by day: young people are three times more likely to be unemployed than adults and over 75 million youth worldwide are looking for work. The ILO has warned the world about the "scarred" generation of young workers facing a dangerous mix of high unemployment, increased inactivity and precarious work in developed countries, as well as persistently high working poverty in the developing world[21]. Persistent and growing youth unemployment is recognised as a problem with long-term risks. Apart from the time spent in lower wage employment or on state support, unemployment in youth can have longer- term effects such as wage scarring that can persist long into adult life, as well as wider social problems. The rise in unemployment of youth, as well as working age unemployment, must stabilise in Albania. The threat of a "jobless" or slow recovery only adds to the concerns about the longer term impact on young people, with youth unemployment levels likely to be closely monitored for several years to come. The World Health Organization (WHO) has acknowledged that in recent years there has been an increase in mental health issues among youth, including anxiety, depression, eating disorders and self-harm. There is a lack of specific data on youth and mental health but the WHO estimates that 10-20 percent of young people in Europe suffer from mental health issues, this figure is much higher among disadvantaged young people and migrants. Suicide remains the third most common cause of death among young people in Europe[22]. It is generally accepted that increased social pressures, such as financial and employment worries can trigger mental health problems or exacerbate existing issues, so unless concerted action is taken, the mental health situation of young people in Europe is likely

---

[21] http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/youth-employment/lang--en/index.htm
[22] World Health Organization: Mental Health and Development: Targeting People with Mental Health

to further decline in coming years. The young people that are unemployment may be the victim of drugs, crime, cheat, theft.

The national government should deal with the issues of youth employment generation and poverty eradication, matters which need a wide array of policies that must be able to create decent jobs for the youth. (Fashoyin. T, 2012).

Long-term unemployment may in some circumstances lead to social exclusion, but high levels of social or financial support may reduce the chances of exclusion. In terms of young people's experiences, the simple chart below (table 2) highlights the basic factors associated with exclusion and integration.

Table 2: Integration versus exclusion

Social Integration	Social Exclusion
Employment/sporadic unemployment	Long-term unemployment
High employment commitment	Low employment commitment
Financial security	Financial insecurity
Optimism	Financial insecurity
Life satisfaction	Life dissatisfaction
High social support	Low social support
Active lifestyle	Passive lifestyle

Conclusions

Employment and youth entrepreneurship are directly linked with a nation's stable economy and overall societal prosperity.

A significant part of Albanian youth that is unemployed, need a new qualification in order to integrate as soon as possible in the labor market.

This young people may take part in informal economy which provides one source of income, but there has also been disturbing evidence of a rise in the number of unemployed urban youth who are turning to street crime, gangsters, prostitution and armed conflict.

The information on new working places in Albania is almost non-existent and does not have any significant impact on young people who are seeking for work. Youth has very limited communication channels using of acquaintances to seek a new job. These jobs provide a source not only of income, but also of dignity and self-respect for them.

Securing suitable employment that meets a young person's individual expectations leads to personal and occupational fulfillment, but at the same time it offers benefits to the community, ensures social cohesion, promotes economic development, and better living standards.

Improvement of labor market administration. This will help the country to achieve a quick, balanced and sustainable economic, social and human development against corruption and establishment of the state of law.

The realities of living within Albanian society should not crush such aspirations. Nevertheless, the current unemployment crisis calls for an immediate and efficient reaction from all key societal players including the individual members of the society itself.

The government should to increase the role of work office in order that the youth has the opportunity to find a new work.

REFERENCES

World Bank (2006). *Albania: An Evaluation of the Job Market*, 18- 19.

Fashoyin, Tay. 2012, The Youth Employment Challenge in Nigeria, *E-Journal of International and Comparative Labour Studies*, 1, 316-319

Hasluck C (1998), Employers, young people and the unemployed: *a review of research Institute for Employment Research*, University of Warwick, Coventry

Global Employment Trends for Youth, August 2004, ILO, 22.

Meyer, J. W. (1978). Strategies for further research: Varieties of environmental variation. In M. W. Meyer and Associates, Environments and organizations Ministry of Work, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,"Sectoral Employment", 352-368.

Modern Human resource Management, *The COMPASS Project*, July 2001, Tirana, www.ilo.org International Labor Organization

World Bank, Albania: Labour market assessment, op. cit.

http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/youth-employment/lang--en/index.htm (7 October 2013)

http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/ecploreeconomies/Albania/ (7 October 2013)

http://www.instat.gov.al/al/themes/tregu-i-pun%C3%ABs.aspx (7 October 2013)

reviews

The Aftermath of War: Experiences and Social Attitudes in the Western Balkans

Kristen Ringdal and Albert Simkus
Sara Jud

Foreign Policy: From Conception to Diplomatic Practice

Ernest Petrič
Petra Trkov

Sara Jud

The social, political, economic, humanitarian, developmental and security consequences of war do not end upon the conclusion of armed conflict. Although the bombing and fighting is over, people's lives are changed forever. When it comes to the decision whether go or not to go into the war, its potential consequences are mostly measured in its costs and soldiers' lives whereas war has also long term effects on the psychological well-being of people, it may change attitudes in ethnic relations and general values of the society.

The Aftermath of war, edited by sociologists Kristen Ringdal and Albert Simkus, consists of 14 chapters analysing social and demographical characteristics of the societies in the Western Balkans which were irrevocably influenced by war. The first two chapters introduce readers into the methodological background of the research and provide a historical background for understanding the ethnic conflicts that culminated in the Wars of Yugoslav Succession. The main findings are based on the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) with surveys conducted from November 2003 to March 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.

Measuring the psychological effects of war experiences in chapter 3 surprisingly shows that the war related distress is twice as high in Kosovo than in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, although the scale of fighting together with genocide and the number of death was far greater in Bosnia. However, the findings correspond to the greater time distance since the conflict and more people who were forced to

leave, greater amount of prisoners of enemy and more frequent destruction of homes in Kosovo.

