

# Development of the Current African Peace and Security Architecture

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## ABSTRACT

The African continent has for many decades been the epitome of conflicts. They are associated with many factors including arbitrary artificial borders created by the colonial powers, governance deficiency, dictatorial political leadership, resource competition, and mismanagement of ethnic diversity. Attendant results have been continental insecurity, instability, and economic stagnation. To respond to the security trajectory challenges, the African Union (AU) developed the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2002. This article mirrors the activities of the APSA and highlights some of AU's past and current peace missions and support activities. It commences by identifying the reasons behind the establishment of APSA which included the inaction by the then Organization of the African Union (OAU) in the internal affairs of its member states and also the failure of the United Nations and the international community to prevent and act on the Rwanda Genocide in 1994. Moreover, the article points to some challenges encountered, and opportunities for possible reforms to enhance peace, security, and stability within the continent.

**KEYWORDS:** conflicts, genocide, governance, peace, security, stability

## POVZETEK

Afriška celina je bila dolga desetletja žarišče sporov. Povezani so bili s številnimi dejavniki, vključno s samovoljnimi umetnimi mejami, ki so jih ustvarile kolonialne sile, pomanjkljivim upravljanjem, diktatorskim političnim vodstvom, tekmovanjem za vire in slabim upravljanjem etnične raznolikosti. Spremljajoče posledice so bile celinska negotovost, nestabilnost in gospodarska stagnacija. Da bi se odzvala na izzive varnostne poti, je Afriška unija (AU) leta 2002 razvila Afriško arhitekturo miru in varnosti (APSA). Ta članek odraža dejavnosti APSA in poudarja nekatere pretekle in trenutne mirovne misije in podporne dejavnosti AU. Začne se z opredelitvijo razlogov za ustanovitev APSA, ki so vključevali nedejavnost takratne Organizacije Afriške unije (OAU) v notranjih zadevah njenih držav članic ter tudi neuspeh Združenih narodov in mednarodne skupnosti, da bi preprečili in ukrepali o genocidu v Ruandi leta 1994. Poleg tega članek opozarja na nekatere izzive in priložnosti za možne reforme za krepitev miru, varnosti in stabilnosti na celini.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** spori, genocid, vladanje, mir, varnost, stabilnost

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## INTRODUCTION

The re-constitution of the Organization of the African Unity<sup>2</sup> (OAU) into the African Union (<sup>3</sup>AU) in 2000 was driven by various factors (Leila, 2012). First, the genuine desire for multilateralism after completing the liberation of Africa from colonialism through the OAU Pan-African agenda (Berhe, 2016). Second, the deliberate and strategic objective is to spur economic development and reinforce good governance. Third, the need to promote peace, security, and stability within the African continent.<sup>4</sup>

During the period from the 1990s to the early 2000s, Africa faced multiple crises, from the Rwanda genocide to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) crises, the statelessness of Somalia, to the war and crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone<sup>5</sup>. However, the need to promote peace and security became even more imperative following the inaction and failure of the OAU, the United Nations, and the international community to prevent and act on the Rwanda Genocide in 1994<sup>6</sup>. Essentially, the African continent was not only marginalized and neglected but also seen through a security lens and outrightly treated as a humanitarian case, by the international community.

The prevailing situation made the Member States of the African Union greatly concerned with the enormous impediment caused by the conflicts to the socio-economic development of the continent. As such, African countries were necessitated to take primary responsibility for peace, security, stability, and related activities in the continent as a prerequisite for the implementation of the African development and integration agenda. That resolve is underpinned in the Constitutive Act through the principles of common defense, peaceful resolution of conflicts, prohibition of the use of force, peaceful coexistence of Member States, and their right to live in peace and security.

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2 The OAU Charter that established the Organization of African Unity was signed by 32 Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963 with the aim to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the African States, and to also eradicate all forms of colonialism and white minority rule in Africa.

3 The African Union Constitutive Act that transformed OAU into AU was adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lome, Togo, on 11 July 2000 with the aim to promote unity and solidarity of African states, spur economic development, and promote international cooperation.

4 Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000 provides for the promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa.

5 Some other countries that experienced conflicts included Eritrea and Ethiopia.

6 During the Rwanda Genocide, over one million Tutsis and Hutus were brutally killed.

Additionally, it should be reckoned that a remarkable aspect of the Constitutive Act bestows upon the AU the right and mandate of intervening in any of the Member States to restore peace and security, especially in situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of genocide. This mandate was borne out of the principle of non-indifference, espoused under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. The principle that was formulated by the International Panel of Eminent Personalities established by the African Union to investigate the Rwandan genocide, besides codifying the responsibility for collective African action in the gravest circumstances, also calls for a commitment to an African solution for African conflicts.

### **CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA)**

Strategically and to respond to the continent's peace and security trajectory challenges, the AU developed the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework in 2002. The framework is built around objectives, structures, and a decision-making process relating to the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. The overarching objective of the APSA framework is therefore the legitimization and coordination of the maintenance of peace and security within the continent in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as well as the Regional Mechanism (RMs) in line with the Constitutive Act of the AU (Yeyew, 2019).

The APSA is formed of five pillars, (Sophie, 2019) namely: the Africa Union Peace and Security Council <sup>7</sup>(AU PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), African Standby Force (ASF), and the African Peace, all of which are expounded herein below.

#### ***THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL***

The AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC), is the “standing decision-making organ of the AU for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts<sup>8</sup>” As such, the Peace and Security Council is the

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7 The African Union Peace and Security was established under Article 3 of the Protocol Establishing Peace and Security Council that was adopted on 9 July 2002.

8 The African Union Peace and Security Council was established with the main mandate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.

supreme organ of the APSA that legitimizes and coordinates all actions of the other structures within the architecture (Moolakkattu (2010)).

The Peace and Security Council was established by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council which was adopted on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, and subsequently entered into force in December 2003. The overall basis of AU-PSC draws from Article 5 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Council became fully operational in 2004. Although AU-PSC draws its operational authority from Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, on a complimentary basis, it is nevertheless legally junior to the UNSC.

In terms of composition, the Peace and Security Council is comprised of fifteen Members of which ten are elected for a term of two years while the other five are elected for a term of three years. The differential composition is calculated at ensuring the continuity of the Peace and Security Council. The election of the above members is undertaken by the AU Executive Council and later approved by the AU Assembly while taking into account equitable regional representation and rotation.

As indicated under Articles 3 and 6 of the Constitutive Act, the mandates of the Peace and Security Council include the Promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa, anticipation and prevention of conflicts, promotion and implementation of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities, coordination and harmonization of continental efforts to curb international terrorism; developing a common defense policy for the AU and promoting and encouraging democratic practices, good governance, and the rule of law.

The fulfillment of the Peace and Security Council mandates is aimed at ensuring that peace and security are marinated within the AU to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people, and the attainment of sustainable development. In that regard, key activities of the Council comprise instituting sanctions against a member state, implementing the AU's common defense policy, performing peacemaking and building functions, authorizing and overseeing peace support missions, recommending to the Assembly interventions for situations of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, facilitating humanitarian action, and imposing sanctions for unconstitutional changes of government.

In order to discharge its work effectively, the AU- PSC is under Article 8(5) of its Protocol authorized to establish subsidiary bodies and seek military, legal, and other forms of expertise as may be necessary. To that effect, the Council has in place the Committee of Experts (CoE) established under Article 8(5), and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) established under Article 13(8). The Committee of Experts is composed of 15 designated experts each representing a PSC member State and two Peace and Security Department expert officers. Its main work is to assist in elaborating draft decisions of the PSC.

### ***THE CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM***

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) component of APSA has the mandate for the anticipation and prevention of conflicts or situations that would threaten peace and security on the continent and the timely provision of information regarding evolving violent conflicts (Cilliers, 2005). This mandate is enshrined in Article 12 of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council. Essentially, the Early Warning System is required to develop an early warning module premised on well-defined and acceptable political, economic, social, and humanitarian indicators from which the developments in conflicts are to be analyzed.

On the basis of the early warning information, the AU Commission Chairperson can advise the Peace and Security Council on the potential conflicts and likely infringement of peace and security within the continent to take viable steps. In terms of the structure and operations, CEWS is made up of “the Situation Room” and the observation and monitoring units of the various RECS. The Situation Room is located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the AU.