By the end of April 1999, about 600,000 residents of Kosovo had become refugees, another 400,000 were displaced inside Kosovo, meaning that half of the two million residents of Kosovo were refugees or internally displaced people. About 375,000 Kosovars moved south to neighbouring Albania and 150,000 had moved to Macedonia, others moved to Montenegro and Bosnia. At the end of the Kosovo war, in June 1999, 360,000 Albanian refugees stayed in Macedonia who had generously opened its door according to all international standards. The burden of having addressed the needs of refugees took its toll. Instead of the modest growth Macedonian economy rapidly shrank, lost its main trade partner Yugoslavia and also meanwhile its products in other markets got more expensive due to transit difficulties. Many perspective factories were closed and the unemployment rate increased rapidly. At the same time many Macedonians were worried about the potential impact of Albanian influx on the demographic balance in the country.

It was the same phenomena we might currently observe by the influx of Syrian refugees in neighbour Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria. The majority, more than half a million, have settled in Turkey who has the same as Macedonia generously opened its borders. Also the same as Macedonians Turks are worried of the possible destructive spill over effects of the last phases of the Syrian conflict. Increased demands of the Albanian minority and special autonomy gained by Kosovo even strengthened security dilemma by Macedonians, led to clashes between the opposing groups and brought Macedonia on the edge of the civil war. People were afraid that after Kosovo Macedonia would came.

Can Turkey come after Syria? One is sure, ethnic relations in the region will be irrevocably changed. As long as the conflict in Syria lasts and no spill over effect emerges in Turkey Syrian refugees are not likely to get into conflict with the hosting state. So far, Turkish economy stands well and none of its major trading market has collapsed. However, tensions are emerging in the Alewite regions of Turkey

where people support Assad. The future depends on the outcome of the Syrian crisis and the legal status of Syrians, which is still to be further developed. According to Ellingsen, Ringdal, Simkus and Strabac in chapter 8 Turkish level of tolerance towards others depends mainly on the effectiveness and will of the central government to provide security for all and thus prevent the emergence of anarchy. When the exact rules of cohabitation will be set, as they were in the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 in Macedonia, the ethnic security dilemma will decrease, but it will be only possible after the end of the war in Syria. Considering the experiences of ethnic intolerance of Croats towards Serbs in Croatia, presented in chapter 9, level of intolerance is likely to decrease after time.

There are also other consequences of war and refugee flows that must be taken into account while estimating the final outcome. The comparison of war related distress in chapter 4 from the data of SEESSP survey in winter 2004 and survey, which was conducted immediately after the end of war in Croatia in 1996 shows that war related distress does not decline after time, but it stays con-

stant or even increase, leaving incorrigible scars on the surface of the society. Moreover, according to Eikemo and Ringdal in chapter 5 and 6, war in the Balkans had caused significantly lower levels of self-reported health and happiness and increased social inequalities in comparison with the rest of the Europe. Since nationality and country of origin represent the main factors determining someone's values such as nationalism, authoritarianism, ethnic intolerance, conservative sexual mores and egalitarianism, as it is analysed by Simkus in chapter 7, new relations among ethnicities and their cohabitation might be endangered. Even after the end of the civil crisis in Macedonia the society stayed deeply polarized in perceptions over the reasons for the civil strife, which are together with causes for the outbreak of the civil war introduced by Ringdal, Simkus and Listhaug in chapter 10. The ending chapters are dedicated to the analysis of gender roles, patriarchy, heterosexuality and the general values of the middle class in the Western Balkans.

The processes in the aftermath of war in the Balkans consists of various effects of individual war experiences on health, distress

and changes in ethnic tolerance, which are related to the fear of potential loss of rights and strife connected with ethnic conflict. But even more importantly, the effects of wars have postponed effective transition of the socialist societies into democracies and prevent rapid integration of Balkan economies with Western and Central Europe.

Ernest Petrič
FOREIGN POLICY:
FROM CONCEPTION TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

Foreign policy activities of international actors are much debated in scientific writings as well as in the daily news media. However, those analyses and reports too often do not take into account the theoretical background of the events. In his monograph *Foreign Policy: From Conception to diplomatic practice*, which is a shortened translation of the Slovenian original published in 2010, Ernest Petrič masterfully integrates the theoretical analysis with the practical aspects of the subject field and presents us with a comprehensive account of foreign policy.

Dr. Ernest Petrič's life is intrinsically linked to international relations and diplomacy. He is a renowned university professor of international law and international relations; he was lecturing at law faculties and faculties of political sciences in Slovenia, as well as abroad, and was also the Dean of the Faculty of Sociology, Political Sciences and Journalism at University of Ljubljana. Besides being an acclaimed scholar in the afore mentioned fields, he also has vast practical experiences in the field of foreign policy; he was a State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia and the Ambassador to India, the United States of America, Austria, and the Permanent representative to the UN and OSCE. Currently he is the President of the Slovenian Constitutional Court.

Foreign Policy is the synthesis of the author's theoretical knowledge of foreign policy and his experiences in diplomacy. In the book, which is divided into five parts, Petrič first examines the theoretical fundamentals of foreign policy. In the second part,

he discusses the international environment and its development from bipolar to the new multipolar international system. The subsequent two parts elucidate the foreign policy decision-making process and the means of foreign policy. In the final part Petrič analyses the particularities of foreign policy of small and new countries.

In the first part of the book, Petrič emphasizes that the theory of foreign policy is essentially linked to the theory of international relations but also stresses that foreign policy is a specific phenomenon requiring special treatment. Whereas the theory of international relations scientifically studies the structure and development of the international community, the theory of foreign policy addresses the activities of the main actors – the states – in the international arena. Both theories are therefore closely connected and in fact inseparable; it is not possible to fully comprehend one without the understanding of the other.

In the second part, the author first takes us on a short historical journey of development of the international community, the emphasis being on the changes of the balance of power which resulted in the modern international community, where the balance of powers is still being forged. Whereas the reasons for the emergence of the bipolar international system was the loss of power and influence of Europe's great powers after World War II, one of the main reasons for the transition to multipolar system, besides the internal problems of the Soviet Union, was the emergence of new centers of economic power; e. g. EU, China, and Japan. Petrič enriches the historical narrative with the short presentation of centers of power (or as he calls them – the poles) of the emerging multipolar system; he introduces their development and their potentials and restrictions for the future.