One of the drawbacks to the effectiveness of CEWS is that quite often the information generated by the system is not acted upon as a result of self-denial by the concerned member states, under the guise of state sovereignty.

### ***THE PANEL OF THE WISE***

The Panel of the Wise (POW) was established pursuant to the provision of Article 11 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. The Panel is tasked with the responsibility

of offering advisory functions to Peace and Security, as also mediation and preventive diplomacy role to the Council alongside the AU Commission Chairperson.

Importantly, the Panel membership comprises five persons who are highly respected African personalities of high integrity and independence with notable contributions to Africa in the realm of peace and security, and development. The members are appointed by the AU Assembly subject to the recommendations of the AU Commission Chairperson. The term of office of the members of the Panel lasts for a period of three years.

The Members of the Panel work on their own initiative or upon request by the AU PSC or Chairperson of the AU Commission. Important to note, the AU Assembly during the 2010 July summit in Kampala Uganda approved the establishment of a team of “Friends of the Panel of the Wise” to offer additional support to the Panel (Gomes and Ngandu, 2014). Therein, it is envisaged that the Friends of the Panel of the Wise is to be constituted, among others, of outgoing members of the Panel of the Wise. As such, the Friends offer support to the incoming members of the Panel in various peace and security-related activities within the APSA framework. The Panel of the Wise is credited for successfully intervening in the Kenyan post-election violence in 2008.

### ***THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE***

The African Standby Force (ASF) is a standby multidisciplinary contingent made of the military, police, and civilian personnel who are ready for rapid deployment when required. The Force was established pursuant to Article 13 of the Protocol to enable the AU-PSC to deploy timely peace support missions and interventions. It would be impossible to implement the Peace and Security Council’s activities in so far as the suppression of conflicts on the continent is concerned without the deployment of peace support missions and intervention (Dersso, 2010). Under the framework, the AU Member States are therefore required to establish in their countries standby contingents to participate in peace support missions.

In order to enhance support to the Force, the AU-PSC in line with its authority under Article 8(5), established the Military Staff Committee under Article 13(8)/ The Committee’s mandate is to offer advice and

assistance to the Council on all matters pertaining to military and security requirements with the overarching aim of promoting peace and stability on the continent. The Military Staff Committee is comprised of Senior Military Officers of the Members of the AU- PSC.

The chain of command of operations performed by the African Standby Force is such that the AU Commission Chairperson is to appoint a Special Representative and a Force Commander whose roles and functions with respect to the operations are well outlined. The Force Commander is expected to report to the Special Representative who in turn is required to report to the AU Commission Chairperson and to the AU-PSC periodically or as may be necessary.

The functions and roles of the African Standby Force as enumerated under Article 13(3) of the Protocol include; observing and monitoring missions, intervening in a Member State in grave breaches of peace and security, conflict prevention through deployment, peace-building including post-conflict disarmament and provision of humanitarian assistance. Presently, some of the established African Standby Force contingents are the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force; the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF); the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force; and the North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force.

The SADC Standby Force that was deployed as part of the SADC Prevention Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho on 2 December 2017 was instrumental in restoring peace and stability in Kingdom.

### ***THE AFRICAN PEACE FUND***

The rationale behind the establishment of the African Peace Fund within APSA was to provide a predictable and sustainable financial resource base that could be used to support African Union-led peace missions and operations in the continent (Kuwali, 2018). Article 21 of the PSC Protocol envisages that the Peace Fund is to be comprised of financial appropriations from the AU regular budget, voluntary contributions from Member States, private contributions including from foreign sources as may be prescribed by the AU Commission Chairperson keeping in line with the objective and principles of the Union. The AU

Peace Fund under the APSA framework is overseen by a High Representative appointed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission in line with the AU Assembly decision 605(XXVII) of July 2016.

The preceding discussion under this section of the article postulates that the APSA framework is comprised of various organs and institutions, the overall goal of which is to ensure the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. Against the preceding backdrop, the subsequent sections of the article provide an elaborate analysis of some of the notable operations of the AU within the APSA framework to assess its effectiveness or otherwise. This will be critical in examining and discussing the challenges facing the AU APSA framework and finding out some of the opportunities that can be harnessed by the AU to enhance peace and security within the African region.