Petrič identifies the EU as one of the important players in the international community, which has the potential to become one of the poles of the emerging multipolar system. This can be achieved only if the member states and the Union pursue their common foreign policy goals through the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, the EU also has at its disposal the European External Action Service to help with the

implementation of the foreign policy decisions. When taking into account also the economic, technologic and social state of the Union, the vast potential of EU's foreign policy becomes evident. It is important, however, for the member states to realize that individually they will never be the leading actors in the international forum; the status of the pole of the multipolar international community can be achieved only through the Union. Petrič draws attention to the lost opportunities in the past, when the EU, due to the inability of the member states to establish common positions on the important international issues, has failed to be a partner in the international efforts to resolve several regional issues; e.g. the Palestinian issue, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, problems facing Africa, and the Balkan Wars after 1991. The inability to reach the consensus on such important issues diminishes EU's influence in the world.

The decision-making process and the means of foreign policy are presented in parts three and four respectively. The fundamental maxim in the foreign policy decision making process is the relationship between the goals and the means; while setting the goals one must keep in mind the means available to the country and, mutatis mutandis, while choosing the means one must keep in mind the preset goal that is trying to be achieved. Policy makers should also be mindful of the constraints, particular to each individual state, in setting the foreign policy objectives and choosing the appropriate means to achieve the goals. Constraints can be either endogenous (existing within the state) or exogenous (coming from the international environment).

The goal-setting of the foreign policy is in the hands of the political organs of the state and the choice of the means for achieving them is left to the Government and its Foreign Ministry. Therefore, a high-grade bureaucratic apparatus is of the utmost importance with respect to the efficient coordination of foreign policy of the state. Furthermore, especially for small states it is essential to have a highly qualified diplomatic service, which can compensate for the limited scope of means available to such countries.

The limitations of the foreign policy of small and new states are

in more detail elucidated in the final part of the book. Petrič reiterates the utmost importance of the uniformity and consistency of foreign policy of small states. The main challenge is the limited amount of resources, both financial and human. Therefore, rational use of material and human resources as well as rational choices of foreign policy objectives is of utmost importance. The limited number of top experts in the foreign policy field presents a problem by itself but it becomes an even bigger issue in the case of changing the government, especially since the small countries are also prone to lack of professionalism and clear hierarchy in the bureaucratic apparatus. In order to pursue successful foreign policy small states must pay special attention to ensure a high quality analytical service and professionalism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When following their general foreign policy objectives – security and prosperity – the most practical and effective means for those states are friendly relations with their neighbors, membership in international organizations, and allies among powerful states. Small countries should aspire to build and preserve good reputation, which can be then used as

an important indirect means of their foreign policy. Such reputation can be attained through the achievement of political stability, economic prosperity, respect for human rights, and last but certainly not least through principled foreign policy.

Foreign Policy: From Conception to diplomatic practice offers a comprehensive yet lucid account of the complex realm of foreign policy. Particularly the last part on foreign policy of small and new states constitutes a significant contribution to the field of the foreign policy. The book represents a welcomed companion for everyone involved in the practical side of the foreign policy, academics, and students of diplomacy and international relations. Since it is a good source of information for understanding the complexity of the foreign policy actions of international actors, I would recommend it also to anybody interested in the daily international politics.

Six Lessons to be Learnt from the Story of our Mythological Europe

Irida Laçi

Six Lessons to be Learnt from the Story of our Mythological Europe

Irida Laçi[1]

....

ABSTRACT

In 1957 the Treaty of Rome called for "an ever closer union among peoples of Europe" aiming at their economic welfare and social progress. Almost 60 years later EU values are at risk not only because of economic problems, but mainly due to social ones. Rising intolerance and other related phenomena are causing major headache to EU leaders. Moreover these problems are having their repercussion to the EU enlargement perspective toward Western Balkans. If EU wants to hold its indisputable role as an "anchor" of stability and prosperity it should identify the deeply rooted cultural traits that hold our ancient continent together. One of them, part of our European cultural heritage, is the mythological story of Europe. Through a descriptive and analytical approach this paper offers a narrative of the idea of Europe through the myth based story, by arguing that this legend should make us more conscious of the long journey towards the "United Europe". The mythological Europe shows that our continent has a starting point which consists of the concept of relativity and diversity. Moreover it is argued that Europe's journey is still in progress toward Western Balkans.

KEY WORDS:
myth, Europe, identity, transformation, coexistence of diversities.

---

[1] CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Irida Laçi (Lika), Head of the CoE & OSCE Unit, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania, Blv. Gjergj Fishta no.6, 1001 Tirana, Albania, e-mail: irida.laci@mfa.gov.al,

Introduction

Whoever is trying to deal with the issue of "Europe" and its history is faced with some inevitable dilemmas concerning its genesis: Asia, the ancient Greece, the Roman Empire or the Christian Middle Ages. Furthermore there still exists the concern on how to understand Europe beyond its geographical borders: a set of cultural, civil and moral values, or just an economic and somehow political entity. Additionally, the different phases of EU enlargement towards South Eastern Countries have increased the debate on which populations belong to the concept of Europe, because of which history, costumes or other cultural or political traditions. The motto of the Council of Europe about "a Europe without dividing lines" where Europeans could live in harmony while sharing their past, their symbols, their dreams and objectives have continuously troubled the Euro-enthusiastic as well as the Euro-skeptics, who with a lot of arguments and counterarguments are trying to define their ideas on this ancient continent.

The young Albanian generations, as well as many of their peers from the Western Balkans , belong to the Euro-enthusiastic group. It can be argued that this is firstly due to the fact that they come from what used to be called "Eastern" countries with a long tradition of isolation and hostility towards anything or anyone existed beyond their boundaries. Secondly, in the last twenty years a lot of Albanians had the possibility to be educated in "Western" countries. Too often they found themselves at a crossroad between "East and West", two worlds that until the late 1980's had been considered as opposite, incomparable, far away from their political, economic, social and cultural standpoint. Moreover the reality most Albanians experienced in the "West" made them feel rather ill at ease with that spontaneous feeling of many "Europeans" towards the extra – communitarian foreigners, excluded from the "European civil and political community". However the differences between these two "opposites" were not so insurmountable, on the contrary, in many aspects they were artificial. As a matter of fact, in these two last decades, a good part of the "new Eastern barbarians" have joined that so much desired community called "European". Nowadays we are experiencing the expanding of the geopolitical concept of the European Union, while the concept of Eastern Europe is ever-shrinking towards the geopolitical concept of the Western Balkans.