### **SELECTED PEACE MISSION OPERATIONS OF THE APSA**

Over the two decades, the AU through the APSA structure and institutions has intervened in situations of breach of peace and security within its member states, (Rafiu, 2014). In this section, the Article discusses some notable peace operations and activities of APSA since its establishment in 2002.

#### ***AFRICAN UNION MISSION FOR SOMALIA (AMISOM)***

The African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) is one of the most remarkable AU interventions. Internal wars, conflicts, and humanitarian crises in Somalia, date back to the collapse of Said Barre's regime in 1991. The regime's collapse adversely destroyed the entire country's governance and administrative structures and capability. The capability vacuum gave room for the emergence of terrorist organizations such as the Al-Shabaab that has up to date not only continued to shape Somalia's independence and its peace and security but also the peace and security in the wider Horn of Africa region (Ligawa, Okoth, and Matanga, 2017).

In response to the crisis in Somalia, the AU through PSC intervened by establishing AMISOM on 19 January 2007 (PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX)). The need for the Mission was also supported by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in its resolution 1744 (2007). The Mission's mandate was to restore peace and security in the region by *inter alia*



neutralizing the capability of the Al-Shabaab operations. Notably, over the years, the mandate of AMISOM continued to mutate to cover supporting dialogue and reconciliation, protection of the Federal institutions, infrastructure, and civilian population, assisting in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, and also providing humanitarian assistance.

The first deployment of troops took place in 2007 with the support of foreign organizations such as the EU and with the support of the UN. In the inception days, AMISOM was mainly composed of staff from Uganda and Burundi following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops. Later, other countries including Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Kenya, and Nigeria formed part of AMISOM<sup>9</sup> (Williams, 2018).

The application of APSA in Somalia through AMISOM contributed greatly towards the degrading of Al-Shabaab as well as to the stabilization and restoration of peace and security in the country. The successes of Mission operations on the ground have been attributed to the autonomy with which the Force Commander Operates particularly with the minimal micro-management from the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa (Freear, and De Coning, 2013). In spite of the success, it is however important to note that AMISOM in its operations suffered from a lack of force multipliers and insufficient modern and specialized security equipment to suppress decisively the insurgents and rebels in the region. Instead, heavy reliance was placed on the UN and EU, amongst other international organizations to offer financial and machinery support to the Mission.

As part of the exit process from Somalia and in order to safeguard the gains by AMISOM, from December 2021, the Mission got transformed into African Union Transition Mission in Somalia<sup>10</sup> (ATMIS). The transformation resulted from a tripartite agreement between the African Union, the United Nations, and the Federal Government of Somalia. ATMIS is going to operate until 2024 and hand over all responsibilities to Somali Security Forces.

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9 Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone were the six countries.

10 The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) become operational on 1 April 2022 and comprises of 18,000 troops, 1000 Police, and 70 Civilians.

## ***AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN (AMIS)***

The other key AU peace and security operation under the APSA framework was the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) related to the Darfur crisis. Leading up to the cessation of South Sudan from Sudan, conflicts between ethnic minority rebels and the Sudanese Government erupted in the Darfur region in 2003. According to the United Nations, more than 300,000 people were killed, thousands injured and more than two million people displaced.

To address the situation, the AU-PSC through (PSC/PR/Comm(X)) established AMIS in May 2004 with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the N'djamena 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Parties to the conflict in Sudan that had been signed early 2004. The Mission had two hundred military personnel mainly from Rwanda. (Mensah, 2006). At the same time, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1564 that sought to reinforce the operations of the AU in Darfur and also imposed certain reducible minimums for the Sudanese government which *inter alia* touched on sanctions on the country's oil industry.<sup>11</sup> Additional troops sourced from Nigeria were also deployed to AMIS alongside significant additional budgetary allocation to quell conflict in the region.

In spite of the additional measures, efforts to reach reconciliatory agreements between the government and the rebel groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) were not fruitful. The AU operations experienced inadequate human capacity and financial resources. This prompted the UNSC to establish the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2005<sup>12</sup> to address the escalating Darfur crisis.

Towards 2007, the UNSC was keen to take over the peacekeeping mission in Sudan from AMIS. When the mandate of AMIS lapsed in 2006, attempts for the UN to take over failed due to opposition by the Sudanese government that sought to extend AMIS operations till mid-2007<sup>13</sup> Later, the UN Security Council took over operations from AMIS

11 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) on Darfur, Sudan, was passed on 18 September 2004, S/RES/1564 (2004).