Thus the European Union of the XXI century has become so far the largest multinational reality in the world. The extension to the east, up to the border with Russia, and to the south, up to a possible inclusion of all Western Balkans countries, has increased the ethnic, social, cultural and religious variety of this community. While the geostrategic Europe is oriented toward expansion within *a sui generis* Community, its continental version is worried about further integration. In terms of EU – Western Balkans expansion it is high time for the European Union to reassess its commitment to enlargement in this region and take a closer look at the social and cultural policies. If the EU really wants to create a stronger European identity it needs to reach to the roots of the European community, starting from its common myths (Rossi 2008). The whole ancient mythology is at its disposal, starting from the mythological character of the girl Europe, one of the most beautiful figures of the classical world.

The myth based story

From the ancient times until nowadays, the legend of Europe has provided a very rich iconography, literature as well as various philosophical thoughts and historical studies. The Greek mythology (World book encyclopedia 1992/3) describes Europe as a very beautiful girl, daughter of Agenor, the Phoenician King of Tyre, (today's Lebanon). While she was gathering flowers in a lawn along with other nymphs, the Father of Gods, Zeus, fell in love with her. He transformed himself into a tame white bull and mixed in with her father's herds. Europe saw the bull, caressed his flanks, and eventually got onto his back. Suddenly the bull rushed over the sea abducting Europe.

In his work Metamorphosis (Ovidio 2005) (II 833 to 875) the poet
Ovid describes the seduction of Zeus and the abduction of Europe
like this:

> Her right hand grasped
> A horn, the other lent upon his back
> Her fluttering tunic floated in the breeze

After crossing the Mediterranean Sea, Zeus brought Europe to the
Mediterranean island of Crete. Europe became the first queen of
Crete and together they had three sons: Minos[2] (who built the fa-
mous Labyrinth), Rhadamanthus and Sarpedon. Symbolically, in
this passage of the Princess of Phoenix to Crete, Zeus transferred the
fruits of the ancient eastern Asian civilization towards a new Aegean
island.

The story continues with the father of Europe, Agenor, who sent out
his three sons in search of their sister. One of them Cadmus arrived
to Thebe and became the founder of the Theban city[3], one of the
most important centers of classical Greece. However, the oracle told
Cadmus that his search was in vain. Cadmus and Europe never met
again; however, thanks to their "travel" they spread their seed all over
the "European" territory, thus creating new nations and ethnicities,
in an Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek and Asian blood mixture[4].
Zeus gave Cadmus Harmonia for his wife[5]. Together they settled
in the land of Enchelians, to the north of modern Epirus area, who

[2] Aligheri, Dante. Canto V: Virgil and Dante leave Limbo and enter the Second Circle that begins
the torments of Hell. There blocking their way sits Minos, "Grinning, grotesque, and hale".
Minos is the dreaded semi-bestial judge of the damned. He assigns to each soul coming into Hell
their eternal torment. Minos is the son of Europa and Zeus. He became a mythological king of
Crete, who was so famous for his wisdom and justice that after his death his soul was made into
the judge for the dead. Dante, however, transforms Minos into an irate and hideous monster with a
tail. The transformation may have been suggested by the form Zeus assumed for the rape of Europa
the monster appears bullish but the obvious purpose of the brutalization is to present a figure sym-
bolic of the guilty conscience of the wretches who come before it to make their confessions. Minos
orders the Poets back; but Virgil silences Minos as he earlier silenced Charon, and the Poets move on.

[3] *The World Book Encyclopedia*, Vol. 19, pp.210 Cadmus was the Phoenician founder of Thebes
and brother of Europa who taught to the Greeks the alphabet, which he had brought from Phoenicia.
Cadmus, in search of his abducted sister Europa, settled in Boeotia, which some say he invaded
with a Phoenician army, founding in this new land the city of Cadmea, later called Thebes. Cadmus
is credited for having combined consonants with vowels, thus teaching the secrets of correct speech.

[4] Turroni, Federica *"Il vagare di Cadmo" (The research of Cadmus) International Conference aiming
at finding a connection among history, religion and jurisdiction for the reconstruction of a European
identity, February 2005*, Bologna University.

[5] See http://www.mythindex.com/greek-mythology/C/Cadmus.html

made him their king[6]. Cadmus and Harmonia ruled over the Enchelians and founded the towns of Bouthoe (Budva) and Lychinidus (Ohrid). According to the legend one of their sons was Illyria, the eponymous ancestor of the whole Albanian people (Wilkes 1992).

The Rational Version of the Abduction of Europe

The great Greek philosopher Herodotus (484 – 420 BC) is well known for the passage from the legend into the science of history. In his version, he does not present a union of the divinity with a human, but a rationalized version of the myth, in the meaning of a real case of war "an eye for an eye". According to him, the kidnapping of Europe was a banal incident of ancient wars, marked by the kidnapping of women. In his work "Historie[7]", he wrote that some Phoenician traders made port to Argo (Hellas). While they had almost sold all their goods, a considerable number of women came to the shore. Among them there was the daughter of the king Inachus, whose name was Io. The Phoenicians rushed to the girls and sized Io along with some others. They were thrust on board, after which the ship made sail for Egypt. Sometimes later certain Greeks, most probably Cretans, went to the Phoenician port of Tyre and carried off the king's daughter, Europe. They got the girl out of Asia on a ship with the shape of a bull. The story of abductions went on for two generations until the Persian prince Paris, son of Priam, influenced by these stories, decided to use abduction to get a wife from Greece. He carried off Helen (Shirly & Romm 2003), the wife of Menelaus, whose brother Agamemnon formed an army, crossed the sea and began the most controversial and most remembered war in European history: the Trojan War.

This story told by Herodotus is a rational one, because it aims at answering the raised issues through the interpretation of evidence[8].

---

[6] See http://www.greeka.com/greece-myths/cadmus.htm

[7] Herodotus (484-ca. 425 BCE), the 'Father of History,' wrote this account of the epochal conflict between the Greeks and Persians between 430 and 424 BCE. The title of the work, 'Historie' means 'Inquiry.' Subsequently it became the name of the science of history, and via Latin passed into other languages including English.

[8] Sinani, Gjergj. 1999, Hyrje në filozofinë e historisë,(Introduction into the history of philosophy) Tirana, SHBLU editor, pp 14. Mr. Sinani is a well-known Albanian professor of philosophy at the Albanian University of Social Sciences.

This historian is well known for many of his travels to the Persian Empire, to Athens as well as to Greece. On his way he tried to collect information and testimonies for his stories (Giglioni 2004).

According to him the period in which the abduction events happened is unclear, but it may be said that they occurred around the XVI – XIII BC, -during the period considered the "era" of Trojan War.

This historical version of facts, according to Herodotus is also painted in some Greek vases, where Europe is designed as the "apple of discord" between Greeks and Trojans (Davies 1996)[9].

Why do we need this story?

The purpose for using the figure of the myth of Europe is not to tell a story about big events or idealistic deeds, on how beautiful and peaceful Europe was. It is not even the aim to transform the story into a propaganda tool by giving "facts". The main reason of this narrative is to draw lessons from this tale, being fictional or real, because the myth story is an essential part of our European cultural heritage. In my view the cultural policy of the European Union should become more important than before while the economic crisis threatens to undermine the European identity. The primary aim of the cultural policy of the European Union is to enhance the obvious cultural diversity in Europe, while looking for some shared elements which unify the multitude of cultures of our continent. One of the common cultural traits is mythology and more specifically the story of the mythological Europe. It is therefore essential to tell and teach the story to young European generations, through illustrating its inherent dichotomies, and even its allegories with concrete examples of the dangerous precedent in our history. Thus the myth-based story should become a platform for discussions on the long story of our European journey.

---

[9] *Europe: A history*, the United States, Oxford University Press Inc., This book has several useful features, one of which is its immense size which will make it useful for dropping on the next overbearing know-it-all that uses the phrase, 'Western Civilization'.

Lessons to be Learnt

The first lesson is that from the cultural point of view, the European community is not lacking a starting point. On the contrary- this "beginning" could be the ultimate goal we should focus on. Europe has a "collective memory", starting from the myth of Europe, being it an artistic, historical or academic presentation. The purpose is not to misinterpret the plot. From an artistic or academic image the mythological Europe is transformed into a vision of the European spirit which generates a sense of belonging: a myth of Europe to bring up European citizens. The European Union was built on the myth that we are one people with one common destiny – an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' in the words of the Treaty of Rome 1957[10]. In the myth based story Western Balkans countries are part and parcel of this starting point.

The second lesson to be learnt is that the more complex sense of belonging to the European community does not include only a legal or financial binding. Most Europeans have little idea of the meaning of more than 200.000 pages of EU legislation as well as of the multitude of EU treaties. That is why it is not enough to affirm that "unanimity of people is justified only by unanimity of the legal system (Kelsen 1995) " in order to belong to the European Community. We are citizens of this legal entity, such as the EU and therefore, we are "Europeans" who obey and follow its rules and norms. This statement does not facilitate the coexistence within a community. The history of the youngest members of the EU, clearly shows that the political or monetary integration has brought a package of complex social problems, mainly because of the misinterpretation of the integration process, by claiming homogeneity there where the myth leads us to the coexistence of diversity and pluralities. The myth based story shows that our being "Europeans" is dedicated to a historical paradox that has the Asians for protagonist. From this paradox arouses the awareness that Europeans are a social rather than a racial unity. The validity of the myth today is its message on the importance of accepting a plurality of life styles, social customs and identities. That is why young Europeans need to be educated not just and simply about the politi-

---

[10] See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf

cal institutions or EU legal instruments. They need to rediscover the lack of common European symbols which helps to increase the sense of solidarity. According to the historian professor Wolfgang Schmale "The myth – based identity supports the process of political integration by reducing the complexity and denying strangeness (Schmale 1998)".

The third lesson is that Europe itself is built on dichotomies. If we refer to Friedrich Meinecke (Meinecke 1997) academic discussion on the dichotomy of Europe as Staatsnation (in the sense of a civil and constitutional entity) or Kulturnation (as sharing attributes, languages and images of a common provenience), we can affirm that Europe cannot ever be just a Staatsnation or just a Kulturnation but an interaction between the two. The European Union is still a "work in progress" and its challenge is how to cope with threats or concerns of daily living or cohabitation, that is why it cannot be a "complete work" in a simple, rational, logical way, by accepting a Euro banknote or by signing a legal instrument. The way to cope with the new challenges is by seeking the roots of the problem, in order to understand it in depth, enter into the spiritual and emotional world of each person belonging to a different nationality and accept to get to know him/her, being open towards "the other". If "We/Western Balkan countries" consider "Them/EU member states" as opposed or incompatible then we will fall into the mistakes of the past "us and them", but if the interaction between "We and Them" is a "walking together" we could enrich ourselves and more over make much simpler our living together. "We and They" belong to a "community" that has never existed before, a community not in the sense of an "ethnic group", but a community within which we identify ourselves as part of the norms, rules, and respect for human rights and respect for the other's culture and social traditions. The interpretation of the dichotomies of myth and the current experience of the EU teaches us that "He / the other / the different" should not be excluded, prejudiced, labeled, but accepted.

The fundamental model of the European Union is not that of many centers competing with the main one. On the contrary it is about many centers replaced by the CENTER thanks to a model made up of various concentric circles around the EU. This is a brand new politi-

cal geography, very different from the more traditional geopolitical centers in competition with each other. This setup makes it possible that the concept of "They / the others/the different from me", belongs to the past history of Europe and that those still remote circles, including the Western Balkan countries have not to be defined as anti-Europe, but as "less Europe"(Adler & Barnet). Our approach to myth aims to awaken a political and social consciousness in order to engage seriously in the project of a "European family", without prejudice, without absolutisms, but with an open mind.