12 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005) on the establishment of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), was passed on 24 March 2005, S/RES/1590 (2005).

13 The move by the Sudanese Government frustrated the UN Security Council, Resolution 1706(2006) on Reports of the Secretary-General on Sudan, which was passed on 31 August 2006.

in 2007 pursuant to Resolution 1769 which merged AMIS into UN-AMID on the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2007. Through UNAMID, more than 20,000 troops were deployed to intervene in Darfur where they achieved considerable success. Further, following the UNSC Resolution 2148 of 2014, UNAMID's mandate became more streamlined and focused on *inter alia* civilian protection, facilitation of mediation between the government and the rebel groups, and enhanced facilitation of humanitarian assistance.<sup>14</sup>

In December 2020, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 2559 which saw the termination of the mandate of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, UNAMID transitioned into the current United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS).

### ***AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN BURUNDI (AMIB)***

Hot on the heels of the formal inauguration, the AU faced its first peace and security intervention in Burundi (Boshoff, 2004). In the period towards the end of 2002, Burundi was the epicenter of an intensive civil war fueled by the heated political temperatures in the country. The Hutu rebel movement, alongside the National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) under the command of Pierre Nkurunziza sought to compel the Transitional Government to make various concessions including but not limited to the inclusion of the FDD in the government. This saw the eruption of the civil war characterized by humanitarian crises in early 2003 between the national army and CNDD-FDD rebel groups. Even though ceasefire agreements were signed between various rebel groups and the government, the crisis heightened thus necessitating external intervention.

In cross-accusations, the FDD called upon the international community, particularly the AU to intervene in the restoration of peace and security in the region. In the initial stages, AU appointed observers, and later, on 2 April 2003, the AU under its central organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution approved the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Boshoff,

<sup>14</sup> UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2148 (2014) on the review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)], was passed on 3 April 2014.

<sup>15</sup> UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2559 (2020) on the termination of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was passed on 31 December 2020.

2003). The main mandate of the Mission was to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement for an initial period of one year. Other tasks included the facilitation of the activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), as well as the provision of technical assistance for disarmament and demobilization processes. AMIB was initially constituted of troops from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.

One of the key activities undertaken by AMIB was the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) measures (Badmus, 2017). The program was carried out in partnership with the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). The Bank also in December 2004, supported the establishment of the National Commission on Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR) at a cost of US dollars 33 million. AMIB could not complete the implementation of the DDR as its mandate was nonetheless assumed by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) on 1 June 2004 owing to limited capacity and resource constraints.

The deployment of AMIB is credited as having contributed to an environment conducive to the attainment of peace and security in Burundi and the region (Boshoff, Very, and Rautenbach, 2010). AMIB also aided the Joint Ceasefire Commission in fulfilling its mandate of ensuring an agreement is reached between the variously conflicting groups. However, just like the other AU-led missions, AMIB's efficiency was to some extent derailed by a serious lack of critical equipment and inadequate financial capacity.

The preceding three peace missions are some of the many interventions undertaken by the AU in the past<sup>16</sup>. Other notable AU-led support missions and operations were African Union Mission for Support to Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) in 2006; African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to Comoros (MAES) in 2007; African Union Led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA) from 2013 – 2014 before transforming to MINUSMA, Economic Community for Central Africa States (ECCAS) – AU backed Multinational Force in Central African Republic (FOMAC) IN 2014; and the African Union-led International Support Mission in Central African Republic (MISCA) in 2013 before transforming into MINUSCA in September 2014.

Currently, there are other ongoing peace activities by the AU or under

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16 Others interventions by the AU -PSC has been in the Gambia, Guinea and Comoros.

the auspices of Regional Economic Communities (RECs). They include the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and also AU-backed operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the East African Community Forces.