The fourth lesson is that from the sense of belonging to a common, shared legal, monetary, social and cultural reality is generated a broader concept of security. In their book "Security Communities", Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett argue that a community can exist on the international level and that the security policies deriving from this "living together" allow a peaceful coexistence. These authors refer to the concept of Karl Deutsch, who in 1968 defined "security communities" as pluralistic communities, which are set up when countries are integrated at that point such us to have a shared feeling of belonging to a community. After a decade of almost perpetual conflict, Western Balkan region can be the best example on how the EU enlargement perspective has reduced security threats in our region. Thus by bringing together community and security we create a wider concept of security itself, not simply as a military matter but most of all as a set of economic, social, cultural, environmental issues to be shared. The fifth lesson is that the myth expresses very clearly the idea that there has never existed a "European Hero" to hold together the continent, neither a "European country" better, wiser or more peaceful than the others. The story in itself is not built on a single population, territory, or culture, but it is a complex of realities and allegories, just like the human nature itself. This means that today we still exist and talk about the fulfillment of a "Project Europe", not because someone or something led us far greater than us, but because we share common experiences, common sufferings, common lessons, a common story/history to be told and from which to draw lessons. To this end the myth story does not include the feeling of excessive pride, which in many cases has provoked a sense of superiority for the "pure race" and as a consequence led to two World Wars.

Last but not the least, the sixth lesson is related to the plurality of religious credo in Europe. The image of the bull itself is one of the most typical examples of polytheism in ancient Greece. In free and pluralistic societies people must feel free to hold any or no religious belief. While different surveys in Europe confirm a prevalence of negative opinions on Islam, considering it as incompatible with "modern European life". In my view European Union should look for concrete models of peaceful coexistence. One of them is offered by a small Western Balkan Country: Albania. We, Albanians are proud of the multi-century old tradition of full harmony and understanding among the country's three major religions (muslim, orthodox and catholic). Albania has turned the interfaith and cultural dialogue into a priority for development and regional stability, supporting every initiative that aims at fostering dialogue by using our region's rich and diverse cultural heritage as a basis for effective dialogue. This is an additional proof to the fact that a worthy cohabitation can hold only on the basis of respect for diversity.

In addition Albania is firmly convinced that the different major religions can assume a strategic role in the world today, boosting governmental and nongovernmental actors and helping them in the resolution of conflicts and the promotion of interreligious dialogue.

Let us believe in the fact that "God is one" while the way we believe, worship or adore him is up to -us humans.

Conclusions

At the very heart of the myth-based story of Europe we find the dynamism of the transformation of our continent, thus admitting that since the ancient times the metamorphosis, the beauty, the charm, the violence, the regeneration or hybridization are the typical images which have accompanied the history of Europe. The story of the myth teaches us that Europe is not a natural entity, but the result of a long spiritual and historical evolution. European identity has a starting point derived from the non-European origins of Europe. Our itinerary towards the future should starts precisely from our inception. Our name "European" was given to us by the Phoenicians

(Asians) who named us like this before our existence. In other words, being European is dedicated to a historical paradox that present the Asians as protagonists. Meanwhile, from the paradox arises the consciousness that the European represents a social unity rather than a racial one.

In addition, I do firmly believe that cultural integration in some regards precedes and supersedes political and economic integration. That is why various important documents to the EU cultural policy, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Agenda for Culture, the EU's decision on the European Capital of Culture call for increasing practices of fostering common cultural heritages.

Part of the logic says that as long as Western Balkans Countries are the first in the "waiting list" for EU membership more efforts should be made in promoting intercultural dialogue in the countries of Western Balkans as part of the EU integration policies[11]. The EC's Culture programme[12] (2007 – 2013) is coming to an end. It is therefore essential to reassess the commitments on enhancing our shared cultural heritage through educational or cultural projects. A very good step should be the promotion of concrete common cultural symbols, such as mythological representations. Our mythological Europe can be considered as a starting point in which EU member countries and Western Balkan countries can claim common cultural heritage and even draw common lesson.

In his well-known work *Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus spoke Zarathustra)* the German writer Nietzsche wrote: "Whoever wants to understand everything that is human must try everything (Nietzche 2001)". The Europeans of the XXI Century have undoubtedly experienced everything. Let us have a look back and ask ourselves what we can do to prevent that future generation do not go through the era of Auschwitz, the two World Wars, the dictatorship, and even closer through the Sarajevo, Srebrenica massacres. Let us start to engage from our small everyday world and share together our rich multi-

---

[11] See http://www.kulturdokumentation.org/ The project is supported by the EC Culture 2007-2013 Programme within the Sub-Programme: Support for cooperation projects between organisations involved in cultural policy analysis.

[12] See more information at: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/culture-programe-%282007-2013%29_en.htm

cultural and social variety. Let us start then from the schools by telling and teaching the myth of Europe and by drawing the necessary lessons. The young generations should be aware that from the cultural point of view, the European community is not lacking a starting point, by going back to the ancient roots. The myth of Europe generates a wider and complex sense of belonging to a social reality, which do not include only a legal or financial binding. Furthermore, from the sense of belonging to a common shared legal, monetary, social and cultural reality is generated a broader concept of security, in which "they" are not opposing "us", but sharing their experiences and backgrounds. The myth based story argues that no one is superior to the others because there has never existed a "European Hero" to hold together the continent, neither a "European country" better, wiser or more peaceful than the others nor a religious credo above others.

If young generations are educated through this spirit they will be more committed to bring forward the European Community: Europe as a reality in which we deal with "the other" at school or at work long before we go to the Brussels or Strasbourg offices.

REFERENCES

Aligheri, Dante (1997) "Komedia Hyjnore, Ferri", Tiranë, Dituria, pp.227.

Adler, Emanuel. & Barnett, Michael (2002) "Security Communities", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp 17.

Barroso, Jose. Manuel: (2006) A soul for Europe, Speech held at the Conference "A soul for Europe" Berlin, , Speech/06/706.

Davies, Norman. (1996). "Europe: A history", the United States, Oxford University Press Inc., pp. Xvi – Xvii.

Erodoto, (2006), "Le Storie: Libro Primo", Torino, UTET, pp 59.

Giglioni, Gabriela (2002), "Erodoto e i sogni di Serse: L'invasione persiana dell'Europa", Pisa, Donzelli Editore, pp.34.

,. Shirley, Samuel & Romm, James (2003). "Herodotus: On the war for Greek freedom: Selection form the Histories". Sheridan Books Inc, pp. 43 - 87.

Kelsen, Hans (1925) *Allgemeine Staatlehre*, Berlin.

Meinecke, Friedrich (1907), *Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat*, Munich.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2001) Kështu foli Zarathustra (Also Sprach Zarathustra), *Tiranë*, Phoenix, pp.148

Ovidio, Publio Nasone (2005), Metamofosi, Classici Latini, Torino, UTET, pp 101 - 102.

Rossi, Giusi (2003), "Il mito di Europa", *Revista Politiche Europee, Nr. 7.*

Sinani, Gjergj (1999), Hyrje në filozofinë e historisë, Tiranë, SHBLU, pp.14.

Turroni, Federica (2005) "*Il vagare di Cadmo*", Kumtesë, Universiteti i Bolonjës, Schmale, Wolfgang (1998) "*Europa ohne Mythos*", in:Voelker-Rasor, MythenMaechte – Mythen als Argument, Arno Spitz, Berlin, pp 140 .

Wilkes, John (1992) The Illyrians, James Campbell Editor, pp 99. *The World Book Encyclopedia*, (1992 – 1993)., New York, World Book Inc. Vol. 6, Vol 19, pp 359

http://www.mythindex.com/greek-mythology/C/Cadmus.html (7 October 2013)

http://www.greeka.com/greece-myths/cadmus.htm (7 October 2013)

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/ treaties/rometreaty2.pdf

http://www.kulturdokumentation.org/ (7 October 2013)

http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/culture -programme (7 October 2013)

BELGRADE - MARINA ABRAMOVIĆ

Belgrade ("The White City") is not something unknown to the people of the Western Balkans. Moreover, it is as familiar to middle-age and older generations as Brussels is today for the younger. It was namely the capital of the 2nd Yugoslavia, for approximately 50 years. Before, it was the capital of the so called "old Yugoslavia". However, today Belgrade is known to many tourists for being the capital of Serbia, having a population of 1, 2 million people and highly appreciated as the "ultimate party city" (according to the Lonely Planet), a city that "really rocks". Especially is well known for summer clubs in heaving barges on the Sava and Danube River and for the restaurants and bars of the *Skadarlija*.

Belgrade was in the 1980s one of the main centres of the Yugoslav new Wave, which has produced a kind of critical or rebellion outlook to the situation in the country, or even the depressed picture of the years to come. The most popular groups were for example: *Idoli*, *Šarlo Akrobata, Električni Orgazam* and *Ekaterina Velika* (EKV).

Today, one of the most popular contemporary artists, famous all over the world, is Marina Abramović, who now lives in New York. She describes herself as a "grandmother of performance art". In her art, Abramović explores the relationship between performer and audience, the limits of the body and the mind capacity to interact with the body. In the year 2010, MoMA held a major retrospective and performance recreation of Abramović's work and the biggest exhibition of performance art in MoMA's history. The film with the title "The Artist is Present" was made upon the exhibition and upon the 736-hour and 30-minute static, silent piece, in which Abramović sat immobile in the museum and spectators were invited to sit opposite to her. In 2013 Abramović founded "Marina Abramović Institute" (MAI) and she continues her work, dedicated to performance art.

One of the very well-known cultural events in Belgrade is connected with the Belgrade Philharmonic Orchestra. The institution has the population of artists with average age around 35 years and is a cult Serbian orchestra (*Financial Times*) and one of the leading European orchestra (*Independent*). The orchestra is constantly collaborating with the world's best appreciated artists. Since the 2010 the chief conductor has been famous Chinese artist Muhai Tang. With its creative and provocative marketing, the Belgrade Philharmonics is constantly drawing the attention of the public and is in line with the world trends. All could be regarded also as the result of a very popular and famous director of Belgrade Philharmonic Orchestra, Ivan Tasovac, who is on function from 2001 on.

Very interesting for the cooperation on the basis of good will and positive, peaceful orientation is the regional project *Pika – Točka – Tačka*[1]. It is about cooperation of three philharmonic orchestras, Slovene, Croatian and Serbian. The project has gained the support of the Embassy of the United States in all three countries.

Once again a proof, that art has no ordinary limits and goes far behind the common understanding of human community. Art is what we live, experience and create, timeless; time and again.

Anja Fabiani

---

[1] Which means "point" in three languages: Slovene, Croatian and Serbian

GENERAL SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

ARTICLES

European Perspectives is a scientific journal that publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific articles focusing on relevant political, sociological, social, security, economic and legal as well as ethnic, cross-cultural, minority and cross-ethnical issues related to European and Euro-Atlantic integrations and South-Eastern Europe.

Manuscripts should be written in English, normally not exceed 8,000 words in length (including footnotes) and submitted in electronic version via e-mail to info@europeanperspectives.si, in the .doc format.

The journal reviews received manuscripts on the assumption of an exclusive submission: by submitting a manuscript for consideration, the author(s) warrant(s) that it is not simultaneously being considered by any other publication and that it shall not be sent to another publication until a response is received from the journal.

All texts submitted to the journal must be original works of the author(s). By submitting a manuscript, the author(s) warrant(s) to the journal that it does not infringe the copyright or any other rights of third parties.

When submitting the manuscript, please also attach:
- an abstract of 150–200 words, in English, stating precisely the topic under consideration, the method of argument used in addressing the topic, and the conclusions reached
- a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes
- a full postal and e-mail address of the author. If the manuscript is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about all the authors.

PEER REVIEW

All manuscripts are checked by referees by means of a double-blind peer review. Two external referees review each manuscript. European Perspectives reserves the right to reject any manuscript as being unsuitable in topic, style or form without requesting an external review.