## **CHALLENGES TO AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AU-APSA FRAMEWORK**

### **CHALLENGES**

The implementation of the APSA framework has scored impressive peace and security dividends in the continent. Nevertheless, there is a myriad of challenges apparent in the framework operational process. The challenges revolve around security and governance issues to co-operation problems within and beyond the continental APSA stakeholders. The challenges include:

#### **1. Insufficient internal funding and over-reliance on foreign donors**

One of the striking factors that determine the effective implementation of APSA is funding. Generally, there is insufficient internal funding from the AU Member States and corresponding over-reliance on donor funding for AU peace activities. Notably, only 25% of the total peace operations come from the AU Member States with the rest coming from foreign donors in form of cash and support equipment. Moreover, 2% of the contribution by Member States comes from the “big five” countries namely; South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, and Angola. As such, most of the AU-led peace-keeping missions have heavily relied on foreign funding from the EU and the UN on a select basis and are mostly limited to equipment (Engel, 2018).

Illustratively, the funding of AMISOM and AMIB was mainly from foreign donors and trust funds. AMISOM drew support from the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, the UN Trust Fund for Somali Security Forces, and the European Union. Although the UN has the overall responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it nevertheless resisted funding AMISOM through the window of assessed contributions. Currently, the EU support for AU peace activities accounts for over 30% with a budget of Euro 17.5m for the years 1921-1927.

In the case of AMIB in Burundi, the contingent troops that had been

deployed by the AU in 2003 to monitor the enforcement of the cease-fire agreements heavily depended on funding from the United States of America and the UK to carry out their activities once deployed in the mission area. The significant reliance on foreign donors rendered AMIB unsustainable. Additionally, due to a lack of adequate funding and human resources, the RECs' early warning systems are unable to cover their vast regions and many security issues that require reporting (Debial, 2009).

This over-reliance by the AU on foreign donors in implementing APSA not only triggers questions as to the adequacy of the Union's resource capacity but also invokes delicate political considerations). It erodes the Union's political independence to deal with peace and security maintenance in the African continent (Vines, 2013). Further, besides determining the overall effectiveness of the AU-led peace operations, it also portrays the absence of coherent ownership and efforts by the AU toward implementing the APSA framework.

As a measure to secure a predictable and sustainable financial resource base to implement peace and security agenda, the APSA framework will need to ensure an effective governance regime of the African Peace Fund (APF) that was established under Article 21 of the PSC Protocol.

## **2. Inadequate human resource capacity**

Inadequate human resources capacities both at the AU Commission and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) level have hindered the full and effective implementation of the APSA. To a large extent, within APSA there is allegedly low pay, poor working standards, inadequate necessary infrastructure, lack of requisite skills, and competencies that would be required of persons performing such high-stake jobs. One of the major deficits in the implementation of APSA is that the AU and RECs have not been able to recruit, train and retain adequate skilled personnel who can implement their mandate in the existing peace and security structure<sup>17</sup> (Vines, 2013).

In view of such conditions, the level of retention of skilled personnel within the APSA structure is very low. Moreover, most personnel of the AU and RECs don't prefer working for the organizations as they would get better opportunities in the private sector or even in the gen-

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<sup>17</sup> Alex Vines was in 2013 commenting on the review of ten years of achievements of African peace and security architecture.

eral UN framework. At times also, the human resource is unable to effectively cope with the workload that continues to stream in large volumes amidst cases of breach of peace and security in various regions of the continent. Illustratively, both the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) were subsumed into the UN peace and security operations that were subsequently established to take over from the AU missions. In all the situations, the AU missions suffered a lack of the necessary infrastructure and human resources that were necessary for the implementation of the DDR measures that had been targeted (Boshoff, Very, and Rautenbach, 2010). Generally, inadequate human resources are a problem rooted in the inadequacy of financial resources.

### **3. Lack of strong capacity and cooperation mechanisms of au - psc**

The AU-PSC as the first responder to African crisis situations is not adequately equipped with the right instruments and mechanisms to meet its expectations. This problem cuts across the other interrelated pillars of the Centre for Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF), and the African Peace Fund. For instance, the membership of the Member States to the AU-PSC is based on regional representation and on a rotational basis and not the capacity of each individual member state. As such quite often there are member states of the AU-PSC who do not have the capacity to be represented in the meetings and committees such as the Military Staff Committee. To address the situation, the African states need to take the appointment of their permanent representatives to AU-PSC seriously in order to improve the quality of debate and upscale the implementation of the Council decisions.

### **4. Lack of good governance and low respect for human rights**

Besides the aspects of low capacity and underfunding, the other seemingly persistent factor hampering the effective implementation of the AU-APSA framework is the poor governance and low respect for human rights in most countries in the continent. In many of the AU member states, the human rights guarantees are theoretical and remain to be aspirational within communities (Annan, 2014). In some countries, wanton cases of breach of peace and lack of insecurity under the watch of the AU have been orchestrated by blatant disregard for people's human rights. This has partly been the case of crimes against humanity in some parts of the continent as perpetrators take the law into their own hands.

The disregard for human rights is notwithstanding the fact that most of the AU Member States are and have for a long time been signatories of key international and regional treaties. For instance, the ratification rate of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by African States is very high compared to other regions. This has been alongside other area-specific treaties such as the CEDAW, the ICESCR, the CRPD, and CRC, amongst others. Within the African region, there are human rights treaty instruments including the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter)<sup>18</sup>, the Maputo Protocol, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, whose ratification rates by the AU member states has not attained universality.

The foregoing suffices to imply that the implementation of human rights instruments in the African continent remains a challenge, and the same is to be blamed *inter alia* on impunity that has a bearing on implementing APSA. Further, the above trend would attribute to the “dysfunctional” nature of the key institutions such as the African Commission, and the African Court of Justice, which are tasked to enforce human rights guarantees in the region.

On the governance spectrum, though the African continent tends to portray a considerable emulation of democratic values and principles, generally however, there is a significant measure of poor governance. In many countries, there is a transparency and accountability deficit in governance, low levels of public participation in public affairs, poor electoral management, exclusion and marginalization of the minority, and disregard for the rule of law.

The cumulative effect of the foregoing is that they trigger public resentment and quite often give rise to political instability and conflicts as well as the desire for communities to pursue self-determination of course without due regard to the principles of territorial sovereignty and peaceful settlement of disputes as enshrined in both the UN Charter and the Banjul Charter. Indeed, some of the key threats to peace and security that the AU has had to deal with such as the situations in Somalia and Sudan were triggered by poor governance.

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<sup>18</sup> The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights “Banjul Charter” was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. The Charter is to promote, protect and preserve in the continent of Africa the values associated with human rights.



If this state of affairs is to be reformed, there is definitely a need to improve the state of practice of good governance amongst the AU Member States. Perhaps the enjoyment of their benefits in the AU membership should be predicated on the practice of good governance.

##### **5. Lack of cooperation and information flow within AU**

The AU APSA adversely suffers the effects of impaired internal cooperation among the institutions constituting the peace architecture and also unharmonized communication and connectivity strategy for the collection, sharing, and distribution of information among stakeholders. This is also compounded by a lack of necessary tools for data collection and analysis. In terms of internal cooperation, there is for instance no clear synergy between the Panel of the Wise and other APSA Components. Likewise, there is no elaborate communication strategy for a smooth, secure, and timely flow of critical information from RECs to the AU Situation and between CEWS and Member States. Surprisingly, this problem which has been prevalent since the era of the OAU continues to hinder effective peace and security management in the continent.

To strengthen the relations between CEWs at the AU and early warning systems at RECs, there is a need for a clear collaborative framework. Systems for linking information from RECs to the CEWS at the AU Headquarters are also necessary for the effective management of peace and security issues.

##### ***OPPORTUNITIES FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF APSA***

In spite of the notable operational challenges towards the implementation of APSA, there still exist plausible opportunities to be tapped by the AU to enhance attaining the peace and security agenda within the continent.

To boast cooperation mechanism, there is a need for the AU-PSC to strengthen appropriate consultative, operational, and legal relationships with UNSC, European Union Peace and Security Committee, and AU- RECs, as well as strengthen linkage with the A3 Members<sup>19</sup> of the UNSC to reflect the position of the AU-PSC positions within the RECs and in the UNSC resolutions.

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<sup>19</sup> There are three African Countries that are non-permanent members of the UNSC at any particular time.

The RECs are strongly committed not only to regional economic development but also to the maintenance of peace, security, and stability within their jurisdictional regions<sup>20</sup> (Asgedom, 2019). Moreover, some RECs such as the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the ECOWAS and SADC have more operational frameworks and institutions with more commitment towards the fulfillment of their objectives as would be compared with the AU. They also have in place active security structures based on the Africa Standby Forces, acting alongside other regional brigades such as the East Africa Brigade (EASBRIG).