REFERENCES

In the text, refer to the name(s) of the author(s) (without initials, unless there are two authors with the same name) and year of publication. Unpublished data and personal communications (interviews etc.) should include initials and year. For example: Since Bull (1977) has shown that ... This is in results attained later (Buzan - Jones - Little 1993: 117). As contemporary research shows (Wendt 1992), states are the ...

Publications by the same author(s) in the same year should be identified with a, b, c (2005a, 2005b) closed up to the year and separated by commas. Publications in references that include different authors should be separated by a semicolon: (Miller 1994a: 32, 1994b; Gordon 1976). If the year of first publication by a particular author is important, use the form: (e.g. Bull 1977/2002: 34). If there are two authors of a publication, separate the names by ' - ' (not ' and ' or ' & '). If there are more than two authors, put the name of the first author followed by ' et al. ', or write all names separated with ' - ' (four authors maximum).

References to unauthorized data from periodicals may be given in brackets in the text together with the exact page(s). For example: '(quoted in International Security (Summer 1990): 5). ' If such a reference is included in the reference list, the title of the contribution referred to must be provided, and a short title without inverted commas and a year of publication is used for in-text-referencing (e.g. short title year). As a general rule, an exact web address of a particular article can be substituted for its exact page(s).

List of References should appear at the end of the manuscript, listed alphabetically by author's surname.

BOOK REVIEWS

European Perspectives welcomes reviews of recently published books (i.e. those published in the year in which the current issue of European Perspectives was published or in the previous year). Authors should submit reviews of works relating to political science and other social sciences with the themes focused on (East) Central European issues.

When submitting a book review, authors should abide by the following requirements:

- A book review should not exceed 1,500 words.
- State clearly the name of the author(s), the title of the book (the subtitle, if any, should also be included), the place of publication, the publishing house, the year of publication and the number of pages.
- If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review.
- Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified.
- An exact page reference should be provided for all direct quotations used in reviewing the book.

Ernest Petrič et al.
Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu
(Slovene Diplomats in Slavic Countries)
2010 / 472 pages / ISBN 978-961-92839-0-5
Price: € 40

This is an excellent and rare book which analyses and reflects the role of Slovene diplomats in the Slavic countries up till 1990. The main message of the book is that Slavic component is part of the Slovene diplomatic experience. It has contributed to enhanced diplomatic relations between the Republic of Slovenia and several Slavic countries. Contributions are published in Slovene, Czech and Russian languages. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Andrej Rahten
Izidor Cankar – diplomat dveh Jugoslavij
(Izidor Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias)
2009 / 420 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-8-2
Price: € 40

The biography Izidor *Cankar – A Diplomat of Two Yugoslavias* is an account of the diplomatic career of Izidor Cankar in the first and second Yugoslav states. The book outlines Slovenia's progress from the end of the 19th century to the late 1950s in broad social terms as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the monarchist and communist Yugoslavias. Special attention is given to the international point of view – debates on the Slovenian issue in correspondence involving Slovenian diplomats serving at Yugoslav missions. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Franc Rozman

Baron Josef Schwegel – spomini in pisma (Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters)

2007 / 376 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-0-6
Price: € 34

The book *Baron Josef Schwegel – Memories and Letters* contains an autobiography of Baron Josef Schwegel and his notes from the Congress of Berlin. The book sheds light on Schwegel's work in diplomacy and foreign affairs based on his memoirs and the letters he wrote his wife when he was a member of the Austro-Hungarian delegation at the Congress of Berlin. The book was published as part of the *Personae* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Ernest Petrič

Slovenci v očeh Imperija - Priročniki britanskih diplomatov na Pariški mirovni konferenci leta 1919

(Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919)

2007 / 524 pages / ISBN 978-961-92173-1-3
Price: € 35

The book *Slovenes in the Eyes of an Empire – Handbooks of the British Diplomats Attending the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* includes a collection of handbooks prepared by the Historical Section at the British Foreign Office for the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Political analyses, texts containing historical and general information (Slovenes, the Yugoslav movement, the Austrian Primorska (Littoral) and Kansan (Carniola) regions, Koroška (Carinthia), Štajerska (Styria)) that were intended to help shape British policy on Central and Southern Europe following World War I. The book was published as part of the *Fontes* series of the *Studia diplomatica Slovenica* collection.

Ernest Petrič
**Zunanja politika – Osnove teorije in praksa
(Foreign Policy - Basic Theory and Practice)**
2010/509 pages/ISBN 978-961-92839-2-9
Price: € 45

The author, an experienced professor of international law, ambassador with remarkable career and currently the president of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, presents in this book a comprehensive overview of foreign policy. He combines in-depth theoretical expertise and long year experience both in foreign policy decision-making process and in its exercising through diplomatic means. This monograph is the first of its kind in Slovene language and represents a pioneering contribution to science.

Andrej Rahten, Janez Šumrada (ed.)
**Velikih pet in nastanek Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev
(Les Grands Cinq et la création du Royaume des Serbes,
Croates et Slovènes)**
2011/510 pages/ISBN 978-961-92173-0-6
Price: € 35

Book is based on the research in the archives of the Great Powers for the period 1918–1920, with a focus on the Slovenian role in re-defining the borders of Europe at the Paris Peace Conference. For the first time in one place and on the basis of primary sources, the research describes the policy of the "Big Five" – the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan – towards the establishment of the Yugoslav state.

Foundation - Centre for European Perspective

The Foundation - Centre for European Perspective was established to assist the countries of the Western Balkans in their efforts to join the European Union. The Centre performs its mission by providing high-quality, tailor-made projects transferring Slovenian best practices and practical know-how to the European Union candidate countries and potential candidate countries in the region. CEP focuses its assistance on institutional and administrative capacity building, security and socio-economic development.

More information about the Centre for European Perspective is available at http://www.cep.si.

Chair of Defence Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

Chair of defence studies, part of Department of Political Science at Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, organizes and (in cooperation with other chairs at the Faculty of Social Sciences) performs political science study programme – defence studies which are mainly intended for education of future security and civilian military and defence experts.

More information about the Chair of Defence Studies is available at http://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/en/study/departments-and-chairs/department-of-political-science/chair-of-defence-studies/