Additionally, the AU Member States are more participatory within their RECs as compared to those within the AU. Therefore, the AU should take advantage of the wealth in cooperation within the RECs as well as their operational architecture in so far as the maintenance of peace and security is concerned in the continent. In so doing, however, the AU should be alive to the regional incoherence that may pose significant challenges to a smooth realization of APSA's agenda. Thus, the AU should strategically analyze the internal dynamics of the RECs, examine the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities thereof, and integrate the same without eroding their distinctiveness and uniqueness from which they draw their efficiency.

On the issue of support to peace operations and activities, the AU needs to reduce the over-dependence on foreign aid by enhancing the funding of the African Peace Fund through adequate resource mobilization. It should be appreciated that the African continent boasts numerous natural resources, which when efficiently exploited and managed can draw revenues enough to fund the Union's peace and security-keeping agendas. Perhaps each of the AU Member States should commit to making a minimum contribution of its annual revenues towards the African Peace Fund. This arrangement could work effectively if underpinned by the concept of the common but differentiated responsibility, wherein the more able Member States remit more contributions compared to the low economically ranked countries from the continent.

Similarly, and in order to ensure more robust results, the Panel of the Wise needs to be expanded to include mediation support mechanisms.

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20 The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are EAC, IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC, and ECCAS.

Those mechanisms could also comprise developing norms to guide mediation and political processes within given changing conflicts and mediation dynamics. With respect CEWs, it needs to be enhanced with appropriate conflict analysis capacity as well as connecting to peace missions for the development and use of its conflict analysis and early warning products.

## CONCLUSION

The article has illustrated the activities of the AU under the APSA framework. Notably, the APSA framework is comprised of various bodies and institutions undertaking various tasks critical in ensuring the maintenance of peace and security in the African continent region. Since its inception in 2002, and in pursuance of its Constitutive mandates, the AU has been able to substantially deliver on its mandate through leading major peace operations missions as well as other smaller monitoring and electoral support and security operations, both directly or indirectly.

Key missions comprise of inter-alia the African Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007 to December 2021, African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) from 2003 – 2004, African Mission for Support to Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) in 2006, African Led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA) from 2013 - 2014, Multinational Force in Central African Republic (FOMAC), and African Mission in Sudan, Darfur (AMIS) 2004 -2007. Contrasted with its predecessor the OAU, the AU has recorded significant positive strides as manifested in quelling conflicts and restoring peace and security in the region.

However, the successes of the APSA notwithstanding, there are concerns that the AU has failed not only in suppressing threats to peace and security but also in effectively resolving conflicts that continue to bedevil the continent. The undesired trend is blamed on various factors, including a lack of adequate cooperation mechanisms with RECs, gaps in the existing policy and institutional framework coupled with the ineffective implementation of the existing peace and security architecture.

The overdependence by the African Union on foreign aid in the implementation of the APSA signals that the AU is unable to strike “African” solutions towards African peace and security challenges. Further, the realization of the objectives of the AU APSA has been significantly undermined by the low respect for human rights and democratic governance, which factors have been breeding grounds for breaches of peace and stability in the region.

In terms of resources, the APSA, as it is, does not have the adequate human resource capable of effecting its mandate. AU Commission has

fewer staff as would be compared to other organizations such as the EU. Moreover, the lack of full cooperation and information asymmetry within the structure and between the Member States has rendered the enforcement of the existing policy framework difficult. Financially, since its establishment to the present day, the AU APSA framework has heavily relied on external aid and reinforcement from donors and other international organizations. This implies the Union cannot independently and effectively operate in the maintenance of peace and security within the continent.

Moving forward, the article has identified certain opportunities that should be utilized by the AU to enhance the efficiency of the APSA framework. Notably, there is a need for capacity building and mobilization of adequate funds, respect for human rights, and the emulation of democratic governance in the region to stem the root causes of conflicts and other peace-threatening situations for long-term purposes. Moreover, the AU should endeavor to enhance national ownership of APSA, and cooperation with RECs, particularly by taking advantage of their high level of coherence.

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## **REGIONAL TREATIES**

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